MASTER 
NEGA  TIVE 

NO.  91-80193 


MICROFILMED  1991 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES/NEW  YORK 


as  part  of  the 
"Foundations  of  Western  Civilization  Preservation  Project 


Funded  by  the 
NATIONAL  ENDOWMENT  FOR  THE  HUMANITIES 


Reproductions  may  not  be  made  without  permission  from 

Columbia  University  Library 


COPYRIGHT  STATEMENT 

The  copyright  law  of  the  United  States  -  Title  17,  United 
States  Code  -  concerns  the  making  of  photocopies  or  other 
reproductions  of  copyrighted  material... 

Columbia  University  Library  reserves  the  right  to  refuse  to 
accept  a  copy  order  if,  in  its  judgement,  fiilfilhnent  of  the  order 
would  involve  violation  of  the  copyright  law. 


\ 


AUTHOR: 


VEITCH,  JOHN 


TITLE: 


HAMILTON. 


PLACE: 


EDINBURGH 


DA  TE : 


1882 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

BIBUOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARGET 


Master  Negative  # 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


.•»■      \S 


VeiIcK,  John.     1819-M. 
iHamilTon. 


1 


|BVI 

classics    for    Lrf^\%\\    readers.,  W^.Kni^M, 
ed.  v.  6.^ 


411674         (j 


I. 


TECHNICAL  MICROFORM  DATA 


FILM     SIZE;     <^-:x^    noon  REDUCTION    RATIO: 

IMAGE  PLACEMENT:    lA    ^    IB    UB  _ 

DATE     FILMED;  ^/ag/?/ INITIALS___jb,i?=._ 

FILMED  BY:    RESEARCH  PUBLICATIONS.  INC  WOODBRIDGE.  CT 


__.Zi2<_ 


^•>2f 


1^ 


C 


Association  for  Information  and  image  Management 

1100  Wayne  Avenue,  Suite  1100 
Silver  Spring.  Maryland  20910 

301/587-8202 


Centimeter 

12        3        4 


I  I  r 


TTT 


iiH 


6        7        8        9       10 

iiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliii 


T 


Inches 


1 


M^ 


1.0 


LI 


1.25 


J  1  ITT 


11 

iilm 


2.5 

1^    |3-2 

^■i     mil 

■  6.3 

1  ^-^ 

^      14.0 

lA 

*^     u 

■iUU 

2.0 

1.8 

1.4 


1.6 


12       13       14       15   mm 

liiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiilimlmil 


r  I  I     I  i  I 


I 


'^#  J> 


MflNUFPCTURED  TO  RUM  STfiNDflROS 
BY  fiPPLIED  IMAGE,    INC. 


\ » 


■■f%fij 


till 


! 


X>i 


> 


.;*:■•  J 


.om 


'-  '■■  :«»Sii'3^,, 


tnt4e(Ct^afllmSork 


LIBRARY 


i: 


HAMILTON 


B^ 


J0H2^  VEITCH,   LL.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  LOGIC  AND  RHETORIC   IN  THE 
UNIVERSITY   OF  GLASGOW 


WILLIAM    BLACKWOOD    AND    SONS 

EDINBURGH     AND     LONDON 

MDCCCLXXXII 


I 


Y> 


y    ::i 


i  .-.J 


s 


CONTENTS. 


--T 


CD 
00 


iO 


CHAP.  PAGE 

I.    LIFE   AND   WRITINGS,       .  .  .  .1-35 

II.   THE    PROBLEM,    BRANCHES,    AND    METHOD    OF 

PHILOSOPHY,     .....  36-72 

in.   CONSCIOUSNESS  —  ITS     NATURE     AND      CONDI- 
TIONS— MENTAL   LATENCY,       .  .  .        73-102 

IV.  CONSCIOUSNESS — ITS  AUTHORITY  AND  VERACITY 

— THE  ARGUMENT   FROM   COMMON  SENSE,       .      103-119 

V.  CONSCIOUSNESS— ITS  PHiENOMENA — THE  POWERS 

OF   KNOWLEDGE — EXTERNAL   PERCEPTION,      .      120-154 
VT.    PERCEPTION — THE     REPRESENTATIVE    THEORY 
AND  INFERENTIAL   REALISM — HAMILTON  AND 
BROWN,  .....      155-175 

VIL   PERCEPTION  —  NATURAL    REALISM  AND    OBJEC-       . 

TIVE  IDEALISM— HAMILTON   AND    BERKELEY,       176-191 

Vin.    PHENOMENAL  PSYCHOLOGY — GENERAL  POINTS,      192-200 
IX.   CLASSIFICATION   OF  THE  LAWS   OF  KNOWLEDGE 
—  NEGATIVE    AND    POSITIVE    THOUGHT  —  RE- 
LATIVITY, .....     201-222 


70969 


VI 


Contents. 


X.   CLASSIFICATION   OB^  THE  LAWS   OF  KNOWLEDGE 

— HAMILTON    AND    KANT— THE    CONDITIONED 

AND   THE   UNCONDITIONED,       .  .  .      22.1-246 

XL   THE    CONDITIONED    AND    THE    UNCONDITIONED 

— HAMILTON    AND    COUSIN  —  FICHTE,     SCHEL- 

.     247-260 
.     261 -268 


LINO,   HECiEL, 


Xn.    INFERENTIAL    PSYCHOLOGY    OK   ONTOLOGY, 


HAMILTON, 


CHAPTER    I. 


LIFE     AND     WRITINGS. 


The  town  of  Airdrie  is  situated  some  eleven  miles  east 
of  Glasgow,  on  the  highroad  to  Edinburgh.  Within  the 
last  century  or  less  it  has  grown  to  be  a  big  place,  because 
of  digging  for  coal  and  "black-band."  Three  hundred 
years  ago  it  was  ancient  but  unimportant.  The  surround- 
ing fields  had  not  been  made  hideous  by  repulsive  black 
heaps,  and  its  atmosphere  was  unbegrimed  by  foulness  of 
soot  and  smoke.  ]\Ien  saw  and  felt  the  naturalness  of 
the  earth  around  it,  and  the  beauty  of  the  heaven  over  it. 
Very  early  in  the  sixteenth  century,  there  stood  close 
to  this  old  burghal  town  a  tower  of  the  ordinary  Scot- 
tish type.  This  was  the  residence  of  John  Hamilton, 
styled  of  Airdrie.  He  was  the  second  son  of  the  head  of 
a  considerable  family.  Sir  Eobert  Hamilton,  Knight  of 
Preston.  Loyal  to  his  chief  and  the  king,  he  went  forth 
with  them  to  Flodden,  and  there  shared  the  fate  of  "dule" 
P.— VL  A 


HamUtoiu 


along  with  so  many  other  Scottish  lairds.  His  descend- 
ant,—liivin,  third  of  the  line, — fought  on  the  side  (jf 
(^iieen  ^lary.  Another  Gavin,  fifth  of  the  line,  was 
with  hia  hinsman,  the  Duke  of  Hamilton,  at  the  battle 
of  Worcester ;  and  for  the  King  and  Covenant  —  he 
tliinking  tlie  king  believed  in  it  —  involved  seriously 
his  estate  of  Airdrie.  The  spirit  of  the  father  descended 
to  his  elder  son,  Robert,  who  sided  with  the  Covenanters 
against  the  unmixed  brutalities  of  Claverhouse  and  the 
Government.  He  fouglit  imder  his  kinsman.  Sir  Robert 
Hamilton  of  Preston,  at  Both  well  Bridge,  where  he  was 
made  prisoner.  The  second  son,  William,  was,  first,  Pro- 
fessor of  Divinity  in  Edinburgh,  and  then  Principal  of 
the  University, — a  man  of  considerable  note  in  his  time. 
Robert  Hamilton  of  Airdrie  had  a  son,  William,  who 
became  minister  of  Bothwell.  The  eldest  son  of  the 
minister,  Robert,  studied  medicine  in  Glasgow,  became 
M.D.,  and  then  successively  Professor  of  Anatomy,  and 
of  the  Practice  of  ]\Iedicine,  in  the  University.  He  still 
held  the  estate  of  Airdrie, — somewhat  curtailed  from  the 
time  of  the  ancestor  who  fought  at  Worcester,  but  yet  a 
consideral)lc  property.  Smitten  with  the  current  spirit 
of  speculation,  he  lost  the  most  of  it,  and  the  last 
fragment  of  the  ancient  property  was  sold  during  the 
minority  of  his  eldest  son.  Dr  Thomas  Hamilton,  the 
younger  brother  of  this  Dr  Robert  Hamilton,  succeeded 
him  in  the  Chair  of  Anatomy.  He  died  in  1781.  His 
son  was  Dr  AVilliam  Hamilton ;  he  succeeded  his  father 
in  the  same  chair,  and  held  it  from  1781  to  1790.  Dr 
AVilliam  Hamilton  died  in  this  year,  leaving  two  sons. 
The  elder  was  William,  afterwards  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton, Baronet  of  Preston,  a  name  that  will  not  be  for- 


JBirthjplace  and  Family.  3 

gotten  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  The  younger  was 
Thomas,  afterwards  Captain  Thomas  Hamilton,  a  man  of 
marked  literary  power,  who  has  left  in  *  Cyril  Thornton' 
a  graphic  and  caustic  portraiture  of  the  affluence,  the 
unconscious  humour,  and  the  homely  ways  of  Glasgow 
life  in  the  earlier  years  of  the  century.  This  young  lad, 
William  Hamilton,  had  a  constitutional  right,  if  there 
be  anything  in  heredity,  to  a  very  vigorous  and  varied 
activity 

He  was  born  in  a  house  attached  to  the  College  of 
Glasgow, — the  old,  quaint,  dignified  buildings  remind- 
ing one  of  the  style  and  the  grace  of  Holyrood, — situated 
in  the  High  Street  of  the  city,  whose  worn  pathways 
and  picturesque  crow  gables  had  witnessed  many  a  stir- 
ring scene  in  Scottish  story.  The  day  was  the  8th  of 
!March  1788.  He  was  thus  but  two  years  old  on  the 
death  of  his  father.  His  upbringing  devolved  wholly  on 
his  mother  and  her  relatives.  Mrs  Hamilton  had  been 
an  Elizabeth  Stirling.  She  belonged  to  a  family  of 
merchants  in  Glasgow,  who  once  had  been  lairds  of 
Bankeir  and  Lettyr,  and  were  eventually  the  legal  rep- 
resentatives of  Janet  Stirling,  the  heiress  of  Cadder — 
the  oldest  property  of  the  Stirlings.  Now,  alike  from 
their  historical  credit  and  their  actual  position,  they 
occupied  a  high  place  amid  the  somewhat  exclusive 
commercial  aristocracy  of  the  city.  William  Stirling, 
her  father,  was  a  man  of  great  practical  capacity 
and  energy.  He  founded  the  trade  in  Glasgow  of 
cotton  and  linen  printing,  first  at  Dalsholm  on  the 
Kelvin,  and  then  at  Cordale  and  Dalquhurn  on  the 
Leven.  He  was  the  direct  lineal  descendant  of  Robert 
Stirling  of   Lettyr,  who  feU  in  a  feud  in  1537,  and 


4  Jlamiltoiu 

whose  descendants  had  from  about  that  date  been 
merchants  in  Glasgow.  His  wife  was  a  daughter  of 
Andrew  Buchanan  of  Drumpellier.  His  eldest  son, 
Andrew  Stirling  of  Drumpellier,  made  out  in  1818,  be- 
fore the  Lord  Lyon  of  the  time,  his  claim  to  represent 
the  oldest  line  of  the  Stirlings,— that  of  Cadder,  a  family 
of  importance  in  the  time  of  Edward  I.^  ^Irs  Hamil- 
ton was  a  somewhat  stern,  unbending,  yet  withal  kindly 
woman.  Thougli  her  father  had  at  one  time  amassed  a 
fortune,  her  means  were  not  large,  but  she  was  careful ; 
and  in  the  management  of  her  boys,  whose  force  of 
character  needed  guidance  and  control,  she  succeeded 
well.  The  eldest  boy  cherished  through  life  a  passionate 
regard  for  his  mother,  and  mourned  her  death  as  only  a 
true  an  (I  loyal  son  could  do. 

Young  Hamilton  was  sent,  like  other  boys  of  the 
time,  to  the  Grammar  or  Latin  school  of  Glasgow.  He 
afterwards,  in  1800,  entered  the  junior  Latin  and  Greek 
classes  of  the  University,  at  the  age  of  twelve.  He  was 
in  the  following  year  sent  to  a  school  in  England,  at 

1  This  claim,  impugned  in  the  book  of  the  *  Stirlings  of  Keir,'  is 
thoroughly  revindicated  by  the  eminent  antiquary,  John  Rid«lell,  in 
his  'Connuents  on  the  Stirlings  of  Keir,'  1860.  The  story  of  Janet 
Stirling  of  Cadder,  therein  baldly  told,  shows  her  as  one  of  the  worst- 
nseil  heiresses,  even  in  lawless  Scottish  history.  Her  wardship  of 
marriage  was  seized  by  John  Stirling  of  Keir,  and  she  was  forced 
into  a  sort  of  Scotch  marriage  with  his  son  James.  When  through 
this  means  she  had  been  stripped  of  her  ancestral  estate,  the  un- 
manly husband  divorced  her  on  the  ground  of  consanguinity,  which 
he  declared,  falsely,  to  have  been  unknoAvn  to  him  at  the  time  of  the 
marriage.  The  heiress  was  then  handed  over  like  a  chattel,  and 
"  married  "  to  a  fellow  of  the  name  of  Bishop — a  local  writer  and 
''servitor"  to  Keir,  in  which  capacity  Bishop  had  been  his  instru- 
ment for  grasping  the  estate  of  Cadder.  To  complete  the  infamy  of 
Keir,  he  contrived  to  disinherit  the  legitimate  son  of  Janet  Stirling, 
and  deprive  him  of  his  mother's  estate. 


Early  Education. 


5 


Lromley,  under  the  charge  of  a  Br  Dean.  In  1803  he 
went  to  reside  in  summer  with  the  minister  of  Mid- 
calder,  the  Eev.  James  Sommers.  He  again  entered 
the  University  of  Glasgow  in  session  1803-4,  and  passed 
through  the  Arts  curriculum.  The  professors  of  the 
time  were  Richardson  (Humanity),  Young  (Greek), 
Jardine  (Logic),  and  Mylne  (Moral  Philosophy).  Hamil- 
ton was  the  first  student  of  his  year  in  logic  and  in 
moral  philosophy.  He  cherished  tlirough  life  a  great 
regard  for  Professor  Jardine,  who,  though  not  dealing 
much  with  philosophical  questions,  was  yet  a  powerful 
general  educator.  Mylne  taught  a  kind  of  sensation- 
alism, based  chiefly  on  the  -writings  of  CondiUac  and 
De  Tracy.  Hamilton's  first  introduction  to  philosophy 
cannot  thus  be  said  to  have  had  any  determining  influ- 
ence on  the  peculiar  character  of  his  subsequent  opinions. 
His  mother  and  guardians  had  evidently  destined 
him  for  the  profession  of  medicine.  We  find  that, 
along  with  the  arts,  he  took  classes  in  the  medical 
faculty,  particularly  chemistry  and  anatomy.  In 
the  winter  of  1806-7  he  was  in  Edinburgh  pursu- 
ing his  medical  studies,  ^feanwhile,  however,  he  ob- 
tained an  exhibition,  the  Snell,  in  connection  with 
the  University  of  Glasgow,  but  requiring  the  holder 
to  study  at  Oxford.  He  went  there  accordingly  in 
1807.  Hamilton  does  not  appear  to  have  got  much 
from  the  tutors  or  the  studies  of  the  place.  He  formed 
a  line  of  reading  for  himself — embracing  especially  the 
De  Anima,  the  Ethics,  the  Organon,  and  the  Rhetoric 
of  Aristotle.  "When  he  went  up  for  his  final  examina- 
tion in  ^lichaelmas  1810,  he  professed  more  and  higher 
books   than   had    before    been  given   up   for  honours 


6 


Hamilton. 


I 

\ 


in  Literis  Ilumaniorihus.  So  remarkable  was  the  list, 
that  Mr  Gaisford,  then  an  examiner,  and  afterwards 
Professor  of  Greek,  took  and  kept  a  copy  of  it.^  His 
examination  was  regarded  at  the  time  as  one  of  un- 
paralleled distinction.  The  period  at  Oxford  was  evi- 
dently the  turning-point  of  his  career.  He  there  laid 
the  foundations  of  that  marvellous  scholarship,  and  phi- 
losophical and  historical  research,  which  finally  became 
the  absorbing  pursuit  of  his  life.  The  special  direction 
which  his  studies  were  to  take,  was  foreshadowed  in  the 
Oxford  list  of  books. 

After  leaving  Oxford  in  1810,  Hamilton  seems 
to  have  hesitated  about  entering  the  profession  of 
medicine.  He  finally  abandoned  the  idea,  and  began  to 
prepare  for  law.  He  passed  as  advocate  at  the  Scottish 
Bar  in  July  1813.  After  that  he  took  up  his  residence 
with  his  mother  in  Edinburgh.  His  legal  employment 
was  never  great ;  but  it  was  considerable.  He  was  not 
a  ready  speaker,  —  had,  in  fact,  a  certain  nervous 
hesitation  in  his  speech,  which  was  against  his  success 
in  public  appearances.  His  tastes,  too,  were  for  the  re- 
condite departments  of  his  profession,  rather  than  the 
practical  and  money-making.  He  was  well  versed  in 
civil  law,  in  teinds,  and  he  was  strong  in  antiquarian 
and  genealogical  cases.  Some  of  the  legal  papers  which 
he  drew  up  were  considered  remarkably  able.  But  on  the 
whole,  the  famous  library  in  the  hall  down-stairs  had 
greatly  more  attraction  for  him  than  the  pacing  of  the 
Parliament  House. 

The  family  of  Airdrie,  whom  Hamilton  represented,  was, 
as  I  have  said,  descended  from  the  HamUtons  of  Preston. 

*  See  Memoir  of  Sir  W.  Ilamilton,  p.  53. 


Baronetcy.  7 

One  of  these  was  created  a  baronet  of  Nova  Scotia  in 
1673.     After  suffering  exile  in  Holland  for  his  political 
opinions,  Sir  AVilliam  Hamilton  of  Preston  returned  to 
England  in  the  suite  of  the  Prince  of  Orange,  but  died 
suddenlv  at  Exeter  on   the   march   to   London.       His 
brother,    Eobert   Hamilton,  was   commonly   called    Sir 
Robert,  though,  owing  to  his  refusal  to  acknowledge  the 
kincT  as  "  an  uncovenanted  sovereign  of  these  covenanted 
nations,"  he  never  actually  assumed  the  baronetcy.     He 
was  a  notable  man  in  the  struggles  of  the  Covenanters. 
It  was  under  him  that  the  party  defeated  Claverhouse 
at  Drumclog,  and  shortly  afterwards  lost  the  battle  of 
Bothwell  Bridge.      He  died  in  1701.      The  baronetcy 
fell    to   the    Hamiltons    of   Airdrie    as    heirs -male    in 
general,  but  it  was  not  taken  up  by  them.     Hamilton 
set   himself   to   investigate   the  whole   matter,    shortly 
after  being   called  to  the   Bar.      His  relative,   Hubert 
Hamilton  of  Airdrie,  had  died  in  1799,  and  he  was  now 
the  representative  of   that  family.      Assisted  by  John 
Ptiddell,  the  famous  antiquarian  laAvyer,  he  presented  his 
case,  according  to  custom,  to  the  Sheriff  of  Edinburgh 
and  a  jury  in  1816.     He  was  declared  the  heir-male  in 
general  of  John  Hamilton  of  Airdrie, — who  died  before 
1522, — the  second  son  of   Sir  Bobert  Hamilton,   the 
seventh  of  Preston,  and  thus  entitled  to  the  baronetcy. 
Hamilton  was  exactly  the  kind   of   man,    the  pure 
scholar  and  thinker,  for  whom  Scotland  had,  and  has, 
absolutely  no  sort  of  provision.     The  only  chance  for  a 
man  of  this  type,  in  the  lack  of  any  means  for  fostering 
scholarship  or  culture,  is  a  university  chair.     And  this 
chance  is  but  occasional;  it  may  be  got,  or  lost  for  a  gen- 
eration, or  even  a  lifetime.     Hamilton's  friends  accord- 


8 


Hamilton, 


Edinhurgh  Beview 


ingly  in  1820,  when  Dr  Thomas  Brown  died,  urged  liim 
to  become  a  candidate  for  the  Chair  of  Moral  Philosophy 
in  Edinburgh.  He  did  so,  but  lost  it;  John  Wilson 
being  appointed  professor.  The  decision  turned  very 
much  in  those  days  on  politics :  it  lay  with  the 
Town  Council.  Hamilton  was  a  Whig,  W^ilson  a  Tory. 
The  Tories  were  in  the  majority,  and  put  in  their  man. 

Hamilton  after  this  had  no  chance  of  any  appoint- 
ment of  the  least  importance  for  sixteen  years.  In  1821 
the  Faculty  of  Advocates  nominated  him  to  the  Chair 
of  Civil  History  in  the  University,  worth  about  £100 
u-year.  This  sum  was  not  even  regularly  paid,  owing  to 
the  embarrassments  of  the  city.  In  1832  the  Crown 
gave  him  the  office  of  the  Solicitorship  of  Teinds — a 
minor  appointment,  requiring  his  attendance  once  or 
twice  a-week  in  the  Parliament  House.  The  salary  was 
quite  inconsiderable.  This  was  the  only  legal  promotion 
he  received. 

From  1820  onwards  to  1829  there  is  little  to  record, 
l)eyond  the  fact  of  constant  reading  and  application  to 
his  favourite  pursuits.  About  this  period.  Phrenology 
was  attracting  notice  in  Edinburgh,  and  Hamilton  was 
prompted  to  examine  its  pretensions.  He  addressed 
himself  to  the  investigation  of  its  principal  general 
doctrines,  particularly  those  respecting  the  function  of 
the  cerebellum,  and  the  existence  and  extent  of  the 
frontal  sinuses.  His  observations  and  experiments,  con- 
ducted in  a  singularly  careful  and  methodical  manner, 
resulted  in  conclusions  entirely  subversive  of  the  phreno- 
logical allegations  on  the  points  at  issue.  ^ 

Two  years  after  his  mother's  death,  Sir  William 
^  See  Memoir,  pp.  114,  115. 


married  his  cousin,  Janet  IMarshall,  31st  March  1829. 
In  her  he  found  a  helpmate  of  the  most  fitting  and 
truest  sort.  She  had  a  fund  of  wonderful  practical 
power.  She  was  unwearied  in  her  assistance  to  her 
husband  in  his  work,  especially  as  amanuensis.  His 
marriage,  his  comparatively  limited  means,  and  the 
character  of  his  wife,  furnished  him  with  inducements  to 
composition,  which  his  habit  of  absorption  in  study,  and 
an  exaggemted  ideal  of  what  a  piece  of  work  ought  to 
be,  threatened  to  prevent  him  even  from  attempting. 

The  seven  years  from  1829  to  1836  was  the  most 
productive  era  of  his  life.  He  was  now  forty-one ;  he 
had  amassed  stores  of  learning  on  varied  subjects ;  he 
had  quietly  matured  a  power  of  consecutive  thinking 
and  trenchant  dialectic  unequalled  in  his  day.  But  he 
had  -written  little  or  nothing.  Fortunately  a  new  editor 
— Mr  Macvey  Xapier — had  been  appointed  to  the  *  Edin- 
burgh Eeview,'  who  had  some  acquaintance  and  sym- 
pathy with  philosophical  questions.  Encouraged  by  [Mr 
Xapier,  Sir  William  contributed  to  the  *  Eeview '  from 
1829  to  1836  those  essays  on  philosophical  subjects, 
which  riveted  the  attention  of  the  few  men  of  the  time, 
in  this  country  and  abroad,  who  had  any  real  knowledge 
of  philosophy,  and  on  which  his  repute  as  a  thinker 
must,  for  the  most  part,  ultimately  rest.  The  power 
and  mastery  of  detail  shown  in  the  discussion  of  the 
other  subjects  which  he  treated  in  the  same  period, 
iittracted  notice  in  even  a  wider  sphere.  The  nature, 
amount,  and  variety  of  the  work  which  he  did  in  this 
period,  may  be  gathered  from  the  following  summary  of 
his  contributions  to  the  *  Eeview.'  These  were — "  Cous- 
in's Writings,  and  Philosophy  of  the  Unconditioned," 


10 


Hamilton. 


1829;  "Brown's  Writings,  and  Philosophy  of  Percep- 
tion," 1830;  "Epistol*  Obscurorum  Virorum,"  1831; 
"State  of  the  English  Universities,"  1831;  "Oxford," 
1831;  "Eevolutions  of  Medicine,"  1832;  "Johnson's 
Translation  of  Tennemann*s  Manual,"  1832;  "Logic," 
1833  ;  "  Cousin  on  German  Schools,"  1833  ;  "  The  Eight 
of  Dissenters  to  admission  into  the  English  Universi- 
ties," 1834  and  1835;  "The  Patronage  and  Superin- 
tendence of  Universities,"  1834  ;  "The  Deaf  and  Dumb 
—review  of  Dalgarno,"  1835;  "The  Study  of  Mathe- 
matics," 1836;  "The  Conditions  of  Classical  Learning," 
1836.  After  a  lapse  of  three  years,  in  1839  he  made  his 
last  contribution  to  the  *  Eeview,'  in  the  form  of  a  notice 
of  Idealism  and  Arthur  Collier. 

These  contributions  to  the  '  Eeview  *  represented  fairly 
the  different  lines  of  Hamilton's  interest  and  intellec- 
tual activity.  The  exceptions  are  his  study  of  Mod- 
ern Latin  Poetry,  of  Buchanan,  and  Luther  and  the 
Lutheran  writings.  His  essays  on  Oxford  and  English 
University  Eeform  bore  fruit  in  the  Commission  of  1850  ; 
and  at  present  there  is  a  tendency  to  make  changes  in  the 
line  he  indicated  —  viz.,  restoring  the  old  practice  of 
2)ublic  lectures  and  professorial  education.^ 

In  1836  Hamilton  was  appointed  to  the  Chair  of 
Logic  and  Metaphysics  in  the  University  of  Edin- 
burgh. It  was  chiefly  through  the  influence  of 
Cousin,  Brand  is,  and  others  on  the  continent  of  Europe, 
brought  to  bear  on  the  Town  Council  of  Edinburgh, 
that  Hamilton,  by  a  small  majority,  obtained  the 
appointment.  The  men  in  whose  hands  the  appoint- 
ment  lay,   knew   themselves   as  much   of   philosophy, 

1  See  Memoir,  p.  167  et  seq. 


Chair  of  Logic. 


and  the  merits  of  philosophical  candidates,  as  they 
knew  of  the  differential  calculus.  But  they  had  the 
advantage  of  being  tied  to  no  philosophical  sect. 
From  this,  their  ignorance  preserved  them.  The  only 
danger  was,  that  they  might  look  at  a  candidate  from  the 
point  of  view  which  alone  interested  them — the  political 
or  ecclesiastical.  This  was  no  worse,  at  any  rate,  than 
the  prevailing  nepotism  of  the  Glasgow  Senate  of  the 
time.  Hamilton  held  the  Chair  for  twenty  years,  until 
his  death  in  1856. 

It  was  in  1836,  while  composing  his  first  course  of 
lectures,  that  Hamilton  turned  his  attention  to  a  new 
edition  of  Eeid's  Works.  His  labours  on  Eeid  were 
greatly  interrupted ;  the  book  finally  appeared  in  1846. 

In  1844  Hamilton  was  struck  down  by  illness.  It 
was  an  attack  of  paralysis,  hemiplegia  of  the  left  side. 
The  stroke  was  sudden  and  heavy  to  bear.  He  was  yet 
in  his  prime,  and,  up  to  the  day  of  his  seizure,  had  been 
active  and  athletic  beyond  most  men.  The  illness  which 
followed  was  tedious,  and  it  left  him  broken  in  health 
and  vigour.  His  intellect,  however,  was  entire,  active, 
and  acute  as  before,  and  his  wonderful  memory  remained 
unimpaired.  He  himself,  indeed,  considered  that  his 
memory  was  even  better  and  more  relial)le  after  his  ill- 
ness than  before.  This  improvement  he  accounted 
for  by  his  being  liable  to  fewer  outward  abstractions 
than  formerly.  But  there  was  much  physical  weakness, 
which  made  all  bodily  exertion  laborious  and  painful. 
StiU  he  carried  on  his  congenial  work,  brought  out  his 
edition  of  Eeid's  Works,  and  republished,  with  additions, 
his  contributions  to  the  *  Edinburgh  Eeview.'  With  the 
exception  of  the  winter  of  1844-45,  he  appeared  regularly 


12 


Hamilton, 


in  his  class-room,  read  a  portion  of  the  hour's  lecture, 
having  an  assistant  who  read  the  remainder.  The  income 
of  the  Chair  was  not  great ;  barely  £500  a-year.  Out  of 
this,  up  to  1844,  £100  a-year  had  to  be  paid  to  the  for- 
mer occupant.  There  was  no  retiring  allowance.  Had 
there  been  any  provision  of  this  sort,  Sir  AYilliam  would 
doubtless  have  withdrawn  from  the  work  of  the  Chair 
before  his  death.  But  there  is  no  ground  for  the  state- 
ment that  his  state  of  health  in  any  way  lessened  his 
efficiency  in  the  Chair.  His  mode  of  teaching  and  his 
influence  remained  entirely  unimpaired  to  the  close  of 
liis  career.  This  was  due  to  the  heroic  nature  of  tlie 
man,  who,  true  to  his  favourite  motto,  showed,  auiid 
physical  infirmity,  that  in  man  the  greatest  thing  is 
mind. 

After  his  illness,  Hamilton's  friends  on  both  sides  of 
politics,  but  especially  those  on  the  Conservative  side, 
made  an  effort  to  have  his  public  services  and  contribu- 
tions to  philosophy  and  literature  rewarded  by  a  pension. 
This  was  in  1846.  Lord  John  Russell,  the  Minister  of 
the  day,  offered  him  £100  a-year.  This  he  declined,  on 
the  ground  of  its  inadequacy  to  his  services.  The  con- 
duct of  the  ^linister  throughout  this  matter  was  an 
offence  to  the  Whigs,  and  a  subject  of  scorn  on  the  part 
of  the  Conservatives.  An  arrangement  made  by  some 
friends  resulted  in  the  pension  being  bestowed  on  Lady 
Hamilton,  some  three  years  later.  This  sort  of  thing  has 
been  pretty  nearly  always  the  case.  Scientific  discoverers, 
who  can  make  their  work  palpable  to  eye,  ear,  and  touch, 
and  even  intriguing  local  politicians,  who  can  manage 
a  borough  or  county,  are  rewarded ;  but  for  men  of  ab- 
stract thought  there  is  little  appreciation  and  no  provi- 


Lectures. 


13 


sion.  The  kind  of  faculty  which  gets  to  high  places  does 
not  understand  their  work,  and  takes  no  account  of  them. 
Yet  these  men  have  proved  in  the  end  the  most  influen- 
tial forces  in  moulding  society.  But  as  this  action  takes 
time,  and  meanwhile  does  not  influence  votes,  the  men 
themselves  may  live  unassisted,  and,  so  far  as  the  poli- 
tician is  concerned,  die  unregarded. 

The  Lectures  on  Psychology  and  INIetaphysics,  and 
those  on  Logic,  as  we  now  have  them,  were  written 
durinfr  the  nights  of  the  winters  of  1836-37  and  1837-38. 
Nothing  like  them  had  been  known  or  felt  before  in 
Scotland  or  in  a  Scottish  University.  These  Lectures 
were  for  twenty  years  the  most  powerful  factor  in  the 
philosophical  thought  of  Scotland.  But  for  them  the 
knowledge  of  questions,  of  authors,  and  of  technical 
terms  current  abroad,  would  have  been  unknown  to  our 
philosophical  literature ;  even  the  present  state  of  philo- 
sophical discussion,  where  it  is  reactionary  and  adverse, 
would  not  have  been  possible.  At  the  same  time,  we 
ought  to  understand  properly  the  position  of  those 
Lectures  as  an  exposition  of  their  author's  philosophical 
opinions,  and  in  relation  to  his  other  writings.  I  thus 
spoke  on  this  point  in  1869  : — 

"  It  is  perhaps  necessary  here  to  say  a  word  regarding  the 
place  of  the  Lectures  as  an  exposition  of  their  author's  philo- 
sophical doctrines,  and  in  relation  to  his  other  writings. 
What  has  been  already  said  of  the  circumstances  under  which 
tliey  were  composed, and  the  purpose  which  they  were  designed 
to  subserve,  is  sufficient  to  show  their  special  and  exceptional 
character  as  expositions  of  their  author's  opinions.  Tliis  was 
pretty  fully  explained  in  the  Preftice  to  tlie  first  edition  of 
the  Lectures  (p.  ix.  et  seq.)  But  as  a  recent  critic,  who 
professes  *  to  anticipate  the  judgment  of  posterity  on  Sir  W. 


u 


Hamilton, 


Other  Writings. 


U 


Hamilton's  labours,'  has  yet  represented  the  Lectures  as  *  tlie 
fullest  and  only  consecutive  exposition  of  his  philosophy,' 
and  has  very  elaborately  criticised  the  author's  opinions  on 
this  assumption,  it  may  be  proper  again  to  state  the  matter 
at  greater  length.  Though  written  subsequently,  in  point  of 
time,  to  the  articles  in  the  *  Edinburgh  Review '  on  Cousin 
(the  Unconditioned),  on  Perception,  and  on  Logic,  the  Lec- 
tures were  yet  prior  to  nearly  all  the  footnotes  on  Reid,  to 
all  the  Dissertations  supplementary  to  the  same  author,  and 
to  the  development  of  Sir  William's  special  logical  doctrine 
of  a  Quantified  Predicate  with  its  consequences — prior,  in 
fact,  to  all  that  can  fairiy  be  regarded  as  the  published 
authoritative  expositions  of  his  philosophical  doctrines,  ex- 
cepting only  the  articles  in  the  *  Review.'  In  the  Lectures, 
indeed,  we  find  the  subject  of  Perception  treated  with  some- 
what greater  dettiil,  and  certainly  with  more  diffuseness,  than 
in  the  article  on  the  Siime  subject  in  the  *  Review  ; '  but  we 
must  have  recourse  to  the  Dissertations  supplementary  to 
Reid  (Notes  B,  C,  D,  and  D*)  for  the  full  and  final  develop- 
ment of  Sir  William's  own  doctrine  of  Perception,  To  these, 
as  he  himself  tells  us  in  a  footnote  to  the  article  on  Perception, 
republished  in  the  *  Discussions,'  he  gives  references  *  when 
the  points  under  discussion  are  more  fully  or  more  accurately 
treated.'  These  Dissertations  were  published  for  the  first 
time  in  1846,  ten  years  after  the  *  Lectures  on  Metaphysics 
were  written.  Again,  the  doctrine  of  the  limitation  of  human 
knowledge — of  the  Conditioned  and  Unconditioned — is  for- 
mally expounded  only  in  the  article  on  M.  Cousin's  WTitings, 
republished  in  the  'Discussions'  (1852),  and  in  the  new 
matter  contiiined  in  Appendix  L  A  and  B.  In  the  *  Lectures 
on  Metiiphysics '  (L.  xxxviii.,  xxxix.,  xl.)  he  states  the  doc- 
trine with  some  illustrations,  and  seeks  to  show  its  applica- 
tion to  the  principle  of  causidity.  But  this  exposition  is 
slighter  and  looser  in  manner  than  that  in  the  article  on 
Cousin,  and  earlier  in  time  than  the  consideration  of  the 
same  point  in  the  Appendix  to  the  *  Discussions,'  where,  as 
he  siiys,  a  *  more  matured  view  of  the  conditions  of  thought ' 


is  to  be  found  than  that  given  in  the  review  of  Cousin. 
The  Lectures  on  Consciousness  contain,  among  other  matters, 
the  distinctive  doctrine  which  he  developed  under  the  desig- 
nation of  the  Argument  from  Common  Sense  ;  but  here,  too, 
we  must  refer  for  the  latest  and  most  precise  exposition  of 
the  doctrine  to  Note  A  of  the  supplementary  Dissertations  to 
Reid's  Works.  The  '  Lectures  on  Logic '  contain,  of  course, 
the  fullest  exposition  of  his  views  of  the  details  of  that 
science  from  the  Aristotelic  and  Kantian  standpoints.  But 
his  new  and  special  logical  doctrines  (with  the  exception  of 
that  of  Comprehension  in  Concepts,  Judgments,  and  Reason- 
ings) are  only  cursorily  and  incidentally  treated  in  two  lec- 
tures, which  he  occasionally  interposed  in  the  middle  of  the 
course  on  Logic,  and  which  are  to  be  found  in  the  Appendix 
to  the  second  volume  of  the  Logic  Lectures  (p.  255  (c),  first 
edition).  The  latest  and  fullest  development  of  his  special 
logical  theory  is  to  be  found  in  the  *  Discussions,'  second  edi- 
tion. Appendix  II.  A  and  B.  On  many  topics — especially 
the  distinctive  doctrines  in  the  philosophy  of  their  author — 
the  Lectures  on  Metaphysics  and  Logic  can  in  fairness  be 
tiiken  merely  as  the  point  from  which  he  started  in  his  course 
of  philosophical  investigation  ;  and  where  there  may  appear, 
as  there  must  do  in  tlie  career  of  every  man  of  vitality  of 
thought  and  activity  of  research,  any  difference  or  discrepancy 
between  the  earlier  and  the  later  form  of  opinion — as,  for 
example,  in  his  theory  of  association — the  later  view,  espe- 
cially if  it  be  also  that  published  by  himself,  is  that  which 
ouglit,  in  common  fairness,  to  be  attributed  to  the  author, 
and  dealt  with  as  his.  What  renders  this  the  more  impera- 
tive in  the  present  case  is,  that  Sir  William  did  not  find  it 
necessary  or  expedient  to  embody  the  fuller  or  more  advanced 
statement  in  his  series  of  Lectures,  which  were  already  suffi- 
cient to  occupy  the  whole  time  of  each  session,  and  most 
adequately  to  fulfil  the  wants  of  university  instruction.  For 
the  more  elaborate  and  more  advanced  discussions  of  certain 
questions  he  was  content  to  refer  his  students  to  his  published 
writings.     After  their  first  composition,  indeed,  the  Lectures 


16 


Hamilton, 


were  never  substantially  changed  ;  they  received  only  occa- 
sional verbal  alterations.  Though  amply  sufficient  for  the 
purposes  of  class  instruction,  they  were  always  spoken  of  by 
their  author  as  falling  far  short  of  complete  or  adequate 
courses,  whether  of  Metaphysics  or  of  Logic — as  forming,  in 
fact,  only  introductions  to  a  full  and  thorough-going  discus- 
sion of  the  principal  topics  of  those  sciences.  In  the  Lectures 
he  certainly  intnxluces  and  briefly  discusses  a  number  of 
subjects  upon  which  lie  has  not  otherwise  given  anything  t«> 
the  world.  But  these  are  taken  up  always  and  only  with  a 
view  to  class  instruction,  and  do  not  receive  at  his  hands  (as, 
in  the  time  allotted  to  each  course,  they  could  not)  that  pro- 
longed or  deliberate  treatment  which  is  accorded  to  the  sub- 
jects  of  the  *  Discussions '  or  of  the  *  Dissertations  on  Reid,' 
publishiMl  in  his  lifetime.  On  the  more  elementary  and  trite 
parts  of  philosophy  and  logic.  Sir  William,  moreover,  was 
content  to  piece  together  expositions  from  authors  who  had 
clearly  stated  current  or  received  opinions.  This  practice  lie 
carried  to  a  gretiter  extent  than  was  desirable  or  commend- 
able ;  the  only  consideration  that  could  even  temporarily 
excuse  it  being  the  pressure  under  which  the  Lectures  were 
originally  written — for  whicli,  however,  he  had  ample  time. 
sul)se<[uently  to  apply  a  remedy.  Whatever  degree  of  censure 
may  be  awarded  on  this  ground,  it  is  a  matter  of  positive 
unfairness  in  any  critic  who  professes  to  discuss  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  opinions,  to  deal  with  these  Lectures — written 
early,  hastily,  for  a  special  and  temporary  purpose,  never 
revised  for  publication  by  their  author,  not  containing  either 
the  most  authentic  or  the  most  complete  statements  of  his 
peculiar  doctrines — as  of  co-ortlinate  authority  with  his  other 
published  writings  ;  and,  keeping  all  this  out  of  view,  actually 
to  represent  them  as  *  the  fullest  exposition  of  his  philosophy.' 
This  they  are  not,  in  any  true  or  pertinent  sense  of  those 
wortls  ;  they  are  simply  offhand  expositions  of  a  series  of 
pliilosophical  questions,  and  are  in  many  respects  of  styh' 
and  treatment  in  absolute  contrast  to  the  author's  published 
^mtings.    What  a  knight  in  undress  was  to  himself  armed 


MilVs  Use  of  them. 


17 


cap-d'piej  this  Sir  William  is  in  the  loose  robes  of  the  Lec- 
tures compared  with  himself  in  his  usual  formal  and  guarded 
manner.  The  spirit  of  ancient  chivalry  would  have  disdained 
to  draw  the  sword  at  a  vantage,  and  would  have  sought  a  foe 
when  his  armour  was  on :  but  the  modem  philosophical 
knight-errant  is  of  a  different  type ;  he  strikes  his  home- 
thrusts  through  the  loose  robe,  and  withal  loudly  proclaims 
that  his  opponent  was  armed  to  the  teeth. 

"  As  to  the  other  statement,  that  they  are  *  the  only  consecu- 
tive exposition  of  his  philosophy,'  it  is  hardly  better  founded 
than  the  preceding.  Though  the  Lectures,  especially  those 
on  Logic,  show  great  clearness  and  power  of  arrangement 
of  a  certain  number  of  philosophical  topics  for  purposes  of 
academical  instruction,  and  are  thus  *  consecutive,'  they  are 
far  from  being  a  *  consecutive  exposition  of  his  philosophy  ; ' 
for  a  consecutive  development  of  his  distinctive  theories  in 
Metaphysics  and  Logic  he  has  not  anywhere  given,  unfortu- 
nately enough  for  the  interests  of  those  sciences,  but  espe- 
cially for  a  competent  comprehension  of  his  views  by  his 
critics."  ^ 


Mr  Mill  notices  this  criticism  of  his  method  of  dealinsr 
with  Hamilton  in  the  preface  to  the  fourth  edition  of  his 
*  Examination.'  What  he  has  to  say  in  reply  is,  that  the 
Lectures  are  to  be  considered  "  a  fair  representation  of 
his  [Hamilton's]  philosophy."  "  A  complete  representa- 
tion," he  says,  *'  I  never  pretended  they  were ;  a  correct 
representation  I  am  bound  to  think  them ;  for  it  cannot 
be  believed  that  he  would  have  gone  on  delivering  to 
his  pupUs  matter  which  he  judged  to  be  inconsistent 
with  the  subsequent  development  of  his  philosophy." 
This  is  all  Mill  has  got  to  say  in  answer  to  the  charge — 
(1)  that  he  had  represented  the  Lectures  as  "the  fullest 
and  the  only  consecutive  exposition  of  his  philosophy," 

I  Memoir,  pp.  209-213. 
P. — VI.       *    J  B 


18 


Hamilton, 


Avhile  it  was  shown  that  they  did  not  contain  many  of 
his  doctrines  at  all,  and  these  the  latest  and  most  matured. 
Is  "  a  fair  representation  "  equivalent  to  "  the  fullest  and 
the  only  consecutive  exposition  "  1  How  is  a  hook  "  a 
fair  representation  of  a  philosophy"  which  does  not  con- 
tain its  latest  developments?— It  is  all,  moreover,  he  has 
to  say  in  answer  to  the  charge  (2)  that  he  had  actually 
proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  the  earliest  statements  ^ 
of  the  Lectures  were  of  co-ordinate  authority  with  those 
made  at  a  later  period,  and  declared  to  he  "  more  ma- 
tured expositions "  of  the  doctrines;  and  had  criticised 
Hamilton's  opinions  accordingly. 

The  quibhle  about  "  correct  representation "  need  de- 
ceive no  one.  The  Lectures  are  to  be  viewed  as  a  correct 
representation  of  Hamilton's  philosophy,  because,  their 
author  having  delivered  them  to  the  end,  there  could  be 
nothing  in  them  inconsistent  with  the  subsequent  de- 
velopment of  his  philosophy.  But  might  not  Hamilton 
have  advanced  to  new  doctrines,  nay,  doctrines  wliicli 
superseded  earlier  opmions,  without  thinking  it  necessary 
to  embody  these  in  his  courses  of  lectures,  designed,  as 
they  were,  for  purposes  of  comparatively  elementary  in- 
struction 1  Might  he  not,  for  example,  have  advanced 
on  the  doctrines  of  the  Aristotelian  logic,— even  replaced 
some  of  these  by  others,— pomting  out  generally  that  he 
aid  so,  without  there  being  any  possible  supposition  of 
inconsistencies  between  the  earlier  views  of  the  Lectures 
and  the  subsequent  development  of  his  philosophy? 
And  is  this  not  exactly  what  the  evidence  lying  clear 
before  Mill  might  have  taught  him  was  the  fact  ?  In 
this  case,  does  the  quibble  about  "  a  correct  representa- 
tion "  save  the  character  of  the  critic  ?    Are  the  Lectures 


Zast  Illness. 


19 


to  be  regarded  as  "  a  correct  representation  "  of  doctrines 
maintained  by  the  author,  which  they  do  not  contain? 
Onwards  from  1844,  the  course  of  HamUton's  life  was 
a  struggle,— a  noble  struggle  with  physical  infirmity. 
But  Hamilton  did  grand  and  continuous  work  durincr 
that  period  to  the  end  of  his  life.  This  is  shown  in  the 
additions  to  the  *  Discussions,'  and  in  the  edition  of 
lieid's  Works. 

All  through  this  period  of  life,  onwards  to  the  close 
there  is  a  curious  pathetic  interest.     His  eldest  boy  had 
gone  out  to  India  as  a  soldier,  and  the  father  was  keenly 
interested  in  the  career  of  the  son.     This  is  touchingly 
apparent  in  the  letters  sent  from  home  to  India  whtch 
conveyed  the  father's  dictation,  or  his  loving  message 
Once   the  lad,    suddenly  attacked   by   natives   in   the 
mght,  had  risen  and  baffled  them  with  the  keen  blood 
and  courage  of  his  race.      The  news  reached  the  old 
man  at  home,  and  all  the  deep  affection  and  pride  of 
Ills  nature  rose  in  him  and  throbbed  to  tender  emo- 
tion.    Hamilton's  was  a  character  of  such  strength,  that 
whether  it  found  outlet  in  abstract  thought  or  in  feel- 
ing, it  appeared  always  as  if  that  were  its  only,  because 
its  intensest,  form. 

Sir  William  was  for  some  years  before  his  death 
engaged,  at  the  instance  of  the  trustees  of  Miss  Stewart, 
on  a  complete  edition  of  Dugald  Stewart's  works.  Thi^ 
lie  accomplished.  But  the  memoir  of  Stewart  was  stHl 
to  be  written.  To  this  he  had  made  certain  fragmentary 
contributions ;  but  the  hand  was  failing  somewhat.  The 
thought  of  the  work  evidently  pressed  heavily  upon  him. 
He  passed  away  before  the  task  was  required  of  him. 
It  was,  if  I  remember  rightly,  on  Saturday  the  3d  of 


20 


Hamilton, 


May  1856  that  I  called  at  the  house,  16  Great  King 
Street,  to  inquire  for  him.  I  had  learned  that  he  was 
not  so  well  as  ll  had  been  at  the  close  of  the  session 
about  the  middle  of  April,  and  some  days  before  when 
I  had  seen  him.  I  had  had  the  honour  of  assisting  him 
in  the  work  of  the  class  during  the  session,  chiefly  read- 
ing the  greater  portion  of  each  day's  lecture.  I  had 
thus  the  privilege  of  daily  intercourse  with  him  during 
the  last  six  months  of  his  lifetime.  The  deeply  affec- 
tionate, the  true,  inner  nature  of  the  great  strong  man, 
was  revealed  to  me  by  many  a  slight  and  touching 
incident,  too  sacred  to  be  given  to  the  world,  and  prob- 
ably such  as  this  said  world  would  not  care  for.  On 
this  Saturday  I  found  Lady  Hamilton  anxious,  tearful. 
There  was  the  intense  devotion  of  the  eager- hearted 
woman,  mingled  with  a  painful  foreboding.  The  symp- 
toms indicated  congestion  of  the  brain.  On  Monday 
morning,  the  5th,  there  was  the  beginnmg  of  uncon- 
sciousness; and  when  I  went  again  on  Tuesday,  he 
had  passed  away  early  that  morning. 

Hamilton  was  a  man  to  love,  to  fear,  and  to  revere. 
t  thus  wrote  of  him  after  his  death,  and  I  have  nothhig 
to  add  or  change  : — 

«  All  through  life  there  was  a  singleness  of  aim,  a  purity,  de- 
votion, and  unworldliness  of  purpose,  and  a  childlike  freshness 
of  feeling,  which  accompanied,  guided,  and  in  a  great  measure 
constituted  liis  intellectual  greatness.  To  the  vulgar  ambi- 
tions of  the  world  he  was  indifferent  as  a  child  ;  in  his  soul 
he  scorned  the  common  artifices  and  measures  of  compromise 
by  which  they  are  frequently  sought  and  secured.  To  be  a 
master  of  thought  and  learning,  he  had  an  ambition  ;  in  this 
sphere  he  naturally  and  spontaneously  found  the  outlet  for 
his  powers.     But  this  craving,  passionate  as  it  was,  never  did 


As  Teacher  and  Writer. 


21 


Tl 


harm  to  the  moral  nature  of  the  man.  The  increase  of  years, 
the  growth  of  learning  and  fame,  took  nothing  away  frcmi 
the  simplicity  of  his  aim,  his  devotion  to  its  pursuit,  or  his 
freshness  of  heart.  No  sordid  covering  ever  gathered  over 
his  soul  to  restrain  the  warmth,  the  quickness,  the  chival- 
rousness,  the  generosity  of  his  early  emotions  ;  no  hai'<lened 
satisfaction  witli  the  routine  of  the  world  settled  down  on 
a  nature  which  had  looked  so  long  and  so  steadily  at  the 
point  where  definite  human  knowledge  merges  in  faith  : — 

'  Time,  which  matures  the  intellectual  part, 
Had  tinged  the  hairs  with  grey,  but  left  untouched  the  heart.' 

The  elevated  intellectual  sphere  in  wliich  he  lived  carried 
with  it  a  corresponding  elevation  and  purity  of  moral  atmo- 
sphere ;  the  ideals  of  philosophy  had  been  to  him  far  more 
than  the  world  of  the  reiil." 

After  Sir  "William  Hamilton's  death,  a  sum  was  sub- 
scribed for  a  Fellowship  in  connection  with  the  Univer- 
sity of  Edinburgh,  in  honour  of  his  memory.  A  bust  of 
him  was  also  made  by  Brodie,  the  cost  of  Avhich  was 
defrayed  by  subscription.  This  is  now  in  the  Senate 
Hall  of  the  University  of  Edinburgh.  Best  of  all,  per- 
haps, twenty  gentlemen  in  his  native  city  subscribed 
£2000  to  purchase  his  library.  This  is  now  intact, 
— a  gift  to  the  University  of  Glasgow,  in  which  ho 
was  educated,  and  by  which  he  Avas  sent  as  a  Snell 
exhibitioner  to  Oxford. 

Lady  Hamilton  survived  her  husband  for  more  than 
twenty  years,  dying  on  the  24th  December  1877.  This 
year  (1882),  on  the  2d  of  [March,  the  only  daughter, 
Elizabeth,  jiassed  away,  after  showing  that  she  inherited 
in  no  small  measure  her  father's  liigh  aims,  and  much 
of  his  characteristic  poAver. 

Looking   back  on  his  life,  the  career  of   Hamilton 


•a  J 


Hamilton, 


Hume  arul  Reid. 


23 


presents  itself  to  us  in  two  aspects — that  of  a  teacher  of 
philosophy,  and  that  of  a  Avriter  on  jihilosophy.  Of  his 
power  as  a  teacher,  I  shall  here  only  say  that  he  inspiretl 
the  youth  who  listened  to  him  by  the  feeling  of  an 
absolutely  disinterested  love  of  truth ;  of  a  simple  life 
devoted  to  the  walks  of  abstract  thought,  as  if  therein 
was  for  him  the  highest  charm  and  the  most  natural 
sphere  of  life — all  professional,  all  worldly  ambition 
being  utterly  sunk  and  insignificant.  And  to  those  of 
his  students  thus  feeling  him  and  thus  inspired  by  him, 
who  gave  themselves  up  for  a  time  to  his  power,  and 
followed  from  day  to  day  the  clear,  firm-paced,  vigorous, 
and  consecutive  steps  of  his  prelections,  he  became  the 
moulder  of  their  intellectual  life.  During  the  twenty 
years  in  which  he  occupied  the  Chair,  from  1836  to 
1856,  his  influence  as  a  teacher  of  philosophy  was  un- 
equalled in  Britain.  It  is  doubtful  whether  it  had  any 
parallel  in  a  Scottish,  or  a  British,  University  before; 
certainly  it  has  had  none  since. 

But  it  is  chiefly  as  a  writer  and  contributor  to  the 
progress  of  philosophical  thinking  that  I  have  now  to 
do  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  Up  to  his  time,  the  com- 
plexion of  philosophical  thought  in  Scotland  may  be 
said  to  have  been  wholly  native  to  the  soil.  There 
could  be  no  question  as  to  the  originality  of  such 
writers  as  Hume  and  Reid,  to  say  nothing  of  inferior 
names.  Hume  was  negative  and  destructive  of  cher- 
ished beliefs,  but  the  weapon  was  wholly  his  own — 
the  criticism  of  the  principles  of  Locke  and  Berkeley. 
His  tone,  too,  was  that  of  the  pococurante  man  of  the 
century  in  which  he  lived ;  easy,  good-humoured,  some- 
what indifferent,  finding  a  sort  of  certainty  in  the  facts 


I 


of  the  present  world,  but  looking  very  much  on  what 
might  cast  up  afterwards,  as  a  chance  unpredictable  as 
the  throw  of  the  dice,  yet  not  denying  the  possibility 
at  least  of  some  sort  of  evolution  in  the  unknowal)le 
future.  He  was  the  Edinburgh  polite  man  of  letters  all 
over,  with  more  subtlety  than  any  other  man  of  his  day, 
and  probably  less  belief  than  even  the  most  of  the  men 
around  him,  and  that  was  very  little,  in  dignity  of 
character  or  purity  and  elevation  of  motive.  There  was 
a  great  talk  in  this  circle  of  "  the  beauty  of  virtue," 
but  the  admiration  was  much  more  for  the  beauty  than 

the  virtue. 

Thomas  Beid,  on  the  other  hand,  who  followed  Hume 
in  the  order  of  time,  was  more  of  a  typical  Scotchman 
and    Scotch   thinker   than    Hume   or   any   one    before 
liim.      Reid  was  strongly  conservative  of  our  natural 
beliefs.     He  did  not  think  that  "  reason  "  could  give  him 
anything  better.     He  was  not  less  original  in  his  defence 
of  these,  and  in  reply  to  Hume,  than  Hume  had  been 
in  attack.     In  fact,  he  challenged  the  title  of  "  Reason  " 
to  say  anything  of  superior  authority,  unless  it  could,  to 
begin  with,  vindicate  itself  as  better  than  natural  belief 
in  its  ultimate  form.     Reasoning  on  groundless  or  un- 
i:)roved  assumptions  is  not  Reason.     If  Reid's  thought 
was  not  so  subtle  as  that  of  Hume,  it  was  more  robust ; 
and   the   spirit  which  he  carried  into  philosophy  was 
not  one  due  to  the  helles  htfres  society  of  Edinburgh 
of  the  time,  but  had  grown  up  through  the  influence 
and  associations  of  the  Scottish  country  manse  and  the 
traditions  of  the  old  Scottish  Kirk.      His  father  was 
a  clergyman;   his  forefathers  had  been   clergj^men  for 
generations;   and  the  moral  spirit  of  Reid  was,  in  a 


34 


Hamilton. 


delation  to  previous  Fhilosojphers. 


25 


measure,  an  outcome  of  liis  ancestors.  It  was  a  thor- 
oughly earnest  spirit,  deepened  into  reverence  by  a  long 
course  of  solitary  meditation  on  the  ultimate  questions 
regarding  man,  the  world,  and  God,  and  tlie  bearings 
on  these  of  the  current  philosophy.  Eeid  had  not  a 
very  wide  acquaintance  with  the  literature  of  pliilo- 
sophy;  but  he  saw  in  the  issues  of  the  premisses  of 
Locke  and  Berkeley  very  grave  bearings  on  moral  and 
theological  beliefs,  and  those  premisses  it  was  his  func- 
tion to  scrutinise.  The  highest  thought  could  not  be 
left  in  contradictory  results. 

Adam  Fergusson,  the  historian  of  the  Eoman  Ee- 
public,  and  expounder  of  the  stoical  system  of  ethics 
in  Edinburgh,  had  force  and  eloquence  of  style ;  but  * 
he  was  a  moral  pliilosopher  rather  than  an  inquirer 
into  the  theory  of  knowledge.  Dugald  Stewart,  his 
successor,  was  the  one  man  of  learning  of  the  school  of 
Scottish  tliought ;  but  even  his  learning  was  more  of  an 
accomplishment  than  an  inspiring,  originating  element 
in  his  philosophy.  He  kept  very  close  to  the  views  of 
Eeid,  of  which  he  was  a  singularly  clear  and  eloquent 
exponent. 

Dt  Thomas  Brown,  whose  influence  intervened  be- 
tween that  of  Stewart  and  Hamilton,  was  indebted 
largely  to  foreign  sources  for  his  opinions,  but  only  to 
one  school,  the  sensational  of  France.  He  was  in- 
spired by  Condillac  and  De  Tracy.  His  writings  and 
teachings  form  a  sort  of  foreign  episode  in  our  philo- 
sophical literature.  With  certain  positive  relations  to 
Hume,  he  has  no  distinctive  originality,  and  cannot 
be  said  to  have  had  a  permanent  or  continuous  influence 
on  the  thought  of   the  country.     Certain  of  his  more 


especially  sensational  doctrines  have  influenced  the  two 
Mills,  father  and  son,  and  thus  afiected   the   thinkino- 
of  England,  which,  since  the  days  of  Locke,  has  always 
been  under  the  influence  of  impressions  rather  than  ideas. 
In  moral  spirit  Hamilton  was  allied  to  Eeid,  not  to 
Hume,  and  he  followed  in  the  line  of  the  earlier  Scottish 
thought  as  represented  by  Eeid ;  but  he  carried  this  up 
to  far  higher  issues  than  had  before  been  dreamt  of. 
Both  Eeid  and  Stewart  had  properly  returned  to  psy- 
chology— in  a  word,  to   consciousness,   as   they   were 
forced  to  do  by  the  meagre  analysis  on  which  Himie 
had  proceeded.      Hamilton  thoroughly   accepted   their 
method,    that   of    a   scrutiny   of    consciousness   in   its 
fullest  integrity;   but  he  was  clearer  and  more  precise 
in  his  tests  and  criteria.     And  not  satisfied  with  the 
somewhat  partial  and  faltering  applications  of  psycho- 
logical results  to  metaphysical  questions  by  the  earlier 
thinkers,  Hamilton  boldly  grappled  with   the   highest 
questions   of  philosophy   regarding   our   knowledge   of 
being.  Infinite  and  Absolute  Eeality.     Even  the  manner 
and  style  of  dealing  with  the  psychological  and  logical 
questions  took  new  forms  in  his  hands.     He  brought  the 
questions  nearer  to  the  methods  of   the  learned,   and 
to  the  treatment  of  them  in  other  schools.     Even  in 
his  youth  he  had  gone  far  beyond  the  range  of  read- 
ing in  philosophy  then  usual  in  Scotland.      He   had 
studied  the  *Organon'  of  Aristotle,   and  had  acquired 
a  mastery  of   it  at  an  early  age,   rarely  paralleled  at 
the  close  of   the  long  and  laborious  eff'orts  of  a  life- 
tune.     Even  at  Oxford  he  knew  it  better  than  all  the 
tutors.     He  was  familiar  with  the  principal  schoolmen. 
Durandus  and   Biel  he  had   studied  well,   and  with 


26 


Hamilton. 


Edinhurgh  Beview '  Essays. 


27 


a  shrewdness  and  power  of  assimilation  that  stood  him 
in  good  stead,  when  in  later  life  lie  elaborated  his  doc- 
trine   of    Perception.      Descartes    and    the    Cartesian 
school  had  been  matter  of  minute  investigation ;   and 
from  Descartes  he  gathered  the   ultimate  principle  in 
his  theory  of  knowledge— viz.,  the  subversion  of  doubt 
in  the  fact  of  consciousness.     He  had  mastered  German 
at  a  time  when  few  people  in  the  country  knew  any- 
thing about  its  literature  or  philosophy.     He  had  given 
diligent  and  quite  competent  attention  to  the  '  Critique/ 
and  to  the  logical  wiitings  of  Kant.     He  had  traced  the 
course  of  subsequent  German  speculation  through  Fichte, 
Schelling,  and  Hegel,  as  his  unpublished  notanda  especi- 
ally show.     The  influence  of  Kant  both  upon  the  cast  of 
liis  thought  and  his  philosophic  phraseology  is  marked 
enough.     In  point  of  positive  doctrine,  however,  the  two 
men  in  Germany  he  most  nearly  approached  were  Jacobi 
and  G.  E.  Schulze.     His  relation  to  the  absolutism  that 
followed  Kant~was  decidedly  antagonistic  from  the  first; 
but  the  mode  of  thought  which  it  represented,  and  its 
phraseology,  are  seen  in  his  writings.     This  reading  and 
training  in  other  schools  widened  his  conceptions  of  the 
problems  of  philosophy,  and  disclosed  to  him  points  of 
view  and  relations  among  those  problems,  unnoticed  in 
the  homespun  thinking  of  Scotland  that  went  before 
him.     And  when  he  made  his  first  published  contribu- 
tion to  philosophy,  in  the  essay  on  Cousin,  in  the  *  Edin- 
burgh Review*  of  October  1829,  the  first  impression, 
even  among  people  who  professed  some  philosophical 
knowledge,  was  that  of  astonished  bewilderment  rather 
than  admiration,  or  even  appreciation. 

The  essay  on  Cousin  dealt  with  a  question  regarding 


{ 


the  reach  and  limits  of  human  knowledge  which  was 
wholly  new,  in  form  at  least,  to  British  speculation. 
That  on  Perception  (1830)  revealed  an  amount  of  philo- 
sophical learning,  and  put  the  question  on  grounds  not 
less  new  to  our  literature.  It  pointed  out  issues,  more- 
over, which  turned  on  the  question  of  the  ultimate 
authority  of  the  intuitive  consciousness,  which  had 
not  been  previously  seen  to  be  involved.  The  dis- 
cussion on  Logic  (1833)  was  not  less  a  revelation 
to  the  country.  It  put  the  science  on  a  basis  which 
had  not  been  possible  through  any  previous  line  of 
analysis  in  Scotland.  It  brought  to  a  point  the  issue 
between  the  two  schools  of  the  Deductive  and  the  In- 
ductive Logics,  boldly  challenging  for  the  former  an  in- 
dependent sphere  and  proper  laws.  Whether  we  agree 
or  not  with  the  conclusions  of  those  essays,  we  must 
admit  that  any  one  who  differs  from  them  cannot  aiford 
to  pass  by  the  forms  of  the  questions  which  Hamilton 
stated  for  the  first  time  in  our  literature,  or  the  argu- 
ments by  which  his  own  view  is  supported,  without 
virtually  acknowledging  that  he  has  left  principal  posi- 
tions in  philosophy  unassailed,  and  trenchant  reasoning 
unanswered. 

As  the  form  of  the  questions  in  those  discussions 
differed  greatly  from  what  had  gone  before,  so  did  the 
style.  The  thinking  was  exact,  precise,  and  very  subtle ; 
so  was  the  expression.  The  severely  abstract  character 
of  the  thought,  and  the  learning  that  had  brought  treas- 
ures from  other  schools,  found  outlet  in  a  correspondingly 
abstract  style  and  in  technical  terms  which  were  simply 
a  bewilderment  to  the  mere  vernacular  reader.  On 
such  the  power  and  historical  importance  of  the  first 


28 


Ham  ilton. 


Their  Reception. 


29 


essay  at  least  were  greatly  lost.  It  is  thus  that  Jeffrey 
AVTote  of  the  review  of  Cousin,  on  its  publication,  to  the 
editor  of  the  *  Edinburgh  Review  : ' — 

"Cousin,  I  pronounce  beyond  all  doubt  the  mo.st  un- 
readable thing  that  ever  appeared  in  the  *  Review.'  .  .  . 
It  is  ten  times  more  mystical  than  anything  my  frientl 
Carlyle  ever  wrote,  and  not  half  so  agreeably  -wTitten.  It  is 
nothing  to  the  purpose  that  he  does  not  agree  with  the  most 
part  of  the  mysticism,  for  he  affects  to  understand  it  and  to 
explain  it,  and  to  think  it  very  ingenious  and  respectable, 
and  it  is  mere  gibberish."  ^ 

Tliis  is  about  as  fair  a  sj^ecimen  of  the  sutor  ultra 
crepklam  as  could  well  be  given.  But  it  may  be  taken 
as  a  specimen  of  the  level  of  philosophical  knowledge 
which  had  been  reached,  even  by  the  leading  literary 
authority  of  the  time.  The  inherent  force  of  the  dis- 
cussion was  shown  by  the  place  which  it  finally  attained 
in  public  opinion  at  home,  in  face  of  the  degree  of  ignor- 
ance which  it  had  to  overcome.  Sir  James  ^lackiiitosh, 
a  man  whose  reading  and  cast  of  mind  were  of  greater 
l)readth  and  philosophical  culture,  showed  a  better  appre- 
ciation of  the  essay  when  he  said — 

"  I  think  the  review  of  Cousin  has  no  fault  but  that  of  not 
being  in  the  least  degree  adapted  to  Englisli  and  British 
understiindings,  for  wliom  it  should  have  been  meiint.  But 
the  writer  is  a  very  clever  man,  with  whom  I  should  like  to 
liave  a  morning  tete-d-tSte." 

3Iackintosh    here    touched    the    only    fault    of    the 

essay,    but    it    was    obviously    one    which,    though    it 

might  have  been  lessened,  could  not  be  whcdly  removed 

within  the  limits  of  a  Review  article.     We  should  be 

^  Correspcmdence  t^f  the  late  Macvey  yapier,  p.  68. 


I 


thankful  that  Mr  Macvey  Xapier's  penetrating  sense 
put  Jeffrey's  criticism  aside,  and  solicited  the  author  to 
continue  his  contributions  to  the  *  Review.'  Of  course, 
in  Germany  and  France,  where  there  really  was  some 
knowledge  of  the  higher  philosophical  questions,  the 
discussion  was  at  once  appreciated,  and  attracted  the 
notice  of  the  eminent  philosophic  thinkers  of  the  time. 
There  is  indeed  no  parallel  in  our  times  to  the  European 
reputation  which  those  three  Review  articles  gained  in 
the  short  space  of  seven  years,  for  a  man  known  only 
by  their  authorship.  Even  now  we  may  look  back  on 
them  as  containing  in  substance  the  whole  philosophy 
of  Hamilton.  His  labours  on  Reid,  his  Lectures,  and 
the  Discussions  in  their  final  form,  cannot  be  said  essen- 
tially to  go  beyond  the  lines  of  thought  therein  laid 
down.  There  are  naturally  advances,  and  there  are 
modifications;  but  these  years,  from  1829  to  1836,  were 
really  the  productive  years  in  the  growth  of  his  philo- 
sophical thought. 

Well  might  Napier  write  in  1836 — 

« I  confess  that  I  have  a  sort  of  selfish  joy  in  this  splendid 
approbation  of  those  papers,  which  I  have  been  instrumental 
in  drawing  forth  from  you,  and  for  the  doing  of  which  I 
have  been  blamed  by  those  who  should  have  known  better 
what  a  journal  like  the  '  Edinburgh  Review '  owes  to  science 
and  the  world." 

Hamilton,  while  he  lived  and  wrote,  was  confessedly 
the  most  powerful  speculative  thinker  in  Britain.  He 
was  also  the  most  learned,  the  man  best  acquainted  in 
his  time  with  philosophical  opinions,  past  and  present. 
No  one  before  him  had  put  the  questions  of  philo- 
sophy as  they  needed  to  be,  in  face  of  the  historical 


30 


HamUton, 


development  which  they  had  readied.  His  mode  of 
statement  and  discussion,  his  pliraseology,  were  then  all 
utterly  new  to  British  philosophical  literature.  But  at 
the  same  time  there  was  an  imperfectly  realised  convic- 
tion among  reflective  men  that  in  his  hands  the  philo- 
sophical problems  had  taken  new  shapes,  and  had  re- 
ceived new  and  powerful  solutions.  And  the  average 
of  moderately  informed  people,  who  took  an  interest 
in  those  questions,  accepted  his  conclusions  as  almost 
absolute  dicta,  at  least  utterly  "  irredarguable  conclu- 
sions," to  use  an  expression  of  his  own.  The  state  of 
dogmatism  or  acquiescence  thus  superinduced  was  not 
altogether  healthy ;  and  it  was  well  that  one  fonu  of 
intense  action  or  dogmatism  should  lead  to  a  reaction — 
the  reaction  at  least  of  rethinking  his  processes,  and  so 
revivifying  liis  conclusions,  and  possibly  modifying  them. 
As  he  himself  says  : — 

"  If  the  accomplishment  of  philosophy  imply  a  cessation 
of  discussion,  if  the  result  of  speculation  be  a  paralysis  of 
itself,  the  consummation  of  knowledge  is  only  the  condition 
of  intellectual  barbarism."  ^ 

But,  as  a  rule,  reaction  in  philosophy,  when  carried  out 
through  the  mere  passive  receptivity  of  opinions,  is  vio- 
lent and  irrational  And  so  it  has  proved  in  the  case  of 
Ifiimilton.  It  was  unfortunate  in  this  point  of  view, 
that  the  reaction  was  led  principally  by  a  man  who, 
with  a  high  repute  in  other  branches  of  study,  had 
really  no  accurate  or  broad  acquaintance  with  the  ques- 
tions of  intellectual  philosophy,  and  none  whatever  with 
the  development  of  philosophy  from  Kant  to  Hegel  and 


*  Discussions,  p.  40. 


MilVs  CriHcis7)i, 


31 


Cousin,  the  period  with  which  Hamilton  had  especially 
dealt.  It  was  mifortimate,  too,  that  what  may  be  called 
the  speculative  faculty  of  the  critic  was  of  a  cast  which, 
compared  with  that  of  Hamilton,  was  utterly  out  of 
proportion  either  for  understanding  or  criticising.  Com- 
bined with  this  was  the  circumstance  of  a  public  press 
full  of  the  idea  of  the  power  of  this  man  on  other  sub- 
jects,— not  accurately  acquainted  at  the  same  time  with 
the  scope  or  method  of  Hamilton's  speculations, — ready 
to  accept  a  critic's  statement  without  questioning,  how- 
ever ignorant  or  incompetent ;  leady  thus  to  spread  the 
critic's  estimate  over  an  equally  uninquiring  and  ill-read 
public.  Hence  it  came  about,  that,  with  a  few  honour- 
able exceptions,  the  critic's  estimate  was  accepted  as  in- 
telligent, and  his  verdict  as  all  -  prevailing  and  final. 
Happily  for  the  interests  of  truth,  the  tide  has  turned ; 
and  even  the  "  general  reader "  is  beginning  to  discover 
that  the  critic  so  lauded  in  his  hour,  while  making  here 
and  there  his  little  acutenesses,  has.  the  essential  defect 
of  misconceiving  his  author  on  every  essential  point  of 
his  philosophy.  It  seems  impossible  for  ]\Ir  Mill  to  | 
place  himself  in  Hamilton's  sphere  of  vision,  that  of, 
abstract  speculative  thought.  Mr  Mill  may  be  strong  in 
the  region  of  the  axiomata  media,  and  the  bearing  of  such 
l)rinciples  on  pmctice  and  life ;  but  lie  is  certainly  weak 
where  Hamilton  was  strong.  The  proof  of  this  is  to 
be  found  in  the  fact  that  he  has  entirely  misconceived 
the  doctrine  of  the  Unconditioned,  and,  indeed,  of  the 
Ilelativity  of  knowledge  in  general ;  that  he  has  missed 
the  point  of  the  argument  against  Cousin ;  that  he  has 
confused  throughout  the  Infinite  and  the  Indefinite ; 
tliat  he  has    mistaken    the    argument  from   Kegativo 


"     ■  •   '   — [—--^-1 


S3 


Hamilton. 


notion;  that  he  has  misrepresented  the  distinction 
between  Belief  and  Knowledge;  that  he  has  entirely 
misunderstood  the  distinction  between  Immediate  and 
^[ediate  Knowledge.  As  for  Hamilton's  main  logical 
doctrines,  Mill's  examination  is  for  the  most  part  a 
simple  caricature.^ 

There  is  an  intellectual  fairness  and  breadth  of  view- 
characteristic  of  the  trustworthy  critic.  This  weighs  a 
writer's  statements,  tries  to  find  the  meaning  of  his  words, 
to  compare  and  truthfully  conciliate  apparently  conflicting 
expressions  of  them,  with  a  view  to  elicit  the  real  meaning. 
But  of  this  there  is  no  trace  in  ^lill's  work.  One  of 
the  most  constant  practices,  indeed,  of  the  *  Examina- 
tion,' in  dealing  with  Hamilton's  style,  is  to  put  into  his 
terms  some  popular  meaning,  without  at  all  inquiring 
whether  the  writer  he  criticises  has  defined  these  terms  or 
not  in  a  philosophical  sense,  or  whether  he  even  uses 
them  in  a  sense  accepted  in  philosophy.  It  is  thus  easy 
to  treat  statements  as  meaning  what  was  never  contem- 
plated. This  method  of  criticism  is  convenient  and 
cheap,  but  it  is  fruitless  of  anything  but  the  semblance 
of  victory.^ 

1  On  this  point,  see  Hamilton  v.  Mill,  passim,  a  very  able  and  con- 
clusive exposure  of  Mill's  perpetually  recurring  fallacies  on  the  logical 
points. 

2  Of  the  first  and  second  editions  of  the  'Examination,'  this,  said 
by  a  competent  critic,  is  less  than  literally  true  : — 

"  A  reader  who  compares  the  two  editions  together  will  probably 
be  surprised  at  the  number  of  silent  omissions  and  corrections. 
These,  no  doubt,  show  a  laudable  desire  on  the  part  of  the  author  to 
amend  his  work  ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  they  also  show  that  it  was 
originally  written  with  very  insufficient  preparation.  The  majority 
of  the  amendments,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  do  not  much  improve  the 
argument,  though  they  are  evidence  of  the  author's  persevering  deter- 
mination to  find  Sir  W.  Hamilton  wrong  somehow  or  other."— Mr 


f 


Other  Criticmii. 


33 


.1 


if 


I 


As  to  the  constant  parade  of  «  contradictions  "  which 
Mill  makes,  it  may  be  said  once  for  all,  that  Hamilton's 
"  contradictions  "  are,  as  a  rule,  simply  MiU's  confusions. 
There  may  be,  nay,  there  must  often  be,  apparent  contra- 
dictions in  a  phUosophical  system  which  deals  with  the 
highest  questions.  A  thinker  of  a  true  metaphysical 
insight  has  said: — 

"  Some  uncertainty  of  view,  possibly  even  involving  incon- 
sistency,  is  by  no  means  a  defect  in  a  philosopher  in  my  eyes  • 
if  only  It  seems  to  arise  not  from  confused  thought,  but  froni 
a  contmued  nism  in  the  conception  of  truth,  a  stru^crle  a 
feeling  after  it."  ^  ^°   ' 

Mill's  "contradictions,^'  on  the  other  hand,  are  either 
grounded  in  misconception,  or  they  are  the  result  of 
strained  verbal  interpretation. 

One  other  form  of  criticism  of  Hamilton  is  curious 
when  we  consider  his  relations  to  the  history  of  phil- 
osophy, and  his  novel  and  rich  philosophical  learning. 
His  feeling  for  the  past,  and  for  the  thinkers  who  had  ' 
preceded  him  in  the  same  field,  was  very  marked.     This 
led  him  to  his  extraordinary  research  into  the  history  of 
opinions,  which  consumed  so  much  of  the  best  energies 
of  his  life.     Careful  in  tracing  philosophical  opinions  to 
their  source,  he  was  unwearied  in  verification,  in  saga- 
ciously tracking  back  to  first-hand  authority.     He  has 
thus  done  a  measure  of  justice  to  foregoing  thinkers, 
revealed  unknown  treasures  of  thought,  and  shown  in 
many  instances  the  continuity  of  philosophical  opinions. 
This  work  is  wholly  without  a  parallel  in  Britain.     I  do 

Mansel,  in  Cant  P.ninc,  No.  21, 1867,  p.  19.    It  was  over  this  original 
edition  that  the  self-complacent  raised  their  shout  of  triumph. 

1  Exploratio  Pki/osophica,  by  John  Grote,  B.D.,  p.  129. 

P. — VL 


S4 


Hamilton, 


not  think  that  he  has  always  mastered  in  their  full  reach 
and  relations  the  systems  to  which  he  refers.  His  read- 
ing was  probably  too  multifarious  for  this.  When  he 
gave  special  study  to  a  system  he  mastered  it,  as,  for 
example,  that  of  Descartes  and  several  others.  At  the 
same  time  he  would  have  been  the  last  man  to  dream 
of  judging  an  author  or  determining  his  opmions  by  a 
formula  called  historical,  which  is  to  grasp  all  systems 
and  fix  the  place  of  each.  This  is  named,  of  course,  a 
law  of  Reason,  while  Reason  never  knew  it,  and  ex- 
perience disavows  it.  It  is  a  law,  too,  which  can- 
not plead  either  intuitive  consciousness  or  the  test  of 
necessity  in  its  favour,  and  does  not  even  possess 
inherent  consistency.  Yet  this  is  the  kind  of  criticism 
which  we  find  confidently  in  these  days  applied  to 
Hamilton.  Its  recommendation  is  of  course  that  it 
saves  the  trouble  of  mastering  the  system  to  which  it  is 
applied,  for  if  we  know  what  in  the  course  of  philosophy 
a  man  at  a  given  epoch  must  think,  we  are  saved  a  great 
deal  of  reading  of  what  he  did  think  and  say.  Hence 
such  phrases  as  that  his  philosophy  is  that  of  "the 
individual  consciousness,"  "irreflective  common-sense," 
"the  ordinary  understanding,"  &c.  These  and  similar 
expressions,  when  they  have  any  meaning,  show  simply 
that  the  people  using  them  do  not  know  what  are 
the  essential  positions  of  Hamilton's  philosophy.  It 
is  thus  no  wonder  that  we  find  him  actually  classed 
indiscriminately  with  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  ^lill,  and  so 
treated  historically.  Hamilton,  above  all  men,  deserves 
to  be  read,  and  needs  to  be  studied  before  he  is  judged, 
or  rather  caricatured. 

There   was  about    Hamilton   a  sterling,   open-eyed 


Hamilton's  Honesty. 


35 


honesty.     When  he  spoke  of  an  outer  world,  its  reality 
and  vindication,  he  meant  what  he  said.     He  had  no 
subterfuge  of  new  meanings  or  aliases  under  which  he 
sought  to  keep  by  the  terms  while  eviscerating  the  sub- 
stance.    He  meant  to  hold  by  an  Ego  and  a  Kon-Ego  in 
the  literal  meaning  of  those  terms,  distinct,  independent, 
neither   determining,    nor    determined    by,    the    other. 
AVhen  he  spoke  of  personality  and   immortality,   and 
sought  philosophically  to  vindicate  these,  he  did  not 
palter  with  the  convictions  on  which  mankind  act  and 
must  act.     He  meant,  and  he  held  by,  a  true  person- 
ality, whose  reality  was  not  simply  in  some  other  or 
infinite  reality,  but  a  definite  fact  of  human  experience. 
JS'or  would  he  ever  have  thought  of  retaining  the  term 
immortality,  if  all  that  could  be  vindicated  was  only 
a  corporate  immortality;   for  he  would  have  had  the 
acuteness   to  see   that   an   immortality  of  individuals, 
who  in  themselves  have  no  guarantee  of  immortality, 
is  simply  a  contradiction  in  terms.     And  he  certainly 
would  not   have  retained  the  word  God  in  his  phil- 
osophy, if  he  had  believed  God  to  be  a  mere  develop- 
ment from  Pure  Being  or  Pure  iS'othing  up  to  the  Ego 
of  "  Reason,"  which  in  itself  realises  and  constitutes  all 
that  is.     When  he  had  cast  away  the  thing,  he  would 
not,  through  self-illusion,  have  retained  the  name.^ 

1  See  the  emphatic  protest  of  Ueberweg  on  this  voini— History 
vol.  ii.  p.  521.  ' 


36 


CHAPTER    11. 

THE    PROBLEM,    BRANCHES,    AND   METHOD    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

Hamilton  reaches  liis  conception  of  the  problem  of 
Philosophy  through  his  view  of  science  as  regulated  by 
the  principle  of  causality.  In  our  oixlinary  knowledge, 
we  are  aware  of  a  fact,  or  that  something  is.  Science 
asks  the  question,  How  or  why  the  fact  is  1  In  this  it 
is  impelled  and  guided  by  the  need  we  feel  of  thinking 
a  cause  for  each  event  But  the  scientific  step  is  only 
one  in  the  direction  towards  which  the  causal  need 
impels.  Science  is  knowledge — a  form  of  knowledge. 
AVlience  knowledge  in  this  form?  If  we  seek  a  cause 
of  the  fact  of  experience,  we  may,  nay  must,  equally 
ask  for  a  cause  of  our  knowing  the  fact.  Knowledge 
has  its  cause  or  source  in  what  we  call  mind,  and  it  is 
])ossible  only  under  certain  conditions.  Tlie  primary 
problem  of  Plulosophy  is  thus  to  investigate  the  nature 
and  necessary  conditions  of  knowledge, — the  conditions 
of  its  own  pos.sil)ility.  ^Miat  is  knowledge  1  Wliat  are 
the  laws  of  knowledge  1  Such  is  Hamilton's  conception 
of  the  problem  of  philosophy  proper. 

Keeping  this  in  view,  we  can  see  how  the  philosophy 
of  Hamilton  rises  to  its  highest  question— that  of  the 


Problem  of  Philosophy.  37 

nature  of  our  knowledge  of  the  absolutely  first,  or  of 
the   unconditioned.      The   line   of    causality   in   finite 
things  leads  backwards  and  upwards  to  the  problem  of 
an  ultimate  or  primary  cause,  and  we  have  the  points- 
is  this  a  necessity  of  inference?  is  it  an  object  of  know- 
ledge 1  m  what  sense  is  it  an  object  of  faith  ? 
^    Philosophy,  guided  by  the  principle  of  causality,  finds 
Itself  on  the  path  which  leads  from  effects  to  causes 
and  thus  seeks  to  trace  up  "  the  series  of  effects  and 
causes,  untd  we  amve  at  causes  which  are  not  them- 
selves effects."     But  these  first  causes,  or  the  first  cause, 
philosophy  cannot  actually  reach.     Philosophy  thus  re- 
mains for  ever  a  tendency~a  tendency  unaccomplished 
Yet  in  thought  or  theory  it  can  be  viewed  as  completed 
only  when  this  unattainable  goal  is  reached.     Further 
the  higher  we  ascend  in  the  line  of  causes,  the  less  is 
the  complexity-the  nearer  we  are  to  simplicity  and 
"luty.     But  it  is  only  in  imagination  that  we  can  reach 
unity— "that  ultimate  cause,  which  as  ultimate  cannot 
again  be  conceived  as  an  effect" 

Hamilton  may  fairly  be  regarded  as  holding  the  belief 
m  Unity  to  be  a  principle  alongside  of  causality,  thou-h 
speaking  of  them  as  of  the  same  origin.     Following  this 
principle,  and  ascending  from  generalisation  to  generali- 
sation, we  also  tend  to  the  one.      "Tlie  conscious  E-o 
the  conscious  self,  seems  also  constrained  to  require  that 
unity  by  which  it  is  distinguished  in  everything  which  it 
receives,  and  in  everything  wliich  it  produces,  "i     Unity 
is  the  one  great  aim  of  our  intellectual  life.     This  is 
shown  in  perception,  imagination,  generalisation,  jud- 
ment,   and   reasoning.     And    "reason,    intellect   (rovs), 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  III. 


38 


Hamilton, 


concatenating  thoughts  and  objects  into  system,  and 
tending  always  upwards  from  particular  facts  to  general 
laws,  from  general  laws  to  universal  principles,  is  never 
satisfied  in  its  ascent  till  it  comprehend — what,  however, 
it  can  never  do — all  laws  in  a  single  formula,  and  con- 
summate all  conditional  knowledge  in  the  unity  of 
unconditional  existence."^ 

Philosophy  thus  tends  necessarily  not  towards  a 
plurality  of  ultimate  or  first  causes,  but  towards  one 
alone.  This  first  cause  it  can,  however,  never  reach  as 
an  object  either  of  immediate  or  positive  knowledge. 
Eut  as  the  convergence  to  unity  in  the  ascending  series 
of  causes  is  manifest,  ill  so  far  as  our  view  extends, 
analogy  forces  us  to  regard  it  as  continuous  and  com- 
plete. There  is  thus  a  philosophical  belief  in,  though 
not  a  philosophical  knowledge  of,  the  ultimate  or 
primary  unity.  We  have  here  in  brief  both  the  posi- 
tive and  the  negative  aspect  of  his  Metaphysic  of  the 
Absolute. 

The  essential  points  in  Hamilton's  philosophy  at  its 
highest  reach  lie  in  this  outline, — virtually  given  in  the 
opening  metaphysical  lectures.     He  there  warns  ofi"  what 
may  be  called  pure  thought,  reason,  or  speculative  in- 
telligence, regarded  as  a  faculty  ^;er  se,  as  Kant  and 
others  since  his  time  have  viewed  it,  from  the  sphw-e  of 
,  the  first  or  unconditioned  being  or  cause.     At  the  same 
\  time,  he  marks  off  his  doctrine  from  mere  Agnosticism, 
\  — such  as  is  represented  by  ^Ir  Herbert  Spencer,  who 
\  simply  ignores  Hamilton's  broad  view  of  the  problem. 
Spencer's  theory  is  that  the  origin  of  natural  law  and 
\  things  is  absolutely  inexplicable — incognisable.      This 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  IV. 


I 


His  General  Position. 


39 


taken  by  itself  is  pure  and  simple  agnosticism.  Hamil- 
ton holds  that  Deity  as  a  cause  beyond  which  there 
is  no  cause, — a  cause  not  conditioned, — is  inconceiv- 
able by  us,  owing,  however,  simply  to  our  limitation. 
He  holds,  also,  that  the  how  or  mode  of  divine  causality 
is  not  conceivable  by  us.  In  both  cases  the  meaning 
would  be  best  expressed  by  the  term  incomprehensible. 
This  indicates  simply  an  impossibility  on  our  part  of 
rising  beyond  the  fact  to  the  how  of  the  fact.  But  this 
is  not  the  whole  of  Hamilton's  teaching.  He  holds  at 
the  same  time  that  analogically,  or  on  the  ground  of  the 
personal  and  moral  side  of  our  consciousness,  there  is 
good  reason  for  believing  in  a  God  at  once  personal, 
intelligent,  causal,  and  moral  This  is  a  totally  different 
doctrine  from  that  of  a  mere  or  pure  agnosticism.  His 
first  or  negative  doctrine  was  meant  simply  to  banish 
from  the  sphere  of  sound  thought  and  accurate  philo- 
sophy a  theory  of  a  God  founded  on  "pure  thought," 
divorced  from  experience,  or  above  relation,  which  could 
be  nothing  in  its  primary  nature  but  an  unconscious  im- 
personality, or  the  mere  vague  substance  of  all  that 
phainomenally  is. 

As  an  object  of  pure  thought  or  reason,  the  Uncon- 
ditioned in  the  sense  of  an  Absolute  x^er  se,  or  an  Abso- 
lute made  relative  as  a  cause,  so  that,  out  of  time,  to 
begin  with,  this  being  may  yet  be  conceived  as  neces- 
sarily flowing  into  time, — all  this  Hamilton  regards  as 
empty  conception  —  as  transcending  real  or  positive 
thought;  the  latter  view,  indeed,  as  contradictory.  There 
above  time  lies  the  mystery  for  mere  intelligence,  the 
mystery  of  the  absolute  beginning,  and  the  mystery  of 
the  infinite  regress  of  things ;  yet  it  is  not  inexplicable 


40 


Hamilton, 


how  this  is  a  mystery  to  us,— when  we  have  got  a 
profound  analysis  of  what  our  thought  is,  and  how  it 
is  subject  to  time  and  relations.  Hamilton  is  opposed  to 
the  "intellectual  intuition"  of  Schelling,  "the  ideas" 
of  Kant,  "the  pure  being"  of  Hegel :  but  he  is  not  less 
opposed  to  the  dead  negation  or  indifference  of  Comte  or 
Spencer  as  to  problems  of  origin ;  for  he  holds  that  the 
question  of  a  first  cause — of  beginning — must  come  up 
'  in  all  normal  minds  for  answer  and  solution;  that  the 
restriction  of  view  to  mere  natural  phaenomena  is  the 
death  of  healthy  thought  and  feeling — the  quenching 
of  the  necessary  and  legitimate  aspirations  of  philoso- 
phic faith. 

One  can  quite  well  understand  the  hostility,   even 
animosity,  which  a  philosophy  like  that  of  Hamilton's 
has  met  with  from  Positivists,  Pantheists,  and  Hegelians. 
The  first  dislike  it  because  it  raises  the  question  of  a 
Divine  or  first  cause,  defines  the  sphere  within  which  it  is 
cognisable,  and  points  to  the  moral  grounds  which  necessi- 
tate it  by  implication.     This  is  a  trouble  to  Positivism, 
because  it  wishes  to  restrict  itself   to   sequences   and 
coexistences  between  facts,  and  relegate  the  question  of 
Deity  to  the  sphere   of   the  wholly  incognisable  and 
insoluble.     It  feels,  too,  that  its  regress  of  phaenomena, 
neither  capable  of  being  pursued  infinitely  nor  stopping 
absolutely,  is  a  causeless  absurdity,— a  kind  of  niglit- 
mare   under  which  it  sleeps   uncomfortably.      To   tlie 
Pantheist,  again,  Hamilton  is  equally  repugnant.     The 
pantheistic  unity  may  be  either  a  material  substance 
underlying  all,  or  it  may  be  the  so-called  "  idea,"  which 
is  not  yet  either  conscious  or  personal     But  the  pro- 
cess  of  development   of   the   actual  is   alleged   to   be 


y 


I  - 


OpposiTig  Schools.  41 

equally  comprehensible  on  both  schemes.     This  Hamil- 
ton denies,  and  charges  the  process  in  both  cases  with 
inherent   absurdity;    that    the   pantheistic    unity   can 
develop  and  yet  remain  one ;  that  the  impersonal  can 
develop    into    the    personal    in    any  form;    that    the 
Hegelian  "idea"  can,  being  nothing,  become  aught- 
can  become  this,  too,  through  a  dialectic  of  contradiction 
which  saps  intelligibility,  and  yet  professes  to  be  com- 
prehensible.     He   opposes  equally  all   those   schemes. 
He  virtually  says :  This  problem  of  origin  and  develop- 
ment cannot  be  solved  by  any  process  of  pure  thought, 
caU  it  idea,    substance,   unconditioned,    or  knowledge 
of  aught  in  itself,  or  above  experience.     We  have  no 
starting-point  of  this  sort:  for  to  intelligence,  as  a  specu- 
lative question,  the  unconditioned  is  a  mystery  in  any 
form ;  yet  looking  to  experience,— looking  to  conscious- 
ness in  all  its  breadth,  to  the  facts  and  the  implications 
of  the  moral  data,  the  grounds  of  the  moral  life,— there 
is  necessity  for  holding  a  personal  God,  partly  revealed 
to  us  out  of  the  intellectual  mystery.     This  is  repugnant 
to  the  narrow  physicist,  who  makes  knowledge  convert- 
ible with  uniform  sequence  of   phenomena,  and  that 
even  of  a  limited  sort,  the  sensible ;  to  the  absolutist, 
who  thinks  he  has  got  to  the  point  whence  he  may 
know  how  the  synthesis  of  subject  and  object  has  arisen. 
For  him,  of  course,  there  is  no  mystery,  or  there  ought 
to  be  none.     He  finds  in  the  absolute  Ego,  which  sees 
itself  in  everything,  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  the 
universe.     In  this  all  contradictions  are  consciously  re- 
conciled, and  truth  lies  in  their  remarkable  unity. 

The   nature   and   proper  scope   of  the   principle   of 
causality,   the  notions   of    simplicity  and   unity,   and 


f 


42 


Hamilton, 


the  relation  of  the  ultimate  unity  to  our  dual  experi- 
ence, or  the  duality  of  being  in  experience, — these  are 
questions  which  arise  for  discussion  on  Hamilton's 
view  of  the  sphere  and  result  of  philosophy.  But  it 
is  clear  that  the  first  thing  requisite  for  all  those  ques- 
tions is  an  analysis  of  knowledge  itself, — its  facts  and 
its  laws. 

Mind,  then,  is  the  object  of  study  in  philosophy,  and 
the  three  great  questions  regarding  it  are  these  : — 

(1.)  What  are  the  facts  or  phaenomena  to  be  observed 
and  generalised  1  This  we  may  call  the  Phoenomenology 
of  Miiidy  or  Phcenomenal  Pdychology.  It  is  commonly 
called  simply  Psychology. 

(2.)  Wliat  are  the  laws  which  regulate  these  facts,  or 
under  which  they  appear  1  or  what  are  the  necessary 
and  universal  facts — that  is,  laws  by  which  our  faculties 
are  governed,  and  which  afford  criteria  for  judging  or 
explaining  their  procedure  1  The  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion is  found  in  the  department  of  the  Nomology  of 
Mindy  or  Nomologwul  Psychology. 

(3.)  We  may  ask  what  are  the  results  or  inferences 
which  the  fact*  of  mind  or  consciousness  warrant  ?  Or 
what  are  the  real  results,  not  immediately  manifested, 
which  these  facts  or  phtenomena  warrant  us  in  drawing  1 
The  branch  of  philosophy  which  deals  with  this  ques- 
tion is  Ontology  and  Meta2)hysics  Projr)er,  Hamilton 
prefers  to  call  it  Inferential  Psychology. 

There  is  little  difficulty  in  understanding  what  is 
included  under  Psychology.  It  is  simply  the  observa- 
tion, analysis,  generalisation  of  the  mental  phaenomena 
or  manifestations,  with  a  view  to  their  reduction  to  ulti- 
mate faculties  and  capacities.     There  would  be  groups 


Branches  of  Philosophy. 


43 


of  phaenomena,  acts  and  states  of  mind,  referred  to  ulti- 
mate or  primary  powers  and  susceptibilities. 

Under  the  second  head, — that  of  homology, — we 
must  apparently  include  two  sets  of  general  facts  or 
laws, — those  which  may  be  regarded  as  necessary  and 
universal  in  consciousness  or  mind, — such  as  the  laws 
of  the  understanding  or  faculty  of  thought  proper,  the 
primary  laws  of  logic.  But  as  there  will  be  a  nomology 
for  every  specific  mental  faculty  and  capacity, — such  as 
the  feelings  and  desires, — there  will  fall  to  be  included 
under  nomology  not  only  necessary  and  universal  laws, 
but  laws  generalised  from  experience.  For  it  will 
hardly  be  maintained  that  tlie  laws  regulating  the  feel- 
ings or  the  desires  are  anything  but  generalisations  from 
experience.  Hamilton  has  not  expressly  distinguished 
the  generalised  and  the  universal  in  this  connection,  but 
obviously  his  practice  supposes  the  distinction. 

Under  the  third  head, — that  of  Ontology  or  Meta- 
physics Proper, — we  have  what  are  called  inferences  or 
results.  This  points  to  an  essential  distinction  in  the 
doctrine  of  Hamilton.  AYe  may  consider  the  facts  of 
consciousness  exclusively  in  themselves  simply  as  facts. 
But  we  may  also  consider  them  as  furnishing  us  with 
grounds  of  inference  to  something  out  of  themselves.^ 
For  example,  as  effects  they  may  lead  us  to  infer  the 
analogous  character  of  their  unknown  causes;  as  phae- 
nomena, they  may  warrant  us  in  drawing  conclusions 
regarding  the  distinctive  character  of  tliat  unknown 
substance  of  which  they  are  the  manifestations.  Infer- 
ence and  analogy  may  thus  enable  us  to  rise  above  t3ie 
mere  appearances  of  observation  and  experience.     Thus 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  VII. 


41 


Hamilton. 


we  may  infer  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  although  these  are  not  given  us  as  pha-no- 
mena,  or  objects  of  immediate  knowledge.^ 

This  is  obviously  a  very  important  point  As  Hamil- 
ton  holds  that  even  the  Ego  or  self  of  consciousness  is 
not  an  immediate  object  of  knowledge,  but  inferred— 
apparently  directly  from  the  phcenomena;  and  as  he 
holds  a  similar  view  regarding  material  substance,  these, 
the  Ego  and  material  substance,  would  form  two  of  the 
results  or  inferences  of  ontology.  The  identity  and 
immortality  of  the  Ego  would  also  be  reached  somehow 
as  inferences  or  results.  And  lastly,  the  existence  and 
attributes  of  Deity  would  be  an-ived  at  by  the  same 
method.  These— the  Ego,  the  World,  God— would  be 
the  highest  forms  of  being  attainable  by  us.  They 
would  be  the  highest  points  of  ascent  in  metaphysics 
proper  or  the  science  of  being. 

This  division  of  philosophy  was  apparently  that 
originally  in  the  view  of  Hamilton  when  he  commenced 
Ids  course  of  lectures.  But  he  has  not  in  the  arrange- 
ment of  his  lectures,  nor  indeed  anywhere  in  his  philo- 
sophical writings,  adhered  to  it  with  any  constancy  in 
practice.  And  it  would  be  impossible,  perhaps,  without 
doing  some  violence  both  to  the  development  of  his 
thinking  and  to  some  portions  of  his  philosophy  itself, 
to  seek  rigidly  to  force  his  speculations  into  the  order 
of  those  departments.  At  the  same  time,  this  scheme 
affords  a  good  general  arrangement,  under  which  his 
philosophical  opinions  may  be  set;  and  I  shall  endea- 
vour, as  far  as  I  may,  to  keep  this  order  in  view  in  the 
present  summary  of  his  opinions. 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  VII. 


Psychological  Question. 


45 


The  first  question,  then,  is  the  psychological  one, — 
What  is  mind  as  known  to  us  %  What  is  a  mental  fact 
or  phsenomenoni  The  answer  to  this  is,  it  is  a  con- 
sciousness at  least.  A  fact  of  mind  is  as  it  is  known, 
and  it  is  known  only  as  there  is  consciousness  of  it. 
Mind  as  a  mere  potency  is  to  us  nothing. 

The  fundamental  point— the  main  inspiration  of  the 
philosophy  of  Hamilton— is  that  philosophy  is  simply 
an  explicit  or  articulate  development  of  human  con- 
sciousness. ^Consciousness  in  some  form  or  other  affords 
the  possibility  of  experience, — is  the  ground  of  it,  the 
limit  and  measure  of  it.  Human  experience,  whether 
in  the  past  or  the  present,  is  the  expression  for  the 
consciousness  of  this  or  that  individual  in  presence  of 
the  universe  of  fact  and  event.  Ko  form  of  knowledge 
transcends  consciousness — no  acTO  mind  is  realised  by  us 
as  such  without  appearing  as  an  object  of  consciousness.^ 


11 


"  In  all  legitimate  speculation  with  regard  to  the  plia?no- 
mena  of  mind,  it  is  consciousness  which  affords  us  at  once 
(1)  the  capacity  of  knowledge ;  (2)  the  means  of  observation; 

(3)  the  point  from  whence  our  investigation  should  depart ; 

(4)  the  limit  of  our  inquiry;  (5)  the  measure  of  its  validitv; 
and  (6)  the  warrant  of  its  truth."  i 

Hamilton's  method  is  thus  strictly  reflective  and 
analytic.  It  is  in  fact  the  method  of  analysis  of  the 
complete  facts  of  consciousness,  or  mental  experience,  in 
tlie  fullest  sense  of  the  term.  It  is  directed,  in  the  first 
place,  to  the  phienomena  of  consciousness,  as  it  now  exists 
in  its  mature  state,  to  the  various  mental  acts  and  states 
of  which  we  are  conscious,  and  it  proposes  to  reduce 

1  ReicCs  Works,  p.  929. 


46 


Hamilton, 


these  to  their  utmost  simplicity,— to  find,  in  a  word, 
the  ultimate  faculties  and  capacities  of  our  mental  con- 
stitution. Hence  out  of  it  arises  the  threefold  classifica- 
tion of  the  powers  of  Cognition,  Feeling,  Desire  and  Will. 
The  best  illustration  of  the  analytic  method  as  em- 
ployed by  Hamilton  is  perhaps  to  be  found  in  his  sev- 
erance of  the  elements  of  External  Perception,  his  dis- 
tinction of  Sensation  and  Perception,  and  his  final 
analysis  of  what  is  truly  and  primarily  the  object  of 
intuitive  knowledge  in  sensa  His  treatment  of  the 
Laws  of  Association  may  also  be  cited  as  a  good  illustra- 
tion. His  method  as  applied  to  mind  is  philosophical, 
or  if  it  be  preferred,  scientific — scientific  in  the  best 
sense  of  the  woriL 

The  method  is  directed,  in  the  second  place,  to  find 
the  universal  facts  or  laws  under  which  those  powers 
are  exercised,  and  through  which  we  may  be  able  prac- 
tically to  regulate  and  improve  their  exercise.     These 
are  what  Hamilton  pre-eminently  regards  as  facts  of 
consciousness.     Under  this  head  it  will  be  found  that 
Hamilton  proposes  to  analyse  and  distinguish  by  certain 
tests  what  are  primitive  and  elementary  principles  of 
knowledge,  and  what  are  secondary  and  derivative.     He 
is  at  special  pains  to  point  out  that  principles  which  are 
mere  generalisations  from  experience  may  be  mistaken 
for  necessary  and  universal  laws, — that  principles  appar- 
ently intuitive  may  be  really  after  all  only  derivative ; 
in  fact,  one  main  portion  of  his  philosophy  lies  in  the 
attempt  to  reduce  most  of  the  necessary  principles  to  a 
single  universal  fact  in  our  consciousness— namely,  that 
which  he  calls  the  impotency  of  the  mind  to  compass 
the  unconditioned  or  irrelative  in  any  form.     The  phil- 


s 


m 


h 


I 


F(Kts  of  Consciousness. 


47 


osophy  of  Common  Sense  is  especially  directed  to  distin- 
guish what  is  really  ultimate  in  our  consciousness,  and 
what  is  merely  derivative  and  empirical.  Hamilton's 
firet  rule  is,  "  that  no  fact  be  assumed  as  a  fact  of  con- 
sciousness but  what  is  ultimate  and  simple."  ^  m  alleged 
fact  of  consciousness  is  such  if  it  can  be  shown  to\e 
"  a  generalisation  from  experience,"  or  a  composite  pro- 
duct of  elements  given  in  experience,  capable  of  being 
sundered  and  reduced  thus  to  prior  elements. 

"  Whenever  in  our  analysis  of  the  intellectual  phcenomena 
we  arrive  at  an  element  which  we  cannot  reduce  to  a  gener- 
alisation from  experience,  hut  which  lies  at  the  root  of  all 
experience,  and  which  we  cannot  therefore  resolve  into  any 
higher  principle,— this  we  properly  call  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness. Looking  to  such  a  fact  of  consciousness  as  the  last 
result  of  an  analysis,  we  call  it  an  ultimate  principle ;  look- 
ing from  it  as  the  first  constituent  of  all  intellectual  com- 
bination, we  call  it  a  prirnary  principle.  A  fact  of  conscious- 
ness is  thus  a  simple,  and,  as  we  regard  it,  either  an  ultimate 
or  a  primary  datum  of  intelligence."* 

Secondly,  this  ultimate  priority  supposes  necessity. 
It  must  be  impossible  not  to  think  it.  Ey  its  necessity, 
truly  realised,  can  we  recognise  it  as  an  original  datum 
of  intelligence,  and  distinguish  it  from  the  product  of 
generalisation  and  custom. 

Thirdl}^,  the  fact  as  ultimate  is  given  us  with  a  mere 
belief  in  its  reality.  Consciousness  reveals  that  it  is, 
but  not  how  or  why  it  is;  otherwise  this  knowledge 
would  be  prior,  and  we  should  need  to  go  backwards 
until  we  reached  the  truly  ultimate.  ^ 

It  is  thus  that  Hamilton  speaks  of  the  first  principles 
of  knowledge  as  inconceivable;  better  had  he  said  m- 
1  Metaphysics,  L.  XV.  2  j^id.  3  m^ 


48 


Hamilton. 


compi'ehensihle.^    As  the  true  meaning  of  the  conceivable 
and  inconceivable  is  essential  alike  to  the  understanding^ 
of  the  method  and  the  system,  we  must  here  explain  it. 
Hamilton  has  clearly  stated  the  meaning  of  the  con- 
ceivable to  be  that  of  realising  in  the  mind  a  concept 
or  general  idea  say  of  mw,  mountain,  man,  by  embody- 
ing the  common  attributes  of   each  in  an  individual 
image  or  object.     This  is  the  most  usual  form  of  the 
conceivable.      This  always  implies  that  the  attributes 
embodied  in  the  individual  image   are   non-contradic- 
tory.    In  this  lies  the  negative  requisite  of  conceivabil- 
ity.     The  absolutely  inconceivable  arises  when  two  con- 
tradictory attributes  are  sought  to  be  embodied  in  one 
imago  or  object  of  thought;  as,  for  exami)le,  square-circle. 
We  can  put  a  meaning  into  each  of  these  terms, — 
square  and  circle,— vfQ  know  what  we  propose  to  think 
by  square-circle,  but  we  cannot  actually  think  or  con- 
ceive square-circle,  because  the  attributes  are  contradic- 
torily exclusive.     And  of  course  we  cannot  believe  such 
a  thing  to  be,  or  to  be  possible.     As  Hamilton  has  put 
it,  we  know  what  is  sought  to  be  united  here, — that  is, 
"  the  unity  of  relation ; "  but  we  cannot  accomplish  a 
"unity  of  representation." 2 

And  this  shows  at  once  what  Hamilton  means  when 
he  speaks  of  our  being  unable  to  conceive  something, 
or  an  object  as  possible.  As  he  has  himself  expressly 
stated,  by  "possible"  he  means  logically  possible- 
possible  in  thought,  as  in  a  single  image  or  unity  of 
representation.  Here  are  his  words.  Reid  had  said: 
"  A  man  being  able  to  conceive  a  thing  is  no  proof  that 

J  As  he  does  elsewhere.     See  below,  p.  106 
*  See  Reid's  Works,  p.  377,  note. 


The  Conceivable. 


49 


I 


1 


1 


1 
ill 


it  is  possible."     On  this  Hamilton  remarks,  "Xot  cer- 
tainly that  it  is  really  x>ossible,  but  that  it  is  problemati- 
cally  possible — i.e.,  involves  no  contradiction ;  violates 
no  law  of  thought     The  latter  is  that  possibility  alone 
in  question."  ^     This  application  of  the  term  to  conceive 
is  identical  with  the  first,— is,  in  fact,  simply  the  first 
stated  in  a  negative  form.     We  are  unable  to  conceive 
as  possible,  as  in  thought  one,  an  object  with  contradic- 
tory attributes.    All  else  we  can  mentally  represent.    Mill 
raises  this  application  of  the  verb  to  conceive  into  a  second 
sense  of  the  term,  and  actually  supposes  Hamilton  to 
mean  that  the  mind  "  could  not  realise  the  combination 
as  one  which  could  exist  in  nature ; "  ^  in  other  words, 
that  we  cannot  believe  the  conception  to  be  realised, 
because  it  is  opposed  to  our  limited  experience  of  real 
or  physical  law.      Hamilton  has  no  such  meaning  or 
referenca     What  is  possible  in  thought, — that  is  the 
point,  and  the  deeper  point ;  not  what  is  believable  in 
reality,   or  according  to  our  notions   of   physical  law. 
anil's  favourite  illustration  of  the  antipodes  being  for 
long  unbelievable,  because  contrary  to  a  limited  experi- 
ence, has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  matter.     As 
a   concept,  antipodes  is  in  Hamilton's  sense   perfectly 
possible;   as   a  judgment  of  reality,    it  would   be   an 
improbable  hypothesis  to  people  with  a  limited  experi- 
ence.    What  is  or  is  not  believable  at  a  given  time, 
according  to   the   existing  amount  of  experience,  has 
nothing  to  do  with  what  is  or  is  not  conceivable  on  the 
abstract  conditions  of  the  thinkable.^ 

1  Reid's  Works,  p.  379,  note  t.  2  ExamiTiation,  p.  32  (4th  ed.) 

'  See  Mill's  whole  chapter  vi. ,  where  he  parades  his  discovery  of 
the  three  meanings  of  the  conceivable. 

P.— VI.  n 


50 


Hamilton. 


It  is  thus  clear  that,  logically,  any  two  attributes 
which  are  non- contradictory  may  be  mentally  com- 
bined in  one  image.  But  there  may  be  attributes  whicli 
we  know  as  a  matter  of  fact  are  combined  or  coexist, 
while  the  mode  or  manner  of  their  combination  we  can- 
not conceive.  This  Hamilton  teaches.  We  taay  know 
that  two  things  coexist,  and  yet  not  know  how  they  do 
so, — that  is,  be  able  to  conceive  the  manner  of  their  co- 
existence :  in  his  own  words,  to  conceive  the  coexistence 
as  possible.  This  Hamilton  calls  also  the  inconceivable, 
or  incomprehensible.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  he 
applies  inconceivable,  incomprehensible,  to  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  knowledge.  "A  conviction  is  incomprehen- 
sible when  there  is  merely  given  to  us  in  consciousness 
that  its  ohject  is  (on  cort),  and  when  we  are  unable  to 
comprehend,  through  a  higher  notion  or  belief,  why  or 

hoiO  it    is  (StOTt  COTt)."^ 

The  tcht/  or  how  would,  in  this  case,  be  the  reason  or 
ground  of  the  conviction,  as  well  as  the  conception  of 
the  mode  in  which  the  subject  and  predicate  of  the  con- 
viction are  conjoined.  /  am  conscious  of  an  object^  may 
thus  be  a  conviction  or  knowledge,  though  how  1  a.m  so 
conscious  I  cannot  say,  or  even  conceive  ;  how  "  I "  and 
"  conscious  "  are  conjoined, — how  "  I,"  "  conscious,"  and 
"  object  "  are  conjoined  To  be  unable  to  conceive  as 
possible  in  this  sense  is  not  incompitible  with  knowing 
the  fact;  it  is  only  incompatible  with  knowing  the 
ground,  reason,  or  cause  of  the  fact.  Unless  this  point 
is  correctly  apprehended,  the  key  to  Hamilton's  distinc- 
tion of  Knowledge  and  Belief — indeed,  to  the  whole 
of  his  philosophy  of  the  Conditioned — is  lost.     And 

1  ReicTs  WorU,  p.  754. 


The  Incomprehensihle, 


1 


SI 

Mm  13  not  the  only  critic  who  has  groped  and  failed 
here. 

This  meaning  or  application  of  the  term  Conceivable 
readily  connects  itself  with  the  primary  sense  as  given 
by  Hamilton.     We  refer  an  object  to  a  class,~that  is 
we  make  it  one  with  the  class,  through  its  common  attri- 
bute.    We  thus  conceive  it  under  a  general  notion  or 
head.     W^e  brmg  or  subsume  a  particular  proposition 
under  a  more  general,  as  an  instance  of  it.     We  thus 
conceive  or  comprehend  it.     We  infer  a  consequent  or 
conclusion  in  a  reasoning  from  its  antecedent  or  grounds. 
We  thus  comprehend  it  in  its  sequence  or  connection 
But  suppose  we  run  back  our  notion  te  the  most  general 
or  universal  notion  which  we  can  form,— or  our  major 
proposition  in  the  reasoning  to  the  most  general  or  uni- 
versal proposition;  and  suppose,  further,   that  we  are 
thus  face  to  face  with  what  is  universal   or  ultimate 
m   knowledge,— then   Hamilten   would   say  we  have 
reached  the  limit  of  the  conceivable  or  comprehensible  • 
for  now,  though  we  know,  even  apprehend,  the  ultimate' 
notion  or  principle,  it  is  not  capable  of  being  conceived 
as  intelligibly  connected  with  any  notion  or  principle 
beyond  itself.     Let  the  point  at  which  we  arrive  in  this 
regress  be,  lam  conscious,  or  /  am  conscious  of  a  non-ego 
—or  lam  conscious  of  some  ^^em^/,— Hamilton  would  say 
here  we  are  at  the^incomprehensible,-not,  be  it  observed, 
the  mcognisable;  for  while  admitting  this  most  general 
notion,  fact,  or  truth,  I  have  no  means  of  conceiving  or 
comprehending  how  I  am  conscious, -how  I  am  conscious 
of  seH  and  not-self,-how  I  am  conscious  of  something 
being.     These  are  not  cases  of  a  higher  notion ;  they  are 
no  doubt  particular  instances  of  universal  principles  or 


52 


Hamilton. 


the  liighest  notions ;  but  these  are  the  ultimate  principles 
of  all  knowledge  and  intelligibility  themselves. 

And  now  we  see  clearly  enough  why  Hamilton  dis- 
tinguishes between  Knowledge  and  Belief,  or  philosophic 
faith.  It  is  possible  that,  in  the  case  of  a  combination 
of  attributes,  the  mode  of  which  we  cannot  conceive,  we 
may  yet  believe  that  there  is  an  explanation  of  the  com- 
bination. We  may  even  believe  this  at  the  ultimate 
point  in  the  regress  of  knowledge.  How  I  am,  or  come 
to  be,  a  conscious  being,  I  cannot,  with  only  my  own 
consciousness,  conceive,  but  may  suppose  it  explicable 
if  another  consciousness  were,  out  of  which  mine  arose. 
Or  how,  for  example,  there  may  be  in  one  being  the 
union  of  Personality  and  Infinity, — this  I  may  not  be 
able  to  conceive,  and  yet  I  may  be  at  liberty  to  believe 
that  someliow,  unknown  to  me,  such  a  combination  is 
possible,  even  in  fact.  This  is  not  impossible  in  reality, 
unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  attributes  to  be  com- 
bined are  tnily  contradictory ;  and  this  we  cannot  abso- 
lutely show  in  any  case  Avhere  the  mode  of  combination 
alone  is  not  explicable.  The  beginning  of  existence, — 
the  first  step  in  the  being  of  the  world  and  its  laws, — 
may  not  be  conceivable  by  me,  yet  I  may  be  at  perfect 
liberty  to  believe  that  a  beginning  of  things  and  laws 
somehow  there  was.  Nothing  can  bar  my  belief  in 
such  a  beginning'  except  the  proof  that  beginning  and 
^senomenal  feeing  are  absolutely  contradictory.  This 
is  a  point  which  no  one,  on  any  principle  of  philo- 
sophy, could  possil)ly  establisli.  Belief,  therefore, 
Hamilton  says,  and  says  truly,  is  wider  than  know- 
ledge ;  and  knowledge  pushed  back,  even  in  weari- 
ness, to  its  ultimate  ground,  means,  suggests  possibili- 


Knowledge  and  Belief,  53 

ties  in  which  we  may  believe,  and  which  yet  we  do 
not  know. 

And  is  tliere  not  an  analogy  to  this  in  the  advance 
of  Science  %     l\Tien  Science  gets  to  a  general  law  or  an 
explanation  of  a  fact— immediately  higher  than  the  fact 
—this  -fact  is  comprehended.     The  glass  cracks  under 
hot  water,  and  this  remains  incomprehensible  until  it 
is  found  that  bodies  expand  under  heat.    This,  of  course, 
is  relatively  incomprehensible;  it  is  so  until  it  is  ex- 
plained.     But  go  back  t^  tlie  law  of  gravity,  or  the 
mutual  attraction  of  the  particles  of  bodies :  this  is,  in 
tlie  present  state  of  scientific  knowledge,  inexplicable',— 
incomprehensible.    We  do  not  know  how  it  is  that  bodies 
are  thus  mutuaUy  attracted.    We  may  some  day  come  to 
know  this.    But  meanwhile  we  have  but  the  general  fact 
of  the  attraction,  and  the  ground  or  mode  of  it  is  entirely 
inconceivable.     In  Hamilton's  view  there  is  at  least  a 
partially  paraUel  case  in  certain  of  the  first  principles  of 
knowledge.     We  know  them,  —  cannot  know  without 
them,— but  how  they  are  and  are  so  known  to  us  we 
do  not  know. 

In  the  case  of  physical  law,— even  what  now  appears 
to  us  the  ultimate,— there  is  always  a  possibihty  of  our 
surmounting  our  actual  ignorance.  There  is  no  inher- 
ent or  essential  impossibility  in  getting  to  a  higher  know- 
ledge, in  the  light  of  which  physical  laws,  now  ultimate 
to  us,  may  stand  as  to  mode  clearly  revealed.  But  what 
Hamilton  maintains  is,  that  there  are  ultimate  principles 
in  knowledge  which  we  accept,  and  must  accept,  although 
we  are  wholly  unable  to  reduce  them  to  higher  grounds, 
—to  bring  them  under  wider  notions  or  more  general 
principles.      Of  course  what  Hamilton  here  contends 


54 


Hamiltmi. 


for  is  not  a  temporary  but  an  essential  incomprehensi- 
bility in  the  nature  of  knowledge.  And  this  cannot  be 
relevantly  met  by  talk  about  inevitable  states  of  mind 
regarding  antipodes,  ghosts,  darkness,  or  precipices.  The 
principle  denied  to  be  incomprehensible  must  be  shown 
to  be  capable  of  reduction  to  a  principle  beyond,  or  wider 
than,  itself.  In  the  proof  of  this,  the  principle  itself 
must  not  be  assumed.  In  the  proof  which  assails  the 
ultimacy  of  the  principle,  no  principles  ought  to  be  as- 
sumed which  are  not  vindicable  on  grounds  of  ultimacy 
as  first  principles.  Of  all  this  Mill  cannot  be  said  to 
have  even  a  glimpse ;  and  in  his  attempted  reduction 
of  the  antithesis  of  the  Ego  and  non-Ego  to  a  neutnnn 
lower  than  or  beyond  both,  he  has  violated  every  law 
of  legitimate  argument.  He  has  assumed  general  prin- 
ciples as  ultimate,  without  attempting  to  give  a  guarantee ; 
and  on  the  strength  of  these  he  has  sought  to  show  that 
a  principle  deeper  than  any  of  them — even  one  supposed 
in  each — is  derivative  from  them.  It  is  almost  super- 
fluous to  suggest  that,  had  he  been  successful  in  show- 
ing that  the  antithesis  of  Ego  and  non-Ego  is  derivative, 
the  whole  problems  of  the  reality  and  the  guarantee  of 
first  principles  remain  exactly  as  they  were, — in  his  case 
slurred,  and  misapprehended. 

The  criticism  usually  directed  against  Hamilton  on 
the  point  as  to  the  contradiction  involved  in  saying  that 
the  Infinite  or  Inconditionate,  as  absolute  or  infinite,  is 
inconceivable,  and  yet  that  we  may,  nay,  must  believe 
in  it, — in  one  or  other  of  its  forms, — proceeds  on  the 
misconception  now  pointed  out  There  is  nothing  in- 
consistent in  such  a  statement  We  know  perfectly 
Trhat  we  mean  when  we  use  the  terms  infinity  and  timej 


I 


1 


Criticism  of  Mdliod,  55 

or  an  absolute  commencement  of  time,  just  as  we  know 
what  we  mean  by  two  straight  lines  and  by  enclosing  a 
space.  But  what  we  feel  it  impossible  to  do  in  im^i- 
nation  or  in  thought,  in  any  form,  is  to  conceive  infini'ty 
and  time,  or  an  absolute  beginning  of  time,  in  one  image' 
or  in  one  concept  Yet  we  may  believe  that  'this  com- 
bination of  infinity  and  time  is  possible  in  reality.  There 
may  even  be  reasons  which  lead  us  to  suppose  that  it  is 
so,  and  that  an  absolute  beginning  of  time  is  not  really 
true.  These  reasons  would  lead  to  the  positive  belief  in 
one  of  the  alternatives,  though  this  would  never  enable 
us  actually  to  conceive  how  infinity  iind  time  are  com- 
bined in  one  object  of  knowledge. 

Hamilton's  method,  though  thus  obviously  of  the  most 
analytic  type,  has  been  described  as  quite  the  reverse, 
and  named  « introspective."    The  suggestion  here  is  that 
Hamilton's  method,  as  "  introspective,"  simply  looks  at 
the  facts,  real  or  supposed,  of  consciousness,  as  we  now 
find  it  in  its  matured  state,  and  does  nothing  in  the  way 
of  attempting  to  answer  the  question  as  to  how  the  pres- 
ent forms  and  laws  of  consciousness,— how  its  present 
contents,   in  a  word,— have  growTi  up.      Hamilton  is 
accused,  moreover,  of  accepting  as  intuitive  or  original 
any  fact  or  principle  of  consciousness,  because,  "  in  his 
opinion,  he  himself,   and  those  who  agree  with   him, 
cannot  get  rid  of  the  belief  in  it"     «  A  belief"  is  held^ 
it  is  said,  "to  be  part  of  our  primitive  consciousness,-^ 
an  original  intuition  of  the  mind,— because  of  the  ne- 
cessity of  our  thinking  it" 

According  to  Mill,  the  fact  of  a  principle  or  a  belief 
being  necessary  in  our  present  state  of  consciousness,  is 
no  proof  that  it  is  an  original  or  primary  principle.     It 


56 


Hamilton, 


may  have  grown  up  to  this  state  of  necessity.  It  may 
not  have  been  originally  a  necessity  of  knowledge  or 
belief;  its  necessity  may,  in  a  word,  be  accounted  for 
by  the  influence  of  association, — inseparable  association. 
It  may  be  questioned,  indeed,  according  to  Mill,  whether 
there  are  "  any  natural  inconceivabilities."  To  appeal 
to  present  consciousness  is  of  no  use. 

"  We  have  no  means  of  interrogating  consciousness  in  the 
only  circumstances  in  which  it  is  possible  for  it  to  give  a 
trustworthy  answer.  Could  we  try  the  experiment  of  the 
first  consciousness  in  any  infant, — its  first  reception  of  the 
impressions  which  we  call  external, — whatever  was  present 
in  that  first  consciousness  would  be  the  genuine  testimony  of 
consciousness.  .  .  .  The  proof  that  any  of  the  alleged  uni- 
versal beliefs  or  principles  of  Common  Sense  are  affirmations 
of  consciousness,  supposes  two  things, — that  the  beliefs  exist, 
and  that  they  cannot  possibly  have  been  acquired."  ^ 

Mill,  further,  emphatically  approves  Locke's  method 
of  seeking  "  the  origin  of  our  ideas,"  before  going  to  our 
present  consciousness  to  ascertain  what  and  how  many 
those  ideas  are, — in  a  word,  seeking  an  explanation  of 
the  contents  of  consciousness,  before  ascertaining  by 
observation  of  them  what  characters  they  actually  pre- 
sent. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  to  any  intelligent 
and  candid  student  of  Hamilton's  writing,  that  this  de- 
scription of  his  method  as  introspective  has  no  founda- 
tion in  fact  His  method  is  as  much  "  psychological " 
or  analytic  as  that  of  Mill  himself  is,  or  any  follower  of 
the  Associational  Psychology.  The  only  difference  is, 
that  Hamilton's  use  of  the  method  is  more  philosophically 
and  scientifically  regulated  than  ^Mill's.     The  question  is 

1  Exam.f  chap.  ix.  p.  178. 


' 


li 


Criticism  of  MetJiod. 


67 


not  as  to  method,  but  as  to  the  extent  or  degree  to  which 
analysis  can  go,  the  assumptions  which  it  must  make,  and 
the  guarantee  of  those  assumptions. 

In  Psychology,  or  Phsenomenal  Psychology,  Hamilton 
analyses  our  ordinary  consciousness  and  beliefs  rigidly 
and  thoroughly,  and  seeks  to  show  from  what  primary 
elements,  as  in  External  Perception,  these  have  grown  up. 
The  difference  on  this  and  on  other  points  of  psychological 
science  between  Hamilton  and  Mill,  for  example,  is  truly 
as  to  the  nature  and  number  of  the  primary  elements, — 
as  to  the  doctrine  or  result  of  the  analysis, — not  as  to  the 
method  itself.    And  in  regard  to  the  universal  principles, 
facts,  or  conditions  of  consciousness,  as  Hamilton  calls 
them.  Mill  entirely  mistakes  Hamilton's  procedure.   Hamil- 
ton gives,  as  we  have  seen,  at  least  three  specific  rules  for 
ascertaining  these — viz.,  ultimacy,  necessity,  inexplica- 
bility.     Under  the  first  of  these  tests,  Hamilton  has  dis- 
tinctly laid  down  that  the  alleged  ultimate  fact  of  con- 
sciousness must  be  shown  not  to  be  "a  generalisation  from 
experience,"  or  "  the  mere  result  of  custom," — not,  in 
fact,  to  be  a  product  simply  of  experience.     And  what 
else  or  other  does  Mill  demand  by  his  so-called  psycho- 
logical method,   or  by  the  need  of   showing  that  the 
principle  "  cannot  possibly  liave  been  acquired  by  experi- 
ence "  t     Would  the  operation,  or  his  process  of  associa- 
tion, not  be  properly  enough  described  as  custom  1    And 
does  not  Hamilton  constantly  distinguish  logical  neces- 
sity from  associational  or  customary  connection  1 

But  there  is  a  more  vital  error  on  Mill's  part  than 
even  this.     This  is  shown  in  the  following  words  : — 

"  He  [Hamilton]  completely  sets  at  naught  the  only  pos- 
sible method  of  solving  the  problem  [of  the  original  facts  of 


58 


Hamilton, 


consciousnesss].  He  even  expresses  liis  contempt  for  that 
method.  Speaking  of  extension,  he  says :  *  It  is  truly  an 
idle  problem  to  attempt  imagining  the  steps  by  which 
we  may  be  supposed  to  have  acquired  the  notion  of  exten- 
sion, when,  in  foct,  we  are  unable  to  imagine  to  ourselves 
the  possibility  of  that  notion  not  being  always  in  our  pos- 
session.' *  .  .  .  That  we  cannot  imagine  a  time  at  which 
we  had  no  knowledge  of  extension,  is  no  evidence  that  there 
has  not  been  such  a  time." 

If  the  author  of  this  criticism  had  taken  the  trouble 
to  master  the  method  of  Hamilton,  which  he  so  lightly 
contemns,  he  would  have  seen  a  meaning  which  he  has 
not  apprehended  in  the  phrase,  "  that  lies  at  the  root  of 
all  experience," — that  is,  "the  condition  of  conscious- 
ness," *'  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge," 
— and  other  similar  expressions  illustrating  the  test  of 
ultimacy  and  simplicity.     These  phrases  mean  that  we 
ought  not  to  presuppose  the  notion  or  principle  which 
we  profess  to  generate  out  of  experience  in  the  experi- 
ence itself,  which  is  adduced  as  proof  of  its  genesis. 
Tliis  is  not  only  sound  scientific  method, — it  is  the  very 
heart  of  it     And  it  is  this  principle  which  IVIill  him- 
self perhaps  violates  more  constantly  than  any  other 
inquirer.      But  Mill   supposes  Hamilton    to   mean  by 
this  that  "  we  cannot  imagine  a  time  at  which  we  had 
no    knowledge   of    extension,"   the    truth    being    that 
Hamilton  is  pointing  out  that  there  is  no  possibility 
in  thought  of  even  conceiving  any  percept  or  sensation 
out  of  which  the  notion  of  space  can  be  generalised,  with- 
out therein  assuming  the  notion  of  space  itself.     This  is 
a  position  to  be  examined  on  its  own  grounds ;  but  as 
a  condition  of  sound  method— call  it  philosophical  or 
1  lUid,  p.  882.  s  Exam.,  chap.  ix.  p.  ISO. 


Vindication  of  Metliod. 


59 


.1 


scientific— it  is  indisputable.     Hamilton  enforces  it  not 
only  under  his  test  of  ultimacy,  but  under  that  of  in- 
explicability.    And  what  more  vital  or  searching  test  can 
we  have  of  a  derivative  as  opposed  to  an  ultimate  stage 
in  our  knowledge,  than  that  of  necessary  implication  1 
And  it  may  be  added,  that  the  practical  application  of 
the  test  will  show  the  petitio  iwincipii  involved  in  Mill's 
attempted  genesis  of  space  out  of  sensations  in  time,— 
of  the  notion  of  the  Ego  and  Kon-Ego  from  what  is  sup- 
posed not  to  imply  either,- and  others  of  his  characteristic 
doctrines.  1     It  is  even  a  peculiarity  of  the  philosophy  of 
Hamilton,  that  he  applies  this  test  of  logical  implication 
in  the  way  of  positive  derivation  of  the  principles  of 
knowledge ;  for  his  corollaries  of  the  Law  of  the  Con- 
ditioned,— causality  and  substance, — are  given  by  him 
as  implicates  of  a  higher  or  primary  law.     And  whether 
we  regard  his  deduction  as  correct  or  not,  it  was  cer- 
tainly a  very  important  and  a  very  scientific  application 
of  philosophical  method,  just  as  his  attempt  to  gener- 
alise the  ordinary  facts  of  consciousness,— our  acts  and 
states  of  mind,— into  groups,  and  refer  them  to  ultimate 
powers,  was  in  the  line  of  sound  psychological  inquiry 
and  progress.     All  this  has  for  its  aim  and  spirit  the 
unity  of  knowledge  and  truth. 

The  view  that  the  consciousness  of  the  infant  being 
is  the  only  genuine,  is  somewhat  ridiculous.  As  has 
been  well  said, — 

"  It  is  wholly  contrary  to  all  analogy,  and  therefore  to  all 
'primnA  facie,  probability,  that  consciousness  alone  of  all  our 
natural  properties  needs  no  development,  no  education.  We 

1  On  this  point  see  an  able  criticism  in  The  Battle  of  the  Two 
Philosophies,  p.  57  et  seq. 


60 


Hamilton. 


Vindication  of  Method. 


61 


know  that  our  senses  require  education  ere  we  can  obtain 
from  thera  genuine  testimony  :  why  are  we  to  assume  that, 
in  the  case  of  consciousness,  this  is  only  to  be  had  when  it 
is  in  that  half-awakened,  vague,  indistinct  state  in  which 
it  exists  in  the  infant,  and  that  in  its  full  energy  it  is  neces- 
sarily deceptive  ? "  * 

It  would,  indeed,  be  about  as  sensible  and  scientific  to 
seek  to  ascertain  the  future  form  and  symmetry  of  the 
tree— to  divine  the  idea  of  trunk,  branch,  and  leaf 
— from  the  hidden  potency  of  the  germ  alone.  It 
is  the  study  of  the  mature  development  in  the  first 
instance  which  can  guide  us  to  the  elements  and  the 
original  constituents.  Certainly  the  view  which  would 
give  tlie  first  place  to  "  the  origin  of  ideas  "  and  of  the 
contents  of  consciousness,  is  about  as  unscientific  a  con- 
ception as  could  well  be  imagined.  Stated  broadly, 
it  is  an  absurdity.  We  are  to  inquire  into  the  ori- 
ginal causes  of  facts  which  we  have  not  scrutinised, 

which  we  do  not  even  know  to  exist,  or  which  we 
know  only  in  a  haphazard  way;  and  if  we  set  out 
with  the  distinction,  as  Mill  seems  to  propose,  of  "  our 
acquired  ideas,"  and  an  inquiry  into  their  origin,^  wc 
must  ask  him  for  the  test  for  discriminating  between 
the  acquired  and  the  original  ideas,  which  is  exactly 
what  we  are  supposed  to  be  in  quest  of,  by  the  method 
he  proposes.  Don't  examine  the  facts— seek  the  causes 
first,  is  a  new  version  of  scientific  method 

But  let  us  look  for  a  moment  at  the  actual  working  of 
this  so-called  "  psychological  "  method  as  opposed  to  that 
named  "introspective."     The  former  proposes  to  show 

1  Battle  of  the  Two  Philosophies,  pp.  52,  53. 

2  Exam.,  chap.  ix.  p.  177. 


4 


I 


how  all  our  knowledge  of  matter,  mind,  logical  and  meta- 
physical principles  of  the  utmost  necessity  and  univer- 
sality, is  developed  out  of  scmation.  Xow  what  is 
semation?  It  is  at  least,  and  at  most,  a  state  of 
consciousness.  It  is  not  here  pretended  that  tins  is 
developed  in  an  intelligible  process  from  anything 
lower.  How  is  it  got  tlien,— how  is  it  known  to  be^ 
—but  by  introspection  —  internal  observation?  In 
what  way,  then,  are  we  to  speak  of  a  psychological 
method  as  different  from,  and  superior  to,  one  of 
introspection,  seeing  the  latter  lends  to  tlie  former  its 
very  basis? 

But  there  is  more  here.      IVe  find  that  wlien  tliis 
superior  and  primary  « psychological "  method  is  to  be 
applied  to  the  simple  case  of  the  genesis  of  the  notion  of 
externality  and  the  material  world,  it  cannot  take  a  step 
without  certain  postulates.     It  must  be  allowed  to  sup- 
pose "the  human  mind  capable  of  expectation,"— the 
laws  of  the  "association  of  ideas"  leading  to  insepar- 
able association.     These  imply  time  and  succession,— 
and   laws   regulating  sequence.      These,  tlien,   are  not 
generated.     What  gives  them  or  guarantees  them  1     If 
tliey  are  found  as  facts  of  mind,  what  is  the  method  of 
doing  so  but  introspection  ?     With  such  assumptions  as 
these  before  him,  in  an  elementary  case  like  the  genesis 
of  the  notion  of  externality,  how  can  Mill  profess  to  say 
that   all   our   knowledge   arises  from   sensation?      His 
method  has  not  only  begged  or  borrowed  them  from 
introspection,  but  it  has  borrowed  them  in  a  clumsy 
way  without  analysis  of  them,— without  seeing  what 
is  already  involved  in  them,— without  seeing  that  no 
one  could  possibly  take  a  more  suicidal  position  than 


62 


Hamilton, 


Transcendental  Metlwd. 


63 


he  himself  does.  These  assumptions  are  utterly  incon- 
ceivable per  se.  Sensation  is  knoim  sensation,— it  is  a 
consciousness  at  least  It  cannot  be  known  apart  from 
relations  of  unity,  difference,  &c. — involved  in  its  very 
knowledge.  It  implies  a  sentient,  as  much  as  associa- 
tion implies  an  associator.  It  implies  time  and  sequence. 
It,  in  fact,  is  only  possible  in  knowledge,  as  it  is  pos- 
sible in  our  knowledge,  and  as  it  involves  all  the 
essential  laws  of  knowledge.  Mill's  peculiar  method  is. 
Give  me  the  first  principles  of  knowledge,  and  I  slmll 
evolve  the  genesis  of  hnowledge. 

Objection  may  be  taken  to  the  analytic  method  of. 
psychology  on  the  side  of  what  is  called  the  "transcen- 
dental "  method  or  "  transcendental  deduction."   We  find 
in  Kant, — at  least  in  the  *  Critique,' — a  certain  setting 
aside  and  depreciation  of  the  psychological  method  of 
observation   and   analysis   of   the   mind.      In   this,  of 
course,  he  is  utterly  inconsistent,  because  no  one  can 
dispense  with  it,  and  he  himself  actually  employs  it  in 
a  partial  way.     Wc  are  all  now  tolerably  familiar  with 
his  famous  question  as  to  how  experience  is  possible; 
and  it  is  with  a  view  to  give  a  complete  answer  to  this 
question  that  he  has  recourse  to  "  transcendental  deduc- 
tion."   As  to  what  he  precisely  aimed  at  in  this  method, 
and  as  to  the  true  character  of  the  method  itself,  his  fol- 
lowers and  commentators  are  obviously  very  far  from  a 
common  understanding.    This,  however,  seems  to  be  clear, 
that  at  the  outset  of  the  *  Critique,'  Kant  did  not  apply 
psychological  observation  and  analysis  to  test  Hume's 
position  of  the  limitation  of  intuitive  apprehension  or 
external  perception  to  impressions,— mere  states  of  con- 
eciousnesa     He  accepted  this  limitation,  but  sought  to 


\ 


I 


I 


show  that  in  order  to  constitute  sensation  or  impression 
an  object  of  knowledge,  more  than  itself  is  required,— 
viz.,  time,  space,  category,  which  are  purely  mental  or  a 
priori.    When  we  come,  however,  to  examine  what  ohject 
or  objective  with  Kant  means  in  this  connection,  we  find 
that  it  is  simply  that  the  naked  material  called  impres- 
sion is  to  be  set  under  necessary  and  universal  connec- 
tions or  relations.      It  is  therefore   in  one  important 
aspect  as  much  subjective— i.e.,  a  mere   state  of  the 
consciousness— with  Kant  as  with  Hume.     It  is  objec- 
tive only  in  the  sense  of  being  clothed  in  certain  a  ^^non 
forms   and   categories,— certain    mutual   relations,    and 
relations  to   the  unity  of  the  Ego  as  apperceptive  or 
truly  conscious.     If  this  be  the  whole  of  Kajit's  work, 
it  is  not  much,  and  we  are  as  far  off  from  knowing 
the  possibility  of  experience  as  we  were  before.     For 
experience  would  simply  mean  a  necessary  context  of 
subjective  impressions,— the  reality  of  the  world,  of  the 
soul,  of  God  Himself,  being  left  wholly  undetermined. 
If  it  be  Kant's  aim  to  show  the  possibility  of  experience, 
in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  tenn,  on  the  basis  of  Hume's 
limitation  of  knowledge,  pirn  time,  space,  and  category, 
as  pure  forms  of  consciousness,  his  attempt  is  necessarily 
a  failure.     A  real  or  independent  world,  a  real  or  true 
unity  of   the  Ego,  Kant  could  not  reach  on  any  such 
method.     When,  therefore,  people  speak  of  his  show- 
ing or  deducing  the  possibility  of  experience,  they  are 
using  a  wholly  ambiguous  expression,— the  experience 
whose   conditions   are   supposed   to   be  deduced  being 
in  no  way  necessarily  like   the   experience  which  we 
know  in  consciousness,  whether  intuitive  or  inferential. 
Kant,  in  abandoning  the  psychological  method,  could 


G4 


Hamilton, 


not  consistently  tell  us,  in  the  first  place,  what  experi- 
ence is,  or  what  experience  he  was  speaking  of,  and 
whose  possibility  he  was  seeking  to  deduce.  If  he 
thought  that  he  could  by  his  method  reach  even  the 
conditions  of  our  ordinary  experience, — sifted,  tested, 
and  analysed, — he  was  mistaken.  In  abandoning  the 
/psychological  method,  he  threw  away  the  key  to  the 
door  of  his  prison-house,  and  then  deluded  himself 
with  the  idea  that  by  making  a  circuit  of  the  walls  he 
could  reach  the  open  air. 

As  to  the  transcendental  method  itself,  it  might  be 
readily  shown  that,  whether  it  be  regarded  as  a  process 
of  logical  subsumption,  or  a  constructive,  synthetic  pro- 
cess, it  is  illogical,  inconsistent,  and  useless.  There  can 
be  no  logical  subsumption  of  anything,  or  matter  of  ex- 
perience, under  either  form  or  category, — time,  space, 
causality,  or  whatever  the  a  prion  notion  be, — unless 
the  matter  subsumed  is  already  apprehended  as  possess- 
ing the  feature  of  the  form  or  category — as,  e.g.,  in  time 
or  as  a  cause ;  and  if  this  be  so,  the  matter  subsumed  is 
already  constituted  under  form  or  category,  and  not  left 
to  the  mind  to  do  it  for  tlie  first  time.  There  is  appre- 
hension of  relation  existing, — not  the  imposition  of  rela- 
tion not  yet  existing.  Besides,  there  is  no  knowledge 
of  pure  form  or  category  on  the  one  side,  and  (naked) 
matter  on  the  other.  Though  virtually  assumed,  it  is 
absolutely  impossible ;  for  there  would  thus  be  know- 
ledge ere  it  is  constituted.  Even  if  there  were,  there 
would  be  no  means  whatever  of  subsuming  the  matter 
given  under  different  categories.  How  could  we  in 
such  a  case  distinguish  M'hat  is  to  be  subsumed  under 
time  alone,  or  time  and  space  together,  or  under  sue- 


Transcendental  Metliod.  55 

cession,  coexistence,  causality,  or  substance  ?     Obviously 
only  arbitrarily  and  irrationally. 

Divorce  the  reason  or  sum  of  the  principles  of  pure 
knowledge  from  the  understanding,  and  set  these  facul- 
ties apart,  as  Kant  does,— then  there  is  no  possibility  of 
uniting  them,  or  through  their  union  constituting  human 
knowledge,  or  any  object  of  intelligibility. ^ 

But  the  transcendental  method,  interpreted  as  one  of 
synthetic  construction,  is  perhaps  more  completely  self- 
contradictory  than  the  view  of  it  now  represented.     The 
true  transcendental  method  is  represented  as  synthetic ; 
it  adds  to  the  element  — say  impression  —  something 
besides  itself,  sometliing  beyond  itself,  or  from  with" 
out.      As    element    merely,    the   impression   does    not 
exist   for  us  as  conscious  beings,— is,    in   fact,    mean- 
ingless until   the   elements  ah  extra  are  added  to   it. 
The    transcendental    method     is    thus    a    creation    of 
knowledge    or    experience.      It    is    further   a   creation 
out   of  nothing;  for   the   added  elements— viz.,   time, 
space,  category— make  the  meaningless  or  non-existent 
impression  of  something,— an  object ;  and  we  have  thus 
disclosed  to  us  the  process  of  the  origination  of  experi- 
ence.    This  is  possible  only  through  a  priori  constnic- 
tion  so  carried  on.     ]^ow,  be  it  observed  that  the  tran- 
scendental method  as  thus  interpreted  professes  to  prove, 
or  deduce,  or  show  to  be  necessary,  each  of  the  specified 
elements  of  the  complete  whole  called  knowledge  of  an 
object     It  professes  to  do  this  also,  starting  from  the 

1  The  above  was  written  before  the  appearance  of  Dr  Hutchison 
Stirling  8  Text-Booh  to  Kant.  I  am  gratified  to  find  that  his  view  is 
in  substance  the  same.  The  reader  would  do  well  to  refer  to  his 
lucid  and  admirable  exposition  of  Kant's  svstem  generally 


e^ 


Hamilton. 


impression  or  sensation.  Kow  the  impression  is  not 
liiiown  per  se, — does  not  exist  for  us  at  all  as  an  intel- 
ligible or  even  conscious  object ;  for  we  have  no  object 
of  knowledge  or  consciousness,  unless  as  we  are  con- 
scious of  the  whole  transcendental  apparatus  brought  to 
bear  on  the  impression,  and  so  make  it  cognisable.  In 
these  circumstances,  I  maintain  that  it  is  absolutely 
imj)0ssible  for  us  ever  to  reach  an  object  of  knowledge 
or  intelHgibility  at  all.  We  cannot  start  from  an  im- 
pression as  a  datum  from  which  to  deduce  or  estabhsh 
the  necessity  of  other  elements — viz.,  time,  space,  and 
category ;  and  this  for  the  obvious  reason  that  the 
datum — the  impression  7>er  se — is  confessedly  meaning- 
less and  non-existent  even  in  consciousness.  A  ground 
of  proof  or  intellectual  process,  which  is  meaningless, 
is  no  ground  of  proof.  You  cannot  sliow  anything 
furtlier  to  be  necessary  to  a  meaningless  element,  non- 
existent in  knowledge.  And  the  same  holds  true  of 
any  other  element  in  the  complex  whole  supposed  to  be 
capable  of  affording  a  starting-point  for  the  deduction, 
or  of  proving  the  necessity  of  the  other  elements.  Let 
time  per  *v',  or  space  or  category  per  «e,  or  self  ^>er  se^ 
be  tlie  alleged  starting-point,  there  is  no  possibility  of 
proving  anything  else  to  be  necessary  to  it  or  involved 
in  it,  for  the  simple  reason  that  there  is  as  yet,  by 
supposition,  no  object  of  knowledge.  Transcendental 
deduction,  as  thus  interpreted,  is  no  process  of  proof 
of  the  necessity  of  other  elements  besides  sensation, 
or  besides  anything  else  from  which  it  starts,  to  consti- 
tute knowledge.  As  a  process  of  construction  it  is 
entirely  futile.  It  not  only  fails  to  vindicate  our  right 
to  use  the  necessary  principles  of  knowledge,  it  wholly 


Hamilton  and  Hume, 


67 


fails  to  connect  the  one  side  of  our  knowledge  with 
the  other.  If  this  be  the  method  of  the  "articula- 
tion of  consciousness,"  it  is  an  articulation  without 
joints. 

And  yet  this  method  is  alleged  as  proving,  demon- 
strating against  Hume  and  his  impressional  theory,  that 
the  impression  per  se  is  not  only  unfit  to  be  the  basis  of 
knowledge  or  experience,  but  even  that  it  is  meaningless, 
— no  object  of  consciousness,  non-sensicaL     Do  not  the 
upholders  of  the  transcendental  method  see  that  the 
impression  per  se  is  equally  meaningless  to  them  as  to 
liim  ? — that  if  it  is  meaningless  as  a  ground  of  construct- 
ing knowledge  with  him,  it  is  not  less  meaningless  for 
them,  as  utterly  empty  and  naked?     The  impression j5>er 
se  may  be  meaningless,  but  then  it  is  unfit  to  be  the  sub- 
ject of  a  proposition,  or  to  have  any  definite  correlative. 
In  a  word,  the  transcendental  method,  if  it  is  to  do  any- 
thing at  all,  must  be  able  to  create  both  its  ground  and 
itself  out  of  nothing.     It  must  ascend,  in  a  word,  to 
the  vagaries  of   "pure  thought,"  and  its  spontaneous 
determinations,   as   Hegel   vainly   imagines   he   reveals 
them. 

Obviously  the  analytic  method  of  Hamilton  is  a  great 
deal  deeper  than  any  so-called  transcendental  deduction, 
as  it  is  also  free  from  hypothetical  metaphysical  formulse, 
which  foreclose  the  law  of  the  facts.  Psychology  is 
necessary  as  affording  not  only  a  knowledge  of  what  is 
to  be  deduced, — of  that  experience  whose  conditions  are 
sought,— but  of  the  method  of  all  intelligible  deduction, 
— of  every  act  which  professes  to  evolve  with  conscious- 
ness one  thing  from  another.  Every  rational  method  is 
thus  conditioned  by  psychology  and  its  data.     It  cannot 


J  I         ' 


68 


Hamilton. 


take  a  step  without  these ;  it  can  otherwise  know  neither 
what  it  seeks  nor  the  road  it  takes. 

In  the  application  of  the  analytic  method  to  philos- 
ophy— especially  to  the  question  of  Hume's  limitation 
of  knowledge — the  way  is  quite  clear,  and  the  principle 
sound.     AVlien  it  is  said  that  knowledge,  to  begin  with, 
is   an   impression,  a  consciousness,   it  must  be  on  the 
ground  simply  of  psychological  observation  and  analysis. 
But  if  the  statement  rests  on  an  appeal  to  the  ultimate 
in  consciousness,  so  does  the  denial  of  it  on  the  psyclio- 
logical  method.      This  question  of  fact  must  thus  be 
settled  on  the  process  of  evidence  j^roper  to  the  case. 
This  is  the  method  of  Keid,  and  it  is  that  of  Hamilton, 
— the  latttT  carrying  out  the  analysis  Avith  far  greater 
jirecision  and  rigour  than  the  former.     Then  if  Hume's 
statement  be  a  traditional  one, — or  a  hypothetical  one, 
taken  up  on  the  authority  of  previous  philosophers, — it 
still  falls  to  be  tested  by  psychological  observation  and 
experiment,     '^o  one  is  at  liberty  to  assert  a  matter  of 
fact  simply  on  authority,  when  it  is  open  to  testing, 
much  less  so  to  lay  down  a  principle  in  philosophy. 
Further,  applying  the  same  method,  Hume's  system,  as 
that  of  any  other  thinker,  may  be  tested  by  the  principle 
of  consistency  or  non-contradiction.     Hume  could  not 
object  to  this — for  in  reasoning  at  all  he  postulates  this 
principle ;  and  an  incoherent  system  is  a  false  system. 
This  test  has  been  applied  to  the  system  alike  by  Eeid 
and  Hamilton.     Further,  it  is  quite  competent,  on  the 
analytic  method,  to  show,  in  regard  to  the  principle  of 
Hume's  or  any  other  system,  that  it  involves,  by  neces- 
sary implication,  more  than  its  author  allows,  or  than  is 
provided  for  in  the  system.     It  is  a  complete  miscon- 


Suhjedive  Certainty. 


€9 


ception  to  hold  that  this  process  is  competent  only  to  a 
method  of  "  transcendental  deduction."  On  the  contrary, 
the  use  of  reasoning  to  implication  by  this  method  might 
be  properly  challenged  as  seeking  to  connect  the  non- 
empirical  with  the  empirical,  —  what  is  not  got  from 
experience  with  experience  itself.  But  the  procedure  is 
quite  competent  from  one  form  of  experience  to  another, 
— from  an  act  to  an  agent, — from  a  series  of  changes  to 
an  underlying  permanent.  These  are  simply  applications 
of  the  philosophical  method  of  Hamilton,  and  looked  at 
merely  as  modes  of  procedure  in  seeking  truth,  they  are 
thoroughly  legitimate.  How  far  they  have  been  success- 
fully carried  out  is  another  matter,  and  one  of  detail, 
which  can  be  ascertained  only  by  a  comparison  of  the 
conflicting  philosophical  systems,  and  a  minute  examina- 
tion of  the  philosophy  of  Hamilton. 

There  is  a  talk  in  some  quarters  of  the  insufficiency 
of  subjective  certainty  or  assurance,  and  the  need  for 
an  objective  one.  But  the  answer  has  already  been 
given. 

"  The  necessity  we  find  of  assenting  or  holding  is  the  last 
and  highest  security  we  can  obtain  for  truth  and  reality. 
The  necessary  holding  of  a  thing  for  real  is  not  itself  reality  : 
it  is  only  the  instrument,  the  guarantee  of  reality.  It  is 
not  an  objective,  it  is  only  a  subjective,  certainty."  ^ 

Objective  certainty,  or  the  certainty  of  objective  exist- 
ence, can  mean  only  that 

"  I,  the  subject,  must  hold  the  thing  known  for  objectively 
existent, — that  is,  I  have  but  the  highest  subjective  certainty. 
Any  other  certainty  is  unattainable,  even  contradictory,  for 
human  thought.     A  subject  cannot  be  any  otherwise  certain 

1  Reid's  Works,  p.  800. 


70 


Hamilton. 


than  that  it  ia  certain.  To  be  objectively  certain,  in  the 
sense  here  indicated,  the  subject  must  be  both  itself  and  the 
object,  and,  as  such,  be  able  to  become  certain.  Yet  certainty 
has  no  meaning  except  as  in  a  subject."  ^ 

In  other  words,  the  last  ground  of  appeal  in  knowledge 
is,  I  am  conscious  of  being  constrained  to  think  a  fact 
— a  truth — a  series  of  truths  related.  Necessary  relation 
may  be  the  object  of  thought,  but  the  guarantee  of  the 
necessity  is  still  my  consciousness  of  this  necessity, — my 
subjective  assurance  of  what  is  necessary  and  universaL 
That  is,  in  other  words,  the  last  ground  of  appeal  of  the 
doctrine  of  Common-Sense, — the  meaning  of  Instinctive 
or  Primary  Belief. 

There  is  a  habit  of  writing  about  such  divergent 
thinkers  as  Locke  and  Leibnitz  which  characterises  their 
philosophy  as  "  individualist."  Berkeley,  Hume,  Eeid, 
and  Hamilton  are  all  classed  under  the  same  vague  and 
assumptive  phraseology.  The  meaning  seems  to  be,  that 
the  systems  of  these  thinkers  accept  as  a  fact  the  exist- 
ence of  the  concrete  thinking-subject,  and  endeavour  to 
show  how  this  subject,  as  an  individual  consciousness,  is 
related  to  the  wider  universe  of  which  he  forms  a  part 
Or  how  the  varied  contents  of  the  experience  of  the 
individual  are  to  be  accounted  for,  and  what  certainty 
attaches  to  his  subjective  consciousness  of  things.  This 
is  apparently  to  be  regarded  as  the  true  aim  and  method 
of  the  very  different  philosophers  just  enumerated.  Look- 
ing at  the  really  different  systems  of  those  thinkers,  it 
seems  amazing  to  find  them  grouped  together,  and  grouped 
in  such  a  category. 

The  true  or  metaphysical  way  of  looking  at  philosophy 

1  Hermes  quoted,  Reid's  Works^  pp.  800,  801. 


Tlie  only  Certainty. 


71 


as  opposed  to  the  individual  or  psychological  is  said  to 
be  asking  a  question  of  this  type  :  What  is  the  nature 
of  the  relation  between  the  individual  himself,  as  one 
part  of  the  system,  and  the  system  as  a  whole  1     Sup- 
posing now  that  questions  of  this  sort  are  put — how, 
I  ask,  are  they  to  be  answered?      By  what  method  1 
Can  they  be  answered  by  any  method  which  is  not  one 
of  individual  or  subjective  certainty  in  the  first  instance  ] 
How  can  any  solution  of  the  question  of  my  relation  to 
the  system  of  things  of  which  I  am,  or  suppose  myself, 
a  part,  bo  given  which  does  not  fall  to  be  tested  by 
my  consciousness  or  thought  as  an  individual  1  or  how 
otherwise  can  I  solve  the  question,  what  is  the  nature 
or  meaning  of  my  own  existence,  or  of  the  existence 
of  things  around  me?      Nay,   if  I  have  no  guarantee 
of  my  own  conscious  existence  in  the  first  place,  how 
can  such  questions  be  put,  or  how  can  I  put  such  ques- 
tions at  all  ]     ^Vhat  could  the  solution  of  them  be  after 
all,  but  the  conceptions  which  I,  an  individual  conscious 
thinker,  may  be  able  to  form  of  myself  or  things — of 
the  whole  of  things,  and  of  my  relations  to  them  %     And 
supposing   that    these   very  individual  conceptions  are 
proved  to  be  common  to  mankind,  what  certainty  could 
I  have  of  this  but  the  certainty  which  is  in  my  con- 
sciousness as  an  individual?     And  then  am  I  not  ex- 
actly where  I  was  ? — still  in  face  of  the  question  as  to 
whether  and  how  far  my  knowledge  thus  guaranteed 
is  convertible  with  the  absolute,  permanent,  self-abiding 
reality  of  things?     Can  we  ever  transcend  subjective 
certainty  ?     Is  not  the  question  of  philosophy.  How  far 
can   this   certainty   carry   us   or   assure   us?    and   that 
whether  we  ask  how  the  contents  of  actual  experience 


72 


Hamilton. 


grow  up  in  the  individual,  or  what  the  individual  is, 
or  how  he  is  related  to  the  whole  of  things. 

What  is  this  knowledge  of  the  infinite,  absolute,  or 
universal  beyond,  before,  and  in  the  individual,  but  the 
individual's  conception  of  the  infinite,  absolute,  and 
imiversall  And  why  should  this  or  that  individual 
suppose  that  his  conception  means  more  than  just  the 
conception  which,  as  an  individual,  he  is  capable  of 
forming]  or  that  it  is  anything  but  an  individualised 
infinite,  or  absolute^that  is,  something  representative 
of  the  transcendent  Infinite  or  Absolute  ? 


73 


/■ 


CHAPTEE    III. 

CONSCIOUSNESS — ITS   NATURE   AND   CONDITIONS — 
MENTAL    LATENCY. 

Though  Hamilton  states  Phajnomenal  Psychology  as 
first  in  the  order  of  the  branches  of  philosophy,  his 
treatment  of  the  subject  in  the  'Lectures'  leads  him 
naturally  to  deal  with  what  may  be  called  the  homology, 
or  doctrine  of  the  laws  of  consciousness  in  general  The 
mental  facts  or  phenomena  are  embraced  by  him  in  one 
general  word — consciousness.  He  regards  all  the  special 
phenomena  as  simply  forms  or  facts  of  consciousness. 

"  Consciousness  is  to  the  mind  what  extension  is  to 
matter  or  bodyT^  Though  both  are  phaiiiomena,  yet  both 
are  essential  qualities,  for  we  can  neither  conceive  mind 
without  consciousness,  nor  body  without  extension."-^ 
To  state  its  meaning  generally  meanwhile,  it  may  be 
described  as  |^  the  knowledge  that  I,  or  the  Ego,  or  self, 
exists  in  some  detenninate  state. 'M  It  is  only  in  this 
knowledge  that  mental  pha^nomena  are  for  us, — are,  in 
fact,  at  all.  "With  this  they  appear, — i.e.,  become 
phaenomena;  w4th  this  they  disappear, — cease  to  be 
phaenomena.  '\  Hence   in  a  systematic  exposition  it  is 

1  Metaphysics^  L.  IX. 


74  *  Hamilton. 

natural  to  prefix  a  statement  of  the  laws  or  conditions 
of  consciousness  itself,  for  all  the  special  phaenomena 
must  be  more  or  less  regulated  by  those  laws.  If  there 
be  necessary  laws  or  conditions,  these  will  extend  to  all 
the  phtenomena,  and  will  retjuire  to  be  summarised. 
The  classification  of  the  phaenomena  themselves,  and 
the  general  or  generalised  laws,  fall  to  be  subsequently 
exposed.  This  science  may  be  called  the  Nomology  of 
Consciousness,  and  will  form  the  introduction  to  Psychol- 
ogy proper  or  Phainomenal  Psychology. 

Hamilton  obviously^ilistinguishea[  though  he  does  not 
separate/consciousness  from  the  definite  act  in  which  it 
is  manifested^'  The  former,  or  general  consciousness,  he 
regards  as  the  immediate  basis  or  form  of  all  possible 
knowledge.  He  finds  it,  or  he  realises  himself  in  it, 
and  he  regards  it  as  impossible  to  say  how  it  has  arisen, 
what  are  the  conditions  under  which  it  is  possible.  But 
with  regard  to  any  definite  act  of  consciousness, — be  it 
perception,  sensation,  judgment,  volition, — he  professes 
to  be  able  to  find  by  psychological  method  "the  uni- 
versal conditions  under  which  alone  such  an  act  is  pos- 
sible." These  universal  conditions  are  exemplified  in 
the  determinate  or  individual  acts  of  consciousness,  and 
they  are  known  from  a  study  and  comparison  of  the 
acts.  But  how  they  are  or  arise,  we  cannot  telL  They 
are  the  ultimate  for  us,  constituting  the  essence  of  the 
very  intelligence  which  illegitimately  seeks  to  know 
their  genesis. 

How  consciousness  is  possible  is  an  unphilosophical 
question,  in  so  far  as  it  points  to  determining  this  possi- 
bility by  consciousness  itself.  "We  cannot  explain  how 
we  come  to  be  conscious  of  self,  of  mental  states,  of 


Row  Consciousness  is  Possible  ? 


75 


f 


1 


external  objects,  by  any  process  of  consciousness,  for 
the  obvious  reason  that  we  assume  our  being  conscious 
as  the  means  of  explaining  how  we  are  conscious  at 
all,  or  how  we  come  to  be  conscious.  Consciousness  in 
one  or  other  definite  manner  is  for  us  the  primary 
revelation, — the  alpha  of  our  being.  It  is  a  revelation 
and  a  constitution  'of  existence,  in  the  strictest  sense  of 
these  terms,  of  us,  but  not  by  us.  "VVe  exist,  and  we 
know  we  exist,  only  in  as  far  as  for  the  first  time  we 
consciously  energise.  This  does  not,  be  it  observed, 
preclude  questions  about  the  growth  of  the  contents  of 
consciousness.  These  are  psychological  questions,  and 
quite  within  the  competency  of  research;  but  the  ex- 
planation of  how  there  is  consciousness  at  all,  or  in 
any  form,  this  is  unphilosophical, — inexplicable  by  con- 
sciousness itseK.  Consciousness  is  the  first,  the  last, 
the  abiding  mystery  of  being.  ^ 

This  problem  is  virtually  attempted  by  writers  who 
make  use  of  such  phrases  as, — How  is  knowledge  pos- 
sible 1  What  are  the  ultimate  conditions  of  knowledge  ] 
These  questions  are  quite  legitimate, — are,  in  fact,  the 
questions  of  Eeid,  Hamilton,  and  Cousin,  in  the  sense 
of  being  simply  proposals  for  the  analysis  of  the  con- 
sciousness in  which  we  are  revealed  to  ourselves, — in 
which  any  knowledge  is  realised.  Hamilton's  "  condi- 
tions" or  "limitations"  of  consciousness  refer  to  the 
possibility  of  it  in  a  good  and  soimd  sense.  They  are 
adduced  after  analysis  of  the  fact, — after  the  experi- 
mental tests  of  doubt  and  non-contradiction, — as  the 
common  or  universal  and  necessary  elements  of  know- 
ledge,— those  elements  apart  from  which  we  may  try  to 
1  See  Reid's  Works,  pp.  930,  746,  801. 


75  Hamilton. 

tlilnk  knowledge  but  cannot.  But  these  are  originally 
psychological  data,  as  much  as  the  contingent  experi- 
ences in  which  they  are  manifested,  and  which  tliey 
condition.  They  are  found  by  testing  facts  to  be  nec- 
essary and  universal  in  the  first  instance,  and  as  such 
tliey  are  recognised  as  laws.  In  this  sense,  but  in 
this  only,  can  we  speak  of  showing  how  knowledge  or 
consciousness  is  possible ;  it  is  seen  to  be  possible  only 
as  certain  essential  conditions  of  it,  for  which  we  have 
but  its  ovm  warrant,  are  fulfilled  in  our  experience. 

To  attempt  to  explain  thinking  by  thinking,  or  know- 
ledge by  knowledge,  is  in  its  last  resort  reasoning  in  a 
circle.  To  know  Jiow  we  know  is  to  know, — to  assume 
that  we  can  and  do  know,  and  know  truly.  But  if  we 
know  in  knowing  how  we  know,  we  have  assumed 
knowledge  as  a  fact,  and  as  a  validity,  in  order  to 
explain  the  fact  and  its  validity.  To  explain  know- 
ledge, or  to  show  the  possibility  of  knowledge  in  this 
sense,  is  an  absurdity.  We  assert  knowledge,  and  we 
assert  true  knowledge,  or  knowledge  as  a  valid  instm- 
nient  of  knowing.  Our  explanation  thus,  whatever  it  be, 
is  valid  only  on  the  supposition  that  knowledge  there 
is,  which  does  not  need  explanation. 

Further,  the  metaphysical  possibilities  of  knowledge, 
— subject  and  object,  substance,  cause,  <fec., — are  only 
possibilities  in  the  sense  that  oiu*  knowledge  of  objects 
is  limited  to  such  as  stand  in  one  or  other  of  those 
specifiable  metaphysical  relations.  Before  experience, 
however,  we  know  nothing  of  them,  or  of  their  possi- 
bility. We  find  them  in  concrete  forms.  We  find  them 
necessary.  We  generalise  and  class  them  as  matter  of 
knowledge.     But  to  pretend  to  explain  how  we  think  or 


An  Unphilosojyhical  Qucstio7i. 


77 


\ 


f 


I 


know  under  the  relation  of  subject  and  object,  or 
indeed  of  any  metaphysical  relation,  is  a  vain  dream, 
and  the  result  merely  of  confusion  as  to  the  use  of 
words.  Again,  to  state  analytically  or  psychologically 
the  elements  necessarily  involved  in  any  act  of  know- 
ledge is  not  to  explain  the  act  or  its  possibility,  but 
only  to  state  in  detail  elements  of  whose  coming  toge- 
ther we  know  nothing.  It  is,  in  fact,  an  ideal  analysis 
of  elements  never  given  separately,  and  of  whose  actual 
synthesis,  therefore,  we  can  give  no  account. 

"  How  consciousness  in  general  is  possible ;  and  how,  in 
particular,  the  consciousness  of  self  and  the  consciousness  of 
something  different  from  self  are  possible  ;  in  what  manner 
we  can  have  a  consciousness  of  any  absolute  ^  affection  of  the 
thinking  subject,  and  a  consciousness  of  self  in  representa- 
tive relation  either  to  an  external  possibility  or  to  a  pre- 
vious act  of  consciousness  ; — all  these  questions  are  equally 
unphilosophical,  as  they  all  equally  suppose  the  possibility 
of  a  faculty  exterior  to  consciousness  and  conversant  about 
its  operations.  But  all  philosophy  of  mind,  if  it  does  not 
wander  into  the  region  of  hypothesis,  must  employ  con- 
sciousness as  the  only  instrument  of  observation.  Conscious- 
ness gives  us  the  existence  both  of  the  absolute  and  of  the 
relative  affections  of  the  mind ;  and  it  gives  all  these  as  facts 
equally  ultimate  and  inexplicable."  ^ 

To  explain  how  consciousness  as  in  us  arises  has  been 
essayed  on  the  part  of  the  cerebro-psychological  phil- 
osophy ;  but,  as  might  be  shown,  without  effect.  The 
method  is  as  much  ah  initio  null  as  the  method  by  con- 
sciousness itself.  From  unconscious  nerve  -  moments 
we  cannot  show  the  passage  into  consciousness.  They 
may  precede  constantly,  uniformly ;  their  transmutation 

1  Absolute  as  opposed  to  representative.       ^  Reich's  Works,  p.  930. 


78 


Hamilton, 


Subject  aiid  Object. 


79 


into  consciousness  is  inconceivable — that  is,  we  cannot 
show  how  the  conscious  rises  out  of  the  unconscious. 
If  consciousness  is  to  explain  its  own  origin,  it  must 
assist  at,  even  preside  over,  its  own  creation  and  evo- 
lution. 

Viewing  consciousness,  then,  on  Hamilton's  method, 
what  is  revealed  to  us  1  Take  any  special  consciousness 
or  experience.  I  know,  I  feel,  I  desire.  Wliat  is 
necessarily  involved  in  each  of  these  1  This,  that  when 
I  know,  I  know  that  I  know;  when  I  feel,  I  hiow 
that  I  feel ;  when  I  desire,  I  hiow  that  I  desire.  With- 
out this  common  element,  there  would  be  neither  know- 
ledge, feeling,  nor  desire. 

"  And  this  knowledge,  which  I,  the  subject,  have  of  these 
modifications,  of  my  being,  and  through  which  knowledge 
alone  these  modifications  are  possible,  is  what  we  call 
(consciousness.  .  .  .  Consciousness  is  thus  the  recognition  by 
the  mind  or  Ego  of  its  acts  and  affections ;  in  other  words, 
the  self-affirmation  that  certain  mmlifications  are  known  by 
me,  and  that  these  modifications  are  mine.^ 

Though  the  simplest  act  of  mind,  consciousness  ex- 
presses a  relation  subsisting  between  two  terms, — an  I 
or  self  being  the  subject  of  a  certain  modification,  and 
some  modification  belonging  to  the  subject  Conscious- 
ness thus  in  its  simplicity  necessarily  involves  three 
things  :  1.  A  knowing  subject ;  2.  A  known  modifi- 
cation ;  3.  A  knowledge  of  the  subject  of  the  modifica- 
tion. ^  These  points  Hamilton  holds  to  be  given  by 
philosophical  analysis,  by  reflection,  or  the  attempt  to 
realise  clearly  and  distinctly  what  consciousness  is,  or 
what  the  simplest  experience  is, 

1  Jletajphysics,  L.  XI.  2  Hid. 


I 


We  thus  at  the  outset  meet  with  the  fundamental 
distinction  of  the  subject  of  mind  proper,  and  the  state 
or  phaenomenon.  This  distinction  is  essential  to  the 
conscious  act.  But  we  must  avoid  ambiguity  here. 
The  phaenomena  of  mind  are  not  to  be  understood  as 
appearances  in  the  popular  sense  of  that  term, — such 
things  as  seem  only  to  be,  as  opposed  to  what  truly 
exists.  They  exist  truly  and  really.  They  are  phaeno- 
mena, realities  as  opposed  to  what  does  not  exist,  or 
is  not  observed  to  exist.  They  are  not  seeming  things 
in  the  sense  of  being  merely  illusory  appearances  of  real 
phaenomena  or  presentations.  They  are  really  and  truly 
existent  things  for  us,  and  the  standard  according  to 
which  we  must  try  all  illusory  appearances, — simulacra 
of  phaenomenal  reality. 

Phaenomenal  reality  is  also,  we  must  note,  opposed 
to  absolute  existence, — the  existence  of  that  which 
subsists  per  se,  that  is,  what  is  absolutely  without  attri- 
butes, absolute  substance.  It  is  opposed  also  to  the 
existence  of  an  absolute  subject,  or  that  which  subsists 
under  phaenomena,  a,nd  yet  is  supposed  to  be  known  in 
itself  apart  from  or  otherwise  than  through  the  phaeno- 
mena.^ AVhatever  view  may  be  taken  in  regard  to  the 
contrast  between  absolute  reality  and  relative  existence, 
Hamilton  holds  explicitly  that  existence  is  known  by 
us, — kno^vn,  too,  directly  or  immediately  in  or  under 
relation  to  our  faculties,  their  number,  constitution,  and 
laws. 

But  the  phaenomena  or  states  of  consciousness  are 
somehow  essentially  and  inseparably  related  to  a  Self, 
Ego,  or  Subject.     This  is,  properly  speaking,  the  mind. 
1  Metaphysics,  L.  VIII.  p.  149. 


80 


Hamiltmi. 


The  phnenomena  are  mental ;  they  are  pha^nomenal  of 
the  niincL  Mind  is  "  the  subject  of  the  various  internal 
ph.Tnomena  of  which  we  are  conscious,  or  that  subject  of 
which  consciousness  is  the  general  phaenomenon."  ^  This 
subject  is,  moreover,  one ;  it  is  recognised  as  one,  while 
the  various  phfenomena  are  changing,  passing.  This 
affords  the  contrast  of  subject  and  object. 

**  Sul)ject  denotes  the  mind  itself ;  subjective  that  which 
belonj^'s  to  or  proceeds  from  tlie  tliinking  subject.  Object,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  a  tenn  for  that  about  which  the  knowinix 
sul)ject  is  converwiuit,— ^what  the  schoolmen  have  called  the 
materia  circa  qnam;  while  oljjective  means  that  which  belongs 
to  or  proceeds  from  the  object  kno^vn."  ^ 

Here  the  question  arises, — AMiat  precisely  is  the  rela- 
tion of  knowledge  between  the  Ego  and  the  non-Ego,  or 
the  subject  and  object  of  consciousness  ?  Hamilton  holds, 
that  while  the  state  or  act  of  consciousness  is  known 
directly  and  immediately,  the  subject  of  the  state,  the 
conscious  subject  is  not  so  known.  We  know  directly 
the  phaenomena  of  matter  and  of  mind ;  but  the  subject, 
in  tlie  sense  of  that  which  subsists  under  these  pha> 
nomena,  we  do  not  know  directly  or  apprehend.  Xor 
do  we  know  this  subject  in  the  sense  of  substance  or 
that  wliich  subsists  by  itself  apart  from  the  pha^nomena. 
Indeed  he  tells  us  explicitly  that 

"  mind  and  matter  as  knoA\Ti  and  knowable  are  only  two 
different  series  of  phajnomena  or  qualities  ;  mind  and  matter 
as  unknown  and  unknowable  are  the  two  substances  in  which 
thet*e  two  different  series  of  phsenomena  or  qualities  are  sup- 
posed to  inhere.  The  existence  of  an  unknoAVTi  substance  is 
only  an  inference  we  are  compelled  to  make,  from  the  exist- 


1  Metaphysics^  L.  IX. 


2  Ibid. 


Consciousness  a  General  Power. 


81 


ence  of  kno^vn  phsenomena  ;  and  the  distinction  of  two  sub- 
stances is  only  inferred  from  the  seeming  incompatibility  of 
the  two  series  of  phsenomena  to  coinhere  in  one."  ^ 

He  connects  this  statement  with  the  general  principle, 
that  of  existence,  absolutely  and  in  itself,  we  know  noth- 
ing. Our  whole  knowledge  of  mind  and  matter  is  only 
relative.  2  Still  a  basis,  unknown  in  itself,  alike  of  the 
mental  and  material  phsenomena,  is  "supposed,"  "in- 
ferred," naturally  and  necessarily.  To  maintain  that 
mind  and  matter  have  no  substantial  existence  is 

"  to  belie  the  veracity  of  our  primary  beliefs  ;  it  leaves  un- 
satisfied the  strongest  necessities  of  our  intellectual  nature  ; 
it  admits  as  a  fact  that  the  phsenomena  are  connected,  but 
allows  no  cause  explanatory  of  the  fact  of  their  connec- 
tion." 3 

It  follows  from  what  has  been  said  of  the  connection 
between  a  mental  phajnomenon  and  consciousness,  that 
the  latter  is  coextensive  with  or  the  genus  of  all  the 
mental  phaenomena.  In  other  words,  if  consciousness 
be  regarded  as  a  power  of  knowledge,  it  is  a  general 
power,  not  a  special  one.  Perhaps  it  would  be  best  to 
keep  by  the  expression  that  consciousness  is  the  general 
condition  of  the  mental  phasnomena,  —  that  without 
which  none  of  them  is  a  phsenomenon  for  us.  Ham- 
ilton strongly  insists  on  this  view,  and  criticises  Eeid 
rigorously  for  holding,  as  he  alleges,  that  consciousness  is 
a  special  faculty  of  knowledge.  According  to  Hamilton, 
Reid,  following  Hutcheson,  and  followed  by  Stewart, 
Eoyer-Collard,  and  others,  makes  consciousness  a  special 
faculty  of  knowledge,  co-ordinate  with  the  other  special 


r. 


1  Metaphysics,  L.  VIII. 
—VI. 


^'lUd. 


^Ibid. 
F 


*    •  -  -•  I 


82 


Hamilton, 


faculties,  such  as  perception  and  memory,  and  dis- 
tinguishes consciousness  from  each  of  these,  as  he  dis- 
tinguishes each  of  these  from  the  other.  He  also  attri- 
butes to  Reid  the  doctrine  that  the  peculiar  object  of 
consciousness  is  each  operation  of  mind, — say  perception, 
memory,  imagination, — to  the  exclusion  of  the  objects 
of  those  acts. 

1^0 w  Hamilton  very  strongly  objects  to  this  view  or 
alleged  view  of  Reid.  (1.)  Consciousness  cannot  be 
really  distinguished  from  the  special  faculties  of  know- 
ledge; that  is,  consciousness  is  not  unless  as  a  special 
faculty  is  exercised.  (2.)  No  one  of  these  can  be  really 
discriminated  from  consciousness — that  is,  there  is  no 
exercise  of  a  special  faculty  apart  from  consciousness. 
(3.)  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  a  faculty  of  knowledge 
which  is  cognisant  of  a  mental  operation  and  not 
cognisant  of  its  object.  With  regard  to  the  first  point, 
we  know  (Ae.,  feel,  perceive,  remember,  imagine,  &c.) 
only  as  we  know  that  we  feel,  perceive,  remember,  &c. 
/  know  and  /  know  that  I  know  are  not  two  distinct 
acts,  but  one  and  the  same  act  of  mind.  I  cannot  know 
Avithout  knowing  that  I  know — i.e.,  feel,  perceive,  re- 
member. There  is  no  consciousness  for  me  apart  from 
some  specific  act  of  knowledge.  I  must  be  perceiv- 
ing, remembering,  imagining,  if  I  am  conscious  at  all 
Secondly,  I  cannot  exercise  any  act  of  knowledge, — 
perceiving,  remembering,  imagining, — without  at  the 
same  time  and  in  the  same  act  being  conscious  of  it. 
Tliere  is  no  special  faculty  in  exercise,  apart  from  con- 
sciousness. Thirdly,  I  cannot  be  conscious  of  the  act  of 
knowledge, — say  perception, — without  being  conscious  of 
the  object  perceived.     I  cannot  be  conscious  of  remem- 


Consciousness  a  General  Fewer, 


83 


bering  without  being  conscious  of  the  object  of  memory 
— i.e.,  the  picture  in  the  mind,  and  so  of  imagination. 
For,  (1.)  In  that  case  there  would  be  two  acts  in  percep- 
tion:  there  would  be  the  perception  with  its  object, 
the  outward  quahty;  there  would  be  the  consciousness 
with  its  object,  the  inward  act— the  perception.  (2.)  If 
we  were  conscious  of  the  act  and  not  conscious  of  the 
object  at  the  same  time,  we  could  not  tell  what  sort 
of  act  we  are  conscious  of.  It  is  the  object  which  giveo 
its  character  to  the  act  \  and  without  a  consciousness  of 
it,  we  could  not  tell  whether  the  act  is  perception, 
memory,  or  imagination.  Unless  I  am  conscious  of 
the  object  perceived,  I  cannot  say  that  I  perceive  at 
all,  and  I  cannot  say  that  the  perception  is  of  a  rose, 
or  a  table,  or  a  chair. 

On  these  grounds,  Hamilton  holds  consciousness  to 
be  the  general  power  of  knowledge,  —  not  a  special 
power,  but  the  genus  or  highest  class,  containing  under 
it  as  species  all  the  other  powers  of  knowledge.  It  is 
probable,  however,  that  Eeid  and  others  use  conscious^ 
ness  in  a  narrower  sense  than  Hamiltoa  They  mean 
by  it  chiefly,  if  not  exclusively,  self- consciousness,  or 
the  recognition  by  the  mind  or  self  of  its  own  acts  and 
states,  with  the  implicate  of  a  self  somehow  subsisting 
permanently  in  those  acts  and  states.  This,  no  doubt, 
is  to  contemplate  consciousness  in  one  only  of  its  aspects ; 
and  it  is  rather  this  exclusiveness  of  view  which  is  to  be 
censured,  than  any  general  or  positive  misconception  of 
the  sphere  of  consciousness,  regarded  in  its  relations 
universally  to  the  mental  acts  and  their  objects.  This 
self- consciousness  of  Reid  and  Stewart  is  almost  con- 
vertible with  voluntary  or  reflective  consciousness,  which 


Si 


Hamilton. 


makes  the  acts  its  matter  of  contemplation,  without 
special  reference  to  the  objects,  but  without  expressly 
denying  that  consciousness  in  the  general  sense  ex- 
tends to  acts  and  objects  alike.  Of  course  the  pro- 
priety of  applying  the  term  self-consciousness  to  an  act 
which  is  only  by  inference,  even  if  immediate  inference, 
cognisant  of  tlie  self,  is  open  to  question.  But  this 
criticism  would  apply  to  Hamilton's  oft-repeated  doctrine 
on  this  point  as  well  as  to  that  of  Eeid  and  Stewart. 

This  doctrine  of  the  inseparability  of  the  conscious 
act  of  knowledge  and  its  object,  might  have  been  left 
to  its  self-evidence,  had  it  not  been  for  the  extraordinary 
misconception  of  Hamilton's  doctrine  on  the  point  to 
be  found  in  ^lill's  criticism.  This  is  a  part  of  his  general 
misunderstanding  of  the  distinction  between  Immediate 
and  Mediate  knowledge,  to  which  the  doctrine  of  the 
inseparability  of  the  conscious  act  and  object  is  closely 
related. 

Mill  charges  Hamilton  with  giving  two  irreconcilable 
"  definitions  "  of  consciousness.  Hamilton,  of  course,  ex- 
pressly tells  us  that  consciousness  is  in  any  proper  sense 
of  the  term  indefinable.  It  can,  as  he  explains,  only  be 
*'  philosophically  analysed."  ^  "  Its  most  general  charac- 
teristic "  or  characteristics  can  be  stated ;  and  these  are 
to  be  realised  in  reflection,  each  man  for  himself.  But 
what  are  the  two  so-called  "  definitions  "  1  The  first  or 
most  general  characteristic  is  "the  recognition  by  the 
thinking  subject  of  its  o^vn  acts  or  affections."  This  is 
consciousness  itself.  Later,  Hamilton  states  as  a  feature 
of  the  act  of  consciousness,  "  that  it  is  an  immediate  or 
intuitive  knowledge,  and  that  this  holds  of  every  act  of 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  XI. 


3fiirs  Criticism, 


65 


consciousness."  Consciousness  is  always  of  what  is  now, 
or  of  what  is  now  and  here.  This  may  be  a  percept,  or  a 
picture  of  what  is  no  longer  now,  or  now  and  here.  The 
consciousness  is  of  the  picture  or  representation.  Tliis 
is  immediate  knowledge ;  but  the  picture  may  hold  up 
to  the  mind  a  past  object.  The  knowledge  of  the  past 
through  the  present  is  mediate  knowledge.  How  can 
these  statements  be  regarded  as  incompatible  Is  it 
not  held  that  the  apprehension  of  the  act  or  affection  of 
tlie  mind  is  intuitive  or  immediate  ?  How,  then,  is  this 
irreconcilable  with  the  statement  that  the  act  of  con- 
sciousness is  intuitive  ? 

But  JMill  seeks,  by  putting  a  meaning  of  his  own  into 
Hamilton's  words,  to  bring  out  an  inconsistency.    Hamil- 
ton holds,  that  in  some  acts  of  consciousness, — as  per- 
ception,— we  apprehend  immediately  not  only  the  act, 
but  the  object  of  the  act.     We  perceive  only  as  we  are 
conscious,  and  we  perceive  only  as  Ave  perceive  the  ob- 
ject.    How  is  this  inconsistent  with  the  statement  that 
the  conscious  act   is   immediate  or  intuitive]   or  witli 
the  former  statement  of  the  character  of  consciousness  % 
If  Mill  had  shown,  or  sought  to  show,  that  the  percipi- 
ent act  exists,  or  is  possible,  as  a  matter  of  consciousness, 
apart  from  its  object,  and  that  in  the  percipient  act  there 
is  thus  necessarily  a  double  act  of  knowledge,  he  would 
have  attempted  something  relevant.     What  he  does  is 
quite  different.     Hamilton  is  to  be  held  as  meaning,  by 
the  recognition  on  the  part  of  the  thinking  subject  of  its 
own  acts  or  affections,  also  of  "  all  that  is  therein  im- 
plied, or,  as  he  would  say,  contained."     Hamilton  is  to 
be  held  as  doing  no  such  thing,  in  several  senses  of  these 
words,  or  in  any  sense  of  the  word  relevant  to  the  pres- 


8Q 


Hamilton. 


ent  point  Neither  Hamilton  nor  any  one  else  with  a 
correct  conception  of  consciousness,  would  hold  that  it 
has  for  its  object  every  implicate  of  every  act  of  know- 
ledge or  state  of  mind.  Consciousness  is  of  the  present, 
and  the  present  only, — of  what  is  now,  or  now  and  here. 
And  he  offers  a  perfectly  distinct  explanation  of  the  re- 
lation of  any  existing  cognitive  act  of  consciousness  to 
what  lies  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  now  or  here.  But 
putting  this  utterly  foreign  meaning  on  Hamilton's  words. 
Mill  asks — 

"  How  can  he  refuse  the  name  of  consciousness  to  our  me- 
diate knowledge,— to  our  knowledge  or  belief  (for  instance) 
of  the  past  ?  The  past  reality  is  certainly  implied  in  the 
present  recollection  of  which  we  are  conscious ;  and  our 
author  has  said  that  all  our  mediate  knowledge  is  contained 
in  our  immediate,  as  he  has  elsewhere  said  that  knowledge 
of  the  outward  object  is  contained  in  our  knowledge  of  the 
perception."  ^ 

**  The  past  reality  is  certainly  implied  in  the  present 
recollection  of  which  we  are  conscious."  In  what  sense 
implied?  It  is  not  a  present  object  of  consciousness; 
it  is  a  past  object  or  reality.  This  past  object  is  in 
consciousness  as  an  image,  —  it  is  now  an  ima^^ed 
or  represented  object  As  a  represented  object  it  is 
known,  and  this  is  the  only  possible  sense  in  which  it 
can  be  known ;  and  as  such  the  knowledge  is  immediate, 
— immediate  or  intuitive  of  the  image.  Our  mediate 
knowledge  is  thus  "  contained "  in  our  immediate,  but 
not  "implied"  in  it,  as  Mill  would  pervert  the  sense. 
]S"or  has  Hamilton  ever  said  "  that  all  our  mediate  know- 
ledge is  contained  in  our  immediate,  just  as  knowledge  of 

*  Exam.,  chap.  viii.  p.  144. 


Its  Groundlessness. 


87 


I 


the  outward  object  is  contained  in  our  knowledge  of  the 
perception."  He  has  often  said  the  very  reverse, — that 
while  the  object  kno^vn  in  perception  cannot  be  separated 
from  the  percipient  act,  the  past  object  in  memory — i.e., 
the  original  or  presented  object — does  not  necessarily 
now  exist,  because  we  are  conscious  of  its  image,  or  that 
it  was  presented  to  us  at  a  past  time ;  whereas  the  ob- 
ject in  perception  being  now  apprehended,  now  neces- 
sarily exists.  This  confusion  of  "the  past  reality"  as 
object  of  presentation  and  of  representation,  runs  through 
the  whole  of  Mill's  criticism  of  Hamilton's  doctrine  of 
presentative  and  representative  knowledge.  He  never 
once  gets  within  sight  of  Hamilton's  meaning,  and  thus 
misconceives  the  essential  point  of  his  whole  doctrine  of 
Cognition  and  of  Eealism.^  Mill  actually  goes  the 
length  of  assuming  that  the  representation  of  that  which 
has  never  been  perceived  at  all,  as  in  the  theory  of  Eep- 
resentative  Perception,  is  exactly  parallel  with  the  rep- 
resentation in  Memory  of  that  which  was  presented  or 
perceived  at  a  past  time,  and  that  there  is  no  more  diffi- 
culty of  representation  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other ! 
Mill  carries  out  his  misconception  in  reference  to  the 
distinction  of  Knowledge  and  Belief.        » 

"  If  it  be  true  that  *  an  act  of  knowledge '  exists,  and  is 
what  it  is  'only  by  relation  to  its  object,'  this  must  be 
equally  true  of  an  act  of  Belief ;  and  it  must  be  as  manifest 
of  the  one  act  as  of  the  other,  *  that  it  can  be  known  only 
through  the  object  to  which  it  is  correlative.'  Therefore, 
past  events,  distant  objects,  .  .  .  inasmuch  as  they  are 
believed,  are  as  much  objects  of  immediate  knowledge  as 
things  finite  and  present, — since  they  are  presupposed  and 

1  See  below  further  on  this  point,  chap,  vi 


88 


Hamilton, 


implicitly  contained  in  the  mentiil  fact  of  belief,  exactly  as 
a  present  object  is  implicitly  contained  in  the  mental  fact  of 
perception."  ^ 

Belief  no  doubt  implies  an  object  believed  in ;  belief 
as  an  act  of  consciousness  implies  a  consciousness  of  the 
object  believed  in;   but  the  object  believed  in  is  not 
necessarily  always  an  object  of  the  same  sort.     It  may 
be  an  object  which  I  perceive  now  and  here— in  this 
time  and  this  space.     I  may  believe  in  the  reality  of 
that,  because  I  am  conscious  of  it.     Or  tlie  object  be- 
lieved in  may  be  an  imaged  object  corresponding  to 
that  wliicli  was  once  presented  to  me, — now  no  longer 
possibly  in   existence;    and   this   imaged   object,   with 
the  judgment  that  it  has  arisen  from  a  presentation  in 
the  past,  is  the  object  of  wliich  I  am  conscious,— nay, 
cognisant  only,— and  of  all  that  I  am  immecHately  cog- 
nisant.    I  believe  that  the  image  in  my  mind  represents 
what  once  was ;  but  the  past  event  itself  is  not  as  much 
an  object  of  immediate  knowledge  as  is  this  present,  or 
even  an  object  of  immediate  knowledge  at  all    The  same 
is  true  of  the  belief  in  the  distant  (or  absent)  object,— dis- 
tant in  space.    This  is  no  more  apprehended  immediately, 
because  the  image  of  it  is  apprehended,  than  the  past 
event  is  apprehended  intuitively  because  of  the  image  of 
it  in  the  consciousness. 

Besides  the  features  of  (1)  knowledge,  (2)  knowledge 
by  me,  and  (3)  immediate  knowledge  implied  in  con- 
sciousness, Hamilton  specifies  other  "conditions"  or 
"limitations."  These  are  most  fully  given  in  l^ote 
H  to  neMs  WorU^ 

1  Exam,,  chap.  viii.  p.  151. 

*  P.  929.    For  an  earlier  sketch  see  Metaj}hijsics,  L.  XT.,  XII. 


Conditions  of  Co7iscious7i€ss 


m 


(4)  Consciousness  is  an  actual,  not  o.  potential  know- 
ledge. There  may  be  knowledge  in  the  mind  in  a  state 
of  potentiality,  as,  for  example, — 

"a  man  is  said  to  know— that  is,  is  able  to  know— that  7 
-f  9  =  16,  though  that  equation  be  not,  at  the  moment, 
the  object  of  his  thouglit ;  but  we  cannot  say  that  he  is  con- 
scious of  this  truth  unless  while  actually  present  to  his 
mind."  ^ 

(5)  It  is  an  appreliemlon.  To  know,  we  must  know 
something ;  and  immediately  and  actually  to  know  any- 
thing is  to  know  it  as  now  and  here  existing— that  is, 
to  apprehend  it. 

(6)  It  is  a  discrimination,  and  supposes  therefore 
plurality  and  difference.  For  we  cannot  apprehend  a 
thing  unless  we  distinguisli  the  apprehending  subject 
from  the  apprehended  object. 

a.  There  is  the  contrast  between  the  opposites, — self 
and  not-self.  Ego  and  non-Ego,  mind  and  matter. 

h.  There  is  the  discrimination  of  tlie  modifications, — 
acts  and  states  of  the  internal  subject  or  self  from  each 
other.  We  are  conscious  of  one  mental  state  only  as  v^o 
distinguish  it  from  another. 

c.  There  is  tlie  discrimination  of  the  facts  and  quali- 
ties of  the  external  world.  We  are  conscious  of  an  ex- 
ternal quality  or  body  only  as  we  distinguish  it  from 
others.  2 

(7)  It  is  a  judgment.  We  cannot  apprehend  a  thing 
without,  pro  tanto,  affirming  it  to  exist.  Tliis  condition 
is  virtually  contained  in  the  preceding.  It  is  a  judg- 
ment affirmative  of  subjective  or  ideal  existence  in 
which  all  consciousness  is  realised. 

I  Metaphysics,  L.  XI.  2  ma.^  L.  XXXIV. 


90 


Hamilton. 


(8)  The  eighth  condition  is,  AVhatever  is  thought  is 
thought  under  the  attribute  of  existence,  —  existence 
being  a  notion  aprion\  and  the  primary  act  of  conscious- 
ness an  existential  judgment.  If  we  are  only  conscious 
as  we  apprehend  an  object,  and  only  apprehend  it  as  we 
affirm  it  to  exist,  existence  must  be  attributed  to  the 
object  by  the  mind ;  and  this  could  not  be  done  unless 
existence  as  a  notion  virtually  pre-existed  in  the  mind.^ 

Hamilton  insists  strongly  on  the  fact  that  judgment 
is  the  simplest  or  most  elementary  act  of  knowledge. 
But  he  recognises  two  kinds  or  rather  degrees  of  judg- 
ment,— what  we  might  venture  to  name  the  j^^jchologi- 
cal  (or  better  metaphysical)  judgment,  and  the  logical. 
The  first  or  simplest  form  of  judgment  is  "  the  primary 
affirmation  of  existence, — the  existential  judgment." 
"  The  notion  of  existence  is  native  to  the  mind.  The 
first  act  of  experience  awoke  it,  and  the  first  act  of  con- 
sciousness was  a  subsumption  of  that  of  which  we  were 
conscious  under  this  notion;  in  other  words,  the  first 
act  of  consciousness  was  an  affirmation  of  the  existence 
of  something.  The  first  and  simplest  act  of  comparison 
is  thus  the  discrimination  of  existence  from  non-exist- 
ence ;  and  the  first  or  simplest  judgment  is  the  affirma- 
tion of  existence, — in  other  words,  the  denial  of  non- 
existence. "^ 

The  existence  affirmed  in  the  primary  judgment  is 
either  ideal,  as  of  a  mode  of  consciousness,  or  real,  as  of 
a  quality  of  a  non-Ego. 

The  other  form  of  judgment,  which  may  be  called  the 
logical,  is  "  a  judgment  of  something  more  than  a  mere 
affirmation  of  the  existence  of  a  phsenomenon, — some- 

1  Raid's  W(yrks,  p.  934.  2  Metaphysics,  L.  XXXIV. 


Conditions  of  Consciousness. 


91 


i 


thing  more  than  a  mere  discrimination  of  one  phseno- 
menon  from  another."  This  is  "the  more  varied  and 
elaborate  comparison  of  one  notion  with  another,  and 
the  enouncement  of  their  agreement  and  disagreement."^ 
This  comparison  of  notion  and  notion,  or  of  individual 
and  notion, — of  subject  and  predicate, — is  obviously 
only  possible  through  the  primary  judgment,  for  subject 
and  predicate  as  separate  notions  must  be  conceived, 
and  in  the  conception  affirmed  ideally  to  be,  ere  we  can 
join  or  disjoin  them  in  the  secondary  or  logical  judgment. 
This  is  an  important  and  fundamental  point  in  every 
philosophy  of  knowledge  and  being. 

(9)  The  ninth  limitation  of  consciousness  is,  that  Avliile  . 
only  realised  in  the  recognition  of  existence,  it  is  only  ' 
realised  in  the  recognition  of  the  existent  as  conditioned.^ 

(10)  The  tenth  limitation  of  consciousness  is  that  of 
Tirtie.    This  is  the  necessary  condition  of  every  conscious 
act ;  thought  is  only  realised  to  us  as  in  succession,  and 
succession  is  only  conceived  by  us  under  the  concept  of 
time.     Existence  and  existence  in  time  is  thus  an  ele- 
mentary form  of  our  intelligence.     But  we  do  not  con- 
ceive existence  in  time  absolutely  or  infinitely — we  con- . 
ceive  it  only  as  conditioned  in  time;    and   existence 
conditioned  in  time  expresses  at  once  and  in  relation,  the 
three  categories  of  thought,  which  afford  us  in  combina- 
tion the  principle  of  causality.     Existence  thus  known 
as  successive,  is  essential  to  what  we  call  consciousness ; 
and  the  latter  accordingly  involves  Memory.^ 

The   general   doctrine    of    consciousness    now  given 
suggests   several   points   for  remark.      I  confess  there 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  XXXVII.       «  See  further  below,  chaps,  ix.,  x.,  xi. 
»  Compare  Metaphysics,  L.  XI. 


92 


Hamilton, 


Knowledge  of  the  Ego. 


93 


seems  to  me  some  very  considerable  amliiguity  in  the 
doctrine  of  Hamilton  regarding  our  knowledge  of  the 
Ego.     The  Ego,  or  Self,  cannot  be  tiidy  or  properly 
said  to  be  unknown  or  unknowable.      It  is  true  that 
we  do  not  know  a  self  per  se,  or  an  Ego,  out  of  rela- 
tion to  a  state  or  act  of  consciousness.     I  know  myself 
to  be,  only  as  I  know  myself  to  be  feeling,  to  be  per- 
ceiving, to  be  willing,  or  in  some  definite  act.     I  never 
apprehend  myself  apart  from  a  conscious  state ;  I  never 
apprehend  a  conscious  state  apart  from  myself.     This  is 
tme ;  and  in  that  sense,  as  separate  existences,  self  and 
phainomenon  are  alike  unknowable,  if  not  meaningless. 
But  I  do  apprehend  or  know  myself  truly,  really,  when 
I  apprehend  or  know  any  state  of  consciousness.     "  I  am 
conscious  of  this  or  that  thing  "  means  that  I  know  myself 
to  Ije, — to  be  one, — to  be  one  among  many, — to  be  one 
and  the  same, — to  be  more  than  the  existing  or  tempo- 
rary state.     And  if  I  know  all  this,  I  know  a  great  deal 
about  myself, — as  much,  in  fact,  as  I  know  about  the 
act  or  state  itself.     And  in  so  knowing  myself,  I  know 
myself  not  by  means  of  inference  or  suggestion  from  the 
previous  or  contemporaneous  knowledge  of  the  act  or 
state ;  I  know  myself  directly  as  in  and  along  with  the 
act  or  state.    At  least,  in  and  along  with  this  act  or  state, 
I  know  myself  to  be ;  and  in  and  along  with  the  various 
acts  and  states,  I  know  niyself  to  be  one  and  the  same. 
It  is  only  with  regard  to  my  identity  that  succession  of 
various  states  is  needed ;  and  it  is  only  here,  and  in  and 
through  these,  that  there  can  be  any  ground  for  saying 
that  I  do  not  directly  or  immediately  know  myself  to  be 
the  same.     ^ly  oneness  and  identity  are  consciously  im- 
plied, at  least,  in  the  very  fact  of  my  knowledge  of  a 


ii 
§ 


succession  in  consciousness.  It  would  seem,  indeed,  that 
while  self  can  be  directly  apprehended  as  in  contrast  to 
the  act  or  state  of  consciousness,  as  soon  as  we  can  realise 
the  fact  and  meaning  of  an  act  or  state  at  all,  it  is  only 
through  the  knowledge  of  successive  states  that  we  can 
know  the  identity  of  the  self,— as  against  the  manifold ; 
while,  at  the  same  time,  the  knowledge  of  the  manifold 
is  possible  only  through  the  knowledge  of  the  accompany- 
ing—even underlying— identity  of  self.  The  identity 
of  self  cannot  thus  be  given  in  a  single  intuition ;  it  can 
be  realised  only  through  its  relation  to  successive  in- 
tuitions, as  these  can  be  realised  only  through  relation 
to  this  identity. 

If,  moreover,  there  be  a  primary  belief  in  a  conscious 
subject  or  Ego,  if,  further,  its  reality  be  inferred  or 
supposed  on  the  general  principle  of  a  necessity  of 
thought,  and  if  this  subject  be  known  as  different  from 
that  of  tlie  material  phaiuomena, — it  cannot  properly  be 
said  to  be  unknowable,  or  even  unknown.  The  conscious 
subject,  in  so  far  as  it  is  that  which  knows,  feels,  and 
%vills,  is  very  distinctly  and  definitely  an  object  of  know- 
ledge to  itself.  What  it  is,  or  whether  it  is,  independ-  ' 
ently  of  these  relative  manifestations,  may  be  considered 
soluble  questions  or  not ;  but  thus  at  least,  as  the  term 
of  a  relation,  it  is  object  of  definite,  even  immediate 
knowledge. 

On  this  point  of  the  mediate  or  inferential  know- 
ledge of  the  Ego,  Hamilton  cannot,  however,  be  said  to 
be  quite  consistent.  There  are  passages  in  which  he 
seems  to  assert  an  immediate  knowledge  or  conscious- 
ness of  the  Ego  or  Self  as  well  as  of  the  state  and  alon^r 
with  it. 


\ 


91 


Hamilton, 


He  tells  us  that  "the  something  of  which  we  are 
conscious,  and  of  which  we  predicate  existence  in  the 
primary  judgment,  is  twofold, — the  Ego  and  the  non- 
Ego.  We  are  conscious  of  both,  and  affirm  existence  of 
both."^  If  we  are  conscious  of  the  Ego,  as  we  are  of 
the  non-Ego,  it  must  be  kno^vn  immediately,  not  me- 
diately. The  immediate  knowledge  of  the  Ego,  as  well 
as  of  the  non-Ego,  seems  indeed  essential  to  his  doc- 
trine of  Natural  Dualism.  These  are  regarded  as  the 
original  and  ultimate  elements  of  our  experience, — given 
or  presented  in  mutual  relatioa 

Hamilton's  doctrine  regarding  the  Identity  of  Self 
and  its  ground  is  not  more  satisfactory.  In  evolving 
fully  the  conditions  of  consciousness,  he  makes  one  of 
these  succession  in  time,  and  hence  Memory.  He  adds 
to  this  that  Memory  is  necessary,  («)  in  order  to  the 
holding  fast,  comparison  and  distinction  of  the  mental 
states;  (1))  their  reference  to  self.  "Without  it,  each 
moment  in  the  mental  succession  would  be  a  separate 
existence 

"  The  notion  of  the  Ego  or  Self  arises  from  the  recognised 
permanence  and  identity  of  the  thinking  subject  in  contrast 
to  the  recognised  succession  and  variety  of  its  modifications. 
This  recognition  is  possible  only  through  memory.  The 
notion  of  self  is,  therefore,  the  result  of  memory.  But  the 
notion  of  self  is  involved  in  consciousness,  so  consequently  is 
memory 


»2 


This  is,  perhaps,  stated  in  a  way  too  unqualified.  It 
is  certainly  not  the  whole  of  the  truth  in  the  matter. 
For,  on  the  other  hand,  {a)  consciousness  as  a  direct  act 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  IX.  *  Ihid.,  L.  XI. 


V 


Consciousness  and  Mental  Fhxnomena.        95 

of  intuition  is  obviously  necessary  to  memory.  Memory 
of  that  which  was  never  in  consciousness  is  obviously 
impossible.  Memory  cannot  thus  ground  consciousness ; 
consciousness  grounds  memory. 

ih)  The  notion  of  self  and  the  notion  of  the  per- 
manence and  identity  of  self  are  not  quite  the  same; 
and  while  the  identity  of  self  is  known  through  succes- 
sion and  variety,  possible  only  on  the  supposition  of 
memory,  the  notion  of  self  cannot  be  said  to  be  "  the 
result  of  memory."  Memory  itself  already  supposes  the 
notion  of  self  and  a  permanent  identical  self  capable  of  so 
knowing  the  succession  and  variety  in  contrast  to  itself.^ 
It  would  be  better  to  say  that  consciousness  is  realised 
in  and  through  memory,  and  memory  is  realised  in  and 
through  consciousness;  and  that  both  repose  on  and 
presuppose  a  self,  one  and  identical  in  time, — a  reality 
which,  however,  is  revealed  to  us,  or  which  we  know 
ourselves  to  be,  only  in  consciousness,  and  in  fuU  and 
clear,  or  reflective  consciousness. 

Consciousness,  thus,  being  the  common  element  or 
condition  of  all  mental  phaenomena  as  such,  certain 
important  questions  still  arise.  The  most  general  of 
these  is,  "What  precisely  is  the  relation  of  consciousness 
to  each  kind  or  class  of  the  mental  phaenomena  %  Is  it 
related  to  each  in  exactly  the  same  way,  or  if  differ- 
ently, howl 

On  this  point  it  cannot  be  said  that  Hamilton's  doc- 
trine is  perfectly  clear.  He  tells  us,  no  doubt,  that 
consciousness,  this  general  condition  of  the  existence  of 
the  modifications  of  mind,  "  or  of  their  existence  within 
the  sphere  of  intelligence,"  is  "not  to  be  viewed  as 
1  Compare  Reid's  Works,  pp.  350-353. 


96 


Hamilton, 


anything  different  from  these  modifications  themselves."^ 
It  may  be  taken,  in  fact,  as  their  mmmum  genm,  or  as 
that  element  >vhich  can  he  predicated  of  each  kind 
universally. 

«  Consciousness  is  simple,— is  not  composed  of  parts,  either 
similar  or  dissimilar.  It  always  resembles  itself,  differing 
only  in  the  degrees  of  its  intensity  :  thus  there  are  not 
various  kinds  of  consciousneas,  although  there  are  various 
kinds  of  mental  modes  or  stiites,  of  wliich  we  are  conscious."  2 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  it  that  constitutes  the 
difference  in  kind  of  a  mental  state,  if  it  be  not  a 
difference  in  consciousness  1  So  far  as  the  relation  of 
consciousness  to  the  acts  of  knowledge  is  concerned,  we 
may  take  the  doctrine  a^  sufficiently  clear  and  explicit. 
On  this  point  he  says :  ^^Consciousness  and  knowledge 
are,  in  fact,  the  same  thing  considered  in  different 
relations,  or  from  different  points  of  view.  Knowledge 
is  consciousness  viewed  in  relation  to  its  object;  con- 
sciousness is  knowledge  viewed  in  relation  to  its  subject. 
The  one  signalises  that  somefhhig  is  Irnoirn  {hy  me);  the 
other  signalises  that  I htoio  (something)."^ 

When  we  come  to  the  question  of  the  precise  relation 
of  consciousness  to  the  facts  of  feeling,  desire,  and  voli- 
tion, there  does  seem  considerable  difficulty  in  its  proper 
statement  and  adjustment.  Consciousness  being  admit- 
tedly the  mtimmwi  genus  of  all  the  modifications  of 
mind,  each  is  a  consciousness,  l^ut  then  each  kmd — 
feeling,  desire,  volition  —  differs  from  knowledge,  and 
from  each  other.  In  answer  to  those  who  maintain  the 
faculty  of   cognition  to  be  the  fundamental   power  of 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  XT.  ^  Ibid. 

»  Rnd's  Works,  Note  H,  p.  933. 


Mental  Latenjcy. 


97 


mind  from  which  all  others  are  derivative,  he  says  that 
they  did  not  observe  that  although  pleasure  and  pain, 
desire  and  volition,  are  only  as  they  are  known  to  be, 
yet  in  these  a  quality  of  mind  absolutely  new  has  been 
superadded.     This  was  not  involved  in,  and,  therefore, 
could  not  have  been  evolved  out  of,  the  new  faculty  of 
knowledge.^   In  what  terms,  then,  are  we  to  describe  the 
specific  difference  ?     The  common  element  is  knowledge, 
and  knowledge  only.     How  am  I  to  distinguish,  thus, 
perception  from  feeling,  or  feeling  from  desire  or  voli- 
tion ]    Wherein  precisely  lies  the  difference  in  the  con- 
sciousness?    Is  it  an  element  other  or  more  than  con- 
sciousness'?    Is  this,  then,  a  mental  element]     Or  is 
there  in  the  consciousness  of  feeling  or  volition  a  mental 
element  which  is  not  a  conscious  element  %    Either  con- 
sciousness is  more  than  mere  recognition  of  each  mental 
state  as  mine,  or  there  is  more  than  consciousness  in  each 
mental  phaenomenon.     Consciousness  seems  indeed  to  be 
badly  described  when  it  is  restricted  to  simple  recog- 
nition or  knowledge  of  mental  modifications  :  as  such  it 
is  not  convertible  with  every  mental  modification  expe- 
rienced, and  yet  we  cannot  throw  out  of  consciousness 
either  the    distinctive    element   of    feeling,   desire,    or 
volition. 

"  Consciousness  is  the  general  condition  of  their  ex- 
istence [the  modifications  of  mind],  or  of  their  existence 
within  the  sphere  of  intelligence"  ^  It  is  to  be  regarded 
"as  a  general  expression  for  the  primary  and  funda- 
mental condition  of  all  the  energies  and  affections  of  our 
mind,  inasmuch  as  these  are  know7i  to  exist." ^ 


^  Metaphysics,  L.  XI. 

3  Rdd's  Works,  p.  929. 
P. — YL 


^Ihid, 


98 


Hamilton, 


Mental  Latency, 


99 


These  and  similar  statements  would  seem  to  imply 
tliat  apart  from  a  consciousness  there  is  no  mental  phae- 
nomenon,  that  every  mental  phsenomenon  is  a  conscious- 
ness. But  this  is  not  consistent  with  what  Hamilton 
elsewhere  maintains.  He  very  expressly  teaches  a 
doctrine  of  what  is  called!  Mental  Latency ^This  im- 
plies that  there  are  modifications  of  mind,  activities 
and  passivities,  of  which,  while  they  exist,  there  is  no 
consciousness,  which  never  rise  into  consciousness  at 
all,  and  which  are  yet  influential  on  our  actual  or  con- 
scious experienced  g^he  first  degree  of  latency  is  shown 
in  the  possession  hy  the  mind  of  what  it  does  not 
actually  at  the  present  moment  put  into  use, — as  the 
knowledge  of  a  language.  The  second  degree  is  shown 
when  knowledge  and  habits  of  action  of  which  the 
mind  is  wholly  unconscious  in  its  ordinary  state  are 
revealed  to  consciousness  in  certain  extraordinary  ex- 
altations of  its  powers, — as  in  febrile  delirium,  somnam- 
bulism, &c.  The  third  and  highest  degree  is  found  in 
our  ordinary  experience,  when  mental  activities  and  pas- 
sivities of  which  we  are  unconscious  manifest  their  ex- 
istence by  effects  of  which  we  are  conscious.  He  even 
maintains  "  that  what  we  are  conscious  of  is  constructed 
out  of  what  we  are  not  conscious  of, — that  our  whole 
knowledge  is  made  up  of  the  unknown  and  the  incog- 
nisable."  \\  His  general  Ime  of  proof  of  this  position  is, 
that  certain  parts  of  consciousness  necessarily  suppose 
those  mental  modifications  to  exist,  and  to  exert  an  in- 
fluence on  the  conscious  processes.  He  appeals  to  the 
facts  of  Perception,  Association,  and  the  acquired  Dex- 
terities or  Habits,  in  support  of  his  views. 

1  Metaphysics^  L.  XVII.     Cf.  Reid's  Works^  p.  933 


Of  course,  if  there  be  truly  mental  acts  and  states 
below  or  beyond  consciousnessfconsciousness  is  not  in- 
dispensable to  mental  activity— is  not  an  essential  con- 
dition of  a  mental  energy.     It  is  only  the  condition  of 
the  phenomena  of  the  mind,  or  those  energies  of  mind 
which  appear  or  are  known  to  us, — to  the  Self  or  Eo-o 
— "  of  their  existence  within  the  sphere  of  intelligence," 
or  "  inasmuch  as  these  are  known  to  exist.'']  It  cannot 
consistently  be  maintained  that  every  mental  modifica- 
tion is  a  conscious  one,  or  appears  in  consciousness,  and 
that  there  are  modifications  of  mind  of  which  there  is  no 
consciousness  whatever.    Consciousness  would  indeed  on 
this  view  be  the  highest  development  of  mental  energy, 
but  not  the  only  one.     It  would  include  only  the  experi- 
ence we  have  of  the  mental  energies.   This  would  be  equiv- 
alent to  saying  that  consciousness  of  the  mental  modifica- 
tions is  essential  to  those  modifications  which  we  know 
and  experience  in  the  shape  of  feeling,  desire,  and  will. 

There  are  serious  difficulties  on  any  aspect  of  this 
doctrine  of  latent  mental  energies.     Are  these,  it  may 
be  asked,  the  same  in  character  with  the  conscious  ones 
—with  conscious  knowledge,  feeling,  and  volition?     If 
so,  how  can  it  be  said  that  consciousness  is  essential  to 
knowledge,  feeling,  volition?     Are  they  different  from 
the   conscious   modifications,   and   yet   mental?      Then   ; 
they  differ  by  opposites,— even  contradictories,— for  the   , 
conscious  and  the  unconscious  are  so ;  and  yet  they  are 
regarded  as  of  the  same  genus,— mental     This  whole    ' 
doctrine  of  latency,  and  its  consistency  with  one  main    * 
position  in  his  philosophy,  are  obviously  points  which 
Hamilton  has  not  thoroughly  sifted.     And  the  truth  is, 
that  his  proof  is  by  no  means  cogent. 


y 


100 


Hamilton, 


Mental  Latency, 


101 


Tliis  third  degree  of  latency  may  be  fairly  questioned. 
It  is  not  clear  that  there  is  any  necessity  to  suppose 
that  each  half  of  the  minimum  vidhile^  for  example, 
makes  any  impression  on  the  mind.  The  conscious  act  of 
])erception  may  arise  as  a  new  phfenomenon  only  after  a 
certain  amount  of  surface  has  reflected  the  rays  of  light. 
Tor  it  is  not  sho^vn  that  the  reflection  of  the  liglit  or  the 
amount  of  illuminated  surface  is  more  than  a  mere  con- 
cause,  which  operates  only  in  conjunction  with  coexist- 
ing mental  power.  If  it  is  merely  the  occasion  of  a  per- 
ceptive energy, — an  a})prehensive  act, — there  is  no  need 
for  supposing  its  halves  or  elements  to  have  had  any 
effect,  before  tlicir  synthesis,  and  then  only  in  the  mo- 
ment of  their  cognition  by  the  conscious  mind 

Further,  the  uecidiarity  of  Hamilton's  third  degree  of 
Latency  is  that  jwhat  is  latent — the  unconscious  mental 
modification — never  is  in  consciousness  at  all  before  it 
exists  in  latencyj  In  ^lemory  or  Delirium,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  was  first  a  conscious  state ;  and  this,  through 
decay  or  decrease,  falls,  as  it  were,  below  consciousness 
into  latency.  Tliere  is  thus  a  peciUiar  difficulty  for  the 
third  grade  of  latency  in  attempting  to  show  that  the 
conscious  arises  out  of  the  unconsciou§J  This  cannot 
be  regarded  as  a  mere  case  of  physical  transmutation  of 
force  ;  for  the  two  states  are  not  supposed  to  be  equally 
physical,  or  of  the  same  kind  at  all  There  is,  in  fact, 
|no  natural  community  or  known  continuity  of  develop- 
ment between  the  unconscious — now  called  mental — 
and  the  conscious  state  or  act]  The  union  thus  of  the 
two  halves  of  the  minimum  sensibile  cannot  be  regarded 
as  affording  as  product  this  new,  unique,  and  singidar 
phaenomenon,  the  consciousness  of  the  object.     There  is 


a  break  here  of  physical  continuity ; — and  the  physical 
analogy  is  inapplicable.     There  is  far  more  in  the  con- 
scious act  of  the  perception  of  a  surface  than  the  mere 
surface,  or  the  union  of  the  two  portions  of  the  rays  of 
light.     All  the  space  and  time  conditions,  and  certain  of 
the  categories  of  thought,  are  involved, — especially  dis- 
crimination or  judgment.    The  phoenomenon  of  conscious 
perception  is  thus  not  only  unique,  it  contains  more 
than  its  supposed  antecedent   or   cause.      The  simple 
explanation  of  the  fact  seems  to  lie  in  this  :  (1)  That 
certain  physical  or  physiological  conditions,  or  impres- 
sions, are  needed  in  the  Sense ;  and  (2)  that  these  must 
be  completed  or  fulfilled  ere  the  conscious  act  arises. 
The  amount  of  the  reflection  of  the  rays  of  light  and  the 
conscious  perception  may  stand  to  each  other  in  the  re- 
lation of  antecedent  and  consequent,  and  yet  tliere  may 
be  no  community  or  continuity  of  development  between 
the  unconscious  and  the  conscious.  Cjmpressions  on  the 
organs  and  nerves  may  be  needed,  to  a  definite  extent ; 
but  it  does  not  follow  that  the  conscious  sensation  or 
perception  is  the  product  or  up-gathering  of  these  im- 
pressions, which  are  wholly  unknown  to  consciousness.! 
!N'othing  is  gained,  moreover,  by  introducing  the  notion 
of  unconscious  mental  modification  as  an  intermediary. 
For  of  this  we  can  form  no  precise  iconception.     Ob- 
viously mental  latencies  may  in  some  sense  be  allowed 
in  regard  to  acts  and  states  once  in  consciousness.    These 
do  not  pass  beyond  the  sphere  of  mind, — at  least  beyond 
the  power  of  recall     But  mental  modifications  not  orig-  ) 
inally  conscious  seem  to  imply  great  difficulty,  and  ex-  / 
plain  nothing. 

To  apply  the  term  knowledge,  as  Hamilton  does,  to 


102 


Hamilton, 


a  state  or  mode  of  consciousness  in  latency  is  of  very 
doubtful  propriety.  As  latent,— as  below  consciousness, 
—it  is  not  knowledge  :  it  is  admittedly  only  knowledge 
as  it  is  realised  in  a  present  or  actual  mode  of  conscious- 
ness. But  then  it  is  no  longer  potential  or  a  potency ; 
it  is  an  actual  conscious  state.  To  call  it  knowledge, 
when  in  latency  or  potentiality,  is  certainly  to  contradict 
the  statement  that  consciousness  is  all  knowledge,  or 
that  all  knowledge  is  consciousness.  And  if  it  be  only 
knowledge  when  it  has  ceased  to  be  latent  and  risen  to 
consciousness,  then  it  was  not  properly  knowledge  be- 
fore. In  truth,  the  phrase  potential  knowledge  can  only 
properly  be  construed  as  referring  to  certain  conditions 
of  knowledge,— partly  physiological,  partly  psychological, 
— antecedent  to  or  accompanying  the  actual  conscious- 
ness. But  it  would  be  well  not  to  call  these  knowledge, 
— even  potential  knowledge. 


\ 


103 


CHAPTEE    lY. 


CONSCIOUSNESS — ITS   AUTHORITY   AND   VERACITY — THE 
ARGUMENT   FROM    COMMON   SENSE. 


The  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense,  as  held  and  ex- 
plained by  Hamilton,  is  none  other  than  the  attempt  to 
analyse  knowledge  or  consciousness, — our  experience,  in 
fact,  into  its  elements  He  has  explicitly  and  with  re- 
iteration shown  that  by  "  Common  Sense  "  he  does  not 
mean  the  transfer  to  philosophy  of  "a  sound  under- 
standing applied  to  vulgar  objects,  in  contrast  to  a 
scientific  or  speculative  intelligence,"  as  an  instrument 
of  research. 

"  It  is  ill  this  sense,"  he  says,  « that  it  has  been  taken  by 
those  who  have  derided  the  principle  on  which  the  philo- 
sophy which  has  been  distinctly  denominated  the  Scottish, 
professes  to  be  established."  ^ 

He  has  further  explicitly  shown  that  the  Argument 
from  Common  Sense  or  the  method  of  the  Philosophy  of 
Common  Sense,  though 

"an  appeal  to  the  natural  con\action8  of  mankind,  is  not 
an  appeal  from  philosophy  to  blind  feeling.  It  is  only  an 
appeal  from  the  theoretical  conclusions  of  particular  philo- 
sophers to  the  catholic  principles  of  all  philosophy."  * 


Metajphysics,  L.  XXXVIII. 


^Reid's  Works,  ^.  751. 


104 


HamiltoTi, 


As  it  has  been  well  put : — 


(( 


It  carries  the  appeal  into  a  sphere  where  the  philosophic 
and  the  vulgar  have  ceased  to  be  distinguished  ;  it  shows 
that  not  the  mind  of  the  philosopher,  and  not  the  mind  of 
the  vulgar,  but  the  mind  of  man  is  what  philosophy  has  to 
deal  with,  and  that  its  office  is  to  resolve  current  beliefs  into 
their  elements,  not  satisfied  until  it  has  reached  the  final 
and  absolutely  pure  deliverance  of  consciousness."  ^ 

Hamilton  tells  us  : — 

"  The  first  problem  of  philosophy  is  to  seek  out,  purify, 
and  establish,  by  intellectual  analysis  and  criticism,  the  ele- 
mentary feelings  and  beliefs  in  which  are  given  the  element- 
ary truths  of  which  all  are  in  possession."  "  This  is  depend- 
ent on  philosophy  as  an  art.  Common  Sense  is  like  Com- 
mon Law.  Each  may  be  laid  do^^^l  as  the  general  rule  of 
decision  ;  but  in  the  one  case  it  must  be  left  to  the  jurist, 
in  the  other  to  the  philosopher,  to  ascertain  what  are  the 
contents  of  the  rule.''  - 

Nothing  can  well  be  more  explicit  than  these  state- 
ments. And  we  should  long  ago  have  ceased  to  hear 
the  paltry  criticism  of  the  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense 
to  which  Hamilton  here  refers.  His  own  practice  alone 
should  have  sufficed  to  give  people  a  better  light.  This 
philosophy  differs  as  to  method  in  nothing  from  any 
other  possible  philosophy  which  is  consistent  with  itself. 
Every  system  must  accept  and  start  from  experience, — 
individual  or  universal,  or  both.  A  beginning  alleged 
in  a  point  above  or  beyond  our  actual  experience  is  an 
absurdity.  This  is  a  method  which  professes  to  con- 
struct itself  and  its  datum.     Such  a  method  is  not  pos- 

1  Encyclop.  Brit,  Sir  W.  ITamiltorif  by  Miss  Hamilton. 
*  Reiil's  W&rkSy  pp.  751,  752. 


• 


Argument  from  Common  Sense,  It 

sible  ;  and  if  it  were,  it  would  never  yield  a  philosophy 
of  experience,  or  be  anything  but  abstract  and  fantastic 
verbalism.  The  value  of  the  philosophy  of  Common 
Sense,  in  this  respect,  is,  that  it  indicates  the  ultimate 
and  universal  elements  in  experience,  and  attempts 
also  their  co-ordination,  and,  so  far,  their  systematising. 
And  one  thing  it  does  legitimately ;  it  challenges  a  so- 
called  speculative  or  rationalising  philosophy  to  show 
how  what  is  alleged  to  be  illusory  or  unreal  in  our  actual 
experience  has  grown  up  to  be  as  it  is ;  and  this  is  a 
task  which  that  style  of  speculation  is  much  more  in- 
clined to  pass  by  than  to  attempt.  The  usual  shift  is, 
while  employing  the  term  experience,  and  words  indicat- 
ing its  contents  as  facts,  to  sublimate  these  into  merely 
verbal  relations. 

The  principles  of  Common  Sense  which  Hamilton 
professes  to  find,  and  which  he  seeks  by  a  strictly 
philosophical  method,  are  thus  simply  the  necessary  and 
universal  principles  of  human  knowedge, — reached,  as 
they  can  only  be  reached,  through  analytical  reflection 
on  experience  itself.  If  there  be  such  principles  at  all, 
they  must  be  reflected  in  common  belief  and  action,  in 
history,  in  language,  in  morals,  and  in  social  institutions. 
What  degree  of  importance  is  to  be  given  to  the  practical 
embodiment  and  application  of  those  principles  is  a  very 
pertinent  question  for  philosophy.  But  Hamilton  does 
not  put  this  recognition  and  exemplification  as  the  ulti- 
mate basis  of  philosophy;  he  fairly  grants  it  to  be  matter 
of  analysis,  along  with  the  consciousness  of  the  indi- 
vidual thinker,  and  in  the  light  of  that  consciousness. 
He  off*ers  criteria  for  determining  the  existence,  the 
nature,  the  number  of  those  princiides;  and  those  who 


lOG 


Hamilton, 


attack  his  position  must  understand  this.  Otherwise 
their  efforts  are  but  a  heating  of  the  air.  In  a  very- 
marked  way,  indeed,  did  Hamilton  recognise  the  prac- 
tical embodiment  of  the  universal  principles  of  know- 
ledge. He  regarded  it  as  a  datum  to  be  dealt  with,  and 
the  principles  realised  as  worthy  of  respect  and  careful 
scrutiny.  It  was  not  to  him  a  proof  that  a  principle 
is  illusory  or  false  because  it  happens  to  be  commonly 
embodied  in  history  and  civil  institutions,  or  proceeded 
upon  in  human  action.  This  he  left  for  Spinoza,  and 
those  who  profess  to  construct  what  they  call  reality ; 
to  show  how  greatly  superior  this  ideal  scheme  is  to 
anything  realised,  and,  indeed,  that  whatever,  in  actual 
experience,  does  not  conform  to  \i^  requirements,  is  truly 
unreal  or  non-existent.  No  one  in  these  times  has 
struck  with  firmer  hand  than  Hamilton  at  a  theory 
which  confounds  and  perverts  the  fundamental  distinc- 
tions of  experience,  and  resolves  reality  into  a  spinning 
whirl  of  contradictions,  or  into  figures  of  such  indefinite- 
ness  as,  like  the  spectre  crowd — 

"  seem  to  rise  and  die, 
Gibber  and  sign,  advance  and  fly, 
Wliile  nought  confirmed  can  ear  or  eye 
Discern  of  sound  or  mien." 

The  criteria, — the  essential  notes  or  characters, — by 
which  we  are  enabled  to  distinguish  our  original  from 
our  derivative  cognitions,  are,  as  finally  stated  by  Hamil- 
ton, four : — 

1.  Their  Incomprehensibility.  When  we  are  able  to 
comprehend  how  or  why  a  thing  is,  the  belief  of  the 
existence  of  that  thing  is  not  a  primary  datum  of  con- 


Tests  of  Principles, 


107 


V 


-il 


Bciousness,  but  a  subsumption  under  the  cognition  or 
belief  which  affords  its  reason. 

2.  Their  Simplicity.  If  a  cognition  or  belief  be 
made  up  of,  and  can  be  explicated  into,  a  plurality  of 
cognitions  or  beliefs,  it  is  manifest  that,  as  compound,  it 
cannot  be  original 

3.  Their  !N"ecessity  and  Absolute  Universality.  These 
may  be  regarded  as  coincident, — for  when  a  belief  is 
necessary,  it  is,  eo  ipso^  universal ;  and  that  a  belief  is 
universal,  is  a  certain  index  that  it  must  be  necessary. 
To  prove  the  necessity,  the  universality  must,  however, 
be  absolute ;  for  a  relative  universality  indicates  no 
more  than  custom  and  education,  although  the  subjects 
themselves  may  deem  that  they  follow  the  dictates  of 
nature. 

4.  Their  Comparative  Evidence  and  Certainty.  This 
alone,  with  the  third,  is  well  stated  by  Aristotle,  "  What 
appears  to  all,  that  we  affirm  to  he  ;  and  he  who  rejects 
this  belief  will  assuredly  advance  nothing  better  deserv- 
ing of  credence."  ^ 

Hamilton,  in  laying  down  and  applying  those  canons 
of  analysis,  expressly  seeks  to  set  aside,  as  neither 
primary  nor  ultimate,  what  can  be  shown  to  be  due  to 
mere  generalisation.  The  two  first  tests, — Incomprehen- 
sibility and  Simplicity, — provide  for  this.  He  even 
says :  "  An  element  of  thought  being  found  necessary, 
there  remains  a  further  process  to  ascertain  whether  it 
be  (1)  by  nature  or  education;  (2)  ultimately  or  deriv- 
atively necessary  \  (3)  positive  or  negative."^ 

1  Reid's  Works,  pp.  754,  755.     Cf.  Metaphysics,  IJ.  XV. 

2  Reid's  WorkSf  p.  18 ;  Metaphysics,  L.  XXXVIII.     See  helow, 
chaps,  ix.  X.  xi. 


mos 


Hamilton, 


Hamilton  virtually  says,  in  regard  to  the  proposed  gen- 
eralisation of  the  whole  of  knowledge  from  experience, 
— This  cannot  be  done,  for  the  reason  that  there  is  pre- 
supposed at  every  step  of  the  generalising  process, — from 
the  beginning  and  all  through, — a  fact  or  facts  of  con- 
sciousness not  given  in  the  generalisation.  I  cannot 
even  conceive  the  particulars  to  be  generalised,  or  the 
law  of  the  process,  without  bringing  to  them  what  is 
beyond  them,  or  truly  ultimate  in  knowledge, — what, 
in  fact,  "lies  at  the  root  of  all  experience."  And  in 
regard  to  any  special  generalisation  of  a  law,  Hamilton 
would  say, — You  are  not  entitled  to  call  that  an  acqui- 
sition from  experience  or  a  generalisation,  if  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  very  act  or  process  of  generalising  is 
CJirried  on  under  the  presupposition  of  that  which  you 
profess  to  evolve  in  the  end.  This,  he  would  say,  is  the 
case  in  regard  to  the  eduction  of  space  out  of  time,  of 
the  Ego  out  of  sensation,  and  other  points.  Our  present 
consciousness  is  to  Hamilton  simply  what  it  is  to  any 
inquirer, — the  matter  of  analysis.  He  is  not,  as  has 
been  ignorantly  done,  to  be  regarded  as  unfaithful  to 
his  method 

"  when  he  succeeds  in  tracing  a  belief  or  notion,  of  which 
we  cannot  now  divest  ourselves,  into  a  generalisation  from 
experience,  and  as  ignorant  of  the  only  possible  scientific 
method  whenever  he  asserts  of  another  that  it  cannot  have 
been  acquired  by  experience,  because  that  experience  pre- 
supposes it."  ^ 

This,  in  fact,  in  both  its  sides,  is  his  method. 

It  may  be  asked,  On  what  are  those  criteria  grounded  ? 

'  Battle  of  the  Philosophies,  p.  55.     One  of  the  best  discussions  of 
the  points  between  Mill  and  Hamilton. 


Antlwrity  of  Principles. 


109 


Have  they  a  basis  in  consciousness  itself,  or  in  some- 
thing higher  1    To  this  Hamilton  would  virtually  reply, 

Let  the  fact  of  knowledge  or  consciousness  at  all  be 

accepted, — and  that  we  know  is  implied  in  our  very 
being — in  our  putting  conscious  questions — in  perceiv- 
ing and  thinking, — then  these  criteria  being  realised  by 
us  in  the  course  of  reflection  on  knowledge  or  conscious- 
ness, we  become  aware  of  them  as  the  tests  of  the  ul- 
timate  in  knowledge  before  which  we   recoil,   or  the 
limits  beyond  which  we  cannot  go.     They  are  merely 
general  statements  of  what  we  meet  with  in  reflecting 
on  our  conscious  experience,   when  we   seek  to  push 
back  this  experience  to  its  ultimate  possibility  for  us. 
They  are  not  criteria  superinduced  upon  that  experience 
from  any  higher  or  other  source  than  itself.     They  are 
the  features  of  the  definite  principles  at  the  root  of 
knowledge.     Each  individual  must  go  through  a  pro- 
cess of  reflection  for  himself,  in  order  to  realise  them 
and  their  meaning;   but  in  so  doing,   he  rises  above 
his   mere   individual  experience,   and  puts  himself   in 
the  sphere  of  universal  knowledge  for  man.     He  unites 
himself  with  mind  in  humanity.     There  is  no  mere  in- 
dividualism in  such  a  system ;  there  is  rather  the  lift- 
ing up  of  the  individual  from  his  narrow  sphere  to  the 
realm  of  the  universal  and  the  etems!, 

The  transition  to  the  question  of  the  Authority 
of  those  principles  of  knowledge  thus  found,  and  its 
solution,  is  comparatively  easy.  It  is  asked,  What  is 
the  authority  of  those  primary  elements  of  knowledge 
as  warrants  and  criteria  of  truth?  How  do  those 
primary  propositions  certify  us  of  their  own  veracity  ] 
To  this  Hamilton  replies  : — 


110 


Hamilton, 


Authority  of  Principles, 


"  The  only  possible  answer  is,  tliat  as  elements  of  our 
mental  constitution, — as  the  essential  conditions  of  our  know- 
ledge,— they  must  by  us  be  accepted  as  true."  ^ 

Hamilton  has  no  proof  —  attempts  no  proof  of  the 
authority  of  those  principles     As  Reid  says  : — 

"  Every  kind  of  reasoning  for  the  veracity  of  our  faculties 
amounts  to  no  more  than  tiiking  their  own  testimony  for 
their  veracity.  There  is  an  absurdity  in  attempting  to 
prove  by  any  kind  of  reasoning,  probable  or  demonstrative, 
that  our  reason  is  not  fallacious,  since  the  very  point  in 
question  is  whether  reasoning  may  be  trusted."  ^ 

Hamilton  virtually  accepts  this  position.  He  points 
to  our  natural  or  spontaneous  faith  in  them  as  a 
simple  fact  in  knowledge;  and  all  that  he  does  is  to 
show  that  when  we  question  this  faith,  or  seek  for 
a  ground  of  it,  we  can  but  state  the  necessities  or  limi- 
tations under  which  we  find  ourselves  conscious  of 
thinking,  and  through  which  we  are  in  the  end  com- 
pelled to  rest  in  it.  Descartes  might  fairly  be  trans- 
lated as  meaning  the  same  thing.  We  fall  back  with 
him  on  tlie  veracity  of  God,  as  the  author  of  our  facul- 
ties. This  is  not  properly  a  proof,  it  is  a  statement  of 
our  natural  faith  in  the  spontaneous  outgoings  of  our 
powers, — our  perception  and  our  reason.  And  Hamilton, 
when  he  speaks  of  a  gratuitous  doubt,  merely  implies 
that  the  supposition — the  gratuitous  supposition — of  our 
intelligence  being  delusive,  is  to  be  confronted  wath  the 
natui-al  presumption  of  its  truthfulness,  which  w^e  feel 
and  accept,  and  is  not  to  be  adopted  unless  there  be 
a  proof  that  we  have  been  created  the  victims  of  delu- 

1  ReicCs  Works,  p.  743. 

^IivteU.  Powers,  vi.  p.  447.     Cf.  HamUton,  Reid's  Works,  p.  761. 


1 


11x3 

sion.     But  this  it  is  for  the  gratuitous  doubter,  or  the 
dogmatist  who  denies,  consistently  to  adduce. 

Nowhere  has  Hamilton  stated  the  character  of  the 
argument  from  Common  Sense  more  succinctly  and 
clearly  than  in  these  words  : 

"To  argue  from  Common  Sense  is  nothing  more  than  to 
render  available  the  presumption  in  favour  of  the  original 
facts  of  consciousness-<^«  whM  is  by  nature  necessarily 
BELIEVED  to  be,  truly  is.     Aristotle,  in  whose  philosophy  thk 
presumption  obt^iined   the  authority  of  a  principle,   thus 
enounces  the  argument :  '  What  appears  to  all,  that  we  affirm 
to  be;  and  he  who  rejects  this  belief  will  assuredly  advance 
nothing  better  worthy  of  credit.'-(Eth.  Nic,  x.  2.)    As  this 
argument  rests  entirely  on  a  presumption,  the  fundamental 
condition  of  its  validity  is  that  this  presumption  be  not  dis- 
proved.    The  presumption  in  favour  of  the  veracity  of  con- 
sciousness IS  redargued  by  the  repugnance  of  the  facts  them- 
selves, of  which  consciousness  is  the  complement ;  as  the 
^uth  of  all  can  only  be  vindicated  on  the  truth  of  each 
The  argument  from  common  sense,  therefore,  postulates  and 
lounds  on  the  assumption— that  our  original  beliefs  be  not 
proved  self-contradictory. 

"  The  harmony  of  our  primary  convictions  being  supposed 
and  not  redargued,  the  argument  from  common  sense  is 
decisive  against  every  deductive  inference  not  in  unison  with 
them.  For  as  every  conclusion  is  involved  in  its  premi^^es 
and  as  these  again  must  ultimately  be  resolved  into  some 
original  belief,  the  conclusion,  if  inconsistent  with  the 
primary  phoenomena  of  consciousness,  must,  ex  hypothed,  be 
inconsistent  with  its  premises-that  is,  be  logicaUy  false 
Un  this  ground  our  convictions  at  first  hand  peremptorilv 
derogate  from  our  convictions  at  second."  i 

These  primary  principles  being  ascertained,  and  affirm- 
ing themselves   as  necessary  beliefs  or  principles,  we 

1  Discussions,  p.  90. 


.12 


Hamilton, 


presume  them  trae,  until  they  are  proved  to  be  falsa 
by  their  mutual  contradiction,  direct  or  indirect  We 
assume,  thus,  and  apply  a  certain  test  of  truth  and  false- 
hood,— the  principle  of  non-contradiction.  This,  again,  is 
itself  a  deliverance  of  common  sense  or  a  primary  prin- 
ciple of  consciousness.  But  it  asserts  itself  as  of  a 
higher  grade  than  certain  other  primary  principles ;  for 
contradictory  incompatibility  is  the  annihilation  of  the 
act  of  consciousness  or  thought.  This  principle,  there- 
fore, the  sceptic  must  admit ;  for  he  too,  in  challenging 
the  truth  of  these  primary  data,  thinks,  or  exercises 
a  definite  act  of  consciousness,  and  thus  assumes  the 
principle  of  non-contradiction.  Now,  what  Hamilton 
challenged  the  sceptic  to  do,  was  to  prove  these 
primary  principles  false.  He  admitted  that  if  they 
be  proved  contradictory,  they  are  discredited.  But  he 
might  have  added,  the  sceptic  cannot  do  this  without 
assuming  not  only  the  negative  test  of  non-contradiction, 
but  the  positive  laws  of  inference, — all  of  which  are 
simply  themselves  forms  of  ultimate  principles.  In 
fact,  the  essential  laws  of  our  intelligence  cannot  be 
proved  to  be  deceitful,  without  assuming  the  truth  of 
the  essential  laws  of  our  intelligence. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  ultimate  truths, — the  strictly 
Necessary  and  the  Contingent. 

"Necessity,  he  tells  us,  is  of  two  kinds.  There  is  one 
necessity,  when  we  cannot  construe  it  to  our  minds  as  pos- 
sible that  the  deliverance  of  consciousness  should  not  be 
true.  This  logical  impossibility  occurs  in  the  case  of  what 
are  called  Necessary  Truths— truths  of  reason  and  intelli- 
gence ;  as  in  the  law  of  Causality,  the  law  of  Substance,  and 
still  more  in  the  laws  of  Identity,  Contradiction,  and  Excluded 


Authority  of  Principles. 


113 


Middle.  There  is  another  necessity,  when  it  is  not  unthink- 
able that  the  deliverance  of  consciousness  may  possibly  be 
false,  but  at  the  same  time  when  we  cannot  but  admit  that 
this  deliverance  is  of  such  and  such  a  purport.  This  is  seen 
in  the  case  of  what  are  called  Contingent  Truths  or  truths 
of  fact.  Thus,  for  example,  I  can  theoretically  suppose 
that  the  external  object  I  am  conscious  of  in  perception 
may  be,  in  reality,  nothing  but  a  mode  of  mind  or  self.  I 
am  unable,  however,  to  think  that  it  does  not  appear  to 
me — that  consciousness  does  not  compel  me  to  regard  it, — 
as  external — as  a  mode  of  matter  or  not-self.  And  such 
being  the  case,  I  cannot  practically  believe  the  supposition 
I  am  able  speculatively  to  maintain,  for  I  cannot  believe 
this  supposition  without  believing  that  the  last  ground  of 
all  belief  is  not  to  be  believed;  which  is  self-contradictory. 
.  .  .  The  argument  from  common  sense,  it  may  be  ob- 
served, is  of  principal  importance  in  reference  to  that  class 
of  contingent  truths.  The  others,  from  their  converse  being 
absolutely  incogitable,  sufficiently  guard  themselves."  ^ 

We  thus  are  able  to  see  in  Avhat  sense  Hamilton 
alleges  that  the  facts  of  consciousness,  simply  as  facts,  are 
above  doubt.  This  is  true  to  the  extent  that  beinjr 
conscious  we  cannot,  without  subreptio  jmncipii^  doubt 
our  being  conscious.  But  in  regard  to  an  alleged  spe- 
cific deliverance  of  consciousness, — as  that  an  extended 
thing  there  is, — this,  as  a  specific  fact  of  consciousness, 
must  be  admitted  ere  we  can  say  that  to  doubt  its  being 
a  fact  of  consciousness  involves  a  contradiction.  So 
that  the  principle  of  contradiction  is  directly  of  little  or 
no  avail  here.  This  is  a  point  which  Hamilton  has  not 
accurately  distinguished.  The  main  question  is  as  to 
the  fact  whether  consciousness  testifies  in  a  given  way 
or  not.     Of  course  this  may  be  so,  and  we  may  be  under 

^  Reid's  Works,  p.  753. 
P. — VI.  H 


114 


Hamilton. 


a  necessity  of  admitting  that  it  is  so,  but  this  is  not 
a  necessity  primarily  guaranteed  by  the  principle  of 
non-contradiction.  Hamilton,  however,  would  maintain 
that,  as  the  fact  is  testified  to  by  consciousness, — is  an 
ultimate  deliverance  of  consciousness, — to  suppose  the 
testimony  false  is  to  say  that  consciousness  can  truly 
contradict  itself — that  is,  can  be  a  true  ground  of  belief 
now,  and  a  false  ground  then.  There  is  thus  a  mediate 
contradiction, — a  contradiction  in  holding,  on  the  groimd 
of  consciousness,  the  fact  of  the  testimony,  and  holding, 
on  the  same  ground,  the  falsehood  of  the  testimony. 

It  thus  may  be  fairly  argued  that  the  Idealist  who 
admits  the  fact  of  the  testimony  to  non-mental  reality  in 
perception,  and  who  at  the  same  time  denies  its  truth, 
— says  the  object  perceived  is  after  all  but  a  form  of 
consciousness,  —  is  mediately  contradictory  or  inconsis- 
tent. He  virtually  says  consciousness  as  perception  is 
an  illusion,  and  this  he  does  either  gratuitously  or  on 
some  alleged  ground.  The  gratuitous  denial  may  bo 
thrown  out  of  accomit.  But  the  denial  which  proceeds 
on  a  ground  or  reason  must  found  this  either  on  an 
origmal  or  on  an  acquired  principle  in  consciousness.  If 
the  former,  consciousness  is  assumed  to  be  true  in  order 
to  prove  itself  false.  If  the  latter,  we  have  the  absurdity 
of  an  acquired  principle  or  ground  in  consciousness 
brought  forward  as  of  superior  authority  to  an  admitted 
primary  deliverance.  This  principle,  moreover,  cannot 
be  established  or  accepted,  unless  as  itself  grounded  on 
something  primary  in  consciousness ;  and  we  thus  have 
a  ground  alleged  as  sound  or  true,  which  yet  is  traced 
back  to  a  class  of  primary  deliverances,  which  it  is 
adduced  to  discredit.     The  only  mode  of  escape  from 


Ultimate  Positions. 


115 


absurdity  and  mediate  contradiction  on  the  part  of  the 
idealist,  is  to  deny  that  consciousness  as  perception  does 
testify  to  the  reality  of  non-mental  or  non-conscious 
objects.  The  idealist,  in  denying  the  truth  of  the 
primary  deliverance,  must  assume  some  principle  at  the 
least  of  coequal  rank  with  the  deliverance  he  denies 
and  thus  mediately  contradict,  —  amiiliilate  his  own 
method  of  criticism. 

On  this  head  there  seem  to  me  to  be  but  three  satis- 
factory positions : — 

r.  Consciousness  as  a  given  datum,  or  experience, 
as  realised  in  consciousness,  is  to  be  analysed  and  sifted 
as  far  back  as  it  possibly  can,— analysed  until  it  guaran- 
tees itself,  and  guarantees  itself  as  realised  in  certain 
ultimate  forms  or  principles. 

T,  These  being  thus  revealed  as  the  necessary- 
grounds  and  conditions  of  knowledge,  are  to  be  accepted 
by  us  under  pain  of  abrogating  knowledge  altogether, 
and  thus  paralysing  even  doubt  and  negation. 

3°,  The  veracity  of  those  deliverances,  in  as  far  as 
they  testify  to  what  is  beyond  themselves,  cannot  be 
proved— /.e.,  established  by  reasoning.  JS'either  can  it 
be  disproved— 2.e.,  by  reasoning.  The  judge  of  con- 
sciousness can  only  be  consciousness  itself.  Conscious- 
ness is  thus  assumed,  in  judging,  to  be  trustworthy.  The 
veracity  of  consciousness  cannot  be  disproved,  for  con- 
sciousness alone  could  show  this  unveracity ;  but  in  so 
domg  it  would  necessarily  subvert  its  own  conclusion 
as  itself  a  deliverance  of  consciousness. 

We  cannot,  however,  give  the  benefit  of  this  argu- 
ment to  such  a  position  as  that  of  Terrier.  ^     He  holds 
1  Institutes,  Introd.  §  39  et  seq. 


116 


Hamilton, 


that  even  the  ascertained  and  sifted  primary  data  c»f 
consciousness  are  natural  inadvertences,  and  at  the  same 
time  that  man  is  to  be  taught  to  think  correctly,  and 
that  philosophy  is  to  be  reasoned  out  from  the  begin- 
ning. This  is  really  to  admit  the  fact  of  the  testimony 
of  the  primary  data  of  consciousness  to  certain  things, 
and  yet  to  dispute  their  truthfulness.  Now  the  trust- 
worthiness of  these  primary  deliverances  cannot  be 
assailed  without  assuming  the  trustworthiness  of  them, 
or  of  some  of  them  at  the  same  time.  A  subordmate 
principle,  or  an  acquired  principle,  dependent  as  it 
must  be  on  some  one  or  more  of  them,  is  obviously  a 
futile  basis  of  assault  And  if  they  are  all  natural 
inadvertences,  both  realism  and  idealism,  dogmatism 
and  scepticism,  will  be  found  about  equally  worthy  or 
worthless.  Besides,  one  would  like  very  much  to  know, 
if  philosophy  is  in  such  circumstances  to  be  reasoned 
out  from  the  beginning,  where  and  when  is  the  begin- 
ning 1  By  no  method  of  reasoning  known  to  us  can  we 
create  a  beginning  out  of  nothing.  Our  very  reasoning 
itself  would  be  a  postulated  beginning.  "WTiat,  then,  is 
this  beginning  from  which  we  are  to  start? — how,  further, 
and  by  what  rules,  is  it  to  be  reasoned  out  ]  If  it  is  a 
primary  datum  of  consciousness,  it  is  a  natural  inadver- 
tence, and  reasoning  based  on  that  will  not  help  man 
to  think  more  correctly.  If  it  is  not,  then  what  is  it  ] 
If  a  subordinate  principle,  it  is  either  derived  from  these 
data,  or  it  is  of  inferior  authority.  It  is  inferior  even  to 
a  natural  inadvertence.  One  would  like,  further,  to 
know  something  of  tlie  nature  and  authority  of  the  rules 
of  the  reasoning  thus  advanced  to  correct  our  natural 
inadvertences.     It  can  hardly  be  supposed  capable  of 


Belief  and  Cognition, 


117 


dispensing  with  the  law  of  necessary  implication  or  self- 
consistency.  And  this,  it  will  be  found,  is  but  a  con- 
Crete  application  of  a  very  primary  datum  of  conscious- 
ness,— the  law  of  non-contradiction.  Yet  as  such  it 
ought  to  be  a  natural  inadvertence ! 

As  ultimate,  and  therefore  incomprehensible,  in  the 
proper  sense  of  not  being  explicable  by  principles  other 
than  or  beyond  themselves,  our  primary  principles  are 
by  Hamilton  said  to  be  given  us  in  the  form  rather  of 
heliefs  than  cognitions.  Tliis  would  seem  so  self-evident 
as  to  be  indubitable,  at  least  to  any  one  who  would 
avoid  the  absurdity  of  asserting  knowledge,  and  yet 
holding  an  infinite  regress  of  grounds  of  knowledge, — 
asserting  a  knowledge  which  never  begins.  Hamilton 
clearly  explains  the  doctrine  in  the  following  words  : — 

"  *  We  know  what  rests  on  reason,  but  believe  what  rests 
on  authority.'  But  reason  itself  must  at  last  rest  on  author- 
ity, for  the  original  data  of  reason  do  not  rest  on  reason, 
but  are  necessarily  accepted  by  reason  on  the  authority  of 
what  is  beyond  itself.  These  date  are  therefore,  in  rigid 
propriety.  Beliefs  or  Trusts.  Thus  it  is  that  in  the  last  re- 
sort we  must  perforce  philosophically  admit  that  belief  is  the 
primary  condition  of  reason,  and  not  reason  the  ultimate 
ground  of  behef."  i  "  The  ultimate  facts  of  consciousness  are 
given  less  in  the  form  of  cognitions  than  of  beliefs.  Con- 
sciousness in  its  last  analysis — in  other  words,  our  primary 
experience — is  a  faith.  We  do  not  in  propriety  Inow  that 
what  we  are  compelled  to  receive  as  not  self  is  not  a  per- 
ception of  self ;  we  can  only  on  reflection  believe  such  to 
be  the  case,  in  reliance  on  the  original  necessity  of  so  believ- 
ing, imposed  on  us  by  our  nature.''  2 

On  this,  !Mill  tells  us  that  Hamilton  recognised,  besides 
1  RekVs  Works,  p.  760.  2  Discussions,  p.  86. 


118 


Hamilton. 


knowledge,  a  second  source  of  intellectual  conviction, 
which  he  calls  belief,  and  further,  that  in  Hamilton's 
opinion 

"belief  is  a  higher  source  of  evidence  than  knowledge; 
belief  is  ultimate,  knowledge  only  derivative ;  knowledge 
itself  rests  finally  on  belief ;  natural  beliefs  are  the  sole  war- 
rant for  all  our  knowledge.  Knowledge,  therefore,  is  an 
inferior  ground  of  assurance  to  natural  belief."  i 

For  the  first  statement  there  is  no  ground  whatever. 
Knowledge  as  belief  — that  is,  ultimate  knowledge— 
with  Hamilton  means  simply  and  obviously  that  form  of 
knowledge  which  cannot  be  explained  by  or  derived 
from  aught  beyond  itself,  but  announces  itself  in  the 
necessity  of  thinking  it.  He  expressly  says  that  our 
primary  cognitions  are  not  due  to  "a  certain  peculiar 
sense  distinct  from  Intelligence."  2 

On  the  latter  statement  I  must  quote  the  pointed 
criticism  of  an  acute  writer: — 

"  Sir  W.  Hamilton  says  nothing  of  the  kind.  Take  these 
three  propositions;  a  =  b;  b  =  c;  therefore,  a  =  c.  Suppose 
the  truth  of  the  first  two  rests  on  intuition,  in  which  case  we 
cannot  prove,  but  do  believe  them  to  be  true.  The  truth  of 
the  last  proposition  rests  wholly  on  the  truth  of  those  two 
first.  Does  it  therefore  rest  on  an  inferior  ground  of  assur- 
ance ?  Not  the  least.  Our  certainty  of  its  truth  cannot 
exceed,  but  neither  can  it  by  any  possibility  be  less  than  our 
certainty  of  the  two  first.  The  inference  sought  to  be  drawn 
[by  Mr  Mill]  is  palpably  false."  ^ 

Thought,  call  it  reason  or  reasoning,  must  ultimately 
be  grounded  on  some  first  principle  or  principles,  given 

1  Exam.  chap.  v.  p.  76.  «  Rdd^s  Works,  p.  756. 

3  Battle  of  the  Two  Philosophies,  pp.  28,  29. 


Ultimate  Teat  of  Truth, 


119 


in  experience.  Thought  may  awake  to  consciousness  of 
itself  in  the  consciousness  of  this  principle,  but  thought 
does  not  in  any  sense  create  the  principle;  for  this 
would  be  to  assume  that  thought  is  already  there  to 
create  what  really  is  itself.  But  for  a  principle  given 
in  experience,  and  ultimately  to  us  inexplicable,  our 
reason  would  be  utterly  impotent, — something  like  the 
Avell-kno^vn  Mahomet's  coffin,  hanging  between  heaven 
and  earth,  and  having  no  place  in  either. 

In  this  inquiry  into  human  knowdedge,  we  may 
possibly  find  that  our  ultimate  test  of  truth  or  true 
knowledge  is  something  in  the  shape  of  a  barrier  or 
limit  to  thought,  such  as  we  cannot  overpass.  In  this 
case  truth  in  its  last  analysis  would  be  a  simple  necessity 
of  thought,  which  guarantees  its  own  certainty.  And 
this  will  be  found  to  be  the  case.  We  cannot  have  a 
test  of  ultimate  truth  separate  from  the  truth  itself.  It 
must  be  its  own  guarantee, — its  owti  self -proclaimed  cer- 
titude. And  this  certitude  will  be  found  to  regulate  in 
a  way  the  whole  body  of  human  knowledge.  This  will 
afford  criteria  which  we  shall  be  able  to  apply  to  sub- 
ordinate propositions, — to  the  matter  and  form  of  our 
ordinary  and  scientific  thought. 


120 


CHAPTEK  V. 

CONSCIOUSNESS — ITS   PHENOMENA — THE   POWERS   OF 
KNOWLEDGE — EXTERNAL   PERCEPTION. 

What  then,  according  to  Hamilton,  are  the  phae- 
nomena  or  contents  of  consciousness?  This  is  the 
question  of  Phaenomenal  Psychology. 

The  whole  phsenomena  of  consciousness  may  be 
grouped  into  three  great  classes — viz.,  Knowledge  or 
Cognition,  Feeling,  Desire  and  Will  (Conation).  These 
phaenomena  indicate  fundamental  faculties  and  capaci- 
ties of  mind.  We  are  not,  however,  to  suppose  that 
these  are  entities  really  distinct  from  the  conscious 
subject,  and  really  different  from  each  other.  It  is  the 
same  simple  subject  whicli  exerts  every  energy  of  any 
faculty,  and  which  is  affected  by  every  mode  of  any 
capacity  of  mind. 

The  mind  can  exert  different  actions,  and  be 
affected  by  different  passions.  These  actions  and  pas- 
sions are  like,  and  they  are  unlike.  We  thus  group 
them  together  in  thought,  and  give  them  a  common 
name.  And  these  groups  are  really  few  and  simple. 
Again,  every  action  is  an  effect;  every  action  and 
passion  a  modification.     Every  effect  supposes  a  cause ; 


i' 


N<  .f 


1 


Classification  of  Mental  Flit  -^nomena.        121 

every  modification  a  subject.     When  we'  >*'^y  thus  that 
the  mind  exerts  an  energy,  we  virtually  say'^^^®  mind  is 
the  cause  of  this  energy.     When  we  say  thaf  the  mind 
acts  or  suffers,  we  virtually  say  that  the  mind^  is  the 
subject  of  a  modification.     The  mind  is  thus  the^^^com- 
mon  cause  and  subject  of  those  various  acts  and  stali'^s 
which  fall  into  a  few  simple  groups.     Hence  we  properly 
say  that  the  mind  is  the  faculty  of  exerting  such  and 
such  a  class  of  energies,  or  it  has  the  capacity  of  being 
modified  by  such  and  such  an  order  of  affections.    Faculty 
thus  means  the  causality  of  the  mind  in   originating 
certain  energies  or  acts;  capacity  means  the  suscepti- 
bility the  mind  has  of  being   affected  by  a  particular 
class  of  feelings.^ 

This  threefold  division  of  the  mental  phaenomena 
might,  as  seems  to  me,  be  rendered  more  precise  and 
accurate  by  sundering  Desire  and  Will  Desire  is  much 
more  nearly  allied  to  Feeling  than  to  Will  In  its  ori- 
gin. Desire  points  either  to  agreeable  feeling,  or  to  the 
pain  which  arises  from  the  consciousness  of  a  want,  in 
the  absence  of  an  object  represented  as  suitable  to  our 
nature  in  some  form  or  aspect.  In  its  result.  Desire  is  a 
tendency  pointing  to  one  definite  issue, — tlie  realisation 
of  the  object  or  aim  represented.  It  is  thus  in  both 
aspects  distinguished  from  Will  Will  in  its  highest 
and  proper  form  passes  into  act  through  the  contempla- 
tion of  alternatives :  there  is  free  choice  or  determina- 
tion. In  its  issue,  it  is  not  restricted  to  a  single  result, 
but  has  always  the  possibility  of  one  or  other  alternative 
of  choice.  Desire  and  Will  agree  in  being  characterised 
by  the  element  of  7iisus  or  effort;   but  the  one  is  a 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  XX. 


/ 


122 


Hamilton, 


Powers  of  Krmoledgc. 


123 


fatal  determination,  the  other  is  a  free  power.  The 
most  accurate  division,  accordingly,  is,  I  think,  into  the 
fourfold  form  of  Knowledge,  Feeling,  Desire,  Will 

Hamilton's  analysis  and  classification  of  the  phaeno- 
mena  of  knowledge  is  simple  and  exhaustive. 
'  (1.)  As  we  are  endowed  with  a  faculty  of  Cognition 
or  Consciousness  in  general,  and  as  we  have  not  always 
possessed  the  knowledge  which  we  now  possess,  we 
must  have  a  faculty  of  acquiring  knowledge.  This 
acquisition  can  only  be  accomplished  by  the  immediate 
presentation  of  a  new  object  to  consciousness.  Hence 
it  is  sho\\Ti  that  we  have  a  faculty  which  may  be 
called  the  Acquisitive^  Prcsentative,  or  Receptive, 

New  knowledge  is  either  of  things  external  or  inter- 
nal,— the  phasnomena  of  the  Ego  or  of  the  non-Ego. 
In  the  one  case  we  have  the  faculty  of  Fjcternal  Per- 
ception; in  the  other  that  of  Internal  Perception,  or 
self-consciousness.  The  acquisitive  faculty  is  the  fac- 
ulty of  experience, — external  and  internal  Eeflection 
in  its  original  and  proper  sense  is  self- consciousness 
concentrated 

(2.)  As  capable  of  knowledge,  we  must  be  able  to 
retain  or  conserve  it  when  acquired.  This  is  the  power 
of  mental  Retention  simply, — the  Conservative  or  Re- 
tentive Faculty.  This  is  memory  strictly  so  called,  or 
the  power  of  retaining  knowledge  in  the  mind,  but  out 
of  consciousness.  This  implies  our  capability  of  losing 
from  consciousness  the  object  presented:  otherwise 
there  would  be  no  room  for  a  new  object. 

(3.)  It  is  not  enough  to  possess  the  power  of  Reten- 
tion, we  must  further  be  able  to  recall  what  is  retained 
out  of  unconsciousness  into  consciousness.     This  is  the 


rvf 


Reproductive  Faculty.     It  is  governed  by  the  laws  of 
Mental  Association.     If  these  laws  are  allowed  to  oper- 
ate without  the  intervention  of  the  will,  this  faculty 
is  Sucrcrestion,  or  Spontaneous  Suggestion ;  if  under  the 
influe°nce  of  the  will,  it  is  Reminiscence  or  Recollection. 
(4  )  There  is  further  required  for  the  consummation 
of  Memory  and  Reproduction,  a  faculty  of  representing 
in  consciousness  and  of  keeping  before  the  mmd  the 
knowledge     presented.       This    is    the    Representative 
Faculty,  called  Imagination  or  Phantasy.     The  Imagi- 
nation of  common  language-the  Productive  Imagination 
of  philosophers-is  nothing  but  the  Representative  pro- 
cess plus  the  Comparative. 

Imagination  and  Reproduction  are  not  to  be  con- 
founded :  the  two  powers  have  no  necessary  propoi-tion 
to  each  other.  The  power  of  representing  may  be, 
often  is,  much  stronger  than  the  power  of  recall. 

(5  )  But  all  these  faculties  are  only  subsidiary,     iliey 
acquire,  preserve,  and  hold  up  the   materials  for  the 
use  of   a  higher  faculty  which  operates   upon   them. 
This  is  the  Elaborative   or  Discursive   faculty.      ilns 
faculty  has   only  one   operation;   it   compares, -- it  is 
comparison-the   faculty   of   relations.      Analysis  and 
synthesis   are  the  conditions  of   comparison ;  and  the 
results  of  comparison  as  exercised  under  its  conditions 
are  Conception  or  Generalisation,  Judgment,  and  Reason- 
ing.     The  faculty  is  also  caUed  Thought  Proper,  Aiavota, 
Discursus,  Verstand. 

(6  )  But  the  knowledge  we  have  is  not  aU  due  to 
experience.  What  we  know  by  experience  is  contingent ; 
but  there  are  cognitions  in  the  mind  which  are  neces- 
sary -which  we  cannot  but  think,-which  thought  sup- 


124 


Hamilton, 


poses  as  its  fundamental  condition.  These  are  not 
generalisations  from  experience ;  they  are  native  to  the 
mind.  These  are  the  laws  which  afford  the  conditions 
of  the  capacity  of  knowledge.  They  are  of  a  similar 
character ;  and  on  the  power  possessed  by  the  mind  of 
manifesting  these  we  bestow  the  name  of  the  Regu- 
lative Faculty.  Other  names  are  Reason  and  Common 
Sense.  Tliis  is  not  properly  a  faculty  or  active  power, 
in  the  sense  in  which  this  phrase  is  applied  to  the  other 
faculties.  It  is  rather  tlie  sum  of  the  fundamental 
principles  or  laws  of  thought^ 

The  first  point  under  this  classification  is  that  Ex- 
ternal Perception  is  an  intuitive  faculty  or  faculty  of 
immediate  knowledge ;  while  Memory  and  Imagination 
are  representative  or  mediate  in  their  action.  We  have 
thus  to  ask  what  precisely  is  meant  by  intuitive  or 
immediate  knowledge?  And  in  the  case  of  external 
perception,  we  have  the  further  question,  Wliat  precisely 
is  the  object  or  objects  said  to  be  immediately  known  ] 
In  the  case  of  an  immediate  or  intuitive  act  of  know- 
ledge, the  mind  apprehends  an  object  or  quality  as  now, 
or  as  noio  and  here  existing.  I  am  conscious  of  the  feeling 
of  heat  as  a  present  fact, — that  is  an  intuitive  act.  I  am 
conscious  of  perceiving  an  extended  or  resisting  object, — 
that  also  is  an  act  of  immediate  or  intuitive  knowledge. 
But  the  heat  I  feel  or  the  extension  I  perceive  passes 
away.  I  still  know  that  I  felt  the  one  and  perceived  the 
other.  This  is  ^lediate  or  Representative  Knowledge. 
I  now  know,  through  a  medium,  a  representation  or  image 
of  what  I  no  longer  perceive.  In  plain  words,  I  now 
remember ;  whereas,  formerly,  I  felt  or  perceived. 

1  On  this  see  above,  p.  103, 


^ 


Immediate  and  Mediate  Knowledge.         125 


The  features  of  immediate  and  mediate  knowledge 
may  be  thus  stated  and  contrasted. 

(1.)  An  act  of  immediate  knowledge  is  simple  :  there 
is  nothing  beyond  the  mere  consciousness  of  that  which 
knows,  of  that  which  is  known.  An  act  of  mediate 
knowledge,  on  the  other  hand,  is  complex ;  for  the  mind 
is  both  conscious  of  the  act  or  mental  image  as  its  own, 
and  of  this  as  representative  of  or  relative  to  an  object 
beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness. 

(2.)  In  immediate  knowledge  the  object  is  simple. 
The  object  in  consciousness  and  the  object  in  existence 
are  the  same.  In  mediate  knowledge  the  object  is  two- 
fold,— the  object  known  and  representing  being  different 
from  the  object  unknown,  except  as  represented.  The 
immediate  object  should  be  called  the  subject ive-ohject  or 
md)Ject-ohJect  /  the  mediate  or  unknown  object  the  object- 
object. 

(3.)  Considered  as  judgments, — for  every  act  of  con- 
sciousness is  a  judgment  or  affirmation, — in  an  intui- 
tive act,  the  object  known  is  known  as  actually  exist- 
ing. The  cognition  is  therefore  assertory,  inasmuch  as 
the  reality  of  that,  its  object,  is  given  unconditionally  as 
a  fact.  In  a  representative  act,  the  represented  object 
is  imknown  as  actually  existing;  the  cognition,  there- 
fore, is  problematical,  the  reality  of  the  object  repre- 
sented being  given  only  as  a  possibility,  on  the  hypo- 
thesis of  the  object  representing.^ 

(4.)  Representative  knowledge  is  exclusively  subjec- 
tive; its  immediate  object  is  a  mere  mental  modifica- 
tion, and  its  mediate  object  is  unknown,  except  in  so 
far  as  that  modification  represents  it.     Intuitive  know- 

^  Metaphysics,  L.  XXIII 


i2e 


Hamilton. 


ledge,  on  the  other  hand,  if  consciousness  is  to  be 
credited,  is  either  subjective  or  objective,  for  its  single 
object  may  be  either  a  phrenomenon  of  the  Ego  or  of  the 
non-Ego, — either  mental  or  material. 

(5.)  An  intuitive  cognition,  as  an  act,  is  complete  and 
absolute,  as  irrespective  of  aught  beyond  the  domain 
of  consciousness ;  wliereas  a  representative  cognition  is 
incomplete,  being  relative  to  and  vicarious  of  an  exist- 
ence beyond  the  sphere  of  actual  knowledge.  The 
object  likewise  of  the  former  is  complete,  being  at  once 
known  and  real ;  in  the  latter,  the  object  known  is  ideal, 
the  real  object  unknown. 

In  Hamilton's  view,  every  cognitive  act  which  in 
one  relation  is  mediate  or  representative,  is  in  anoth.-.r 
immediate  or  intuitive.  For  an  illustration  and  proof 
of  this,  let  me  call  up  the  image  of  a  particular  object 
—say  the  High  Church.  In  this  act,  what  do  I  know 
immediately  or  intuitively  ?  what  mediately  or  by  rep- 
resentation 1  I  am  conscious  or  immediately  cognisant 
of  the  act  of  my  mind,  and  therefore  of  the  act  which 
constitutes  tlie  mental  image  of  the  Church ;  but  I  am 
not  conscious  or  immediately  cognisant  of  the  Church  as 
existing.  Still  I  know  it;  it  is  even  the  object  of 
my  thought.  But  I  only  know  it  through  the  mental 
image ;  and  it  is  the  object  of  thought,  inasmuch  as  a 
reference  to  it  is  necessarily  involved  in  the  act  of 
representation. 

Tlie  term  immediate  requires  attention  here.  Hamil- 
ton recognises  that  other  sense  of  immediate  in  which 
it  is  opposed  to  thought  proper,  or  the  reference  of 
an  object  to  a  class.  When  we  think  or  recognise  an 
object  by  relation  to  other  things,  under  a  certain  notion 


Immediate  and  Mediate  Knowledge,         127 

or  general  term,— this  too  is  mediate  knowledge.  He 
holds  that  there  is  a  wide  sense  of  immediate,  accord- 
ing to  which  "we  apprehend  an  individual  thing,  either 
through  sense  or  its  representation  in  the  phantasy." 
This  is  "in  a  certain  sort  an  absolute  or  irrespective 
knowledge,"  and  it  is  justly  named  immediate,  in  con- 
trast to  thought  proper  or  the  comparative  act  of  the 
understanding.^ 

This  mediate  or  comparative  act  of  reference  to  a  class 
will  vary  with  the  quality  of  the  object  attended  to  by 
the  thought:  an  individual  object— the  object  of  this 
time,  or  this  time  and  this  space — may  thus  be  capable 
of  reference  to  various  classes  of  things.  According  to 
Hamilton's  view,  this  is  quite  a  subsequent  reference, 
supervening  upon  perception  or  intuition.  And  he 
holds  that  there  is  an  individual  of  perception  prior 
to  this  altogether.  What  individualises  a  quality  or 
object  of  intuition  is  the  noit\  or  the  now  and  here,  of 
the  quality  perceived  or  apprehended.  ^ 

At  the  same  time,  it  would  be  entirely  to  mistake 
Hamilton's  doctrine  on  this  point  to  maintain  that 
there  is  a  perception  of  the  quality  2^er  ^c,  or  apart 
from  the  general  conditions  of  knowledge.  On  the 
contrary,  he  expressly  tells  us  over  and  over  again  that 
intuition  is  subject  to  all  the  conditions  of  consciousness 
already  enumerated,^  —  implying,  therefore,  judgment 
and  discrimination,  and  the  primary  conditions  of  the 
thinkable.  Further,  under  comparison,  Hamilton  shows 
the  steps  through  which  intuition  passes  up  to  the  stage 

1  Reid's  W&rks,  p.  804,  Note  B. 

*  On  this  whole  matter  see  Reid's  Works,  Note  D*,  p.  878 

»  Cf.  Reid's  Works,  Note  D*,  p.  877  et  se^. 


128 


Hamilton, 


of  logical  generalisation  and  classification.  He  recog- 
nises the  primary  stage  of  the  mere  existential  judg- 
ment,— the  affirmation  of  the  something — the  discri- 
mination of  the  Ego  and  non-Ego, — of  the  multiplicity 
in  the  successive  and  manifold  presented  to  self-con- 
sciousness and  perception, — the  reference  of  the  phaeno- 
mena  to  substance, — the  collation  under  the  notion  of 
causality.  All  this  he  recognises  as  really  implied  in 
and  inseparable  from  intuition.  And  having  stated 
this  in  its  proper  place,  he  thinks  himself  at  liberty, 
and  justly  so,  in  dealing  with  intuition  logically  per 
se,  as  a  matter  thus  fitted  for  scientific  treatment.  It 
is  a  mere  misrepresentation  to  s^^eak  of  external  per- 
ception, or  of  intuition  generally,  as  implying  a  sepa- 
rate or  special  kind  of  knowledge  in  the  sense  of  an 
absolute  divorce  from  the  conditions  of  thought  or 
consciousness  in  general.  What  can  be  more  explicit 
than  this] — 

"  Apprehension  and  Judjjment  are  really  one,  as  each  in- 
volves the  other  (for  we  apprehend  only  as  we  judge  some- 
thing to  be,  and  we  judge  only  as  we  apprehend  the  exist- 
ence of  the  terms  compared),  and  as  together  they  constitute 
a  single  indivisible  act  of  cognition  ;  but  they  are  logically 
double,  inasmuch  as  by  mentiil  abstraction  they  may  be 
viewed  each  for  itself,  and  as  a  distinguishable  element  of 
thought."  ^ 

Of  course  he  never  thought  it  necessary  to  be  constantly 
recalling  those  conditions,  or  restating  them,  whenever 
he  referred  to  Perception  as  a  special  act 

As  to  the  other  and  totally  distinct  position,  that  in- 
tuition can  be  developed  out  of  these  universal  condi- 

1  RdiTs  W(yrks,  p.  806. 


Criticism  of  the  Distinction.  129 

tions  set  up  per  se,  or  as  a  basis  of  evolution,  HamHton 
would  of  course  have  said  that  such  a  procedure  is 
wholly  lUegitimate,  and  as  incapable  of  vindication  as 
the  doctrme  of  perception  per  se.  The  variety  in  the 
content  of  perception  is  wholly  inexplicable  on  any 
hypothesis,  or  so-caUed  theory,  of  the  universal  specify- 
ing Itself  in  this  or  that  quality  of  things.  In  this  case 
every  quality  must  be  identical  with  every  other.  Difi^er- 
ence  is  impossible. 

It- is  thus  clear  that  the  criticism  of  Hamilton's  doc- 
trme on  this  point,  which  proceeds  on  the  assumption 
that   all  thought  is  mediate,— or  the  application  of  a 
notion  to  the  thing  or  object  thought,-is  totally  inept 
Hamilton  thoroughly  recognises  this  in  the  only  sense 
in   which   it   has   a    meaning.     There   is   no   thought, 
knowledge,  or  consciousness  unless  as  embodyin-  "the 
most  general  or  universal  notions,— categories,— of  in- 
telligence,-such  as  self,   not-self,  being,  and  relation, 
&c.     He  holds,   moreover,  the  application  or  the  em- 
bodmient  of  those  notions  to  be  equaUy  necessary  in 
intuition   and   in   representative   cognition.      But  this 
he  mamtains,  does  not  abolish  the  distinction  between 
Perception  and  IVIemory  or  Phantasy.     This  is  a  distinc- 
tion subordinate  to  that  of  the  universal  and  the  par- 
ticular m  knowledge.    And  it  depends  on  a  new  element 
introduced  into  knowledge-viz.,  that  of  a  definite  suc- 
cession m  time,-the  contrast  of  present  and  past,  and 
of  present  and  future.     The  cognition  in  each  case  is 
m  the  wide  sense  equally  mediate,  but  this  common 
element  m  the  two  acts  does  not  abolish  the  difi-erence 
between  me  perceiving  and  me  remembering  what  I  per- 

P.— VL  ^ 


130 


Hamilton. 


ceived,— does  not  abolish  the  difference  between  past, 
present,  and  future.  To  adduce,  therefore,  this  general 
feature  of  knowledge,— the  mediate,— as  a  criticism  of 
Hamilton's  distinction,  is  to  miss  its  whole  point,  and 
virtually  to  confound,  in  fact  abolish,  the  two  distinct 
acts  of  Intuition  and  Representation. 

The  word  real  or  really  existing,— as  applied  to  the 
object  of  intuition,— needs  some  explanation.  This 
is  equivalent  to  "the  object  in  itself."  This  again  is 
convertible  with  "the  object  actually  existing."  Now 
what  is  actual  existence  according  to  Hamilton?  It 
means  the  thing  or  object  known  as  existing  in  its  when, 
or  in  its  tchen  and  where.  The  when  and  ichere  of  an 
object  are  immediately  cogidsable  only  if  the  when  be 
now  {ie.,  at  the  same  moment  with  the  cognitive  act), 
and  the  where  be  here  {i.e.,  within  the  sphere  of  the 
cognitive  faculty).  Therefore  a  presentative  or  an  in- 
tuitive knowledge  is  only  competent  of  an  object  present 
to  the  mind  either  in  time  alone,  or  both  in  time  and 

space.^ 

"The  thing  in  itself"  or  "the  object  in  itself"  does 
not  mean  anything  beyond  the  contrast  of  what  we 
know  in  intuition  and  what  we  know  in  representation. 
It  does  not  mean,  as  Hamilton  has  expressly  told  us, 
"things  in  themselves  and  out  of  relation  to  all  else, 
in  contrast  to  things  in  relation  to  and  known  by  intelli- 
gences, like  men,  who  know  only  under  the  conditions 
of  pliirality  and  difference."  ^  The  real  with  Hamil- 
ton is  primarily  the  existent  as  opposed  to  the  non- 
existent—a. something  in  contrast  to  a  nothing:  it  is 
further,  and  secondarily,  the  object  perceived  or  the 
1  ReidU  Works,  p.  809,  Note  B.  =»  lUd.,  p.  805. 


Perception  Proper.  131 

object  of  intuition,  as  contrasted  with  the  image  of  it 
in  memory  or  phantasy. 

Now  what,  according  to  Hamdton,  is  the  state  of 
consciousness,  or  the  testimony  of  consciousness  in  Per- 
ception or  Perception  proper?  He  maintains  that  in 
the  simplest  act  of  Perception  there  is 

« the  observation  of  two  facts,  or  rather  two  branches  of 
the  same  fact,  that  I  am,  and  that  something  different  from 
me  exists.  In  this  act  I  am  conscious  of  myself  as  the  per- 
ceivmg  subject  and  of  an  external  reality  as  the  object  per- 
ceived ;  and  I  am  conscious  of  both  existences  in  the  same 
indivisible  moment  of  intuition.  The  knowledge  of  the 
subject  does  not  precede  or  follow  the  knowledge  of  the 
object;  neither  determines,  neither  is  determined  by  the 
other.  Tlie  two  terms  of  correlation  stand  in  mutual  counter- 
poise and  equal  independence  :  they  are  given  as  connected 
m  the  synthesis  of  knowledge,  but  as  contrasted  in  the  antith- 
esis of  existence."^ 

It  is  this  deliverance  revealed  in  consciousness  which 
leads  mankind  to  believe  equaUy  in  the  reality  of  an 
external  world  and  in  the  existence  of  their  own  minds. 
Consciousness  declares  our  knowledge  of  material  quali- 
ties to  be  intuitive.  Even  those  philosophers  who 
reject  an  intuitive  perception  find  it  impossible  not  to 
admit  that  their  doctrine  stands  decidedly  opposed  to 
the  voice  of  consciousness  and  the  natural  conviction  of 
mankind.  2 

"  The  universal  belief  of  mankind  is,  that  the  immediate 
object  of  the  mind  in  perception  is  the  material  reaUty  itself 
and  that  as  we  perceive  that  object  under  its  actual  condi- 
tions, so  we  are  no  less  conscious  of  its  existence,  indepen- 


1  Reid's  WorU,  p.  805. 


2  Ibid.,  pp.  747,  748. 


132 


Hamilton. 


(lently  of  our  minds,  than  we  are  conscious  of  the  existence 
of  our  own  mind,  independently  of  external  objects."  ^ 

The  main  ground  of  objection  to  Kealism  has  been  and 
is  now,  that  mind  and  matter  are  substances  not  only 
of  different  but  of  the  most  opposite  natures,— separated, 
as  some  say,  by  the  whole  diameter  of  being;  that 
what  immediately  knows  must  be  of  a  nature  corre- 
spondent, analogous,  to  that  which  is  known;  hence 
mind  cannot  be  immediately  conscious  of  matter. 

This  principle,  as  Hamilton  shows,  has  had  the  widest 
effect  on  philosophical  theories,— especially  of  percep- 
tion. Out  of  it  have  come  Eepresentationalism  in  its 
cruder  and  finer  forms,  and  generally  the  hypothesis 
devised  for  effecting  an  intelligible  intercourse  between 
mind  and  matter.  Dut  it  is  a  mere  arbitrary  assump- 
tiun,— without  necessity,  without  even  probability,  in 
its  favour.  The  counter-assumption  of  the  need  for  a 
contrariety  or  opposition  between  subject  knowing  and 
object  known,  is  of  the  same  character. 

"  We  know  and  can  know  nothing  aiwiori  of  what  is  pos- 
sible or  impossible  to  mind,  and  it  is  only  by  observation  and 
by  generalisation  a  -posteriori  that  we  can  ever  hope  to  attain 
any' insight  into  the  question.  But  the  very  first  act  of 
our  experience  contradicts  the  assertion  that  mind,  as  of 
an  opposite  nature,  can  have  no  inmiediate  cognisance  of 
matter.  In  perception  we  have  an  intuitive  knowledge  of 
the  Ego  and  the  non-Ego,  equally  and  at  once."^ 

A  further  objection  is,  that  the  mind  can  only  know 
immediately  that  to  which  it  is  immediately  present.  As 
external  objects  cannot  come  into  the  mind,  or  the  mind- 

1  Reid's  irorX-5,  Note  N,  p.  964.  -  Metaphysics^  L.  XXV. 


Natural  Realism, 


133 


go  out  to  them,  such  presence  is  impossible  ;  hence  they 
can  be  only  mediately  known. 

The  principal  hypothesis  devised  to  get  over  this 
imaginary  difficulty  is  that  of  Divine  interference.  On 
occasion  of  material  impressions  on  the  organs  of  sense, 
followed  by  sensations,  we  have  a  perception  or  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  the  existence  and  qualities  of  the 
bodies  by  which  the  impressions  are  made.  But  we 
know  no  connection  whatever  between  these  sensations 
and  the  perceptions.  This  leads  readily  to  the  hypothesis 
that  the  cause  of  perception  is  a  Divine  act  interposed 
on  occasion  of  the  sensation.  This,  as  mystical  and 
hyperphysical,  and  incompatible  with  an  intuitive  per- 
ception, may  be  set  aside. -^ 

But  the  assumption  is  without  ground  : — 

(1.)  The  mind  is  not  situated  solely  in  the  brain,  or 
in  any  one  part  of  the  body.  It  is  really  present  wher- 
ever we  are  conscious  that  it  acts.  "  The  soul  is  all  in 
the  whole,  and  all  in  every  part."  AA^e  have  no  more 
right  to  deny  that  the  mind  feels  at  the  finger-points 
than  to  assert  that  it  thinks  exclusively  in  the  brain. 
The  report  of  consciousness  is,  that  we  actually  perceive 
at  the  external  point  of  sensation,  and  that  we  x>erceive 
the  material  reality.^ 

(2.)  The  external  object  perceived  is  not  the  distant 
object,  as  has  been  supposed. 

"  We  perceive  through  no  sense  aught  external,  but  what 
is  in  immediate  relation  and  in  immediate  contact  with  its 
organ  ;  and  that  is  true  which  Democritus  of  old  asserted, 


1  Metaphysics,  L.  XXV. 

-  But  on  this  point  see  note  in  Reid's  Works,  p.  861,  for  his  mature<l 
doctrine. 


134 


Hamilton. 


that  all  our  senses  are  only  modifications  of  touch.  Through 
the  eye  we  perceive  nothing  but  the  rays  of  light  in  relation 
to,  and  in  contact  with,  the  retina ;  what  we  add  to  this 
perception  must  not  be  taken  into  account.  The  same  is  true 
of  the  other  senses."  i  "  In  fact,  the  consciousness  of  external 
objects  on  this  doctrine  is  not  more  inconceivable  than  the 
consciousness  of  species,  or  ideas  on  the  doctrine  of  the 
schoolmen,  Malebranche,  or  Berkeley.  In  either  case,  there  is 
a  consciousness  of  the  non-Ego,  and  in  either  case  the  Ego 
and  non-Ego  are  in  intimate  relation.  There  is,  in  fact,  on 
this  h}T)othesis  no  greater  marvel  that  the  mind  should  be 
cognisant  of  the  external  reality,  than  that  it  should  be  con- 
nected with  a  body  at  all.  The  latter  being  the  case,  the 
former  is  not  even  improbable,  all  inexplicable  as  both 
equally  remain."  2 

He  subsequently  notices  the  objections  of  Hume  and 
Eichte  to  intuitive  perception,  but,  as  he  shows,  they  are 
really  unworthy  of  serious  attention.  ^ 

There  being  an  intuitive  perception  of  a  non-Ego  in 
the  foi-m  of  material  reality,  what,  it  may  be  asked,  is 
the  precise  object,  or  what  are  the  precise  objects,  of 
this  intuition? 

On  this  point  there  is  a  difference  of  opinion  between 
Hamilton  and  the  older  Scottish  philosophers,  Eeid 
and  Stewart.  Hamilton's  view  is,  that  the  object  of 
perception,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  quality  of  the  extra- 
bodily  world, — or  world  beyond  our  organism, — is  that 
which  is  in  contact  with  the  organ  of  sense.  "  An  ex- 
ternal object  is  only  perceived  inasmuch  as  it  is  in  rela- 
tion to  our  sense,  and  it  is  only  in  relation  to  our  sense 
inasmuch  as  it  is  present  to  it."  He  therefore  holds 
it  to  be  improper  and  **  a  confusion  of  ideas,"  to  speak 


Metaphysics^  L.  XXV. 


2iWrf. 


3  Ibid.,  L.  XXVII. 


Sphere  of  Perception. 


135 


as  Eeid  does  of  the  perception  of  a  distant  object  in 
vision. 

"  To  say  that  we  perceive  the  sun  and  moon  is  a  false  or 
elliptical  expression.  We  perceive  nothing  but  certain  modi- 
fications of  light  in  immediate  relation  to  our  organ  of 
vision.  ...  It  is  not  by  perception,  but  by  a  process  of 
reasoning,  that  we  connect  the  objects  of  sense  with  existence 
beyond  the  sphere  of  immediate  knowledge.  It  is  enough 
that  perception  affords  us  the  knowledge  of  the  non-Ego  at 
the  point  of  sense.  To  arrogate  to  it  the  power  of  immedi- 
ately informing  us  of  external  things  which  are  only  the 
causes  of  the  object  we  immediately  perceive,  is  either  posi- 
tively erroneous  or  a  confusion  of  language."  ^ 

As  will  appear  from  what  follows,  he  even  limits  more 
precisely  the  sphere  of  perception,  and  perception  in 
vision.  He  finally  denies  any  perception  of  external  or 
extra-organic  objects  through  sight,  indeed  through  any 
sense  except  that  of  locomotive  effort,  yielding  us  resist- 
ance and  extension.  Hamilton,  accordingly,  censures 
Reid  and  others  for  speaking  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
distant  object  in  sight  as  a  perception  :  it  is  in  his  view 
a  mediate  and  inferential  knowledge.  It  is  clear  from 
this  that  Hamilton's  intuitive  perception  is  extremely 
limited,  so  far  as  the  extra-bodily  world  is  concerned, 
and  that  it  is  but  the  germ  of  the  processes  through 
which  we  build  up  our  knowledge — our  actual  or  matured 
knowledge — of  this  outward  world.  At  the  same  time, 
the  precise  limitation  of  the  sphere  of  perception  does 
not  affect  the  character  and  value  of  the  doctrine  as  a 
theory  of  our  immediate  contact  or  communion  with  the 
world  of  material  reality. 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  XXVII. 


136 


Hamilton. 


The  line  of  speculation  regarding  tlie  sphere  of  Per- 
ception thus  laid  doTO  by  Hamilton  in  1836  was  tlie 
one   along  which  his  thought  worked,  until  the  Dis- 
sertations D  and  D*  appended  to  Reid's  Works  were 
printed  and  stereotyped  in  1841  and  1842,  though  not 
pubhshed   until  November   1846.     In   these,— on  the 
Qualities  of  Body,  and  on  Perception  and  Sensation,— we 
have  his  matured  and  final  doctrine.     The  general  posi- 
tion taken  by  him  is  to  distinguisli  between  the  two 
forms  of  material   reality,    represented   by  the   bodily 
organism  and  the  extra-bodily  or  extra-organic  world ; 
and,  in  this  connection,  to  extend  sensation  from  a  merj 
state  of  the  mind  or  consciousness  to  a  consciousness  or 
affection  of  the  sentient  organism,  to  limit  perception 
to  an  apprehension  of  the  locality  and  the  relations  of 
sensations,  and  to  an  apprehension  of  resistance  in  the 
extra-organic  object.     Still  further,  then,  does  he  go  in 
the  line  of  making  our  sense-knowledge  the  result  of 
a  process  of  inference  superadded  to  a  comparatively 
hmited  sphere  of  immediate  apprehension,  intuition,  or 
consciousness.     All  perception  is  an  immediate  or  pre- 
sentative  cognition,  and  thus  apprehends  what  is  vow 
and  Jiere  existent.     It  is  further  a  sensitive  cognition, 
and  thus  apprehends  the  existence  of  no  object  out  of 
Its  organism,   or   not   in   immediate   correlation  to   its 
organism.     But  what  precisely  is  Sensation  1  and  what 
is  Perception?  — or  Sensation  and  Perception,  viewed 
in  contrast  ?     Sensation  proper  is  the  consciousness  of  an 
affection  of  the  sentient  bodily  organism ;  not  of  the  mind 
merely,  but  of  the  bodily  organism  as  sentient  or  mind- 
pervaded.      Perception   proper,    on  the  other  hand,   is 
conditioned  by  sensation,  and  is  primarily  {a)  the  appre- 


Sphere  of  Sensation  and  Perception,        137 

hension  of  the  locality  of  the  sensation  as  in  the  bodily 
organism ;  (h)  the  apprehension  of  the  sensations  as  like 
or  unlike,  and  as  out  of  or  totally  external  to  each  other; 
(c)  the  apprehension  of  a  resisting  something  external  to 
our  organism.  Except,  therefore,  in  this  last  instance, 
the  sphere  alike  of  Sensation  and  Perception  is  limited 
to  the  organic  world,  or  our  bodily  organism. 

"  As  animated,  as  the  subject  of  affections  of  which  I  am 
conscious,  the  organism  belongs  to  me ;  and  of  these  affec- 
tions which  I  recognise  as  mine.  Sensation  proper  is  the 
apprehension.  As  material,  as  the  subject  of  extension, 
figure,  divisibility,  and  so  forth,  the  organism  does  not  be- 
long to  me,  the  conscious  unit ;  and  of  these  properties  which 
I  do  not  recognise  as  mine,  Perception  proper  is  the  appre- 
liension." 

J^either  Sensation  nor  Perception  proper,  in  as  far 
as  the  latter  apprehends  the  primary  qualities  of  body 
in  general,  carries  us  beyond  the  bodily  organism. 
Through  these  we  apprehend  nothing  of  the  world 
ordinarily  known  as  external  and  extra  -  organic.  In 
sensation  we  know  nothing  of  the  cause  of  the  organic 
affection  of  which  we  are  conscious.  A  perception  of 
the  primary  qualities  does  not  originally  and  in  itself 
reveal  to  us  the  existence  and  qualitative  existence  of 
aught  beyond  the  organism  apprehended  by  us  as  ex- 
tended, figured,  divided,  &c.  The  primary  qualities  of 
things  external  to  our  organism  we  come  to  learn  only 
by  inference  from  the  affections  which  we  come  to  find 
they  determine  in  our  organism.  In  other  words,  by 
tlie  senses  of  taste,  smell,  hearing,  sight,  touch  proper, 
we  get  no  direct  knowledge  whatever  of  any  world 
external  to  our  bodily  organism.    How,  it  may  be  asked. 


138 


Hamilton. 


do  we  come  to  get  .*ny  such  perception  or  direct  know- 
ledge of  this  outward  world  ]     Only  in  one  way. 

"  The  existence  of  an  extra-organic  world  is  apprehended 
in  the  consciousness  that  our  locomotive  energy  is  resisted, 
and  not  resisted  by  aught  in  our  organism  itself.  For  in  the 
consciousness  of  being  thus  resisted  is  involved  as  a  correla- 
tive the  consciousness  of  a  resisting  something  external  to 
our  organism.  Both  are,  therefore,  conjunctly  apprehended. 
This  experience  presupposes  space,  and  motion  in  space." 

This  presupposition  obviously  with  Hamilton  affords  no 
difficulty,  for — 

"  every  perception  of  sensation  out  of  sensation  will  afford 
the  occasion,  in  apprehending  any  one,  of  conceiving  all  the 
three  extensions  ;  that  is,  of  conceiving  space.  .  .  .  We  are 
unable  to  imagine  the  possibility  of  that  notion  [space],  not 
being  always  in  our  possession."  * 

We  have  thus  both  an  a  x'^ioH  and  an  a  posterion 
knowledge  of  space,  as  a  necessary  condition  of  the 
possibility  of  thought,  and  as  a  percept  contingently 
apprehended  in  this  or  that  actual  complexus  of  sen- 
sations. ^ 

This  doctrine  shows  clearly  how  far  beside  the  mark  is 
the  usual  commonplace  criticism  that  Hamilton  accepts 
the  "common-sense,"  or  "ordinary  understanding,"  or 
"  unreflective  common-sense  "  of  mankind,  as  a  guarantee 
for  his  philosophical  facts  or  data.  On  the  contrary,  his 
analysis  of  the  common  belief  given  in  perception  is  as 
searching  and  thorough-going  as  anything  in  the  history 
of  the  question.  It  is  not  an  acceptance  simply  of  what 
is  usually  received  or  believed,  in  its  bare  literality,  but 
1  ReifTs  Works,  p.  882.  -'  Ibid. 


|J 


if 


HemarJcs  on  Theory  of  Perception.  139 

an  eminently  scientific,  and  at  the  same  time  philoso- 
phical, attempt  to  get  at  the  true  import  of  the  fact ;  and 
this  he  does  while  he  conserves  the  whole  principle  and 
meaning  of  the  belief.     As  he  pertinently  remarks — 

"  It  is  suflficient  to  establish  the  simple  fact,  that  we  are 
competent,  as  consciousness  assures  us,  immediately  to  appre- 
hend through  sense  the  non-Ego  in  certain  limited  relations  ; 
and  it  is  of  no  consequence  whatever,  either  to  our  certainty 
of  the  reality  of  a  material  world,  or  to  our  ultimate  know- 
ledge of  its  properties,  whether  by  this  primary  apprehen- 
sion we  lay  hold,  in  the  first  instance,  on  a  larger  or  a  lesser 
portion  of  its  contents."  ^ 

With  regard  generally  to  this  doctrine,  which  may  be 
called  the  Organic  and  Locomotive  theory  of  sensation 
and  perception,  there  are  difficulties,  and,  as  I  think, 
several  needed  supplements. 

In  the  first  place,  it  obviously  carries  us  but  a  very 
little  way  on  the  line  of  building  up  our  matured  know- 
ledge of  the  material  world,  in  its  extra-organic  form,  as 
that  which  lies  beyond  the  bodily  organism.  The  dis- 
tance from  the  consciousness  of  the  sentient  organism, 
with  its  localised  sensations  and  perceptions  of  exten- 
sion,— and  even  from  the  apprehension  of  the  resisting 
something, — to  our  full  world  experience,  is  a  long 
and  tedious  route.  How  and  why  we  come  to  refer 
our  sensations  to  extra-organic  causes  are  questions  that 
wait  solution. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  localis- 
ing of  the  sensation  in  the  bodily  organism  necessarily 
implies  that  it  is  an  affection  of  this  organism,  even  as 
sentient  or  animated.     We  may  localise  without  going 

1  Reid's  Works,  p.  814. 


140 


Hamilton. 


this  length,  or  holding  that  the  sensation  as  sensation 
is  more  than  a  purely  mental  state.  The  localising  need 
mean  nothing  more  than  the  reference,  intuitive  or 
acquired,  of  the  sensation  to  its  proximate  cause  or  con- 
cause  in  the  bodily  organism.  We  may  place,  as  Miiller 
holds,  the  sensation  in  touch  at  the  spot  where  the  nerve 
normally  terminates,  without  implying  that  the  sensa- 
tion itself  is  actually  an  affection  of  the  organism.  A 
sensation  spread  over  a  surface  is  hardly  congnious  with 
the  quality  of  indivisibility  which  a  sensation  proper 
undoubtedly  possesses. 

In  the  third  place,  it  seems  to  be  going  too  far  to  say 
that  our  apprehension  of  an  extra-organic  object  is  due 
to  resisted  locomotion  alone.  Contact  and  pressure,  it 
might  be  contended,  equally  lead  to  this  apprehension. 
In  simple  contact,  when  the  hand  is  at  rest  and  yet  in 
contact  with  the  extra-organic  surface,  there  is  ground 
for  supposing  that  there  is  the  apprehension  of  a  twofold 
surface — viz,,  that  of  the  extended  sentient  organism  and 
that  of  the  object  in  immediate  correlation.  Yet  there 
is  no  effort  at  locomotion. 

In  pressure,  again,  from  without  upon  the  organism, 
and  tending  to  compression  of  it,  there  may  be  the 
apprehension  both  of  externality  and  extension,  while 
there  is  no  effort  on  the  part  of  the  body  towards  loco- 
motion. In  fact,  this  is  one  of  the  most  common  forms 
of  our  experience.  This  could  hardly  be  realised  with- 
out at  least  an  intuition  of  outness,  of  externality  in 
space. 

In  a  note  Hamilton  recognises  this  point,  but  im- 
perfectly. He  says  :  "  The  quasi  -  primary  quality  is 
always  simply  a  resistance  to  our  inorganic  volition  [to 


Beniarhs  on  Theory  of  Perception.  141 


move]  as  realised  in  a  muscular  effort.  But,  be  it 
remembered,  there  may  be  muscular  effort,  even  if  a 
body  weighs  or  is  pressed  upon  a  part  of  the  muscular 
frame  apparently  at  rest."^  This  is  obviously  an  after- 
thought, and  it  is  not  sufficient  for  the  requirements  of 
the  case. 

In  the  fourth  place,  it  seems  doubtful  whetlier  the 
apprehension  of  resistance  or  of  a  resisting  something  as 
extra-organic  in  the  locomotive  effort  is  fitted  or  suffi- 
cient to  give  the  intuition  of  extension  or  an  extended 
thing.  The  intuition  of  resistance  might  be  quite  well 
satisfied  by  a  force — a  degi-ee  or  intension  of  force — in 
correlation  with  the  organism.  Electricity  would  be 
sufficient  to  impede  the  locomotive  effort ;  yet  we  should 
hardly  regard  this  as  adequate  to  give  us  the  intuition 
of  an  extended  object,  though  it  might  be  apprehended 
as  external.  These  considerations  tend  to  show  that 
the  locomotive  power  has  received  somewhat  exaggerated 
importance  as  a  factor  in  our  apj^rehension  of  extra- 
organic  objects.  The  three  sources  of  knowledge — Con- 
tact, Pressure,  and  Locomotion — seem  to  me  to  be  re- 
quired to  go  together,  and  yield  a  conjoint  result,  ere 
we  can  f orai  the  complex  notion  of  body,  —  as  ex- 
ternal, extended,  and  resisting.  After  that  it  would  be 
easy  to  show  how  by  association,  induction,  and  infer- 
ence we  connect  with  it  our  subjective  sensations. ^ 

Hamilton   it  should  be  kept  in  mind,  nowhere  pro- 

1  Reid's  Works,  p.  866. 

2  I  am  inclined  even  to  go  further,  and  to  hold  that,  besides 
the  sources  now  mentioned,  we  have  other  direct  perceptions  of  out- 
ward reality.  But  on  this  and  other  points,  especially  the  true  cri- 
terion of  organic  and  extra-organic  body,  the  limits  of  this  volume 
restrict  me  from  entering. 


142 


Hamilton. 


Qualities  of  Body. 


143 


fesses  to  find  in  perception  the  material  world  in  its 
essence,  nature  per  se,  or  in  what  may  be  called  its  tran- 
scendent reality.  He  constantly  proclaims  that  of  "  the 
absolute  existence  "  of  the  material  world  we  perceive 
nothing, — indeed  ultimately  know  nothing.  But  he 
not  less  strenuously  contends  for  the  fact  that  we  per- 
ceive and  thus  know  more  than  a  mere  sensation  or 
state  of  consciousness.  We  perceive  the  quality  of  a 
not-self  or  non-conscious  reality.  This  is  intuitively 
known.  It  is  known  as  independent  of,  and  distinct 
from,  any  quality  of  me,  tlie  percipient,  in  the  act 
of  perception.  There  is  a  simultaneous  consciousness 
of  the  quality  and  of  me  the  percipient.  The  know- 
ledge of  the  subject  perceiving  does  not  precede  nor 
follow  the  knowledge  of  the  object  perceived :  neither 
determines,  neither  is  determined  by,  the  other.  The 
doctrine  is  thus  one  at  once  of  Eealism  and  Dualism. 
As  the  knowledge  of  the  object  or  quality  is  not  before 
that  of  the  subject.  Materialism  is  precluded;  as  the 
knowledge  of  the  subject  perceiving  is  not  before  the 
object  perceived,  Idealism  is  equally  proscribed. 

This  quality  is  more  than,  it  is  over  and  above,  the 
sensation ;  yet  it  is  still  relative  to  us  and  our  modes 
of  perceiving,  while  existing  in  antithesis  to  us  in  and 
during  the  act  of  perception.  This  doctrine  is  per- 
fectly compatible  with  the  declaration  that  the  sub- 
strate of  the  quality  is  unperceived, — nay,  is  ultimately 
incognisable, — or  that  we  cannot  dogmatise  about  it. 
The  only  inconsistency  is  the  supposition  entertained 
by  Mill,  that  because  the  quality  perceived  is  not  re- 
garded as  a  state  of  the  conscious  subject,  because  it 
is  regarded  as  the  quality  of  a  non-Ego,  therefore  it 


jf 


must  be  held  to  be  known  and  to  exist,  as  we  per- 
ceive it,  as  absolute  transcendent  material  reality,  or 
out  of  and  above  all  our  perception  and  all  perception. 
But  this  is  a  pure  misconception.  What  we  already 
perceive  is  the  first  question — quality  of  Ego  or  non- 
Ego  :  ichetlier  we  perceive  it  directly  (intuitively)  or 
representatively, — this  also  is  a  preliminary  question. 
But  holding  a  quality  of  a  non-Ego — that  is,  something 
other  than  a  sensation — to  be  intuitively  perceived,  we 
are  at  perfect  liberty  thereafter  to  refrain  from  further 
dogmatism,  or  to  adopt  the  view  of  the  incognisability 
of  its  ultimate  ground,  substance,  or  cause. 

The  problem  which  Hamilton  presents  to  himself 
appears  to  be  this.  What,  looking  to  our  apprehen- 
sion of  the  fact,  and  our  conception  of  body  founded 
thereon,  are  the  necessary  and  essential  marks  or  fea- 
tures in  our  notion  of  body  ?  In  other  words,  what 
are  the  elements  in  and  through  which  we  must  con- 
ceive body,  if  it  is  to  be  conceived  at  all?  There 
are  features  in  body  under  which  we  may  and  do  ap- 
prehend and  conceive  it,  and  yet  in  their  absence 
the  notion  of  body  would  not  be  annihilated.  The 
answer  to  this  question,  then,  is  that  the  Primary 
Qualities,  dependent  on  the  apprehension  and  notion 
of  body  as  space-filling,  and  therefore  as  ultimately  in- 
compressible, are  the  essential  elements  or  conditions  of 
our  conception  of  body.  These  are — (1)  Extension,  (2) 
Divisibility,  (3)  Size,  (4)  Density  or  Rarity,  (5)  Figure, 
(6)  Absolute  Incompressibility,  (7)  ^lobility,  (8)  Situa- 
tion. All  such  are  deducible  from  the  space  -  filling. 
The  Secundo-Primary  qualities,  dependent  on  the  appre- 
hension of  the  fact  and  mode  or  degree  of  resistance, 


lU 


Hamilton. 


\ 


SuhJecHve  and  Objective. 


145 


are  contingent  or  accidental.  They  may  be  dispensed 
with,  and  yet  the  conception  of  body  remain.  And 
the  Secondary  Qualities  —  the  sensations  —  are  merely 
consciousnesses  in  the  organism  of  effects  ultimately 
learned  to  be  caused  by  obscure  properties  in  the 
extra-organic  objects.  But  the  peculiarity  of  the  se- 
cundo-primary  and  the  secondary  qualities  is  that  they 
are  apprehended  and  conceived  as  experienced  only  in 
certain  of  the  senses, — that  they  may  pass  away,  and 
yet  our  appreliension  and  conception  of  body  remain. 
Body,  therefore,  is  to  us  an  object  apprehended  and 
conceived  as  possessing  certain  qualities  —  extension, 
figure,  &c.f  which  depend  on  the  occupation  of  space. 
Kow  there  are  numerous  expressions  in  Hamilton 
which  indicate  this  objectivity,  and  nothing  more. 
Yet  these  may  be  construed  in  a  sense  which  he  did 
not  contemplate.  "VVe  have  the  following  expressions : 
The  primary  qualities  are  "attributes  of  body  as 
body,"  whereas  the  others  are  of  this  and  that  body, 
— properly  qualities,  suchnesses.  The  primary  express 
"the  universal  relations  of  body  to  itself," — "the  pos- 
sibility of  matter  absolutely," — whereas  the  secundo- 
primary  express  only  the  "possibility  of  the  material 
universe  as  actually  constituted,"  the  secondary  "the 
possibility  of  our  relation  as  sentient  existences  to  that 
universe."  The  primary  are  "  conceived  as  necessary  and 
perceived  as  actuaL"  The  secundo-primary  are  "per- 
ceived and  conceived  as  actual;"  the  secondary  are 
"  inferred  and  conceived  as  possible."  The  three  sets  are 
to  be  rounelly  regarded  as  mathematical,  mechanical, 
physiological.  Again :  "  Our  nervous  organism,  as  a 
body  simply,  can  possibly  exist,  and   can  possibly  be 


\v 


kno'WTi  as  existent,  only  under  those  necessary  conditions 
of  all  matter  which  have  been  denominated  its  primary 
qualities."  The  primary  qualities  or  modes  of  the  non- 
Ego  are  "definite  in  number  and  exhaustive."  The 
secondary  are  "  indefinite."  There  are  "  any  number  of 
unknowTi  capacities  in  our  animal  organism,"  and  "  any 
number  of  unknown  poAvers  in  matter"  to  excite  these. ^ 
No  doubt,  some  of  these  expressions,  taken  ab- 
stractly, might  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that  we  have 
an  actual  and  necessary  knowledge  of  what  body  is  in 
itself,  apart  from  our  perception,  as  self-subsisting,  and 
whether  we  perceive  it  or  not;  that  we  have  got  in 
this  the  knowledge  of  matter  or  body  per  se, — the 
transcendent  reality.  But  Hamilton  humes  straight- 
way to  disown  this  interpretation.  Ohjecfive,  we  are 
told,  means  only  a  contrast  to  subjective.  It  means 
the  perception  of 

"a  quality  of  the  non-Ego  in  immediate  relation  to  my 
mind.  Siihjective  means,  wlien  I  know  it  only  as  the  hypo- 
thetical or  occult  cause  of  an  affection  of  which  I  am  con- 
scious, or  when  I  think  it  only  mediately  through  a  subject- 
object,  or  representation  in  and  of  the  mind."  2 

Again : — 

"In  saying  that  a  thing  is  knoT\Ti  in  itself,  I  do  not  mean 
that  this  oljject  is  known  in  its  absolute  existence — that  is, 
out  of  relation  to  us.  Tliis  is  impossible;  for  our  know- 
ledge is  only  of  the  relative.  To  know  a  thing  in  itself  or 
inmiediately  is  an  expression  used  merely  in  contrast  to  the 
knowledge  of  a  thing  in  a  representation  or  mediately."  ' 

This  reference — what  may  be  called  the  Ontological 

J  See  Reid's  Works,  pp.  846,  858,  865,  866.  « Ihid.,  p.  846. 

a  See  Reid's  Works,  p.  866. 

P. — VI.  K 


146 


Hamilton. 


— is  no  doubt  the  least  explained  point  in  Hamilton's 
philosophy  of  Perception.  Do  we  actually  perceive 
and  conceive  in  those  primary  qualities  body  as  body 
jyer  «e, — as  that  which  exists  and  subsists  whether  we 
perceive  it  or  not — in  its  o^vn  actual,  absolute  reaUty, — 
the  transcendent  thing  of  existence  1 

My  view  is  that  Hamilton  says  no  to  this  question. 
We  have  no  knowledge  in  perception,  or  in  conception 
which  is  founded  wholly  on  empirical  perception,  of 
body  as  body, — of  body  in  its  absolute  super-sensible 
existence.  We  have  a  mixed  or  rather  complex  cog- 
nition in  which  the  quality  of  a  non-Ego  appears :  this 
is  not  a  sensation  or  state  of  consciousness  simply ;  it  is 
not  a  mere  quality  of  the  Ego ;  it  is  a  quality  of  the 
non-Ego,  such  as  it  must  appear  to  our  perception.  As 
a  time  and  space  object,  we  know  this  quality  as  a 
reality.  In  time  and  space  it  is  permanent,  uniform  to 
us ;  and  that  is  all  we  can  say,  or  need  to  know. 

Whether  the  substance,  or  power  on  which  it  imme- 
diately depends,  is  to  be  conceived  as  atomistic  or  dyna- 
mistic,  is  not  settled.  But,  settle  it  as  you  will,  there 
is  the  great  incognisable  beyond,  into  which  atomism  or 
dynamism  itself  runs  back.  These  would  be  but  dis- 
covered forms  or  grounds  of  the  quality  perceived  and 
stUl  relative  in  knowledge.  But  surely  it  is  something 
to  have  made  out  what  in  our  perception  and  thought 
body  is,  and  must  be  to  us — what  it  constantly  and 
permanently  remains  for  us — what  if  it  were  changed 
from,  it  would  cease  to  be  the  object  we  know  and 
name.  Unless  we  can  go  back  to  infinity  in  the  science 
of  things,  is  not  this  an  adequate  resting-place  for  finite 
knowledge  1    And  what  more  shall  we  ever  be  able  to 


Kant  and  Hamilton. 


147 


make  of  the  essential  in  body  than  simply  those  primary 
qualities,  and  of  the  actual  in  body  than  tliis  form  of 
resistance  to  our  powers — the  fact  of  a  force, — and  those 
sentient  aff'ections  which  are  either  modes  of  our  ani- 
mated frame  or  their  mental  results, — limited,  consti- 
tuted, made  definite  by  the  fundamental  susceptibilities 
of  our  organism  1  The  permanency  and  the  uniformity 
of  this  experience,  in  all  its  phases,  is  for  us  the  true 
reality  of  things. 

The  fundamental  element  of  difibrence  between  the 
position  of  Hamilton  and  that  of  Kant  in  relation  to 
perception  is  that  the  former,  by  liis  immediate  appre- 
hension of  the  quality  of  the  not-self,  puts  himself  in  a 
relation  to  material  reality,  which  Kant  precluded  him- 
self from  doing  at  the  outset,  and  which  he  could  not 
accomplish  in  the  end.  Kant  never  rose  above  the 
traditional  psychology  which  offered  merely  a  sensation, 
impression,  or  affection  of  the  conscious  subject,  as  the 
matter  of  external  perception,  or,  as  he  puts  it, 

"  the  apprehension  of  representations  as  niodifications  of  the 
soul  in  intuition."  ^ 

This  rejection  of  the  immediate  apprehension  of  a 
non-Ego,  decided,  as  Hamilton  says,  the  destiny  of  his 
philosophy. 

"  The  external  world,  as  known,  was  only  a  phsenomenon 
of  the  internal ;  and  our  knowledge  in  general  only  of  self, 
the  objective  only  subjective,  and  truth  only  the  harmony 
of  thought  with  thought,  not  of  thought  with  things."  ^ 

Hamilton  holds  further  that  Kant's  subsequent  attempt 

1  Kritik,  Trans.  An.,  I.  ii.  s.  2  ;  Hartenstein's  ed.,  p.  611. 
'  MetaphysicSf  App.  (b),  p.  400. 


148 


Hamilton, 


to  1)10 ve  the  reality  of  a  material  world  above  and  beyond 
apprehension  and  consciousness,^  is  a  failure,  and,  in 
fact,  in  contradiction  with  his  o^vn  philosophy.  If  the 
knowledge  of  a  material  non-Ego  be  not  given  or  imme- 
diate, a  proof  of  its  reality  in  any  form  is  an  impossi- 
l)ility, — nay,  it  may  even  be  said  the  notion  on  such 
terms  is  an  impossibility. 

Hamilton  further  differs  from  Kant  as  to  Time  and 
Space.  These  he  holds  with  Kant  to  be  necessities  or 
necessary  forms  of  consciousness ;  but  he  regards  them 
also — at  least  space  in  concrete  extension, — as  a  percept, 
— an  object  of  experience  actually  perceived.  They  are 
in  no  sense  forms  imposed  upon  objects, — subjective 
Rl)ectra  through  or  in  which  we  set  objects,  or  which 
we  use  in  constituting  them.  We  are  thus  not  pre- 
cluded from  regarding  the  time  and  space  world  as  a 
real  subsisting  world  of  things  ;  and  those  forms  are 
more  than  mere  subjective  ways  of  beholding  or  rather 
constituting  things.  They  are  conditions  of  things,  not 
of  us  the  percipients  merely.  There  is  an  immediate 
knowledge  or  consciousness  of  the  external  object  as 
extended.  The  extension  as  known  and  the  extension 
as  existing  are  convertible, — known  because  existing, 
and  existing  since  known.  ^ 

As  Hamilton  remarks,  the  discrimination  of  the  pri- 
mary and  secondary  qualities  of  matter  or  body  is  essen- 
tial to  Natural  Realism.  On  the  system  of  Kant, 
and  indeed  in  German  philosophy  generally,  this  dis- 
tinction is  not  taken  into  account.  As  to  the  Kantian 
system  itself — 

^  See  Kritik,  Vorrefle  (1787),  Hartenstein,  p.  32,  Supp.  xxL 
a  ReiJ:s  W(yi'ks,  p.  842. 


Kant  and  Hamilton. 


149 


"it  is,"  says  Hamilton,  "built  on  its  positive  negation,  or 
rather  its  positive  reversal.  For  Kant's  transcendental 
Idealism  not  only  contains  a  general  assertion  of  the  subjec- 
tivity of  all  our  perceptions  ;  its  distinctive  peculiarity  is,  in 
fact,  its  special  demonstration  of  the  absolute  subjectivity  of 
space  or  extension,  and  in  general  of  the  primary  attributes 
of  matter — these  constituting  what  he  calls  the  form^  as  the 
secondary  constitute  what  he  calls  the  matter  of  our  sen^-ible 
intuitions  (see  in  particular  Proleg.,  s.  13,  anm.  2)."^ 

The  different  use  of  the  terms  ohjed,  objective^  by 
Kant  and  Hamilton,  lead  to  mistake  on  this  matter. 
Object  and  objective  with  the  latter  refer  to  the  quality 
of  a  non-Ego  in  immediate  correlation  with  an  act  of  the 
conscious-subject,  as  the  mode  or  degree  of  resistance  in 
locomotion.  With  Kant  the  meanings  are  many  and 
various.  The  most  relevant  sense  is  perhaps  that  im- 
plied where  Kant  defines  concept  (Begriff)  as — 

"  the  one  consciousness  which  unites  into  one  representation 
the  part  by  part  perceived,  and  afterwards  reproduced  mani- 
fold." 2 

This  view  of  the  matter  given  to  the  concept,  or  even 
of  the  known  object,  is  neither  adequate  nor  self -con- 
sistent. It  is  not  the  case  that  every  individual  object 
perceived  is  made  up  in  this  way.  The  definition  can 
refer  only  to  such  objects  as  are  given  in  parts  in  space, 
or  in  time,  or  in  time  and  space.  These  are  not  the  whole 
of  the  objects  of  knowledge,  nor  are  they  even  the 
whole  of  the  objects  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  Ex- 
ternal Perception.  A  sensation  felt  and  known  by  me 
as  a  state  of  consciousness  is  not  known  in  this  way, 

1  ReiiVs  Works,  p.  845. 

2  Kritik,  Trans.  An.,  I.  ii.  s.  2 ;  Hart.,  p.  614. 


150 


Hamilton. 


nor,  though  in  knowledge,  is  it   "an  object,"  in  this 
wholly  narrow  sense  of  the  term.     A  taste,  an  odour,  a 
muscular  feeling,  an  apprehension  of  resistance,  is  not 
known  by  me  in  the  way  of  part  after  part  perception. 
Each  of  these  sensations  or  objects  of  consciousness  is  a 
wholly  indivisible  unit,  and  it  is  only  a  false  and  futile 
psychology  which  would  represent  it  as  anything  else. 
The  sensation  is  wholly  indivisible, — of  definite  degree 
or  intensity, — but  not  composed  of  part  after  part  appre- 
hended and  reproduced.     It  is  surprising  that  any  one 
who  has  really  followed  the  course  of  modern  psychology 
should  make  such  a  statement  as  that  every  sensation 
in  consciousness  is  necessarily  made  up  of  a  series  of 
parts  or  points.     This  is  only  true  of  an  "  object "  which 
is  constituted  by  the  apprehension  of  successive  points 
in  time,  or  coexisting  points  in  space.     But  this  is  a 
comparatively  narrow  class  of  object.     We  do  not  so 
apprehend  the  sensations,  taste,  odour,  muscular  feeling, 
or  the  percept  of  resisting  force.     These  sensations  or 
percepts,   when   added   together,    do   not  for  the  first 
time  form  "an  object"  in  this  Kantian  sense.     They 
form  a  complexus  or  series  of  objects,  each  of  which 
is  as  much  an  object  of  apprehension,  and  therefore  of 
knowledge,  as  the  complexus  itself  can  possibly  ba 

But  further,  an  object  which  supposes  a  series  of 
parts  after  parts  perceived,  implies  the  several  percep- 
tions and  consciousness  of  each  part  in  succession. 
Otherwise  the  object  as  a  manifold  could  never  be  made 
up  or  known.  The  objects  in  space  mainly  fulfil  this 
requirement,— such  as  line,  surface,  length,  and  breadth. 
In  these  we  go  on  to  the  whole  object  apprehended  by 
adding  part  known  to  part  kno^vn.     But  "a  manifold 


Kant  and  Hume, 


151 


before  you  "  ere  we  can  perceive  any  individual  object  as 
such  is  either  a  meaningless  or  a  self-contradictory  ex- 
pression. There  is  no  need  for  "  a  manifold,"  as  it  is 
called,  in  the  majority  of  cases ;  and  ere  you  can  have 
the  manifold,  you  need  to  have  the  parts  of  the  mani- 
fold in  succession,  and  apprehended  severally  and  in 
their  relations.  In  each  of  those  apprehensions  there 
is  an  object  kno^vn,  and  known  in  relation  to  the  con- 
scious-subject. There  can  be  no  putting  together  in 
the  shape  of  "  a  manifold "  in  the  way  of  representa- 
tion of  points  never  consciously  presented, — not  in  fact 
already  objects  of  perception  and  knowledge.  And  it 
might  be  added,  that  not  only  is  the  notion  of  object 
slipped  into  this  manifold,  as  an  element,  before  the 
individual  object  is  contemplated,  but  the  category  of 
quantity  —  ay,  and  the  notion  of  a  permanent  self- 
conscious  subject — is  implied,  as  already  given,  all 
through.  So  that  if  we  are  to  organise  knowledge  from 
the  beginning,  we  must  go  a  good  deal  deeper  than  "  the 
manifold  of  sensation."  Apart  altogether  from  the  ques- 
tion thus  suggested  by  "  the  manifold  of  sensation,"  it 
is  quite  clear  that  the  superposition  on  this  by  the  con- 
scious-subject of  subjective  forms,  of  time  and  space — 
the  representation  according  to  the  schema  of  time  in 
imagination  and  the  imposition  of  category  in  virtue  of 
the  unity  of  self-apperception — are  wholly  impotent  to 
raise  sensations  or  affections  into  a  real  or  material  world, 
— into  an  external  world  in  any  proper  sense  of  the  word. 
Necessary  connection  of  impressions  or  sensations — the 
objectivity  of  them  in  Kant's  language — so  that  they 
show  the  same  relations  to  every  human  intelligent,  this 
may  be  got,  but  that  is  alL     And  sensations  do  not  thus 


152 


ffamilton. 


become,  cannot  become,  perceptions  of  objects  •\vitliin 
and  without, — our  world  of  experience.  A  necessary 
and  universal  connection  of  subjective  sensations  may  be 
opposed  to  Hume's  view  of  contingent  and  customary 
conjunction;  but  that  is  alL  Eeal  objectivity  in  the 
sense  of  externality,  in  the  form  of  extension  or  force, 
as  qualities  of  a  non-Ego,  we  cannot  reach  on  su(;h  a 
metliod. 

There  is  in  Kant  the  constant  repetition  of  the  doc- 
trine of  the  limitation  of  our  knowledge  in  External 
Perception  to  representations, — wholly  subjective  states, 
— and  representations  (as  he  is  often  driven  to  put  it) 
of  an  incognisable  transcendent  object, — which  is  a 
simple  absurdity, — and  representations  caused  by  this 
object,  admitting  no  predicate  or  attribute,  yet  a  cause, 
— which  is  a  simple  contradiction.  Yet,  finally,  in  his 
second  edition,  he  offers  a  j-^roo/  of  "  the  existence  of 
objects  in  space  outside  myself."     The  gist  of  it  is — 

"  I  am  conscious  of  my  own  existence  as  determined  in 
time  ;  this  presupposes  something  permanent  in  the  percep- 
tion ;  this  permanent  cannot  be  anything  within  me,  because 
in  me  are  only  changing  representations  ;  the  perception  of 
this  permanent  is  possible  only  through  a  thing  outside  me ; 
the  determination  of  my  existence  in  time  is,  therefore,  pos- 
sible only  by  the  existence  of  real  things  which  I  perceive 
outside  me.  Hence  the  consciousness  of  my  own  existence 
is,  at  the  same  time,  an  immediate  consciousness  of  the  exist- 
ence of  other  things."  He  adds,  "  The  immediate  conscious- 
ness of  the  existence  of  external  things  is  here  not  assumed, 
but  proved."'  ^ 

AVhy  can  the  changes  in  my  representations  or  sub- 
jective states  in  time  not  be  known  through  the  perma- 

^  Compare  Mliller,  vol.  i.  p.  476. 


Kant's  Proof  of  Externality. 


153 


nent  Ego  of  consciousness  ?  Only  because  it  is  wrongly 
assumed  that  this  Ego  is  itself  a  representation, — that  it 
is  not  intuitively  apprehended  as  a  fact,  and  known  as 
a  permanent  fact  in  the  succession.  If  the  Ego  be  per- 
manent, and  be  known  as  such  in  and  through  the  suc- 
cessive states,  this  is  enough  to  render  the  idea  of  the 
changes  in  me  possible  and  actual  But,  apart  from  this, 
is  the  consciousness  of  these  changes  only  possible 
through  "  the  existence  of  real  things  which  I  perceive 
outside  me  "  %  Why  may  not  the  change  be  satisfied  by 
a  permanent  spiritual  Power  with  whom  I  am  in  com- 
munion 1  Does  the  need  for  a  permanent  imply  specifi- 
cally the  kind  of  permanent  ?  But  does  the  perception 
of  the  external  thing  necessarily  give  me  or  imply  its 
permanency  1  The  perception  of  the  moment  certainly 
does  not  guarantee  the  permanency  through  other  mo- 
ments of  the  thing  perceived.  This  permanency,  if  it 
be  at  all,  is  not  a  perception,  but  a  conception  subse- 
quent to  the  perception, — even  an  inference.  Yet  this 
permanency,  known  indirectly,  inferentially,  is  an  "im- 
mediate consciousness "  !  There  is  the  necessary  and 
immediate  consciousness  of  the  permanency  of  real  things 
outside  me,  and  yet  this  consciousness  is  the  result  of 
inference,  and  problematical  inference.  But  if  this  be 
so, — if  there  be  no  immediate  consciousness  or  percep- 
tion of  the  permanency  of  real  things  outside  me,  the 
process  is  useless,  on  Kant's  own  showing,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  enabling  me  to  know  the  determination  of  my 
states  in  time;  there  is  no  permanent  of  real  things 
immediately  perceived,  and  there  is  none  implied  as  a 
coiTelative  to  the  changes  in  the  states  of  consciousness. 
"  The  scandal,"  therefore,  "  to  philosophy  and  to  human 


154 


Hamilton. 


reason  in  general,"  which  Kant  alleges  as  attaching  to 
our  accepting  the  existence  of  things  without  us  on 
faith  only,  still  remains,  so  far  as  his  effort  is  concernetL 
But  the  truth  is,  this  is  not  a  matter  of  faith  only ;  it 
is  a  matter  of  direct  or  intuitive  knowledge,  inexplicable 
certainly,  and  therefore  only  ultimately  a  faith, — yet  not 
more  so  than,  as  Kant  himself  expressly  admits,  is  the 
"how  of  the  permanent  in  time  in  general,  the  coex- 
istence of  which  with  the  variable  produces  the  concept 
of  change."^  Eealism  asks  and  requires  nothing  more 
than  an  admission  of  this  sort  to  vindicate  its  principle. 

1  KHtik,  Vor.,  Sd  eel.  p.  37 ;  Muller,  vol.  ii.  p.  387. 


155 


CHAPTEE    YI. 


PERCEPTION — THE    REPRESENTATIVE    THEORY   AND    INFER- 
ENTIAL  REALISM — HAMILTON   AND   BROWN. 


There  is  a  doctrine  of  Perception  which  arises  from 
a  violation  of  the  integrity  of  the  fact  as  given  in 
consciousness.  This  is  the  great  rival  theory  to  that 
of  Natural  Eealism.  It  may  be  called  Cosmotlietic 
Idealism,  Hypothetical  Realism,  or  Hypoflietical  Dmil- 
ism.  The  upholders  of  this  theory  regard  the  object 
of  consciousness  in  perception  as  only  a  modification 
of  the  percipient  subject,  or  at  least  a  phainomenon 
numerically  different  from  the  object  it  represents, — 
yet  maintain  the  reality  of  an  external  world.  This 
reality,  and  the  knowledge  of  it,  the  scheme  seeks  by 
various  hypotheses  to  establish  and  explain.  This  is 
the  most  inconsequent  of  all  systems,  yet  it  has  been 
embraced  under  various  forms  by  the  immense  majority 
of  philosophers.^ 

Hamilton,  as  is  well  known,  regards  Brown's  doctrine 
of  Perception  as  that  of  Hypothetical  Eealism.  In 
other  words,  he  regards  Brown  as  holding — (1.)  That 
the  existing  external  world  is  not  directly  or  immedi- 

1  Discussions,  p.  56. 


156 


Hamilton. 


ately  apprehended,  but  posited  on  the  principle  of  sug- 
gestion or  inference.  (2.)  That  our  knowledge  of  it 
is  representational ;  and  "  that  the  representative  object 
is  a  modification  of  the  mind,  non-existent  out  of  con 
sciousness ;  the  idea  and  its  perception  being  only  dif- 
ferent relations  of  an  act  (state)  really  identical"^ 

Mill  holds  in  regard  to  Ero\vn's  doctrine  that  it  is 
not  one  of  representative  perception  at  all,  and  that 
Hamilton  was  entirely  wrong  in  regarding  it  as  sucli, 
besides  being  as  usual  inconsistent  in  his  criticism.  He 
maintains  further  that  Brown's  doctrine  of  Perception 
was  not  even  a  doctrine  of  mediate  knowledge,  and  that 
it  was  thus  not  different  from  Hamilton's  o-vvn  theory 
on  the  subject^  It  can  very  easily  be  sho^^^l  that  not 
one  of  these  statements  is  correct,  and  that  the  incon- 
sistencies which  Mill  imagines  he  has  found  in  Hamil- 
ton's criticism  arise  wholly  from  his  misconception  of 
Hamilton's  doctrine  of  Eepresentation  and  mediate  know- 
ledge, and  even  to  a  great  extent  of  Brown's  theory  of 
Perception,  or  rather  his  failure  to  observe  the  two 
differing  theories  which  run  all  through  Brown's  writ- 
ings on  this  subject.  The  only  reason  for  noticing 
Mill's  criticism  at  all,  is  that  the  doctrine  really  held 
by  Hamilton  may  be  seen  to  stand  out  in  clear  relief 
against  misrepresentation. 

In  the  outset,  ^lill  mistakes  Hamilton's  doctrine  of 
Eepresentative  knowledge  in  its  most  essential  point. 
It  is  not  the  case,  as  ^lill  alleges,^  that  representative 
knowledge  with  Hamilton  always  means  knowledge  of 
a  thing  "  by  means  of  something  which  is  like  the  thing 


1  Discussions,  p.  57. 


3  Ihid.,  p.  162. 


Exam.  c.  x.,  p.  196  et  seq. 


li 


Representation  not  ResemUance.  157 

itself."  It  is  not  even  true  that  representative  know- 
ledge need  mean  this  in  any  case.  The  representation 
need  not  be  like  the  thing  represented,  but,  as  Hamil- 
ton says,  it  must  be  "  conformable  with  the  original," — 
with  "  the  intuition  which  it  represents."  ^ 

This  may  or  may  not  be  a  relation  of  resemblance.    In 
memory,  the  picture  of  the  past  event  presented  must 
give  us  the  event  as  it  at  first  appeared  to  the  sense ; 
but  there  is  no  likeness  as  of  a  painting  to  the  original. 
The  elements  of  the  painting,  and  the  elements  of  the 
thing  painted,  are  of  the  same  material  type  :  they  are 
of  the  same  common  genus.     The  two  are  thus  alike. 
But  in  memory  the  image  is  a  mental  or  spiritual  image 
which  may  represent  a  material  or  physical  fact,  whose 
elements  are  of  a  totally  different  sort  from  the  ele- 
ments  of   the   mental   picture.      Material   qualities  in 
intuition  may  be  represented  by  spiritual  qualities  in 
memory.      There  is  no  analogy  here  "  like  that  of  a 
picture  to  its  original"      Memory  represents  to  me  a 
scene  in  space ;  but  the  image  or  mode  of  mind  is  not 
necessarily  extended.      A   picture  which  represents  a 
scene  in  space  is  necessarily  extended;   it  is  in  fact 
simply  another  form  of  space. 

]\Iill  is  thus  mistaken  in  supposing  that  a  doctrine 
which  makes  the  representative  medium  a  sensation — 
something  not  like  in  kind  to  the  thing  represented— 
necessarily  escapes  being  representational  The  char- 
acter of  the  medium  in  this  respect  matters  nothing,  if 
only  it  be  supposed  capable  of  giving  us  a  knowledge 
more  or  less  adequate  of  the  original,  as  it  would  be  pre- 
sented to  us,  or  as  it  exists  in  experience.     The  whole 

1  Reid's  W&rks,  p.  811. 


158 


Hamilton. 


Heprcsentation  not  EcsemUance. 


159 


^ 


series  of  philosophers  who  hold  what  Hamilton  calls  the 
finer  form  of  the  representative  hypothesis, — that  the 
medium  is  a  mere  state  of  the  mind, — could  not  have 
been  classed  by  Hamilton  as  representationalists  at  all, 
if  he  had  held  what  Mill  attributes  to  him,  a  resem- 
blance in  character  between  the  medium  and  the  thing 
represented ;  and  certain  of  the  earlier  Cosmothetical 
Idealists,  instead  of  holding,  as  Mill  attributes  to  the 
whole  of  them,  the  doctrine  of  similarity  between  the 
y  thing  represented  and  the  medium,  held  the  very  reverse. 
They  held  the  doctrine  of  species  in  perception,  be- 
cause the  species  was  of  the  nature  of  the  mind,  and 
thus  mediated  between  the  two  incompatible  substances, 
matter  and  mind.  Conformity  with  the  intuitions  rep- 
resented, or  conformity  with  the  thing  represented,  thus 
in  no  degree  implies  likeness  in  the  medium. 

Surely  it  is  conceivable  that  my  knowledge  of  an 
event — say,  the  rapid  sweep  of  the  river  which  I  saw 
yesterday — may  be  conformable  to  it,  without  implying 
that  the  mental  picture  is  "  like  "  in  quality  to  the 
physical  motion  I  saw,  or  even  a  form  oS  motion  at  alL 
Conformity  and  its  absence  between  the  presentation 
and  the  representation  in  no  way  depend  on  the  likeness 
of  the  medium.  The  medium  and  mental  picture  would 
be  the  same  in  character  and  nature  if  I  wrongly  repre- 
sented the  current  I  saw  as  nmning  north,  instead  of 
south  ;  yet  this  representation  would  not  be  conformable 
to  the  intuition.  This  sentence,  already  quoted,  might 
alone  have  kept  Mill  right ;  but  there  is  a  passage  in 
which  Hamilton  has  expressly  pointed  out  the  difference 
between  "  similarity  in  existence "  and  "  similarity  in 
representatioa" 


« If,'  he  says,  « we  modify  the  obnoxious  language  of 
Descartes  and  Locke,  and,  instead  of  saying  that  the  idea^  or 
notions  of  the  primary  qualities  resemlle,  merely  assert  that 
they  truly  represent  these  objects,-that  is,  afford  us  such  a 
knowledge  of  them  as  we  should  have  were  an  immediate 
intuition  of  the  extended  reality  in  itself  competent  to 
man,  then  Descartes,  Locke,  and  Reid  would  be  found 
at  one.  «  The  whole  difficulty  and  dispute  on  tliis  point  is 
solved  on  the  old  distinction  of  similarity  in  existence  and 
similarity  %n  representation,  which  Reid  and  our  modern  philo- 
sophers  have  overlooked." 

He  refers  here  to  a  passage  quoted  from  Biel,^  in 
which  the  distinction  between  the  material  object  and  tlie 
spiritual  image  is  clearly  drawn.  Representative  acts 
are  '' figmentay"  not  because  of  similarity  in  being  or 
essence  {in  essendo),  or  that  they  are  of  the  same  species 
with  the  objects  represented,  but  because  of  similarity  in 
representation,— that  is,  they  represent  things  with  their 
properties  as  they  really  are  presented  to  us.  The  non- 
resembling  character,  accordingly,  of  Brown's  modifica- 
tions, or  sensations,  or  states  of  mind,  to  the  unappre- 
liended  reality  or  unknown  cause,  does  not  save  him 
from  being  a  representationalist. 

But  MiU  errs  still  more  vitally  when  he  fails  to  see 
that  presentation  or  intuition  is,  in  Hamilton's  view, 
essential  to  representation.  There  is  no  point  on  which 
Hamilton  has  more  strongly  and  more  properly  insisted 
than  this,— that  what  we  represent  in  memory  was  once 
necessarily  an  object  of  intuition, -that  what  we  repre- 
sent in  imagination  as  possible  was,  in  its  parts  at  least, 
an  object  of  intuition,— that  we  can  conceive  even  no 
jmrt  of  the  past  or  the  future,  the  elements  of  which  did 

1  Reid's  Works,  p.  842 ;  cf.  Discussions,  p.  66.  2  p.  gj^^ 


160 


Hamilton. 


not  appear  in  direct,  presentative,  or  intuitive  know- 
ledge. Mill  never  got  a  glimpse  of  this  fundamental 
doctrine,  and  has  thus  wholly  misconceived  not  only 
Hamilton's  doctrine,  but  its  application  to  theories  of 
representative  perception.  Mill  actually  tells  us  that 
Hamilton 

"  jiffirms  that  we  cannot  possibly  recognise  a  mental  modifi- 
cation to  be  representative  of  something  else,  unless  we  have 
a  present  knowledge  of  that  something  else  otherwise  ob- 
tained." 1 

Of  course,  Hamilton  never  said  anything  so  absurd. 
"VVliat  he  said  was,  that  we  never  can  represent  what  has 
not  been  in  itself,  or  in  its  elements,  presented  to  us. 
A  present  knowledge  of  the  object  represented,  as  a 
condition  of  the  representation,  is  simply  ludicrous.  If 
we  had  this  "  present  knowledge,"  the  representation 
would  be  the  idlest  act  in  the  world. 

Mill  is,  if  possible,  still  further  astray  when  he  sup- 
poses that 

"  in  treating  of  memory  Sir  W.  Hamilton  requires  a  pro- 
cess of  thought  precisely  similar  to  that  which,  when  employed 
by  opponents,  he  declares  to  be  radically  illegitimate."  2 

There  is  no  analogy  whatever  in  the  two  cases.  The 
representationalist  professes  to  have  an  image  or  represen- 
tation in  consciousness  of  that  which  he  never  perceived 
or  found  in  intuition, — which  he  never  directly  knew. 
The  very  hypothesis  of  representation  is  founded  on  this 
assumption  ;  for  if  we  could  directly  perceive  the  ex- 
ternal reality,  we  should  not  need  to  have  recourse  to 
representation  in  order  to  know  it, — be  it  a  tertium  quid 

»  Exam.,  c.  x.,  p.  204.  2  lUd.,  p.  205. 


MilVs  Misapprehensions.  lei 

or  a  form  of  mind  merely.  The  representational 
theories  thus  absolutely  violate  every  condition  of  the 
representative  knowledge  implied  in  memory,  and  no 
critic  could  have  made  a  greater  blunder  than  in  suppos- 
ing the  two  processes  the  same.  What  Hamilton  pro- 
perly  charges  against  representationalism  in  its  cruder 
and  finer  form  alike  is,  that  the  mind  is  blindly  deter- 
mined to  represent  the  reality  which  it  never  appre- 
hended,—never  knew.  MiU  understands  this  so  little 
that  he  says — 

"  it  is  a  literal  description  of  what  takes  place  in  memorv." 

Mill's  conception  of  memory  must  be  a  peculiar  one. 
We  are  able  evidently  on  his  principles  to  remember  and 
represent  to  ourselves  an  event  which  we  never  actually 
perceived  or  witnessed.  We  are  able  also  to  believe 
that  this  event  took  place.  Memory  is  merely  a  blind 
determination  to  represent  what  was  never  actually  an 
object  of  direct  experience. 

But  was  Brown's  doctrine  one  of  representationalism? 
The  truth  on  this  point  is,   that   Bro\^^l  held  uncon- 
sciously two  distinct  theories  on  the  subject  of  percep- 
tion    The  one  may  be  described  more  properly  as  a 
doctrine  of  Inferential  Realism ;  the  other  was  substan- 
tially a  doctrine  of  Representationalism.     In  the  former 
doctrine  Brown  approximates  to  the  somewhat  crude 
view  of  perception  which  Reid  gave  in  his  first  work,  the 
*  Inquiry,'  though  even  here  Mill  is  wrong  in  thinking 
the  theories  of  Reid  and  Brown  identical     The  theory 
of  inferential  Realism  may  be  stated  simply  as  teaching 
the  suggestion  and  inference  of  an  unapprehended  some- 
thing, called  an  outward  world,  from  subjective  states 

P. — VL  T 


16S 


Hamilton. 


known  directly  as  sensations  and  affections  of  our  con- 
Bciousness.  But  as  this  unapprehended  something  may 
be  a  not^elf,  and  yet  not  material  substance,  it  is 
necessary  to  hold  in  a  theory  of  Realism  that  this 
something  is  known  to  be  corporeal  or  material,  and 
existent  in  space.  Brown  holds  both  those  positions ; 
although  the  former  may  be  held  apart  from  the  latter, 
as  in  Berkeleyanism.  , 

MiU  ventures  on  the  dogmatic  assertion  that  Brown  s 
doctrine  of  Perception  was  not  even  one  of  mediate 
perception.     The   reason  he  gives   is   that   in  Browns 
view  there  is  no  tertium  qidd  between  the  mind  per- 
ceiving and  the  outward  object.     There  is  only  "the 
perceptive  act,"  which  is  "the  mind  itself  perceiving. 
Hence  Brown's  doctrine  is  the  same  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton  s 
own  view  :  "  for  Brown  thinks  we  have  on  the  occasion 
of  certain  sensations  an  instantaneous  and  irresistible 
conviction  of  an  outward  object."  ^     A  more  inaccurate 
Tiew    alike  of  the  doctrines  of  Brown  and  Hamilton, 
could  not  be   given.     Brown's   "perceptive   act"   is  a 
mediate  act  or  process,  for  it  is  a  process  of  inference 
from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  or  at  least  to  the 
unapprehended,-from  the  state  of  mind  called  sensa- 
tion, which  is  aU  we  apprehend  or  can  apprehend,  on  his 
view,  to  the  outward  permanent  world,  which,  unless  as 
the  cause  of  certain  sensations,  is  wholly  unknown  and 
unknowable.     The   words   quoted,   moreover,  as  a   de- 
scription   of   Hamilton's  doctrine,   are   such   as  would 
excite  a  smile  in  the  merest  sciolist  in  his  writings. 

But   take   the   one  form   of  Brown's  doctrine-that 
represented  by  Mill  as  the  proper  one.     This  is,  that  "  an 

1  Meam,,  c.  x.,  p.  198. 


I 


Brown's  Doctrine. 


163 


unknown  something,"  or  "something  external  "is  sug- 
gested to  us  by  our  sensations, — we  knowing  this  "  some- 
thing "  only  as  a  cause  of  these  sensations  and  affections, 
but  not  any  one  of  the  attributes  which  it  possesses  in 
itself.     Even   on   this  view  of  Brown's   doctrine,   the 
knowledge  we  have  is  property  mediate.      The   thing 
itself — the  something  external — is  not  known  or  appre- 
hended by  us  directly,  or  as  it  exists ;  it  is  not  appre- 
hended in  its  own  attributes.     It  is  known  only  in  and 
through  the  sensation  which  it  causes  in  us,  and  this 
is  properly  a  mediate,  not  an  immediate  or  intuitive 
knowledge.     On  this  view,  indeed,  the  sensations  need 
not  represent  corresponding  qualities  in  the  something 
external,  though  at  another  time  BroAvn  says  they  do ; 
but  all  the  same,  as  our  knowledge  of  this  something  is 
merely  through  its  effects,  it  is  emphatically  a  mediate 
knowledge.     The  thing  apprehended— the  sensation— is 
not  convertible  with  the  reality  existing  :  the  existence 
of  the   reality  is  inferred  from  the  knowledge  of  the 
sensation. 

But  the  truth  is,  that  Brown's  doctrine  throughout  is 
essentially  one  of  mediate  knowledge  in  Perception.  He 
expressly  limits  knowledge  or  consciousness  in  Percep- 
tion to  a  mere  state  of  the  mind — an  affection  of  the 
mind — the  mind  existing  in  some  particular  affection. 
In  this  respect  there  is  no  distinction  between  sensation 
and  perception.  Each  has  equally  an  object,  or  equally 
no  object.  In  each  case  there  is  simply  a  reference  of  a 
subjective  state  to  an  (objective)  cause  or  occasion.  On 
this  point  even,  as  to  the  precise  cause  or  its  nature. 
Brown,  as  we  shall  see,  is  not  consistent.  But  he  has 
no  idea  whatever  of  the  possibility  of  immediate  percep- 


\ 


164 


Hamilton. 


tion  in  Hamilton's  sense,  and  even,  I  venture  to  say,  in 
Eeid's  later  sense.  Whenever  a  glance  of  this  dawns  on 
him,  he  scouts  the  very  possibility  of  the  doctrine.  He 
says : — 

"  What  I  learn  by  perception  of  the  colour,  or  softness,  or 
shape,  or  fragrance,  or  taste  of  a  peach,  is  a  certain  state  of 
ray  o^\^l  mind,  for  my  mind  surely  can  be  conscious  only  of 
its  own  feelings."  ^ 

Again,  he  says  : — 

"  The  material  object  itself  he  [Reid]  surely  could  not  con- 
sider as  forming  a  part  of  the  perception,  which  is  a  state  of 
the  mind  alone.  To  be  the  object  of  percepti(m  is  nothing 
more  than  to  be  the  foreign  cause  or  occasion  on  which  this 
state  of  the  mind  directly  or  indirectly  arises."  ^ 

There  is  in  these  passages,  and  in  others  following 
them,  not  only  a  denial  of  the  possibility  of  im- 
mediate perception;  there  is  the  limitation  even  of 
knowledge  in  general  to  mental  affections,  —  a  limi- 
tation which  logically  excludes  the  possibility  of  a 
knowledge  alike  of  external  reality,  other  minds,  and 
Deity.  These  can,  in  fact,  on  this  doctrine,  be  regarded 
only  as  hypothetical  causes  of  certain  mental  affections 
in  us.  Our  whole  knowledge  lies  within  the  circle  of 
subjectivity;  the  real  universe  is  wholly  incognisable. 
That  the  external  world,  if  known  at  all  on  such  a 
doctrine,  can  be  known  only  through  our  own  subjective 
aflfections  as  their  cause,  and  thus  mediately,  there  can- 
not be  the  slightest  question. 

But  with  all  this,  Brown  most  explicitly  holds  by  the 
ordinary  realism  as  a  matter  of  belief.     Nothing  can  be 


1  L.  XXIV.,  p.  154. 


1  L.  XXV.,  pp.  159,  160;  ct  p.  166. 


Bcid  and  Brown, 


105 


stronger  than  his  language  on  this  point.  He  accepts 
in  the  most  unreserved  manner  "  the  belief  in  the  real 
existence  of  an  external  universe,"  "  in  the  existence  of 
foreign  changeable  external  bodies  as  separate  from  the 
mind,  and  of  a  corporeal  frame  capable  of  being  affected 
by  other  bodies.'' '  This  is  a  belief  which  no  scepticism 
can  shake.  "It  is  physically  impossible  not  to  admit " 
that  such  a  world  does  exist.^  It  is  as  impossible  to 
disbelieve  the  reality  of  some  external  cause  of  our 
sensations  as  it  is  to  disbelieve  the  reality  of  the 
sensations  themselves.' 

The  only  question  which  he  thinks  it  possible  to  raise 
is  as  to  how,  or  in  what  circumstances,  this  belief  has 
arisen.*  This  is  for  him  the  problem  of  perception. 
How  he  has  solved  it,  and  whether  his  solution  is  at 
all  legitimate,  are  separate  points  to  be  noticed  in  the 

sequel 

On  what  ground,  if  any,  it  may  be  asked,  did  Brown, 
while  repudiating  an  immediate  knowledge  of  an  external 
world,  still  hold  by  the  belief  in  its  reality?  Hamilton 
says — 

"  He  [Brown]  assumes  the  existence  of  an  external  world 
beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  exclusively  on  the 
ground  of  an  irresistible  belief  in  its  unknown  reality.  In- 
dependent of  this  belief,  there  is  no  reasoning  on  which  the 
existence  of  matter  can  be  vindicated :  the  logic  of  the  idealist 
he  admits  to  be  unassailable."  ^ 

This  is  true ;  but  it  is  necessary  to  add  that  Brown  has 
attempted  to  show,  by  a  sort  of  inference,   how  this 

1  L.  XXII.,  p.  135.  2  Hid,  3  L.  XXIV.,  p.  151. 

*  L.  XXII.,  p.  135.  ^  Discussions,  p.  56. 


166 


Hamilton, 


Beid  and  Brown. 


167 


knowledge  and  belief  have  arisen  in  the  mind.  His 
theory  is  a  sort  of  inferential  realism,  and  it  is  fallacious. 
But  it  requires  express  notice,  even  to  show  its  fallacy. 

To  the  inferential  realist  there  are  but  two  modes 
open, — that  of  suggestion,  and  that  of  inference.  Eeid, 
in  the  beginning,  countenanced  the  first.  Brown  accepts 
the  second.  ^lill  has  not  seen  the  distinction  between 
these  two  methods,  and  he  is  thoroughly  mistaken  in 
identifying  Brown's  method  with  that  of  Eeid. 

In  his  first  work,  the  *  Inquiry,*  Eeid's  doctrine  is  no 
doubt  properly  a  form  of  inferential  realism.  The  sen- 
sation, a  purely  subjective  state,  suggests  to  us  the  notion 
and  the  reality  of  an  agent  or  quality  different  from 
itself, — not  a  state  of  mind  at  all.  Thus  tactile  feeling 
suggests  to  us  for  the  first  time  the  notions,  and  the  belief 
in  the  reality,  of  hardness,  smoothness,  extension,  and 
motion, — to  be  reckoned  as  primary  qualities  of  body. 
But  taking  even  this,  the  most  favourable  form  of 
Eeid's  doctrine  of  perception,  IVIill  is  mistaken  in  sup- 
posing that  it  is  identical  with  that  of  Brown.  For,  in 
the  first  place,  the  objects  or  qualities  which  Eeid  holds 
to  be  suggested  or  immediately  inferred  are  qualities 
thereafter  known  and  recognised  as  properties  of  body ; 
whereas  Brown's  external  object,  also  suggested  or 
inferred,  is,  after  the  inference,  an  object  whose  proper- 
ties are  not  knowiL  It  is  simply  an  external  cause  of 
subjective  states,  call  these  states  sensations  or  primary 
qualities.  Between  the  tactile  feeling  and  the  extension 
as  notion  there  is  no  difference  in  character.  They  are 
equally  states  of  the  mind,  and  of  the  mind  alone, — 
equally,  in  fact,  sensationa  The  non-Ego  of  Brown  is 
only  **  something   external  j "  all   that  he   supposes  us 


I 


capable  of  knowing  regarding  it  is,  that  it  is  the  cause 
of  certain  affections  in  us.  This  is  Brown's  explicitly 
declared  doctrine,  though,  as  we  shall  see,  he  does  not 
keep  consistently  to  it. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  Eeid's  principle  of  inference 
and  suggestion  of  the  external  object  is  wholly  different 
from  BroT\Ti's.  Eeid,  in  the  beginning,  holds  that  the 
sensation  suggests  the  primary  qualities,  though  a  specific, 
original,  instinctive  principle.  Given  certain  sensations, 
these  necessarily  imply  the  notion  and  belief  of  certain 
other  or  ulterior  facts.  Brown,  on  the  other  hand,  ex- 
plicitly discards  this  specific  principle. 

"  It  is  not  by  any  peculiar  intuition  we  are  led  to  believe 
in  the  existence  of  things  without.  I  consider  this  belief  as 
the  effect  of  that  more  general  intuition,  by  which  we  con- 
sider a  new  consequent  in  any  series  of  ascertained  events  as 
the  sign  of  a  new  antecedent."  ^ 

In  fact.  Brown  considers  it  an  instance  of  the  universal 
law  of  Causality  as  interpreted  by  himself.  The  infer- 
ence on  such  a  principle  is  easily  shown  to  be  utterly 
impossible. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  no  knowledge  or  apprehen- 
sion of  this  reality  by  any  of  the  senses  of  Smell,  Taste, 
Hearing,  Touch  proper :  the  sensations  or  affections  of 
those  senses  are  simply  states  or  modifications  of  mind, 
but  they  tell  us  nothing  of  an  external  reality  or  cause. 
Consciousness  cannot  in  these,  and  indeed  in  any  of  its 
forms,  transcend  its  own  state.  In  none  of  these  senses, 
moreover,  do  we  obtain  the  two  fundamental  elements 
of  our  notion  of  matter — extension  and  resistance. 

1  L.  XXIV.,  p.  151. 


168 


Hamilton, 


Fallacies  in  BrowrCs  Doctrine, 


We  have  a  notion  not  only  of  extension  but  of  "  ex- 
ternal existence."  The  notion  of  extension  is  not  iden- 
tical with  this. 

«  To  what,  then,"  he  asks,  "  are  we  to  ascribe  the  belief  of 
external  reality  which  now  accompanies  our  sensations  of 
touch ?"  His  explanation  is  as  follows  :  "  It  appears  to  me 
to  depend  on  the  feeling  of  resistance,  which,  breaking  in 
without  any  knouTi  cause  of  difference  on  an  accustomed 
series  of  feelings,  and  combining  with  the  notion  of  exten- 
sion, and  consequently  of  divisibility,  previously  acquired, 
furnishes  the  elements  of  that  compound  notion  which  we 
term  the  notion  of  matter.  Extension  and  resistance— to 
combine  these  simple  notions  in  something  which  is  not  our- 
selves, and  to  have  the  notion  of  matter,  are  precisely  the  same 
thing."  1 

This  is  a  singular  and  glaring  specimen  of  petitio 
principiL  Whence  our  belief  in  external  or  non-mental 
existence  1  Extension  and  resistance  are  "  feelings," 
"  notions,"  subjective  states  merely.  These  combined 
can  but  constitute  a  more  complex  mental  state.  This 
is  not  an  external  reality,— it  is  not  the  matter  which 
Brown  is  in  search  of.  But  he  quietly  adds,  "  to 
combine  these  simple  notions  in  something  which  is 
not  ourselves,  and  to  have  the  notion  of  matter, 
are  precisely  the  same  thing."  But  when  and  how 
do  we  get  this  "something  which  is  not  ourselves," 
this  "  something  "  which  is  over  and  above  our  sensa- 
tions ?  This  is  n*t  explained;  it  is  assumed.  But, 
further,  does  Brown  mean  to  say,  in  the  face  of  all  his 
philosophy,  that  "the  feelings  "—extension  and  resist- 
ance— can  reside  in  or  be  the  properties  of  "  something 

1  L.  XXIV.,  p.  150. 


169 


not  ourselves," — non-mental — not  even  mind,  or  a  subject 
of  conscious  states  1  A  something  not  ourselves  with 
the  feelings  extension  and  resistance ;  this,  forsooth,  is 
matter  or  external  reality, — reality  that  transcends  alike 
the  sphere  of  sensation  and  our  own  bodily  organism ! 
This  is  simply  the  most  contradictory  form  of  Cosmo- 
thetic  Idealism ;  and  it  is  Eepresentationalism,  if  any- 
thing is,  for  the  known  world  of  extension  and  resist- 
ance is  the  counterpart  of  "  the  something "  that  tran- 
scends it,  seeing  that  this  something  is  endowed  with 
our  very  feelings  or  notions. 

But  Brown's  inference  of  a  cause  of  resistance  in 
something  that  is  not  self,  is  wholly  unwarranted  on 
the  premises  and  by  the  process  here  given.  (1.)  It  is 
supposed  to  be  reached  on  the  principle,  assumed  to 
be  intuitive,  of  similar  antecedents  having  similar  con- 
sequents. When  antecedents  are  similar,  consequents 
are  similar;  true,  but  for  all  this  there  may  be  events 
which  have  no  antecedents  at  alL  If  we  infer  an  ante- 
cedent at  all  in  the  case,  it  will  be  in  virtue,  first  of  all, 
of  the  principle  that  every  event  or  change  in  our  ex- 
perience has  a  cause — a  cause  of  some  sort.  This  prin- 
ciple or  necessity  is  not  involved  in  the  principle,  that 
where  antecedents  are  similar,  consequents  are  similar; 
on  the  contrary,  this  latter  principle  is  founded  on  the 
other  as  one  at  least  of  its  essential  elements. 

(2.)  But  if  we  carry  out  our  inference  on  the  principle 
of  difference  of  antecedent  from  difference  of  consequent, 
the  antecedent  inferred  will  still  necessarily  be  one 
within  our  experience,  not  a  something  wholly  un- 
known to  us,  of  which  we  cannot  predicate  either 
affirmatively  or  negatively.     I  have  the  feeling  of  re- 


V 


k 


170 


Hamilton, 


sistance ;  I  know  nothing  more ;  I  have  no  right  to 
speak  of  *'  some  object  opposed  to  me."  This  is  to 
introduce  an  object  which  is  not  a  sensation.  But 
why  speak  here  of  an  antecedent  at  all  %  There  is 
even  no  antecedent  in  time  here.  The  feeling  of 
resistance  is  not,  ex  ?if/poi?iesi\  preceded  in  my  states 
of  consciousness  by  anything  I  know,  or  any  state 
of  consciousness.  It  arises  suddenly,  unexpectedly, 
from  nothing  known  to  me  that  has  gone  before.  I 
have  no  known  antecedent  to  fall  back  upon ;  and  as 
my  whole  knowledge  or  consciousness  in  the  matter 
is  limited  to  antecedents  which  are  states  of  my  own 
mind,  I  ought  naturally  to  seek  the  antecedent  among 
these,  not  in  the  wholly  new  notion  of  something  op- 
posed to  me, — some  object  which  is  not  myself, — an 
object  which  transcends  alike  my  experience  and  my 
knowledge.  If  I  do  reach  this  notion,  I  certainly  do 
not  get  it  by  the  principle  of  similarity  of  sequence 
between  antecedents  and  consequents.  And  just  as 
little  can  I  reach  it  by  the  principle  of  causality.  This 
principle  might  tell  me  there  is  a  cause  of  the  feeling  of 
resistance ;  it  could  never  tell  me  what  that  cause  is, 
or  give  to  me  the  new  notion  of  a  particular  cause. 
This  must  be  learned  from  a  wholly  different  source, 
and  is  a  step  entirely  subsequent  to,  as  it  is  beyond  the 
sphere  of,  the  principle  of  causality. 

Further,  the  external  world  of  popular  irresistible 
belief  is  a  world  in  space.  This  is  the  world  which 
Brown  has  to  establish  by  his  process  of  inference  from 
the  feeling  of  resistance.  But  how  can  the  principle  of 
causality  do  this  in  any  form  1  A  cause  of  the  sensation 
may  be  established — but  how  am  I  to  know  that  it  is 


Fallacies  in  Brown's  Doctrine. 


171 


a  spatial  existence]  Any  form  of  cause — spiritual  or 
material  alike — satisfies  the  idea  of  cause.  How  then 
can  I  thus  account  for  this  belief  in  corporeal  substance 
distinct  from  myself  1  Obviously,  the  whole  process  is  a 
mere  fallacy.  And  if  we  have  this  belief  which  Brown 
assumes,  it  never  arose  in  the  way  he  supposes  it  did. 
We  have  no  alternative  but  to  retrace  our  steps,  and  to 
admit  with  Hamilton  that  we  have  illegitimately  sun- 
dered the  immediate  perception  or  intuition  of  the 
external  object  from  the  irresistible  belief  in  it ;  that,  in 
fact,  we  believe  in  an  outward  world  in  space  because 
we  know  an  outward  world  there,  and  believe  that  we 
know  it. 

But  the  truth  is,  that  on  Brown's  principles  of  the 
limitation  of  knowledge  to  states  of  consciousness,  we 
could  never  even  suppose  this  cause  of  resistance,  when 
suggested  to  us,  to  be  a  non-mental  or  non-sensational 
object.  We  could  certainly  never  suppose  it  identical 
with  the  notion  of  a  material  world,  separate  and  sep- 
arable from  ourselves, — a  not-self  in  the  ordinary  sense 
of  that  term.  In  this  case  we  should  naturally  think 
that  this  unknown  cause  was  a  spiritual  force,  like  our- 
selves— a  will  like  our  own.  Knowing  no  causes  or 
antecedents  but  our  volitions  or  other  states  of  con- 
sciousness, we  should,  if  we  thought  of  the  cause  of  a 
new  sensation,  such  as  resistance,  think  it  as  different 
from  ourselves  but  analogically  the  same.  So  that  in- 
stead of  reaching  the  common  notion  of  external  mate- 
rial reality,  we  should  regard  the  surrounding  universe 
as  a  series  of  wills  or  consciousness  powerful  enough 
to  resist  our  own. 

Kay,  we  might  go  even  further  than  this,  and  show 


/ 


172 


Hamilton, 


that  to  Brown  such  a  consciousness  is  not  possible. 
For  supposing  the  feeling  and  knowledge  of  a  not- 
self  or  external  cause  of  sensation  were  produced  in 
the  mind  by  this  process  of  inference,  what  is  it  on 
Ijrown's  principles  but  a  state  of  the  mind  conscious 
only  of  itself  as  a  state  %  Our  knowledge  on  his  prin- 
ciples is  limited  entirely  to  the  mental  state,  and  its 
content,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  mental — a  part  of  the 
state.  What  advance,  then,  have  we  made  by  reach- 
ing the  consciousness  or  feeling  of  an  external  cause, 
beyond  tliis,  that  we  have  got  merely  to  another 
feeling  or  sensation  like  that  which  this  is  supposed 
to  account  for?  The  feeling  of  resistance  does  not 
bring  before  us  the  external  reality  or  thing  itself 
existing,  for  the  external  world  as  more  than  a  state 
of  our  own  mind  we  cannot  know,  but  it  suggests,  or 
we  infer  from  the  feeling,  the  notion  of  this  workL 
On  the  ground  of  this  suggested  or  inferred  notion 
we  are  led  to  believe  that  a  reality  corresponding  to 
the  notion  exists  in  a  sphere  beyond  our  consciousness. 
The  world  itself  as  a  reality — as  a  matter  of  fact — we 
never  can  either  observe  or  know.  It  is  merely  imaged 
to  us  in  a  notion  as  a  not-self — a  corporeal  substance — 
and  thus  believed  in  as  real, — as  a  correspondent  and 
counterpart  to  the  notion.  This  actual  world  is  thus 
with  Brown  never  known ;  it  is  believed  to  be  because 
of  its  notion,  and  in  conformity  with  its  notion.  Then 
what  is  this  but  a  doctrine  of  Eepresentationalism  in  the 
strictest  sense  of  that  term — a  supposed  coiTespondence 
between  a  state  of  consciousness  and  what  transcends 
consciousness  altogether  ?  —  what  has  never  been  in 
consciousness,  and  never  can  be,  and  which  accordingly 


Vindication  of  Hamilton's  Criticism.       173 

can  never  be  compared  with  the  notion  —  or  known 
to  be  truly  represented?     Between   Brown's   doctrine 
and  that  of  Hamilton  there  thus  emerges  an  absolute 
contrast.      Brown  believes  in  that  which  he  does  not, 
and  cannot,  apprehend  or  even  know ;  he  believes  that 
he  has  a  notion  of  it,  and  a  notion  conformable  to  its 
reality  and  its  character.     His  belief  extends  beyond  his 
knowledge,   for  he  believes  in  an  object  wholly  tran- 
scending consciousness.     With  Hamilton  the  object  is 
first  of  all  apprehended  as  a  matter  of  fact — as  a  fact  of 
our  direct  experience;  and  we  on  the  ground  of  this 
knowledge   believe  the   thing  to  exist,  or  to  be  real, 
just   as   knowing   any   one   of    our   sensations   we   be- 
lieve it  to  exist,  or  to  be  real  while  we  know  it,  and 
on  the  ground  of  the  knowledge.     In  a  word,  Hamil- 
ton's intuition  is  a  knowledge,  Brown's  suggestion  and 
inference  is  a  belief— a  belief  in  that  which  in  itself 
cannot  be  either  apprehended  or  known. 

But  there  are  passages  in  Brown  which  are  quite  in- 
consistent with  the  absolute  incognoscibility  of  the  real 
outward  world.  They,  in  fact,  amount  to  a  doctrine  of 
representative  perception,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the 
term.  The  sensations  or  subjective  states  are  excited 
in  us  by  what  is  not  itself  an  object  of  perception.  It 
is  yet  regarded  by  us,  and  believed  to  be  non-mental, 
material,  and  spatial  Nay,  the  feeling  of  extension 
is  "the  direct  or  immediate  result  of  the  presence  of 
the  external  body  with  the  quality  of  which  it  corre- 
sponds."^ "The  permanence  and  universality  of  the 
agents  which  possess  the  primary  qualities."  "Our 
bodily  frame  is  itself  extended  and  resisting."  ^     "  There 

1  L.  XXVI.,  p.  166.  2  See  L.  XXVI.,  p.  165,  oxi^ passim. 


i..._   X 


174 


Hamilton, 


is  something  which  is  external  to  ourselves  and  in- 
dependent of  our  transitory  feelings, — something  which 
it  is  impossible  for  us  not  to  regard  as  extended  and 
resisting."!  A  doctrine  of  this  sort,  besides  being  in- 
consistent with  the  inference  of  a  mere  "  something "  as 
cause  of  our  sensations,  is  a  doctrine  of  representation ; 
for  through  our  sensations,  as  representative  media,  we 
are  alleged  to  know  the  essential  properties  of  body, — 
nay,  to  know  it  as  what,  on  the  vulgar  belief,  we  think 
we  perceive  it  to  be,  material  or  non-mental, — extended 
and  resisting.  It  is  no  longer  merely  the  unknown 
cause  or  correlate  of  sensations. 

Hamilton  was  quite  well  aware  of  the  connection  of 
the  two  doctrines  of  Inferential  Realism  and  Representa- 
tionalism.     He  tells  us  expressly  that,  in  regard  to  the 
two  latter  forms  of  the  hypothesis,  in  which  the  repre- 
sentation is  a  modification  of  the  mind, — one  of  those 
attributed   to  Brown,  — "the   subaltern  theories  have 
been  determined  by  the  difficulty  to  connect  the  repre- 
sentation with  the  reality  in  a  relation  of  causal  de- 
pendence. "2    And  later,  in  speaking  of  these  subaltern 
theories,  he   divides   them   into   those   which   suppose 
natural  and  supernatural  causes  :  "  Of  these,  the  natural 
determination  to  represent  is  either  (1)  one  foreign  and 
external  (by  the  action  of  the  material  reality  on  the 
passive   mind,  through   sense),  or  (2)  one   native   and 
internal,"   &c.3      The   former  of  these   fitly  describes 
Brown's   process   of   inference    and   suggestion   of  the 
unapprehended  external  world,  through  the  feeling  of 
resistance. 

1  L.  XXV.,  p.  60.  2  Discussions,  p.  68. 

»  Meid's  Works,  p.  818. 


Vindication  of  Hamiltotis  Criticism,       175 

These  things  being  so,  Hamilton's  criticism  of  Brown's 
doctrine  is  perfectly  vindicated.  All  that  need  be 
conceded  in  the  matter  is,  that  Hamilton,  while  ex- 
posing the  fallacy  of  Brown's  attempt  to  reduce  space  to 
time  and  the  succession  of  muscular  feelings,  did  not 
expressly  exhibit  the  fallacy  of  his  inference  of  an  ex- 
ternal reality  from  the  feeling  of  resistance,  and  thus 
did  not  quite  complete  the  case  against  him. 


ii 


176 


CHAPTEE   YIL 

PERCEPTION — NATURAL  REALISM  AND  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM 
HAMILTON   AND    BERKELEY. 

As  opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Eealism  or  Dual- 
ism, Hamilton  notes  the  theories  of  Idealism.     Accord- 
ing to  Idealism,  the  object  of  consciousness  in  perception 
is  ideal — that  is,  a  phenomenon  in  or  of  the  mind.     If 
the  idea  be  regarded  as  a  mode  of  the  human  mind  it- 
self, we  have  Egoistical  Idealism.    If  the  idea  be  viewed 
not  as  a  mode  of  the  human  mind,  we  have  the  scheme 
of  non-Egoistical  Idealism.     If  the  ideal  object  be  sup- 
posed to  be  in  the  perceiving  mind  itself,  there  is  needed 
the  hypothesis,  among  others,  of  its  infusion  by  Deity. 
If  this  object  be  not  in  the  mind  itself,  there  is  needed 
the  hypothesis  of  the  human  mind  being  conscious  of 
it  in  a  Higher  Intelligence,  to  which  it  is  intimately 
present.    We  have,  in  a  word,  the  hypotheses  respective- 
ly of  Berkeley  and  Malebranche. 

Hamilton  regards  Berkeley's  doctrine  as  one  of  objec- 
tive or  non-Egoistical  Idealism.  The  idea  or  ideal  object 
is  not  a  mere  state  or  mode  of  the  mind ;  but  it  is  in 
the  perceiving  mind,  and  it  is  infused  into  it  at  the 
moment  of  consciousness,  immediately  by  God.     The 


Bealism  and  Idealism. 


177 


ideal  object  is  thus  not  a  mere  mode  of  the  mind.  It  is 
a  non-Ego,  the  quality  or  effect  of  a  non-Ego.  This 
non-Ego  is  with  Berkeley  Deity.  HamUton  points  out 
the  general  approximation  of  thorough -going  Realism 
and  thorough-going  Idealism: — 

"Both  buUd  upon  the  same  fundamental  fact— that  the 
extended  object  immediately  perceived  is  identical  with  the 
extended  object  actually  existing.  For  the  truth  of  this  both 
can  appeal  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  and  to  the 
common  sense  of  mankind  Berkeley  did  appeal  not  less  con- 
fidently and  perhaps  more  logically  than  Reid.  Natural 
Realism  and  Absolute  Idealism  are  the  only  systems  worthy 
of  a  philosopher  ;  for,  as  they  alone  have  any  foundation  in 
consciousness,  so  they  alone  have  any  consistency  in  them- 
selves." 1 

Berkeley  no  doubt  held  that  these  ideas  in  the  mind, 
whether  called  sensations  or  perceptions,  were  on  the 
same  level,  and  were  capable  of  existing  out  of  the 
individual  act  of  perception,  and  out  of  the  individual 
mind  altogether, — in  other  individual  minds  and  out 
of  all  human  minds.  But  Berkeley  held  that  they 
were  not  capable  of  existing  per  se, — that  is,  out  of 
some  mind,  or  any  mind.  Hence  he  was  led  to  hold 
that  there  is  a  divine  or  omnipresent  mind,  who  excites 
the  ideas  in  or  communicates  them  to  individual  mindsi 
The  esse  of  the  idea  is  percipi^  but  not  the  percipi  of 
the  individual  act  of  perception,  or  of  the  act  of  any 
individual  man.  This  is  essential  to  their  (perceived) 
reality,  in  our  consciousness,  but  they  do  not  cease  to  be 
when  our  perception  or  consciousness  of  them  ceases  to 
be.  They  are  constant  or  permanent  apart  from  our 
perception. 

1  Pceid's  Works,  p.  817. 
P.— VL  M 


178 


Hamilton, 


I  venture  to  think  that  Hamilton  admits  too  much 
to  Berkeley.  That  the  extended  thing  perceived  is  the 
extended  thing  existing  may  be  true;  but  I  doubt 
very  much  whether  in  Berkeley's  sense  and  in  Hamil- 
ton's these  are  the  same.  The  sensation  of  pleasure  or 
pain — red  or  green — is  also  in  Berkeley's  sense  a  form 
of  the  non-Ego,  excited  or  determined  by  the  omni- 
present mind.  And  this  is  with  Berkeley  quite  as 
distinct  and  independent,  in  the  absence  of  the  inter- 
mediary substance  matter,  as  any  primary  quality. 
But  this  is  confessedly  not  on  the  level  of  extension 
or  any  primary  quahty.  Why,  then,  should  we  regard 
the  perception  of  the  extended  thing,  or  the  ex- 
tended thing,  as  in  any  other  category  than  the  sub- 
jective sensation  of  pleasure  or  pain?  These  are  all 
equally  excitable  or  communicable  by  the  Divine  Mind, 
— they  are  both  equally  in  the  mind  of  the  individual. 
Is  their  being  in  the  mind  or  being  passing  modes  of  the 
mind  really  distinct  1  Can  they  ultimately  be  regarded 
as  something  more  than  modes  of  consciousness  or  states 
of  mind,  determined  equally  by  a  power,  which  can 
also  determine  these  in  other  individuals'?  Berkeley 
on  this  point  is  vague  and  unsatisfactory. 

Let  us  take  only  the  primary  quality  of  extension, 
as  in  an  extended  object  perceived.  The  extension  or 
extended  thing  perceived  is  separate  from  the  mind, 
though  in  it,  and  permanent  (in  the  Divine  Mind). 
If  this  be  Berkeley's  doctrine,  it  certainly  approaches 
Natural  Kealism.  This  too  says  the  extension  perceived 
is  in  the  consciousness,  or  an  object  of  the  consciousness, 
during  the  perception.  Hamilton  adds,  it  is  distinct 
from  ^d  independent  of  the  percipient  act     It  is  real, 


Tlie  Question  of  Realism, 


179 


and  there  is  a  Dualism, — two    numerically  different 
things,— the   conscious    percipient,  and  the   extension 
perceived  as  existing.     The  question  arises.  Does  the 
extension  apprehended  as  distinct  and  independent  of 
us  subsist  after  the  act  of  perception  has  passed  away  1 
If  so,  does  it  subsist  exactly  as  we  perceive  it,  or  in 
some  form  of  potency  merely,  which  is  capable  of  again 
presenting  to  us  the  extension  or  extended  object  %    I 
confess  I  do  not  find  in  Hamilton's  writings  a  perfectly 
explicit  answer  to  these  questions.     No  doubt  ordinary 
common  sense  says  and  believes  that  the  extension  per- 
ceived exists,  whether  we  perceive  it  or  not,  exactly  as 
we  perceive  it.     But  Hamilton  would  not,  and  need  not, 
hold  himself  bound  by  an  unanalysed  dictum  of  this 
sort.     His  appeal  to  common  sense  is  always  under  the 
restriction  of  the  principle  of  philosophical  analysis  and 
criticism.     It  is  sufficient  for  him  to  show  the  essential 
germ  of  truth  at  the  root  of  the  popular  belief, — to  show, 
in  fact,  how  the  conception  itself  of  material  reality  has 
arisen.     It  is  clear,  I  think,  that  the  individual  act  of 
perception,  as  restricted  to  the  now  and  here  of  present 
consciousness,   cannot  reasonably  yield  the   conclusion 
that  the  distinct  and  independent  extension  continues 
to  exist,  far  less  exist  as  we  perceive  it.     This  would  be 
to  extend  our  assertion  of  existence  beyond  the  indi- 
vidual moment,  whereas  our  perception  is  restricted  to 
that  moment.      At  the  same  time,  we  should  not  be 
entitled  to  affirm  that  the  extension  perceived  ceases  to 
exist,  the  moment  we  cease  to  perceive  it.     As  distinct 
and  independent  of  our  single  act  of  perception,  there  is 
no  ground  for  holding  it  to  disappear  from  reality  with 
that  act  of  perception.     The  possibility  of  its  -subsist- 


180 


Hamilton, 


Berkeley  and  Hamilton. 


181 


ence   is  thus  clear.     But  extension  is  after  all   with 
Hamilton  only  a  quality,  not  a  substance,  the  quality 
of  a  substance  corporeal  or  material,— different  from  the 
conscious  subject,— a  substance  of  which  ultimately,  or 
as  it  is  in  itself,  we  are  wholly  ignorant.     This  ultimate 
reality  is  probably  regarded  by  Hamilton  as  something 
above  space  and  time  conditions.     And  he  may  fairly 
be  supposed  to  hold  that  the  world  perceived  in  space 
and  time,  is  a  world  subsisting,  whether  we  perceive  it 
or  not,  with  the  potency  of  presenting  to  us  certain 
qualities.     This  seems  to  be  implied  in  his  doctrine  of 
Natural  Kealism,  when  taken  as  an  explanation  of  the 
recurrence  of  our  perceptions,  after  the  numerous  breaks 
or  interruptions.  '  When  face  to  face  with  this  question, 
he  says — 

"  If  Berkeley  held  that  the  Deity  caused  one  permanent 
material  universe  (be  it  supposed  apart  or  not  apart  from  his 
own  essence),  which  universe,  on  coming  into  relation  with 
our  minds,  through  the  medium  of  our  bodily  organism,  is, 
in  certain  of  its  correlative  sides  or  phases,  so  to  speak,  ex- 
ternal to  our  organism,  objectively  or  really  perceived  (the 
primary  qualities),  or  determines  in  us  certain  subjective 
aflFections  of  which  we  are  conscious  (the  secondary  quali- 
ties) ;  in  that  case  I  must  acknowledge  Berkeley's  theory  to 
be  virtually  one  of  natural  realism,  the  differences  being 
only  verbal.      But  again,  if  Berkeley  held  that  the  Deity 
caused  no  permanent  material  universe  to  exist,  and  to  act 
uniformly  as  one,  but  does  Himself  eitlier  infuse  into  our 
several  minds  the  phsenomena  (ideas)  perceived  and  affec- 
tive, or  determines  our  several  minds  to  elicit  within  con- 
sciousness such  apprehended  qualities  or  felt  affections  ;  in 
that  case  I  can  recognise  in  Berkeley's  theory  only  a  scheme 
of  theistic  idealism— in  fact,  only  a  scheme  of  perpetual  and 
universal  miracle,  against  which  the  law  of  parcimony  ia 


I 


conclusive,  if  the  Divine  interposition  be  not  proved  neces- 
sary to  render  possible  the  facts."  ^ 

Here,  clearly,  Hamilton  points  to  a  material  universe 
created,  to  its  priority  to  perception,  to  the  perception  of 
certain  of  its  qualities  (the  primary)  as  objective  or  real, 
to  their  correlation  with  our  organism,  and  the  perma- 
nency of  this  material  world  and  of  these  qualities  amid 
our  interrupted  perceptions.    This  subsists  as  the  subject 
of  the  quality  perceived,  and  as  the  cause  of  subjective 
affections  and  sensations  in  us.     In  this  way  Hamilton's 
doctrine  of  Natural  Eealism  is  broadly  distinguished 
from  Berkeley's  doctrine  of  even  the  immediate  per- 
ception of  the  primary  qualities,  as  dependent  on  the 
constantly  repeated  causality  of  the  Divine  Mind.     Even 
if  Hamilton  merely  contended  for  an  intermediate  world 
of  force,  subsisting  by  itself  in  space  and  time,  this  would 
differentiate  his  doctrine  from  that  of  Berkeley,  and  it 
would  be  sufficient  for  a  doctrine  of   Eealism.      For, 
according  to  Berkeley,   the  esse   of   sensible  reality  is 
percipi,  and  no  quality  of  matter,  or  material  substance 
even,  can  exist  simply  .or  ^9er  se— that  is,  as  unperceived 
by  some  mind.     The  assumption,  however,  of  the  abso- 
lute convertibility  of  esse  and  x>ercipi  is  not  competent 
on  Hamilton's  allegation  of  the  perceived  distinctness 
or  independence,  involving  externality,  of  the  primary 
quality.     It  is  always  thus  possible  that  the  quality  may 
have  an  existence  in  space  and  time,  apart  from  indi- 
vidual perception ;  and  this  existence  may  be  either  of 
the  quality  as  perceived,  or  of  the  quality  in  the  form 
of  a  material  power,  capable  of  presenting  it  to  the  per- 
cipient    And  at  the  utmost,  Berkeley  can  identify  the 

1  Memoir,  pp.  34G,  347. 


182 


Hamilton, 


esse  of  sensible  reality  with  the  iierciiyi  only  on  the 
unwarranted  assumption  that  our  percqn  limits  the 
existence  of  the  quality  perceived  to  a  percipi.  This 
lie  cannot  prove  without  assuming  that  the  percipi- 
ent act  and  the  quality  perceived  are  not  numeri- 
cally distinct  or  independent  in  the  moment  of  per- 
ception, and  this  is  the  very  point  at  issue.  It  does 
not  follow  that,  because  we  only  apprehend  a  quality 
or  fact  in  a  definite  act  at  a  given  moment,  such 
quality  or  fact  ceases  to  be  the  moment  our  apprehen- 
sion ceases,  unless  it  pass  into  some  other  percipient 
mind.  The  true  inference  is,  that  our  perception  ceasing, 
we  cannot  say  anything  about  the  perceived  object,  or 
the  conditions  of  its  existence,  apart  from  our  percep- 
tion; and  if  its  distinctness  from  us  as  a  fact  be  ap- 
prehended, along  with  its  reality  in  the  perception,  the 

presumption  rather  is  tliat  its  esse  is  not  Birn^ly  percipi 

that,  for  aught  we  know,  it  may  truly  subsist,  all  percep- 
tion ceasing  or  being  interrupted.  Being  may  transcend 
all  being  known  by  us :  we  cannot  at  least  affirm  that  it 
does  not,  on  the  ground  simply  that  we  know  somethinf', 
and  some  being. 

Eut  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  Realism  or 
Dualism  does  not  require  that  the  object  perceived,  in 
the  form  of  the  primary  quality,  should  subsist  after 
our  perception,  or  amid  our  interrupted  perceptions,  ex- 
actly as  we  perceive  it.  All  that  is  logically  required 
is  that,  on  the  ground  of  the  perceived  quality,  as  dis- 
tinctly non-spiritual  or  material,  there  is  a  substance, 
matter  or  force,  or  both  conjoined  in  one,  intermediate 
between  the  percipient  and  the  divine  action,  which  is 
capable  of  exhibiting  the  known  material  qualities,  and 


What  Natural  Eeali&in  Implies.  183 

is  the  ground  of  this  world  perceived  in  space  and  time. 
Material  existence  7;er  se,  or  apart  from  perception,  not 
being  impossible,  the  positive  proof  of  the  permanence  of 
the  material  world  in  space  and  time  will  be  found  in 
the  known  difference  between  material  and  spiritual 
qualities  in  our  experience,  and  the  uniformity  with 
which  the  former  recur  to  our  apprehension,  in  a  man- 
ner impersonal  and  apart  from  our  volition.  Order, 
regularity,  law,  in  our  perceptions,  do  not  necessarily 
point  to  such  an  immediate  action  of  the  divine  mind, 
in  the  presentations  of  sense,  as  is  implied  in  Berkeley- 
anism.  The  Deity  does  not  need  "  to  perform  a  petty 
miracle  on  each  representation  of  each  several  mind." 
There  is  no  need  for  a  doctrine  of  omnipresent  creation ; 
the  cosmos  of  things  may  have  been  constituted  in  one 
great  act,  and  its  grand  order  permanently  established. 
The  ultimate  reference  of  order  and  uniformity  to  God 
does  not  destroy  the  possibility  of  the  impress  of  these 
by  Him  on  an  intermediate  world  of  matter  and  force 
in  a  single  moment,  and  it  may  be  for  all  time.  In  this 
case  the  material  contents  of  space  and  time  would  be 
phsenomenal  of  matter  and  force,  and  of  mind  as  well, 
in  their  regulated  orders  of  succession  and  coexistence. 
A  world  of  force,  subordinated  to  law,  with  its  qualities 
changing  from  potential  to  actual — through  growth,  de- 
cay, and  transmutation — yet  unchanging  to  our  concep- 
tion in  its  definite  order,  would  remain  the  permanent 
amid  our  passing  yet  corresponding  perceptions ;  a  world 
real  now,  real  ere  my  individual  life  was,  real  to  the 
individualities  around  me,  and  subsisting  when  "I," 
and  "  thou,"  and  "  they,"  after  the  transmutation  of  our 
organic  being,  are  garnered  in  the  chaotic  dust  out  of 


184 


Hamilton, 


which  the  wonderful  forms  of  Hfe  and  beauty  continue 
to  arise. 

The  Berkeleyan  theory  is  weak  and  insufficient     (1.) 
It  takes  no  proper  account,  makes  no  adequate  analysis, 
of  the  facts  of  sensation  and  perception.     To  describe 
our  knowledge  of  the  outward  worid  indiscriminately  by 
the  terms  sensation,  idea,  perception,  &c.,  is  to  speak 
vaguely.    Is  the  mere  subjective  affection  of  our  sensible 
pleasure  or  pain  identified  with  the  intuition  of  extension 
or  resistance  to  muscular  and  locomotive  effort  %    Then 
is  the  sensation  taken  wholly  out  of  its  place,  and  ranked 
as  different  and  more  than  what  it  is.     Is  this  latter  in- 
tuition classed  with  the  sensation  ?    Then  is  the  act  low- 
ered to  what  it  is  not,  mutilated  and  distorted.     Are 
sensation  and  perception  treated  as  generically  the  same, 
simply  because  they  are  supposed  to  relate  to  sensible 
reality,  and  involve  a  percipient  subject  1   Then  the  whole 
question  of  intuitive  Eealism  is  slurred  over.     How  can 
Berkeley,  or  any  one  else,  settle  the  question  of   the 
meaning  of  material  reality,  unless  by  an  accurate  sci- 
entific analysis  of  that  which  we  intuitively  perceive  1 
Hamilton's  appeal  to  intuitive  knowledge  must  be  hon- 
estly  faced,  ere  any  statement  can  be  made  regarding  the 
meaning  of  material  existence.    How  such  a  notion  even 
arises  in  consciousness,   as  matter  of  debate,  must  be 
explained.     And  if  externality  and  materiality,  in  the 
proper  sense  of  these  terms,  cannot  be  accounted  for, 
the  causes    of  the  iUusion  must  also  be  legitimately 
explained. 

The  use  of  the  term  idea  to  describe  the  fact  of  sense- 
perception  is  ambiguous.  The  subject  plus  consciousness 
of  the  object,  is  the  idea.     What,  then,  is  meant  by  the 


Berhelci/s  Doctrine, 


185 


object  ?  Is  it  a  sensation  merely, — a  subjective  state  or 
property;  or  is  it  a  percept,  a  quality  of  a  non-Ego  1 
The  whole  point  of  the  difference  lies  here.  We  may 
speak  of  ideas  and  sensations  and  sense-given  pJicenomena, 
but  until  we  realise  this  distinction  and  face  it,  our  work 
is  of  no  avail  Berkeley  summed  up  his  doctrine  in  two 
propositions.  The  one  proposition  he  regards  as  that  of 
the  common  sense  of  mankind,  the  other  that  of  the  phi- 
losophers. The  truth  of  his  system  is  their  conciliation. 
"  The  vulgar,"  he  says,  "  are  of  opinion  that  these  things 
they  immediately  perceive  are  the  real  things."  Philoso- 
phers are  of  opinion  "  that  the  things  immediately  per- 
ceived are  ideas  which  exist  only  in  the  mind."  ^  Man- 
kind not  only  believe  that  the  things  they  immediately 
perceive  are  the  real  things,  but  that  they  are  indepen- 
dent of  the  act  of  perception,  and  in  this  sense  perfectly 
real  This  doctrine  is  utterly  incompatible  with  the  iden- 
tification of  sensible  things  with  "ideas  which  exist 
only  in  the  mind,"  whether  "  the  mind "  be  regarded 
as  "  the  mind "  of  all  finite  percipients,  or  as  only  the 
Divine  Mind,  or  as  both  the  Divine  and  finite  minds. 
It  is  of  no  consequence  that  these  ideas  are  independent 
of  the  will  of  the  percipient,  and  therefore  of  his  per- 
sonality. So  are  dreams  in  a  great  measure ;  and  so  are 
essentially  the  laws  of  association.  Their  esse  is  still 
simiply  percipi ;  they  are  wholly  subjective,  and  do  not 
subsist  except  as  the  acts  of  the  percipient,  or  independ- 
ently of  these  acts.  As  Ueberweg  has  well  said,  hitting 
the  blot  here — 

"  The  first  proposition  (that  which  the  ordinary  mind  cor- 

^.—111  I 

1  Third  Dialogice,  vol.  i.  p.  359.      The  reference  is  to  Professor 
Eraser's  admirable  edition  of  Berkeley. 


186 


Hamilton. 


rectly  affirms)  is,  that  tlie  real  table,  and  all  real  unthinking 
objects  generally,  are  the  table  and  the  objects  which  we  see 
and  feel.  The  second  (or  scientific  one)  is,  that  what  we  see 
and  feel  consists  entirely  of  phsenomena — i.e.,  of  certain 
qualities,  such  as  hardness,  weight,  shape,  magnitude,  whicli 
inhere  in  our  sensations,  and  consequently  that  what  we  see  and 
feel  is  nothing  but  sensation.  From  the  combination  of  these 
two  propositions,  it  follows  that  real  objects  are  phsenomena 
of  the  kind  just  mentioned,  and  that  consequently  there 
exists  in  the  world  nothing  besides  these  objects,  whose  esse 
13  percipi,  and  the  percipient  subjects.  But  *  what  we  see 
and  feel '  is  ambiguous.  If  by  this  expression  we  understand 
oiir  sensuous  perceptions  themselves^  then  the  second  proposi- 
tion is  true,  but  the  first  not.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  under- 
stand by  it  the  transcendental  objects  (or  things  in  them- 
selves) which  so  act  upon  our  senses,  that  in  consequence  of 
this  action  perceptions  arise  in  us,  then  the  first  proposition 
is  true,  but  the  second  false  ;  and  it  is  only  by  a  change  of 
meaning  that  both  are  true,  whence  the  syllogism  is  faulty 
on  account  of  a  quaternio  terminorum.  Our  sensations  de- 
pend upon  a  previous  affection  of  the  organs  of  sensation, 
and  this  affection  depends  on  the  existence  of  intrinsically 
real  external  objects."  ^ 

(2.)  The  notion  of  outness  or  externality  is  miscon- 
ceived, and  it  is  erroneously  identified  with  that  of 
distance.  Externality  is  supposed  to  mean  either  ex- 
ternality to  our  present  sense -experience  in  our  past 
sense  -  experience  now  no  longer  actual,  or  in  our 
future  sense-experience  not  yet  actual,  or  externality 
to  our  own  personal  experience  altogether  in  the  sense- 
experience  of  other  minds,  present,  past,  and  future. 
Such  externality  is  inadequate  even  to  the  proper  ex- 
tension of  the  term.  This  is  not  necessarily  more  than 
externality  in  time ;  it  is  the  difference  in  the  first  case 
1  History  of  Philosophy,  vol  ii.  p.  89. 


The  Notion  of  Externality, 


187 


simply  of  the  present  from  the  past  or  future  in  sense- 
experience.  This  need  mean  nothing  more  than  the 
difference  in  a  succession  of  feelings.  In  the  second 
place,  there  is  no  externality  at  all,  if  the  other  person 
be  with  us  contemporaneous,  for  the  same  time  cannot 
be  external  to  itself ;  and  if  the  other  person  be  past  or 
future,  there  is  nothing  but  the  difference  of  the  notion 
of  myself  from  the  notions  of  other  selves;  that  is, 
either  no  externality  at  all,  or  an  externality  common  to 
different  notions.  But  externality  is  not  limited  to  a 
difference  in  succession  merely.  There  is  also  an  exter- 
nality of  coexistence  in  the  same  time.  One  point  in 
a  succession  in  the  course  of  time  may  be  external  to 
another,  even  if  the  first  point  perishes  at  once,  and  the 
other  succeeds,  equally  perishing.  But  an  externality  of 
coexistence  is  impossible,  unless  the  two  points  subsist, 
and  subsist  in  the  same  time.  And  this  is  the  true 
externality ;  that  of  sensible  reality  or  of  the  world  of 
sense-experience.  Succession  does  not  necessarily  give 
this,  nor  does  it  imply  succession  at  all ;  for  in  the  one 
moment  of  time  I  may  apprehend  the  coexistence. 
This  consideration,  moreover,  is  fatal  to  the  whole  at- 
tempted genesis  of  space  out  of  time.  There  is  presup- 
position of  the  point  at  issue. 

Further,  outness  or  externality  is  not  identical  with 
distance  in  space.  Outness  is  implied  in  simple  contact 
of  the  hand  with  an  extra-organic  body,  although  there 
be  no  appreciable  distance  between  them,  as  indeed  it 
is  implied  in  one  colour  alongside  another,  where  no  line 
of  demarcation  is  sensibly  discernible.  Distance  means 
degree  of  outness  of  one  thing  from  another ;  but  it 
presupposes  outness  as  a  fact  and  a  conception.     Exter- 


188 


Hamilton, 


nality  is  given  in  any  form  of  contact,  in  any  form  of 
locomotive  effort,  and  is  the  essential  condition  of  our 
even  conceiving  its  varying  degrees, — that  is,  distance  in 
a  linear  relation  to  the  bodily  organism. 

Further,  what  is  there  more  or  less  unintelligible  in 
the  externality  of  the  unthinking  object  to  the  organ  of 
sense,  than  there  is  in  the  externality  of  the  thinking 
finite  subject  to  me,  the  thinking  finite  subject  1  Can  I 
not  form  an  equally  adequate  or  an  equally  inadequate 
conception  of  each  1  Is  even  the  continued  subsistence 
of  space,  jTer  se,  less  intelligible  than  the  continued  sub- 
sistence of  Deity  j9er  se  ? 

(3.)  The  Berkeleyan  explanation  of  the  permanence  of 
material  reahty  or  sensible  things  is  wholly  inadequate. 
It  is  admitted  or  contended  for  as  an  interpretation  of 
Berkeley,  that  sensible  things,  visible  or  tangible,  do 
not  pass  out  of  reality  when  they  cease  to  be  seen  or 
touched  by  me,  or  even  by  all  individual  human  beings. 
Our  perceptions  of  them  are  intermittent,  but  sensible 
things  are  permanent  They  are  thus  independent  of 
our  perceptions.  The  material  world,  as  geology  teaches, 
has  existed  thousands  of  years  before  men  and  sentient 
beings.  The  sensible  objects  around  us  do  not  pass  out 
of  being  when  we  cease  to  perceive  them.  How  is  this 
so,  and  in  what  sense  is  it  so  1  In  the  state  of  present 
sensation,  or  perception,  the  actual  knowledge  is  always 
only  of  a  limited  kind.  In  the  vision,  for  example,  of 
a  tree,  what  we  apprehend  by  sight  is  not  the  whole  of 
what  is,  or  of  what  we  should  apprehend  if  we  were  to 
apply  to  the  tree  the  sense  of  touch  and  muscular  effort 
These  would  give  us  more  and  other  actual  sensations 
(perceptions)  than  we  have  by  sight  alone.     Still  look- 


The  PermancTice  of  Things. 


189 


ing  at  the  tree, — experiencing  the  sensation  of  vision, — 
we  believe  that  the  actual  sensations  of  touch  in  con- 
nection with  it  are  possible,  and  that  they  woidd  be 
actually  experienced  if  we  were  to  touch  the  tree.  The 
actual  visual  sensations  are  thus  signs  of  other  conceiv- 
able but  as  yet  non-actual  sensations.  This  connection 
has  been  established  by  association, — by,  in  fact,  a  sort 
of  induction.  The  existence  of  a  "  sensible  thing  "  thus 
implies  all  that  can  be  found  in  the  actual  sensation, 
and  in  the  guarantee,  objective  and  universal,  which 
this  gives  us  of  conceivable  sensations  which  we  may 
experience.  It  is  added  that  the  most  distinct  and 
easily  imaginable  objective  reality  is  found  in  the  asso- 
ciation between  what  is  seen  and  what  is  felt, — between 
Sight  and  Touch. 

The  main  point  to  be  noted  here  is,  that  supposing 
the  principle  sufficient  to  account  for  the  permanence 
and  independence  of  sensible  things,  it  is  odd  that  it 
should  not  give  us  this  conviction,  in  an  identical  sense, 
in  regard  to  every  connection  of  our  sensations  (or  per- 
ceptions). AVhy,  for  example,  does  not  the  association 
of  a  taste  with  a  smell,  or  a  taste  with  a  sound,  or  a 
sound  with  the  feeling  of  pressure  or  contact,  not  give 
us  this  conception  and  conviction  of  the  permanent  pos- 
sibility of  the  smell  to  come,  or  the  sound  to  come,  or 
the  feeling  of  contact  to  come,  in  the  same  sense  as  of 
the  extension  or  force  ?  We  expect,  for  example,  when 
we  smell  an  orange,  that  the  taste  associated  with  the 
former  orange  is  now  capable  of  becoming  an  actual  sen- 
sation; while  the  same  association  leads  us  to  expect 
that  if  the  touch  were  applied  to  the  visible  orange  we 
should  find  resistance,  extension,  and  solidity.     But  do 


190 


Hamilton, 


Essential  Point  in  Eealism. 


191 


we  therefore  believe  that  the  taste  was  permanent  and 
independent  in  the  same  sense  in  which  the  extension 
was  permanent  and  independent  of  our  perceptions? 
Surely  there  is  all  the  difference  in  the  world  between 
the  permanence  or  independence  of  tangible  extension 
and  that  of  the  mere  feeling  of  contact,  the  sensation  of 
taste,  of  pleasure  or  pain.  In  the  latter  cases  we  know 
that  the  actual  sensation  ceases  to  be  the  moment  it 
passes  out  of  consciousness.  Do  we  mean  to  say  that 
because  of  its  association  with  some  other  sensation,  it 
nevertheless  continues  to  be  after  it  ceases  to  be  felt, 
in  the  same  sense  in  which  extension  once  perceived,  or 
force  once  resisted,  continues  to  be  after  our  conscious- 
ness of  each  has  passed  away  ]  There  is  little  wonder 
that  the  objective  reality  in  the  case  of  the  associations 
of  sight  and  touch  is  clear  and  distinct,  seeing  that  the 
object  of  perception  is  in  its  nature  so  thoroughly  different 
from  that  in  the  other  senses.  And  this  lays  bare  the 
whole  fallacy  of  this  method  of  explaining  the  independ- 
ence and  permanence  of  sensible  reality.  The  association 
itself  of  past  and  present  sensations,  and  of  percepts, 
requires  explanation.  They  have  been  connected  in 
our  experience,  and  they  have  recurred  in  a  uniform 
way,  ere  we  begin  to  expect  and  believe  that  they  will 
so  recur  again.  This  is  an  independence  of  us,  and  a 
permanence,  already  given,  presupposed.  It  is  this 
whikh  generates  the  association  with  its  consequent  ex- 
pectancy and  belief  in  a  future  permanence.  But  surely 
if  such  a  permanence  and  independence  be  already  pre- 
supposed, the  association  generated  out  of  it  cannot 
explain  this  independence  and  permanence.  This  is 
simply  a  case  of  varepov  irporcpov.  Whatever  may  be 
the  cause  of  our  belief  in  and  expectation  of  the  perma- 


/I 


nence  and  independence  of  the  sensible  world,  it  is  not 
given  in  this  petitory  theory. 

The   essential    point    in    JSTatural    Eealism   is,   that 
whatever  be  the  object  immediately  apprehended,  be  it 
bodily  extension,  be  rt  resistance  of  inertia,  of  muscle, 
or  fibre  to  volition,  or  to   the  organic  effort  to  move, 
this   is   not   a   mere   mode  of  the  conscious   mind  or 
conscious  agent.     This  relation  is  not  represented  by 
that  of  substance  and  attribute.     The  extension  I  per- 
ceive, be  it  bodily  even,  is  not  a  quality  of  the  Ego ; 
the   resistance   I  apprehend   in   locomotion,  though   it 
cause  a   sensation  which   is   mine,  is  not  a  sensation 
which  is  mine,  but  something  in  contact  with  a  wholly 
different  set  of  nerves,  the  locomotive,  as  opposed  to 
the  mere  nerves  of  pressure  and  sensibility,     "  All  mus- 
cular contraction  is  dependent  on  the  agency  of  one  set 
of  nerves,  all  feeling  of  muscular  contraction   on   an- 
other." ^     In  perception,  then,  the  quality  perceived  is 
not  related  to  me  as  a  mere  feeling,  or  sensation,  or 
emotion  is,  a  passing  state  of  my  sensibility.     It  is  the 
quality  of  a  non-Ego,  the  revelation  of  what  is,  but  is 
not  me.    It  cannot  be  said  to  be  created  by  me,  and  I  am 
not  entitled  to  say  that  it  ceases  to  be  merely  because  I 
cease  to  perceive  it.     Dogmatism  on  this  point  is  pre- 
cluded ;  and  there  being  recurrence  or  uniformity  in  the 
percepts,  the  probability  is  on  the  side  of  a  permanent 
non-Ego  in  one  form  or  another.     The  mental  volition 
I  put  forth  is  a  mode  of  me,  the  one  permanent  willing 
agent ;  but  the  extension  which  I  apprehend,  the  resist- 
ance which  I  meet  with,  these  are  not  mine  in  the  same 
sense,  and  can  never  be  proved  to  be  so.     This  is  all 
that  Natural  Realism  or  Dualism  needs  to  contend  for. 

1  JteieTs  Works,  p.  865. 


192 


CHAPTEE    VIII. 


PHiENOMENAL    PSYCHOLOGY — GENERAL   POINTS. 

There  are  several  salient  points  under  Phsenomenal 
Psychology  which,  though  not  of  equal  prominence  and 
importance  in  the  philosophy  of  Hamilton  with  those 
already  discussed,  would  yet  fall  to  be  noticed  in  an 
adequate  exposition  of  his  contributions  to  the  science 
of  mind.  These  I  can  barely  indicate,  owing  to  the 
limits  of  this  volume. 

(1.)  There  is  the  law  regulating  Perception  and  Sensa- 
tion. This  is  :— that,  above  a  certain  pomt,  the  stronger 
the  Sensation,  the  weaker  the  Perception ;  and  the  dis- 
tincter  the  Perception,  the  less  obtrusive  the  Sensation. 
Looking  at  the  different  senses,  it  is  found  that  precisely 
as  a  sense  has  more  of  the  one  element,  it  has  less  of 
the  other.  In  Sight  and  Hearing,  knowledge  or  percep- 
tion predominates;  in  Taste  and  Smell,  sensation  pre- 
vails. There  are,  in  other  words,  qualities  of  a  non- 
Ego  apprehended  or  known  principally  in  the  former ; 
in  the  latter  there  is  the  experience  of  the  subjective 
states  of  pleasure  or  pain. 

Looking  to  the  impressions  of  the  same  sense,  these 
differ  in  degree  and  in  quality  or  kind.     Above  a  cer- 


Lav)  of  Perception  and  Sensation.  193 

tain  limit,  if  the  impression  be  strong,  as  in  sight,  we 
are  dazzled  and  blinded,  and  consciousness  is  limited  to 
the  pain  or  pleasure  of  the  sensation.     Perception  is 
virtually  lost  in  the  glare.     Looking  to  the  difference 
in  kind,  and  selecting  colour  and  figure  in  sight,  in 
the  former  there  is  more  of  sensation,  in  the  latter  more 
of  perception.      In  colour  there  are  fewer  differences 
and  relations  than  in  figure,  but  a  much  higher  sensuous 
enjoyment.     In  the  apprehension  of  figure,  its  varieties 
and  relations,  the  accompanying  pleasure  is  more  refined 
and  permanent.     In   painting   there   is   pleasure  from 
vivid  and  harmonious  colouring,  and  pleasure  from  the 
drawing  and  grouping  of  the  figures.     The  gratification 
we  feel  in  the  colouring  is,  as  more  sensuous,  less  refined 
and  lasting  than  that  which  we  derive  from  the  harmoni- 
ous relations  of  the  figure.     As  a  rule,  the  pleasure  of 
sensation  is  more  intense  but  less  refined  and  enduring 
than  that  arising  from  perception,  allied  as  it  is  to  intel- 
lectual energy. 

(2.)  Under  the  heads  of  Memory  and  Imagination 
there  are  the  conditions  of  knowledge  out  of  con- 
sciousness,—  already  generally  referred  to  under  men- 
tal latency.^  And  there  is  the  view  of  the  organ  of 
Imagination  as  being  the  original  sense  excited  from 
withia  There  are  cases  of  persons  who,  having  lost 
their  sight,  are  no  longer  capable  of  representing  the 
images  of  visible  objects.  In  these  instances  it  is 
found  that  disorganisation  has  not  only  affected  the  eye, 
but  extended  to  the  optic  nerves  and  thalami, — those 
parts  of  the  brain  which  constitute  the  internal  instru- 
ment of  the  sense.     Had  the  eye  alone  been  destroyed, 

1  See  above,  p.  98. 
P. — VL  If 


194 


Hamilton, 


•while  optic  nerve  and  thalami,  the  real  organ  of  vision, 
remained  unimpaired,  the  imagination  of  forms  and 
colours  would  have  continued  quite  vigorous.  Similar 
cases  are  recorded  in  regard  to  the  deaf.  Even  volun- 
tary motions  are  imitated  in  and  by  the  imagination. 
In  representing  speech,  the  movement  of  the  counte- 
nance, and  the  limbs,  there  is  a  kind  of  tension  in  the 
same  nerves  through  which,  by  an  act  of  will,  I  can  de- 
termine an  overt  and  voluntary  motion  of  the  muscles. 
When  imagination  is  very  lively,  this  outward  move- 
ment actually  takes  place.  It  is  thus  more  than  prob- 
able that  there  are  as  many  organs  of  Imagination  as 

of  Sense. 

There  is  (3)  the  theory  of  the  Laws  of  Association,  at 
which  Hamilton  worked-  for  long,  without  completing 
it,  yet  leaving  very  valuable  results.  The  points  here 
of  especial  note  are  his  final  reduction  of  those  laws  to 
two,  instead  of  one,  as  in  the  Lectures — viz..  Repetition 
or  Direct  llemeinbrance,  according  to  which  "  thoughts 
coidentical  in  modification,  but  differing  in  time,  sug- 
gest each  other ; "  and  Redintegration  or  Reminiscence, 
according  to  which  "  thoughts  once  coidentical  in  time 
are,  however  different  as  mental  modes,  again  suggestive 
of  each  other,  end  that  in  the  mutual  order  which  they 
originally  held."  From  the  combination  of  these  laws 
arise  the  special  ones  of  Similarity,  Contrast,  and  Co- 
adjacency. 

Similarity  depends  on  Repetition,  for  resembling 
objects  being  to  us  identical  in  their  resembling  points, 
must  call  up  each  other.  Redintegration  then  comes 
into  play.  They  now  form  parts  of  the  same  mental 
whole. 


Concepts. 


195 


Contrast  connects  itself  with  Repetition  and  Redinte- 
gration, because  all  contrast  is  of  things  contained  under 
a  common  notion, — qualities  contrasted  are  thus  to  a 
certain  degree  similar.  The  opposite  sides  of  contrast 
make  up  a  common  whole. 

Coadjacency  embraces  thoughts  related  to  each  other, 
as  Cause  and  Effect,  Substance  and  Attribute,  &c.,  and 
are  thus  mutually  suggestive. 

(3.)  Under  the  head  of  Comparison  there  is  the  theory 
of  General  Notions  or  Concepts. 

The  concept  is  the  point  of  view  under  which  we  re- 
cognise a  plurality  of  objects  as  a  unity.  It  is  a  notion 
of  resemblance,  and  thus  implies  relation.  Objects  are 
grouped  as  merif  riverSy  inountahis^  because  of  resembling 
qualities  apprehended.  The  relation  of  resemblance  we 
cannot  depict  in  Imagination,  but  we  can  form  an  indi- 
vidual image  of  man,  river,  or  viountain,  and  consider  it 
as  representing,  though  inadequately,  the  other  objects 
of  the  class.  A  concept  j)er  se  is  unimaginable,  even 
unthinkable,  but  it  can  be  realised  in  and  through  the 
image  of  an  individual  of  the  class  whose  attribute  or 
attributes  it  contains.  An  abstract  concept  is  a  mere 
potentiality  in  knowledge, — that  which  is  capable  of 
being  definitely  realised  in  an  image ;  an  actual  concept 
is  an  image  pliLs  the  knowledge  of  relation  to  other 
resembling  objects,  real  or  possible.  The  ancient  prob- 
lem of  Nominalism  and  Conceptualism  is  thus  solved. 
It  is  impossible  to  form  a  notion  of  the  class — say,  man — 
corresponding  to  the  universality  of  the  class  itself,  as 
has  been  maintained  by  conceptualists, — ultra-conceptu- 
alists.  For  in  this  case  our  one  notion  or  representa- 
tion would  be  of  ichite  and  black,  tall  and  short,  fat  and 


' 


196 


Hamilton. 


thin  men,  of  contrary,  even  contradictory,  qualities.  Our 
picture  or  actual  image  must  be  of  some  one  of  the  class, 
but  through  the  resemblance  known  by  the  understand- 
ing this  one  image  is  representative  of  all  the  other 
objects  of  the  class.  There  is  more  here,  however,  than 
the  Ultra-Nominalist  doctrine  that  the  community  or 
generality  lies  in  the  name  alone.  It  lies  in  the  image 
constituted  into  a  representation. 

The  ground  of  this  theory  is  to  be  found  in  the  distinc- 
tion of  the  two  sides  of  the  concept, — Comprehension 
and  Extension, — a  distinction  first  introduced  into  philo- 
sophical literature  in  these  times  by  Hamilton.  Every 
notion  has  or  means  an  attribute  or  attributes.  Man 
means  living^  sentient^  reasoning ^  responsiUe.  This  is  the 
content  or  comprehension.  Every  notion  has  or  means 
objects,  real  or  possible,  in  which  the  attribute  or  attri- 
butes inhere,  or  to  which  they  belong.  Man  means 
Hack  mfin,  ichiie  man,  copper-coloured  man.  This  is 
the  compass  or  extension.  To  put  Hamilton's  doctrine 
precisely,  we  should  say  that  we  cannot  realise  any  part 
of  the  comprehension  of  the  notion  without  embodying 
it,  the  common  attribute  or  attributes,  in  an  individual 
image.  In  no  one  act,  therefore,  can  we  realise  all  the 
class — that  is,  all  the  objects  of  the  class;  but  in  one 
act  we  can  realise  what  is  essential  to  each,  applicable 
to,  and  thus  representative  of  all,  actual  or  possible. 

Hamilton  further  holds  that  Comprehension  and 
Extension  in  notions  are  regulated  by  the  law, — the 
greater  the  extension,  the  less  the  comprehension,  and 
vice  versd.  When  I  predicate  existence  of  an  ob- 
ject, I  say  the  least  that  is  possible  of  it  Compre- 
hension is  at  its  minimum, — there  is  the  least  number 


I 


] 


Theory  of  Pleasure  and  Pain, 


197 


of  qualities.  When  I  predicate  Alexander  of  the  in- 
dividual, I  say  the  most  that  is  possible  of  him, — here 
comprehension  is  at  its  maximum.  There  is  the  greatest 
sum  of  qualities  or  attributea  And  in  the  former  case, 
extension  is  at  its  maximum,  for  existence  takes  in 
every  class  of  objects.  In  the  latter  case,  extension  is 
at  its  minimum,  for  it  includes  but  one  object 

Out  of  this  distinction  arise  two  kinds  of  Judgments. 
We  have  the  comprehensive  judgment,  when  our  predi- 
cate is  an  attribute, — as  tlie  river  runs.  We  have  the 
extensive  judgment,  when  our  predicate  is  a  class  or 
object-group,  as  plant  is  organised.  Hamilton  carries 
out  this  distinction  to  Reasoning,  and  makes  two  distinct 
but  convertible  kinds  of  syllogism, — the  comprehensive 
and  the  extensive. 

(4.)  Under  the  psychology  of  the  Feelings,  there  is  his 
theory  of  the  laws  of  Pleasure  and  Pain,  founded  mainly 
on  the  Aristotelic  doctrine  of  pleasure  as  the  result  of 
free  and  full,  and  pain  of  impeded  or  over-strained,  energy. 
This  admits  of  most  important  applications  in  .^thetics, 
in  Morals,  and  in  practical  life.  He  has  himseK  applied 
it  to  the  emotions  accompanying  imagination  in  com- 
bination with  the  understanding  —  viz.,  the  Beautiful, 
the  Sublime,  the  Picturesque. 

In  the  case  of  the  Beautiful,  the  imagination  and 
understanding  act  together ;  and  each  faculty  readily 
accomplishes  its  function.  "Variety  or  complexity  of 
parts  is  supposed ;  these  it  is  for  the  imagination  to  hold 
up  or  represent,  while  it  is  the  part  of  the  understanding 
to  make  of  them  a  whole.  When  an  object  is  so  con- 
stituted as  readily  to  allow  imagination  and  understand- 
ing, working  together,  to  reach,  the  conception  of  the 


198 


Hamilton. 


unity  of  the  object, — the  feeling  of  the  beautiful  arises. 
A  beautiful  thing  is  thus  one  whose  form  occupies  the 
imagination  and  understanding  in  a  free  and  full,  and, 
consequently,  in  an  agreeable  activity. 

The  feeling  of  the  Sublime,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a 
mingled  one  of  pleasure  and  pain — of  pleasure  in  the 
consciousness  of  strong  energy,  of  pain  in  the  conscious- 
ness that  this  energy  is  vain.  We  try,  for  example,  to 
bring  the  immensity  of  space  under  an  image ;  we  try,  at 
the  same  time,  to  measure  it  by  other  quantities.  We 
have  the  same  experience  in  dealing  with  transcendent 
Power.  Lutwe  fail;  imagination  and  understanding  are 
baffled,  and  we  desist, — fall  back  into  repose.  There  is 
the  pleasure  of  the  full  energy,  in  tlie  first  instance,  the 
pain  of  its  continuance  as  forced  and  impeded;  and  there 
is  the  pleasure  of  the  contrast  in  the  state  of  repose. 
Hence  the  sublime  at  once  attracts  and  repels. 

The  feeling  of  the  Picturesque,  again,  is  in  contrast 
to  both  the  Beautiful  and  the  Sublime.  The  object  is 
varied,  and  abrupt  in  its  variety:  it  is  regularly  irregu- 
lar. We  thus  do  not  even  seek  to  reduce  it  to  harmony. 
It  is  thus  neither  beautiful  nor  sublime ;  but  the  mind 
is  content  to  linger  over  its  details,  and  thus  get  such 
pleasure  as  each  part  may  afford.  It  was  the  harmony  of 
the  whole  which  was  sought  by  classical  art ;  it  is  too 
often  the  pleasure  of  detail,  of  point  or  episode,  which 
modem  works  yield  or  seek  to  give. 

(5.)  Under  the  head  of  the  Conations — Desire  and  Will 
— the  important  point  is  his  doctrine  of  Free-Will  as  a 
psychological  fact  Hamilton  holds  will  to  be  a  free  cause 
— that  is,  a  cause  which  is  not  also  an  effect, — an  absolute 


Free-  Will. 


199 


or  unconditioned  cause.     This  he  regards  as  established, 
on  the  ground  of  the  direct  testimony  of  consciousness, 
and  indirectly  as  an  implicate  in  our  consciousness  of 
duty  and  responsibility.     He  holds,  at  the  same  time, 
that  free-will,  as  an  absolute  cause  or  commencement  in 
time,  is  inconceivable.     Morally,  however,  a  will  deter- 
mined by  motive  excludes  responsibility ;  while  a  motive- 
less volition  is  worthless.     It  is,  therefore,  impossible  for 
us  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  moral  liberty,  either  in 
man  or  in  God ;  and  yet  the  fact  is  not  to  be  held  as 
disproved  on  the  ground  of  this  incomprehensibility — 
this  impossibility  of  conceiving  the  Jioio  of  the  fact.    Here 
his  special  theory  of  the  judgment  of  Causaljty,  as  the 
result  of  an  impotence  to   conceive  an  absolute  com- 
mencement in  the  universe,  comes  into  application.     It 
is  only  an  incapacity  of  thinking  an  absolute  commence- 
ment, not  a  positive  deliverance  or  positive  necessity  of 
intelligence.     This  purely  negative  judgment  cannot  be 
held  as  counterbalancing  the  unconditional  testimony 
of  consciousness.     Free-will  is  not  impossible  in  fact,  be- 
cause of  the  judgment  of  Causality, — for  virtually  this 
is  not  a  law  of  fact  or  things.     It  is  grounded  on  a  mere 
mental  impotence  to  conceive  an  absolute  commence- 
ment.    But  finally,  he  urges,  that  while  free-will  sup- 
poses as  a  fact  an  unthinkable  absolute  beginning  in 
time,  necessitarianism  supposes  as  a  fact  the  equally  un- 
thinkable alternative  of  an  infinite  non-commencement 
As  speculative  schemes,  the  two  theories  are  thus  equally 
balanced.    The  very  objection  of  incomprehensibility  di- 
rected by  the  necessitarian  against  the  upholder  of  free- 
will is  equally  valid  against  himself.     Mere  speculative 


200 


Hamilton, 


thought  is  unable  to  decide  between  the  two  altemativea 
We  are  left  here,  as  we  are  on  all  ultimate  questions  of 
philosophy,  to  experience,— to  consciousness— to  the  light 
of  its  facts  and  analogies.  The  consciousness  of  moral 
law,  as  implying  moral  liberty  in  man,  gives  a  decisive 
preponderance  to  the  doctrine  of  freedom  over  fate.^ 

»  Cf.  Discussions,  pp.  623-625 ;  Metaphysics,  L.  II. ;  PuiiTs  Works, 
pp.  616,  617,  p.  624,  note. 


201 


CHAPTEE    IX. 

CLASSIFICATION   OF   THE   LAWS   OF   KNOWLEDGE — NEGA- 
TIVE  AND    POSITIVE   THOUGHT — RELATIVITY. 


Supposing  it  admitted  that  a  certain  complement  of 
cognitions  must  be  allowed  as  having  their  origin  in  the 
nature  of  the  thinking  principle  itself,  the  question  arises 
as  to  what  are  ultimate  and  elementary,  and  what  are 
to  be  regarded  as  modifications  or  combinations  of  these. 
The  reduction  of  our  native  cognitions  to  system  still 
remains  to  be  solved.  The  most  ingenious  of  the 
attempts,  that  of  Kant,  is  neither  a  necessary  deduc- 
tion, nor  a  natural  arrangement  of  our  native  cognitions. 
The  truth  is  that  philosophers  have  not  yet  established 
the  principles  on  which  the  solution  of  this  problem 
ought  to  be  undertaken.^  The  classification  of  the  con- 
ditions of  knowledge  which  Hamilton  now  gives  is  in 
the  line  of  completing  the  I^omology  of  Consciousness 
or  of  knowledge  in  general  In  the  analysis  of  the  Con- 
ditions of  the  Thinkable  about  to  be  referred  to,  Hamil- 
ton goes  deeper  than  he  did  in  the  analysis  of  the  con- 
ditions of  Consciousnesa  For  in  these,  while  he  refers 
to  object   as   such,  he  does  not  analyse  it  precisely; 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  XXXVIII. 


20! 


Hamilton. 


whereas  in  the  latter  exposition,  his  main  aim  is  to  state 
the  conditions,  logical  and  metaphysical,  of  an  object  of 
thought — indeed  of  knowledge  as  such,  or  in  general 
He  seeks  to  lay  down  the  ultimate  conditions  at  once  of 
possibility  and  impossibility  in  our  knowledge. 

In  the  scheme  which  Hamilton  terms  the  "  more 
matured "  form  of  his  analysis  and  classification  of  the 
conditions  of  the  thinkable,^  the  first  point  is  the  dis- 
tinction of  thought — that  is,  knowledge  in  its  most 
general  form — into  Negative  and  Positive.  Negative 
thought  emerges  when  existence  is  not  attributed  to  an 
object  By  existence,  however,  Hamilton  obviously 
means  existence  subjective  or  objective — either  ideal 
or  real — that  is,  either  possible  or  actual  existence  in 
the  object  of  thought  Every  object  which  we  can  posi- 
tively think  as  possible  has  existence  attributed  to  it — 
that  is,  ideal  existence  or  existence  as  an  object  of  thought, 
and,  therefore,  of  possible  reality.  Every  object  thought 
or  known  as  real,  is  thus  also  by  implication  first,  as  it 
were,  thought  as  possible.  Negative  thought  is  not, 
however,  the  absence  of  mental  activity.  It  asserts  what 
is  unthinkable.  The  mind  tries  to  think  the  irrelative 
or  the  contradictory,  and  fails.  We  contrast  the  relative 
and  conceivable,  which  we  positively  think,  with  their 
opposites.  We  only  know,  indeed,  what  non-existence 
means,  by  reference  to  the  existence  which  we  know. 
Hence,  in  negative  thought  there  is  mental  effort  or 
activity ;  there  is  the  consciousness  of  its  contrast  with 
the  conceived  and  conceivable. 

But  negative  thought  is  of  two  kinds,  and  is  deter- 
mined by  two  different  sets  of  conditions.     First,  we  may 

^  Discussions,  p.  602. 


Forrtml  Laws  of  the  Thinkable, 


203 


try  to  think  the  contradictory, — to  unite  in  one  indivis- 
ible act  of  thought  two  contradictory  attributes.  In  this 
case,  the  result  of  the  effort  is  nothing  or  zero.  This  is 
"  the  really  impossible  " — the  nUiil  purum — mere  noth- 
ing— the  impossible,  not  only  in  thought  but  in  reality. 

This  condition,  tlien,  of  thought  and  knowledge, 
being  presupposed  as  not  violated — ^having  got  in  truth 
the  not-impossible  —  we  come  to  that  second  condi- 
tion, or  set  of  conditions,  which  makes  positive  thought 
for  us.  This  is  existence  thought  as  relative  or  condi- 
tioned— thought  under  relation.  It  is  only  when  we 
clothe  the  object  of  thought  in  relation, — in  relation  to 
the  self,  or  to  other  objects, — that  Ave  have  a  positive 
object  of  thought  or  knowledge  at  all  This,  in  its  most 
simple  or  abstract  form,  is  something — some  thing  or 
being.  Low^er  than  this  thought  cannot  go.  It  is  the 
ultimate  in  knowledge  ;  only  now  do  we  think  at  all, — 
only  now  do  we  apprehend  or  know. 

Let  us  look,  then,  at  the  first-named  conditions. 

These  laws — Identity,  Non-Contradiction,  Excluded 
Middle — are  common  phases  of  one  great  law.  The 
first  involves  all  the  others.  The  moment  a  thing  or 
quality  is  apprehended  or  thought,  it  is  so  appre- 
hended or  thought  The  law  thus  necessarily  comes 
into  play.  Affinuation  or  determination  is  impossible 
without  presupposing  that  A  is  A.  The  object,  thus 
determined,  by  the  affirmation  of  a  certain  character  or 
quality,  cannot  be  thought  the  same  when  this  quality 
is  denied  of  it  Assertions  regarding  a  thing  are  mu- 
tually contradictory  when  the  one  says  that  the  thing 
possesses  the  character  which  the  other  says  it  does  not 
at  one  and  the  same   time.     The  contradictory  is  un- 


204 


Hamilton, 


Ajpplication  to  Ahsolutis^n. 


205 


thinkable.  A  =  not  A  =  0.  This  is  the  principle  of  all 
logical  negation. 

The  law  of  Excluded  Middle  between  Contradictories 
asserts  that,  of  two  repugnant  notions,  both  of  which 
cannot  be  in  the  same  subject,  we  must  yet  think  the 
one  or  the  other  as  being  in  that  subject.  A  either  is 
or  is  not.  The  alternatives  under  identity  and  non-con- 
tradiction are  alone  possible;  of  these  one  or  other  is 
necessary.  The  violation  of  any  of  these  laws  renders 
the  process  of  thought  suicidal,  or  absolutely  null. 

It  should  here  be  observed,  that  while  Hamilton  holds 
a  contradictory  concept  or  judgment  to  be  null  as  an 
object  of  thought,  he  does  not  hold  that  it  is  incapable 
of  being  understood  in  the  sense  and  to  the  extent  that 
we  may  know  full  well  the  meaning  of  each  term,  taken 
separately.  We  understand  thus  what  is  proposed  by 
an  attempt  at  their  mental  combination.    But  we  cannot 

"  unite  the  tenns  in  a  mental  [concept  or]  judgment,  though 
they  stand  united  in  a  verbal  proposition.  If  we  attempt 
this,  the  two  mutually  exclusive  terms  not  only  cannot  be 
thought  as  one,  but  in  fact  annihilate  each  other ;  and  thus 
the  result,  in  place  of  a  positive  judgment,  is  a  negation  of 
thought"! 

Attention  to  this  somewhat  obvious  distinction  might 
have  saved  a  great  deal  of  criticism  of  a  superficially 
acute  kind ;  as,  for  example,  that  the  contradictory  and 
the  inconceivable  must  be  conceived  in  order  to  be  pro- 
nounced such. 

These  things  premised,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  the 
philosophy  of  Hamilton  regarding  the  very  possibility 
of  an  object  of  knowledge  in  any  form,  be  it  intuitional 

1  Logic,  L.  VI.  j  Jieid's  Works,  pp.  378,  379. 


or  conceptual,  confronts  philosophies  of  the  so-called 
Absolute  in  knowledge.  He  charges  the  Absolutists  in 
general,  meaning  Fichte,  Schelling,  Hegel,  with  proceed- 
ing on  a  subversion  of  all  logical  truth.  Apart  from  the 
condition  of  Kelativity,  Hamilton  would  disallow  Hegel's 
position  both  as  to  ground  and  method.  By  very  differ- 
ent and  contradictory  methods  the  thinkers  of  this  class 
arrive  at  the  same  end,  but  their  systems  all  agree  in 
being  at  variance  with  the  logical  laws.^ 

Hamilton's  general  charge  against  those  who  deny  the 
universal  application  of  the  three  laws  in  question  is, 
that  this  implies  the  subversion  of  the  reality  of  thought, 
— in  fact,  of  knowledge  in  any  form ;  and  as  this  sub- 
version is  itself  an  act  of  thought,  it  mnnihilates  itself. 
What  you  have  left  when  you  have  denied,  or  seemed 
to  deny,  the  principles  of  Identity,  Non-contradiction, 
Excluded  Middle,  and  yet  assert  knowledge  is  really 
nothing.  You  may  baptise  it  in  words  if  you  choose,  but 
you  cannot  realise  it  in  any  form  of  concept.  There  is 
a  verbal  object,  but  no  object  of  thought ;  there  is  a 
verbal  proposition,  but  no  mental  judgment.  To  allege 
a  thought  or  judgment  in  such  circumstances  is  to  sub- 
vert even  its  possibility.  If  A  existing  and  A  not 
existing  are  at  once  true,  there  is  no  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement between  thought  and  its  objects.  Truth  and 
falsehood  are  merely  empty  sounds.  We  think  only  by 
affirmation  and  negation;  these  are  only  as  they  are 
exclusive  of  each  other.  Unless,  therefore,  existence 
and  non-existence  be  opposed  objectively,  as  these  are 
subjectively,  all  thought,  all  truth,  is  mere  illusion. ^ 

It  might  be  added  that  if  the  identity  of  contradic- 


1  Logic,  L.  VI. 


*  Logic,  L.  VI. ;  cf.  L.  V, 


206 


JTamUton. 


Hegelianism, 


207 


tories  be  alleged,  the  allegation,  as  no  more  true  than  its 
contradictory,  is  at  once  paralysed.  If  it  be  alleged  that 
this  identity  may  hold  in  the  sphere  of  the  relative  or 
finite, — in  that  of  the  Understanding,  but  not  in  that  of 
the  so-called  Reason  or  Pure  thought,  which  cognises 
the  Absolute, — then  there  are  two  wholly  contradictory 
spheres  of  knowledge;  and  we  should  need  a  higher 
Reason  and  still  purer  thought  to  tell  us  which  is  the 
true,  or  how  these  are  to  be  reconciled.  A  dualism  of 
the  very  worst  sort  would  still  remain  unreconciled  and 
unreconcilable. 

Further,  it  is  easily  shoAvn  that  Hegel's  pretentious 
attempt  to  apply  the  law  of  contradiction  to  Pure  Beinfr. 
as  the  basis  of  his  logic,  implies  a  violation  of  the  very 
condition  under  which  any  one  of  those  laws  of  thought 
can  be  applied.     There  is  no  identity  unless  it  be  of  a 
definite  quality  or  sum  of  qualities,  or  a  definite  object 
perceived  or  thought.     The  very  conception  of  identity 
implies  something  to  be  identified  with  itself  at  least 
It  implies  an  A  to  begin  with,  and  the  very  possibility 
of  contradiction  implies  the  same  definitude.     We  can- 
not speak  of  Not  A,  unless  we  have  already  an  A  or 
object  given.     And  as  Pure  Being  is,  without  qualities, 
utterly  undetermined,  it  is  neither  identical  with  itself, 
nor  can  anything  be  predicated  as  difi'erent  from  it.     It 
is  not  an  A,  of  which  a  Not  A  can  even  be  said.     So 
that  Hegel's  law  of  immanent  evolution,  through  bein^. 
non-being,  becoming,  is  as  empty  and  impotent  a  formula 
as  could  be  laid  down.     It  is  wholly  hypothetical,  and 
can  never  get  under  way  without  postulating  that  def- 
inite reality  and  those  laws  which  it  is  proposing  to 
construct.     The  verbalism  of  "  synthetic  thought "  is  a 


\ 


\ 


mere  covering  of  the  petitio  principil  involved.  There 
is  no  synthesis,  there  is  no  progress,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  there  is  no  beginning  in  pure  being  or  pure 
thought. 

Hamilton,  speaking  of  Schelling  and  Hegel,  says : — 

"  Both  stuck  to  the  Absolute,  but  each  regarded  the  way 
in  which  the  other  professed  to  reach  it  as  absurd.  Hegel 
derided  the  Intellectual  Intuition  of  Schelling  as  a  poetical 
play  of  fancy;  Schelling  derided  the  Dialectic  of  Hegel  as  a 
logical  play  with  words.  Both,  I  conceive,  were  right ;  but 
neither  fully  right.  If  Schelling's  Intellectual  Intuition 
were  poetical,  it  was  a  poetry  transcending,  in  fact  abolish- 
ing, human  imagination.  If  Hegel's  Dialectic  were  logical, 
it  was  a  logic  outraging  that  science  and  the  conditions  of 
thought  itself.  Hegel's  whole  philosophy  is  indeed  founded 
on  two  errors — on  a  mistake  in  logic,  and  on  a  violation  of 
logic.  In  his  dream  of  disproving  the  law  of  Excluded 
Middle  (between  two  Contradictories),  he  inconceivably  mis- 
takes Contraries  for  Contradictories  ;  and  in  positing  pure 
or  absolute  existence  as  a  mental  datum,  immediate,  intuitive, 
and  above  proof  (though,  in  truth,  this  be  palpably  a  mere 
relative  gained  by  a  process  of  abstraction),  he  not  only  mis- 
takes the  fact,  but  violates  the  logical  law,  which  prohibits 
us  to  assume  the  principle  which  it  behoves  us  to  prove. 
On  these  two  fundamental  errors  rests  Hegel's  Dialectic ; 
and  Hegel's  Dialectic  is  the  ladder  by  which  he  attempts  to 
scale  the  Absolute."  * 

There  is  no  doubt  that  this  confusion  of  contrary  and 
contradictory  opposition  runs  all  through  the  Hegelian 
dialectic,  and  vitiates  it  fundamentally.  It  is  essential 
to  the  dialectic  as  a  progressive  movement  that  the 
opposite  in  each  case  should  be  a  positive.  But  so  far 
as  contradictory  negation  is  concerned,  there  is  no  posi- 
1  Discussions^  p.  24 — note  added. 


208 


Hamilton. 


live — mere  negation  satisfies  it, — the  pure  abolition  of 
the  subject.  Through  this  no  movement  is  possible. 
There  is  simple  paralysis.  Synthesis  is  a  dream.  None 
abolishes  owe,  but  does  not  add  to  it 

If  the  negation  be  contrary,  this,  in  the  first  place, 
supposes  a  concept  or  class  notion  already  constituted 
with  sub-classes, — supposes  already  a  process  of  experi- 
ence, thought,  and  the  laws  of  thought  which  are  sought 
to  be  subverted.  In  the  second  place,  even  the  contrary 
negation  does  not  give  a  definite  or  single  positive,  but 
only  one  out  of  a  number  of  possible  positives  or  oppo- 
sites.  And  the  whole  idea  of  proceeding  to  construct 
knowledge  by  negation, — whether  the  forms  of  know- 
ledge merely,  or  the  matter  of  knowledge,  or  both, — is 
a  mere  imagination.  But  further,  Hamilton's  view  of 
thought  as  itself  cognitive  of  existence  in  this  or  that 
determinate  mode, — quality,  in  fact,  and  its  relations, — 
and  as  such  grounded  on  intuition,  is  fatal  to  the  whole 
Hegelian  hypothesis  of  Pure  Being  as  an  apprehensible 
or  knowable  object  at  alL  To  the  term  Ens,  or  exist- 
ence in  general — Being,  Thing,  &c. — there  corresponds 
no  conception,  no  positive  notion.  We  have  no  know- 
ledge in  apprehension  or  perception  of  being  in  general, 
or  pure  being.  There  is  no  object  of  experience,  in 
short,  which  corresponds  to  these  terms.  There  is  no 
knowledge  of  the  universal  per  se.  All  that  we  appre- 
hend is  the  individual,  definite,  determinate, — something 
known  as  this,  not  that  Being  is  known  in  the  indi- 
vidual or  determinate  thing,  but  never  per  se.  To  lay 
down  this  so-called  notion  as  a  starting-point  for  the 
evolution  of  a  philosophical  system  is  vain. 

Hamilton  proceeds  to  develop  his  theory  of  the  Con- 


Belativity. 


209 


ditions  of  the  Thinkable  beyond  what  may  be  called  the 
formal  point — viz.,  the  bare  or  formal  possibility  of  any 
object  of  thought  or  knowledge  at  alL  Relativity  is  the 
second  great  condition,  or  name  for  a  ncAV  series  of  con- 
ditions. The  violation  of  the  formal  laws  of  thinkimr 
precludes  the  possibility  of  thinking  anything  whatever. 
Their  fulfilment  is  thus  a  negative  condition  for  positive 
thought  But  the  condition  of  Relativity  must  also  be 
fulfilled  ere  even  something  can  be  thought  or  known. 
And  here  we  are  told  that 

"  the  condition  of  RelatiWty,  in  so  far  as  it  is  necessary,  is 
brought  to  bear  under  two  principal  relations;  the  one 
springing  from  the  subject  of  knowledge— the  mind  thinking 
{the  relation  of  knowledge)-,  the  other,  which  is  subdivided, 
from  the  object  of  knowledge— the  thing  thought  about  {the 
relations  of  Existence).  .  .  .  The  relation  of  Knowledge 
is  that  which  arises  from  the  reciprocal  dependence  of  the 
subject  and  object  of  thought,  Subjective  and  Objective, 
including  Self  and  not-Self,  or  Ego  and  non-Ego.  Whatever 
comes  into  consciousness  is  thought  by  us  either  as  belong- 
ing to  the  mental  self  exclusively  (subjectivo-subjective),  or 
as  belonging  to  the  not-self  exclusively  (subjective-objective), 
or  as  belonging  partly  to  both  (subjectivo-objective)."  ^ 

Hamilton's  doctrine  of  Relativity  has  thus  a  twofold 
aspect  It  refers,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  conditions 
under  which  the  object  of  knowledge  exists;  and  it 
refers,  on  the  other,  to  the  conditions  under  which  the 
object  of  existence  is  knowa 

The  two  meanings  of  the  word  condition  which  run 
through  all  the  philosophy  of  Hamilton  come  out  in 
these  statements.  (1.)  Tlie  necessary  relation  of  the  sub- 
ject to  the  object  and  of  the  object  to  the  subject  is  the 
1  Discussions,  ibid.,  p.  604  ;  cf.  p.  14. 

P. — YI.  Q 


210 


Hamilton, 


condition — the  essential  condition — of  the  knowledge  of 
each ;  and  as  this  relation  is  supposed  in  all  our  thought, 
it  is  a  universal  condition  of  our  thought  Thought 
thus  obeys  conditions.  "Conditional  limitation  is  the 
fundamental  law  of  the  possibility  of  thought."  Each 
term,  subject,  or  object,  is  simply  the  condition  of  the 
thought  of  the  other.  (2.)  Apart  from  the  law  or  limit 
to  knowledge  of  the  relation  of  subject  and  object,  what 
we  know  of  either  or  of  anything  is  a  mode,  quality, 
or  state.  This  is  properly  called  a  condition,  or  mode, 
of  being  of  the  subject  It  answers,  in  fact,  to  the  deter- 
minate modes  of  existence,  already  spoken  of  as  the 
matter  of  positive  thought  The  special  modes  of  exist- 
ence are  the  special  conditions  under  which  it  is  known 
and  knowable  by  us.  "To  think  is  thus  to  condition," 
because  it  is  to  know  this  or  that  object,  and  this  or 
that  object  in  a  particular  mode  or  condition.  To  con- 
dition is  thus  identical  with  determining,  or  thinking  in 
the  form  of  determinate  being.  ^ 

This  twofold  aspect  of  relativity  as  put  by  Hamilton 
has  been  entirely  misconceived  by  Mill  and  others. 
Mill,  indeed,  recognises  what  may  be  regarded  as  one 
phase  of  objective  relativity — viz., 

"that  we  only  know  anything  by  knowing  it  as  distin- 
guished from  something  else  ;  that  all  consciousness  is  of  dif- 
ference ;  that  two  objects  are  the  smallest  number  required 
to  constitute  consciousness  ;  that  a  thing  is  only  seen  to  be 
what  it  is  by  contrast  with  what  it  is  not.  It  is  not  in  this 
sense,"  he  adds,  "  that  the  phrase— relativity  of  knowledge 
—is  ordinarily  or  intentionally  used  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton."  » 

Mill  is  as  far  wrong  in  referring  this  law  to  Hobbes 
'  See  Logic^  L.  V.  *  Examiiiatum,  p.  6. 


I 


Subjective  and  Objective  Relativity.         211 

as  its  author,  as  he  is  in  denying  that  it  is  ordinarily  and 
intentionally  recognised  by  Hamilton.  The  distinction 
of  Subjective  and  Objective  Eelativity  is  as  old  at  least 
as  the  time  of  Sextus  Empiricus.  Things  are  relative, 
in  the  first  place,  inasmuch  as  they  appear  to  a  person 
judging ;  and  they  are  relative  in  the  second  place,  inas- 
much as  no  object  comes  into  the  mind  which  is  not 
accompanied  by  some  other  with  which  it  is  necessar- 
ily compared,  and  found  like  to  or  different  from  it* 
Hamilton's  doctrine  of  relativity  might  be  taken  as  a 
full,  new,  and  explicit  development  of  those  two  forms 
of  relation. 

This  latter  principle,  made  specific,  forms  an  essential 
part  of  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  Eelativity  in  its  objective 
aspect     It  is  laid  down  by  him  as  a  condition  of  con- 
sciousness itself— that  of  Contrast  or  Discrimination,  and 
shown  by  him  to  have  a  threefold  application—viz.,  to 
the  difference  of  Self  and  I^ot-self— of  the  conscious 
states  from  each  other,— of  the  parts  and  qualities  of  the 
outward  worid.2     Difference  in  the  object  known  is  for 
him   a   universal   condition   of    knowledge.     Hamilton 
most   certainly  would   not   have   thrown   together  the 
several  clauses  purporting  to  express  the  same  doctrine, 
which  Mill  has  done,  as  these  may  easily  be  shown  to 
mean  several  totally  different  things.     And  he  would 
have   readily  pointed  out  that  two  objects,  in   Mill's 
sense,   are  not  required  to  constitute  plurality  in  the 
object,  but  simply  the  object  and  its  opposite  concept 

There  is  one  other  respect,  and  that  an  essential  one, 
in  which  Mill  has  misrepresented  Hamilton's  doctrine. 
He  speaks  approvingly  of  the  doctrine  which 
»  Uypotyposes,  L.  I.  c.  xiv.,  §§  135  et  seq,        2  Metaphysics,  L.  XI. 


212 


Hamilton. 


"  holds  the  entire  inaccessibility  to  our  faculties  of  any  other 
knowledge  or  thing  than  that  of  the  impressions  which  they 
produce  in  our  mental  {sic)  consciousness.  This  is  a  sub- 
stantial doctrine  of  relativity."  * 

This — which  may  be  named   the  doctrine  of   Imprcs- 
sional  Relativity — is  the  mode  in  which  he  habitually 
interprets  Hamilton's  use  of  the  expressions  phcBiwmemnty 
l)hcBtiomenal  knowledge^  and  relative  knowledge.     ^lill  is 
never  able  to  see  that  these  can  mean  anything  but  a 
doctrine  of   impressions  from   incognisable   objects  on 
what   he   calls   the    "mental"  consciousness.     This   is 
what,  as  a  critic,  he  has  no  business  to  do.     Hamilton 
uses  the  expressions  referred  to  in  a  totally  different 
sense  from  that  which  Mill  would  force  upon  them. 
And  further,  Hamilton  would  most  certainly  have  repu- 
diated as  illogical  and  contradictory  this  "substantial" 
doctrine  of  relativity.     He  would  have  shown  that  the 
inference  from  the  impression  to  the  unknown  object  is 
bad  on  any  view  of  the  principle  of  causality — as  wholly 
transcending  its  sphere;  as  in  fact  assuming  that  this 
principle  can  not  only  tell  us  that  there  is  a  cause  of  an 
impression,  but  the  nature  of  the  cause  itself,  as  at  least 
not  an  impression — the  cause  being  at  the  same  time  con- 
tradictorily pronounced  absolutely  incognisable.    And  he 
would  further  have  pointed  out  that  this  so-called  rela- 
tivity of  knowledge  is  neither  a  primary  nor  an  essential 
relativity,  as  every  fundamental  doctrine  on  such  a  point 
ought  to  be.     It  is  not  primary,  for  in  supposing  an  ob- 
ject to  be  known  as  the  cause  of  impressions,  it  supposes 
the  prior  relation  of  mind  and  object,  and  it  supposes 
also  the  fundamental  categories  of  one  and  many,  cause 

1  Examination,  c.  ii.  p.  13. 


Kinds  of  Relativity. 


213 


and  effect,  &c.  It  is  not  essential  to  knowledge,  for  the 
whole  sphere  of  our  knowledge  of  our  conscious  states, 
is  possible  without  it.  We  do  not  know  the  acts  and 
states  of  consciousness  as  impressions  on  the  conscious- 
ness from  an  incognisable  object.  We  know  these 
directly — essentially.  And  such  a  theory  of  relativity, 
if  set  up  as  the  only  one  substantial  and  important, 
•would  leave  the  greater  part  of  our  knowledge  untouched 
and  absolute. 

But  there  is  a  further  point  in  the  doctrine  : — 

"  All  existence  known  by  us  is  relative  existence  [exist- 
ence under  what  may  be  called  its  objective  relation — rela- 
tion to  the  being  beyond  it.]  .  .  .  But  it  does  not  follow  that 
all  relative  existence  is  relative  to  us  ;  that  all  that  can  be 
known  even  by  a  limited  intelligence  is  actually  cognisable 
by  us." 

This  leads  to  a  more  precise  limitation  of  our  knowledge. 
"  All  we  know  is  known  only  under  the  special  condi- 
tions of  knowledge."  Here  relativity  is  divided  into 
two  branches — 

"  1°,  The  properties  of  existence  are  not  necessarily,  in 
number,  only  as  the  number  of  our  faculties  of  apprehending 
them. 

"  2°,  The  properties  known  are  not  to  be  held  as  known 
in  their  native  purity,  and  without  addition  or  modification 
from  our  organs  of  sense,  or  our  capacities  of  intelligence."  ^ 

AVe  have  a  certain  number  of  susceptibilities  and 
faculties,  organic  and  intellectual.  These  are  "accom- 
modated "  in  their  nature  or  constitution  to  correspond- 
ing objects,  whether  potencies  or  actual  forms  of  being 
in  the  universe.     As  is  the  number  of  those  subjective 

1  IletajahysicSf  L.  VIII, 


214 


Hamilton, 


Belativity  and  External  Perception.         215 


powers,  so  is  the  number  of  the  objects  known  by  us. 
But  possible  modes  of  existence, — modes  that  may  be 
known  by  other  more  richly  endowed  intelligences  than 
we — even  by  us  if  our  powers  were  increased  in  number, 
— these  we  are  not  entitled  to  deny.     We  can  conceive 
them  as  possible — that  is,  as  possible  modes  in  relation 
to  a  possible  intelligence.     We  have,  so  to  speak,  the 
scheme  or  framework  of  their  reality ;  but  it  is  not  filled 
up — it  is  void  of  content.       Against  all  this,  on  the 
principles  of  the  theory  of  relativity,  nothing  can  be 
said.     The  strongest  passage^  implies  a  universe  with 
modes  of  being  and  knowledge  possible  to  us,   apart 
altogether  from   our  faculties  of   apprehension.     It  is 
even  said  that  if  every  eye  to  see,  if  every  ear  to  hear, 
were  annihilated,  that  which  could  be  seen,  that  which 
could  be  heard,  would  still  remain.     The  could  he  here 
may  be  taken,  however,  simply  as  expressing  a  subsist- 
ing potentiality — a  power  that  would  operate  to  seeing 
and  hearing,  if  the  condition  of  the  organic  function 
were  supplied;  otherwise  what  is  phoenomenal,  or  the 
object  of  a  sense,  must  be  regarded  as  existing,  whether 
we  perceive  it  or  not,  exactly  as  we  perceive  it.     And 
this  form  of  existence  might,  in  a  subordinate  sense,  be 
considered  as  absolute — in  existence  as  in  knowledge, 
the  same  to  all  human  intelligence.     Be  this  as  it  may, 
the   broad  principle   is  clear  that  the  variety   of  our 
perceptions  and  sensations  depends  on  the  various  poten- 
cies, so  to  speak,  in  an  objective   universe — primarily 
sundered  from  us — indifferent  to  us   and  our  powers; 
and  only  through  our  relationship  to  it,  with  properly 
accommodated  faculties,   do  we  come  to  know  aught. 

1  Metaphyncs,  L.  VIII. 


II 


And  on  no  other  ground  can  the  infinite  variety  in  the 
matter  or  objects  of  our  cognition  be  explained.  Deduced 
from  the  general  abstract  laws  of  intelligence  it  cannot 
be ;  any  one  quality  a  priori  deducible  from  any  other 
is  an  equally  vain  doctrine.  There  is  a  parallelism 
between  the  universe  of  objective  being  and  of  subjec- 
tive knowledge ;  this  parallelism,  this  correlation,  is  the 
first  and  last  fact  for  us. 

But  besides  the  probable  inadequacy  in  number  of 
our  faculties  to  the  possible  modes  of  being,  there  is  a 
consideration  of  still  greater  importance  : — 

"What  we  know  is  not  a  simple  relation  apprehended 
between  the  object  known  and  the  subject  knowing,  but 
every  knowledge  is  a  sum  made  up  of  several  elements  ;  and 
the  great  business  of  philosophy  is  to  analyse  and  discrim- 
inate these  elements,  and  to  determine  whence  these  con- 
tributions have  been  derived." 

Hamilton  illustrates  this  by  reference  to  external 
perception.  In  this  act  the  mind  does  not  know  the 
external  object  "  in  immediate  relation  to  itself,  but 
mediately  in  relation  to  the  organs  of  sense."  This  is 
the  case  universally  in  Sense-Perception.  Further,  the 
object  of  perception  "  may  make  its  impression  on  the 
organ  through  an  intervening  medium." 

"  As  the  full  object  presented  to  the  mind,  in  perception, 
[sight]  is  an  object  compounded  of  the  external  object  emit- 
ting or  reflecting  light,  t.c,  modifying  the  external  medium, — 
of  this  external  medium, — and  of  the  living  organ  of  sense,  in 
their  mutual  relation, — let  us  suppose,  in  the  example  I  have 
taken  [perception  of  a  book],  that  the  full  or  adequate  object 
perceived  is  equal  to  twelve,  and  that  this  amount  is  made 
up  of  three  several  parts,— of  four,  contributed  by  the  book, 
of  four,  contributed  by  all  that  intervenes  between  the  book 


216 


Hamilton. 


and  the  organ,  and  of  four,  contributed  by  the  living  organ 
itself."  1 

As  in  sense,  so  in  every  act  of  knowledge.  AVe  are 
liable  to  be  deceived  by  not  distinguishing  what  is  con- 
tributed by  the  mind  itself.  2 

This  reference  to  the  composite  character  of  the  object 
of  External  Perception  is  not  to  be  taken  as  conflicting 
with  the  doctrine  of  immediate  perception  or  natural 
realism,  elsewhere  so  frequently  inculcated  by  the  writer. 
Indeed,  it  harmonises  thoroughly  with  the  latest  form 
of  his  doctrine  of  Immediate  Perception,  as  an  appre- 
hension in  and  through  the  organism  of  extension  and 
resistance.  The  total,  full,  or  real  object  is  here  stated 
to  be  a  composite  one,  but  this  is  the  total  object  as 
apprehended  by  the  mind, — not  the  object  merely,  or 
element  of  the  object  in  immediate  relation  to  the  organ 
of  sense.  This  composite  object  of  outward  space,  of 
hodily  affection,  may  be  made  up  through  different  acts 
of  immediate  apprehension  or  perception, — indeed  is 
confessedly  so  made  up,  ere  it  is  presented  as  a  whole 
to  the  mind.  And  it  seems  to  be  the  aim  of  the  later 
analysis  by  Hamilton  of  Perception  to  show  this,  and  to 
show  how  the  total  object  is  successively  constituted. 
But  there  is  nothing  in  Hamilton's  statements  to  show 
that  he  regarded  any  quality  or  element  of  the  non- 
Ego  as  illusorily  presented  to  us  as  a  part  of  the  Ego, 
or  vice  versa.  These  elements  are  given  together,  but 
they  are  capable  of  exact  discrimination ;  and  this  it 
is  the  express  aim  of  the  philosophy  of  perception  to 
accomplish. 

Hamilton's  general  principle,  that  existence  is  wider 

1  Metaphysics,  L.  VIII.  -  PjUI. 


Objections  to  Relativity. 


21' 


than  our  knowledge,  has  been  assailed  on  the  ground 
that  as  subject  implies  object,  there  is  no  reality  separ- 
able from  an  intelligence  which  thinks.  Inability  to 
conceive  such  an  object,  or  existence,  means  inability  to 
conceive  an  abstraction.  There  is  no  absolute  being  in 
the  sense  of  being  out  of  relation  to  thought. 

Because  subject  implies  object,  object  7>er  se,  out  of 
relation  to  a  conscious  subject,  is,  it  is  argued,  unreal 
On  the  logical  principle  of  correlation,  the  one  term  im- 
plies the  other  in  our  thought  A  half  means  and  implies 
another  half ;  a  centre  implies  a  circumference ;  the  one 
end  of  a  stick  implies  the  other.  Thinking  the  one,  we 
must  think  the  other;  each  is  meaningless  by  itself. 
But  this  is  a  purely  analytic  act  of  thought.  It  is  a  taut- 
ology, and  has  no  metaphysical  import.  It  never  touches 
the  question  at  issue  as  to  whether  the  existence  of  the 
object,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  or  is  not  suspended  on  the 
consciousness  of  it  by  the  knowing  self  or  subject  in  any 
given  case.  It  may  be  quite  true  that  if  I  know,  I  know 
an  object  in  contrast  to  me  the  subject  knowing,  and 
that  there  is  no  object  known  by  me  at  all  unless  as 
object  to  me  the  subject.  But  the  object  may,  for  all 
that,  possess  a  permanent  and  potential  existence,  of  such 
a  kind  that  it  is  capable  of  reappearing  to  me  as  a  similar 
object  or  phenomenon.  The  subject  undoubtedly  pos- 
sesses such  an  existence ;  for  it  is  identical,  and  appears 
in  its  identity  amid  the  variety  of  objects ;  and  if  the 
argument  were  worth  anything,  it  would  be  valid  against 
the  existence  of  the  subject  per  se  as  well  The  identity 
of  the  self,  and  the  permanence  and  uniformity  in  the 
recurrence  of  the  objects  of  experience,  are  utterly  in- 
compatible with  the  identity  of  the  relation  of  conscious 


1' 


218 


Hamilton. 


subject  and  known  object,  or  of  knowledge  with  that  of 
existence.  It  leaves  the  relation  itself  ungrounded,  and 
it  makes  existence  convertible  with  the  actual  fleetinjj 
relations  of  subject  and  object. 

But  there  is  a  confusion  in  a  criticism  of  this  sort 
between  relation  to  us  as  subject,  or  to  our  thought,  and 
relation  to  any  subject  or  tliought.  Although  it  were 
proved  that  subject  and  object  are  inseparable, — that  the 
one  always  implies  the  other,— it  does  not  follow  that 
the  sphere  of  subject  and  object  in  reality  is  identical 
with  that  of  the  Ego  and  non-Ego,  or  subject  and  object, 
of  human  consciousness.  Even  admitting  that  being  apart 
from  object  to  a  subject  is  meaningless  or  unreal,  it  does 
not  follow  that  being  is  identical  with  the  object  to  the 
human  or  conscious  subject.  Consequently,  there  may 
be  being  or  object  out  of  relation  to  every  human  con- 
sciousness, and  yet  in  relation  to  other  knowers.  This 
would  be  the  irrelative  to  us,  and  as  such  would  be 
incognisable,  equally  with  the  irrelative  per  se.  So 
far  as  the  doctrine  of  Hamilton  is  concerned,  it  matters 
nothing  whether  the  irrelative  be  one  allowed  to  be  real, 
as  relative  to  others,  or  one  denied  to  be  real,  so  long  as 
it  is  the  irrelative,  incognisable,  for  us.  But  the  implied 
purport  of  the  criticism  is  dogmatically  and  illegitimately 
to  assume  that  the  relative  is  the  real,  and  the  relative 
for  us  is  the  absolutely  real 

But  further,  because  we  can  conceive  no  object  out  of 
relation  to  a  subject,  it  does  not  follow  that  this  definite 
or  limited  existence  of  object  is  the  only  existence,  or  is 
convertible  with  all  existence.  Absolute  in  the  sense  of 
irrelative  being  is  not  a  contradiction  in  terms, — cannot 
by  us  be  pronounced  to  be  so.     What  is  not  a  contradic- 


L\ 


Objections  to  Belativity, 


219 


tion  is  possible, — possibly  existent.  It  is  the  negation, 
no  doubt,  of  definite,  limited,  or  known  being ;  but  we 
cannot  say  that  existence  out  of  all  relation  to  a  knower 
is  a  contradiction,  unless  on  the  supposition  that  definite 
or  known  being  is  the  only  being,  or  is  all  being.  But 
this  is  a  simple  petttio  principiL  We  reason  thus : 
Known  being  is  all  being ;  irrelative  being  is  a  contra- 
diction of  known  (relative)  being ;  therefore  there  is  no 
absolute  (irrelative)  being.  If  this  be  not  so,  of  what 
else  is  irrelative  being  a  contradiction  %  AVhat  does  its 
affinnation  contradict  except  the  arbitrary  limitation  of 
being  to  relative  or  known  being  in  the  first  place? 
And  what  kind  of  argument  is  this  but  a  tautological 
see-saw  ?  What  if  relative  being  ^^er  se  be  itself  incon- 
ceivable ?  What  if  we  can  but  hold  it  as  a  portion  of 
what  we  must  think — the  definite  side  %  Does  not  the 
fact  of  relative  or  known  being  in  our  experience  sug- 
gest a  surrounding  of  the  unknown  and  unknowable,  as 
strictly  for  us  at  least  irrelative  ]  Does  not  the  very 
insufficiency  of  the  being  we  actually  know  necessarily 
suggest  to  us  not  only  the  possibility  but  the  fact  of 
transcendent  being  as  a  ground  of  this  known  and  tem- 
porary sphere  ?  If  there  be  no  sphere  of  the  irrelative 
or  transcendent,  what  must  follow  but  that  experience  is 
God, — God  as  He  is  and  as  He  must  be, — the  one  being 
the  all,  the  all  being  the  one  ? 

It  may  be  added  that  Kant  is  entirely  opposed  to  this 
inference.  He  holds  the  object  of  the  Idea  of  an  Ego, 
one,  simple,  indivisible,  to  be  incapable  of  affirmation 
on  speculative  grounds.  It  is  not  matter  of  intuition ; 
it  cannot  be  brought  under  any  concept  of  the  under- 
standing ;  it  can  only  be  speculatively  inferred  through 


220 


Hamilton. 


a  paralogism;  yet  he  maintains  that  it  is  possible  in 
reality,  and  that  it  may  admit  of  proof  on  other  than 
speculative  grounds.  The  case  is  very  much  the  same 
with  the  Ideal  of  Reason, — God.  Kant  very  pertinently 
asks  how  any  one  can  contest  the  objective  reality  of 
those  ideas,  seeing  there  is  no  contradiction  in  them,  and 
he  knows  as  little  how  to  deny  as  we  how  to  assert  their 
possibility.^  He  thus  perfectly  recognises  the  principle 
that  mere  inconceivability  in  no  way  implies  non-exist- 
ence,— that  in  fact  existence  is  wider  than  conceivable 
knowledge,  that  is,  relative  knowledge.  This  is  really 
all  that  Hamilton,  in  common  with  philosophers  of  the 
most  opposite  schools,  contends  for. 

But  it  has  been  alleged  that  to  say  that  human  know- 
ledge is  relative,  or  only  of  the  phaenomenal,  is  to  imply 
a  contradiction.  We  cannot  say  that  our  knowledge  is 
relative  or  phsenomenal  unless  we  know  that  absolute  or 
something  of  which  it  is  phaenomenal  If  we  know 
that  knowledge  is  relative,  we  know  that  of  which  it  is 
a  manifestation.  Those  who  take  this  position  obvi- 
ously forget  that  precisely  the  same  reasoning  must 
apply  to  the  relation  of  Causality,  if  it  applies  at  all  to 
the  relation  of  Substance  and  Phsenomenon.  A  change 
appears  to  me, — an  apparent  rise  of  a  quality  or  thing 
into  being.  Somehow,  it  matters  nothing  how,  I  am 
led,  even  constrained,  to  think  this  change  as  but  a  new 
form  of  something  which  went  before  it,  and  which  has 
been  transmuted  into  it ;  but  as  yet,  and  until  science 
comes  to  my  aid,  I  do  not  know  what.  In  other  words, 
I  have  asserted  a  cause, — the  need  for  a  cause ;  but  the 
cause  itself  I  do  not  as  yet  know.     Is  this  a  contradio 

1  KritV:^  Hart.,  p.  486 }  MuUer,  vol.  ii.  p.  577. 


Objections  to  Eelativity. 


221 


tory  procedure,  or  an  unreasonable  procedure  ?  Am  I 
to  be  debarred  from  (synthetically)  predicating  a  cause 
of  change  %  Am  I  to  wait  until  I  know  the  cause  before 
I  can  assert  that  the  change  is  an  efifect  %  Certainly,  if 
the  argument  be  well  founded  on  which  I  am  debarred 
from  asserting  a  substance  or  ground  of  being  for  a  given 
quality,  or  for  a  change  in  a  series  of  qualities.  But  it 
is  impossible  that  I  can  ever  find  the  cause  on  such  a 
ridiculous  position.  If  I  cannot  predicate,  first  of  all, 
the  necessity  of  the  unknown  cause,  I  should  never 
move  a  step  by  science  to  seek  the  cause. 

But  we  know  well  that  the  change  of  the  present 
moment  is  the  product  of  a  cause  in  a  past  time,  though 
we  do  not  in  the  least  know  what  that  cause  is.     "VVe 
know  quite  well  that  the  light  or  the  sound  we  see  or 
hear  is  the  result  of  something  beyond  the  immediate 
sphere  of  sense,  and  yet  have  to  wait  for  centuries  ere 
we  know  what  that  is, — whether  a  form  of  motion,  and 
what  sort  of  motion.     And  here  even  the  two  relations 
of  cause  and  effect,  and  of  substance  and  phenomenon, 
may  be  shown  to  coincide.     We  might  quite  well  trans- 
late change  or  eff'ect  into  quality,  and  cause  into  active 
substance.     And  we  might  speak  with  perfect  propriety 
of  the  effect  being  pha3nomenon,   and  a  phaenomenon 
of  what  is  as   yet  unknown.     Light  is  in  a  sense   a 
quality   or   phsenomenon   of   the  ground  or  substance, 
motion;  it,  as  well  as  heat  and  sound,  is  phsenomenal 
to  us,  in  the  first  place,  of  being  or  substance  which 
we  do  not  know,  but  which  we  happen  in  the  course 
of  the  ages  to  come  to  know.     Yet  we  properly  called 
it  phsenomenal,  when  we  did  not  know  that  of  which 
it  was  phsenomenal    And,  consequently,  what  is  true  in 


222 


Hamilton. 


any  special  instance  is  true  in  the  last  resort.  Even  if 
the  cause  or  substance  of  the  sum  of  phaenomena  known 
by  us  were  found  to  be  incognisable,  we  might  stiU 
with  perfect  reason  hold  that  it  is  the  phsenomenon 
or  effect  of  an  unknown  reality.  What  is  true  of 
cause  is  true  of  substance.  I  may  still  be  entitled  to 
speak  of  substance,  ultimate  substance,  as  absolute,  as 
incognisable  by  me,  and  know  that  somehow  it  is — 
that  my  knowledge  is  of  its  manifestations — even  though 
in  itself  it  be  wholly  veiled  from  me.  ^My  knowledge, 
taken  as  a  whole,  may  ultimately  be  found  so  imperfect 
as  in  itself  to  suggest  the  something  beyond.  This  is 
bound  up  with  it,  implied  in  it.  This  dim  correlative 
is  enough  to  enable  me  to  say  that  the  fact  is  phaenom- 
enal,  relative  alike  to  substance  and  cause.  We  have, 
and  can  have,  no  concomitant  or  independent  know- 
ledge of  the  substance,  which  might  enable  us  to  deter- 
mine what  wo  know  as  phsenomenaL  It  is  enough  if 
the  definite  experience,  the  fact  or  sum  of  facts  we  know, 
be  unthinkable  by  us,  per  se,  apart  from  a  reference  to 
something  which  grounds  and  yet  transcends  it.  With 
this  as  a  correlative,  a  necessary  correlative,  we  are 
yet  perfectly  entitled  to  say  that  our  knowledge,  our 
definite  or  positive  knowledge,  is  of  the  relative,  and 
only  of  the  relative;  while  our  faith,  founded  on  the 
conscious  limitation  of  our  knowledge,  proclaims  its  im- 
perfection, its  inadequacy  as  the  expression  of  aU  reality. 


223 


'i 


i 


CHAPTER    X. 

CLASSIFICATION  OP  THE  LAWS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  —  HAMIL- 
TON AND  KANT — THE  CONDITIONED  AND  THE  UNCON- 
DITIONED. 

We  may  be  allowed  to  have  a  knowledge  of  Time  and 
Space  and  Existence  in  Time  and  Space.  We  appre- 
hend or  know  the  present  moment,  the  point  or  points 
of  space  before  us,  the  fact  or  phaenomenon  in  space, — 
the  extended  object.  We  may,  nay,  must,  raise  cer- 
tain questions  regarding  this  knowledge.  Is  the  point 
of  time  which  I  know  connected  with  a  moment  beyond 
it  ?  Is  it  necessarily  so  connected  1  It  would  seem  so. 
This  last  kno\\Ti  moment  of  time  is  obviously  to  my 
thought  dependent  on  a  preceding  moment.  The  pre- 
sent means  the  present  as  against  the  past.  But  this  pre- 
ceding moment  in  its  turn  depends  on  a  further  moment. 
It  matters  not  what  be  the  object  I  think  as  filling  the 
moment  of  time ;  as  I  think  the  moment  in  which  it  is, 
I  necessarily  think  this  moment  as  itself  dependent  on 
a  still  previous  one.  The  question  arises.  How  far  can 
I  go  back  1  How  far  can  I  go  adding  on  to  the  pres- 
ent moment — that  is,  making  a  regressive  synthesis  of 
moments  ]     Here  I  have  but  two  opposing  alternatives, 


224 


Hamilton. 


if  I  am  to  reach  completeness  in  my  regress.  Either  I 
must  be  able  to  go  backwards  until  I  realise  the  infinite 
regress  of  time,  or  until  I  find  a  point  before  which 
there  is  no  time — that  is,  an  absolute  commencement  of 
time.  The  former  I  cannot  do,  for  this  would  imply  the 
infinite  addition  in  thought  of  finite  times,  and  such  an 
addition  would  itself  require  an  eternity  for  its  accom- 
plishment^ On  the  other  hand,  I  am  able  as  little  to 
conceive  or  imagine  an  absolute  commencement  of  time 
— that  is,  a  beginning  beyond  which  time  is  conceived 
as  non-existent  As  well  try  to  think  without  thought, 
as  seek  to  realise  this. 

What  holds  of  time  holds  of  space.  It  is  impossi- 
ble for  us  to  represent  to  ourselves  the  immensity — 
the  boundlessness  of  space,  or  the  absolute  totality  of 
space, — space  beyond  which  there  is  no  space.  All  that 
we  reach  in  each  case  is  the  indefinite — that  beyond  which 
we  can  always  go — not,  however,  realising  anything 
but  this  possible  indefinitude  of  movement.  The  in- 
definite however  expanded  is  always  the  finite.  The 
indefinite  is  merely  the  negation  of  the  actual  apprehen- 
sion of  limits  ;  the  infinite  is  the  negation  of  the  possible 
existence  of  limits. ^  We  fail  to  reach  the  infinite  in 
quantity — that  is,  "  the  unconditionally  unlimited ; "  we 
fail  equally  to  reach  the  absolute  in  quantity — that  is, 
"  the  unconditionally  limited."  Our  knowledge  is  thus 
of  the  conditioned,  and  of  the  conditioned  only.  The 
moment  or  point  known  is  known  as  related  to,  depen- 
dent upon,  or  conditioned  by  something  else — some  other 
moment  in  time  or  point  in  space. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  relations  of  cause  and  sub- 
*  Discitssions,  p.  29.  *  Logic,  L.  VI. 


The  Unconditioned. 


09  p; 


\ 


/ 


Stance.     To  take  only  the  former.     Wo  start  from  a 
given  phenomenon  in  time— something  that  appears  to 
be.     This  leads  us  at  once  to  think  of  a  cause  or  form  of 
existence  by  and  througli  which  it  has  arisen  into  appar- 
ent being.     Whence  this  cause  in  its  turn,  is  the  neces- 
sary  question.     If  it  be  necessary  to  put  ih^  question  in 
the  first  instance,  it  is  always  necessary.     Here,  too,  we 
fall  back  upon  an  infinite  regress  of  phicnomenal  causes  : 
or  we  must  arrive  at  a  cause  in  the  series  which  is  not 
Itself  an  eff"ect,  an  absolutely  first  cause  of  phenomena. 
I3ut  neither  of  these  alternatives  is  conceivable  by  us.    An 
infinite  regress  of  causes  could  be  realised  only  in  an  in- 
finite time;  an  absolute  commencement  is  for  us  incon- 
ceivable.    We  must  tliink  tlie  phenomenon  as  exist- 
mg— as  existing  relatively  in  time.     Change  is  always 
within  existence ;  there  is  previous  existence  implied  in 
change.     There  is  thus  always  relation  to  being  beyond. 
Hence,  as  we  are  unable  to  realise  either  an  absolute  com- 
mencement  of  time  or  an  infinite  non-commencement  of 
time,  we  can  actually  realise  neitlier  an  infinite  regress  of 
causes  nor  an  absolutely  first  cause— a  cause  not  itself 
an  effect     Either  of  tliese  would  be  a  form  of  the  un- 
conditioned.    In  the  case  of  the  infinite  regress  of  causes, 
the  unconditioned  lies  in  the  totality  of  the  series,  for 
each  of  the  members  is  conceived  as  conditioned  or  re- 
lative ;  in  the  ca^e  of  the  absolute  commencement,  the 
unconditioned  is  the  first  of  the  series,  having  no  con- 
dition before  it,  while  it  is  the  condition  of  all  that 
follows. 

It  should  here  be  observed  that  Hamilton's  position 
regarding  the  ultimate  impossibility  of  compassing  the 
totality  of  the  conditions  of  time  and  space,  the  un- 


226 


Hamilton. 


conditioned  in  eitlier,  holds  good,  whether  we  regard 
these  as  real  in  the  sense  of  self-subsisting  objects  out- 
side of  us,  or  the  relations  of  self-subsistmg  objects,  or 
merely  ideal  forms  of  thought.  It  is  sufficient  for 
his  argument  that  time  and  space  are  at  least  quanti- 
ties; and  this  they  are,  be  they  objective  or  merely 
subjective.  Even  intensive  quantity — degree*  or  power 
— would  form  a  basis  for  exactly  the  same  argument, 
whether  it  be  regarded  as  material  or  purely  spiritual. 
So  that  Kant's  professed  solution  of  the  first  two  cos- 
mological  antinomies,  infinitude  and  finitude  in  time 
and  space,  by  supposing  the  phsenomenon  in  these  to 
be  purely  subjective,  or  non-existent  out  of  us,  in  no 
way  affects  the  ground  of  Hamilton's  general  doctrine 
as  to  our  power  of  conceiving  or  knowing. 

Further,  it  is  sufficient  for  the  doctrine  of  the  condi- 
tioned in  its  psychological  application  that  existence  in 
any  form  be  given,  and  what  we  think  we  necessarily 
think  as  existing  in  some  form.  What  we  think  about 
must  be  thought  to  exist,  and  to  exist  in  time,  or  in 
tune  and  space.  And  this  existence,  whether  objective 
or  subjective,  we  are  unable  to  conceive  either  as  abso- 
lutely commencing,  or  as  infinitely  non-commencing. 
Our  capacity  of  thought  is  thus  proved  incompetent  to 
what  we  necessarily  think  about  Existence,  time, 
space,  are  the  indispensable  conditions  of  actual  thought; 
and  yet  when  we  seek  to  run  them  back  to  the  counter- 
alternatives,  in  one  or  other  of  which  we  cannot  but 
admit  they  exist,  we  are  unable,  as  even  Kant  himself 
allows,  positively  to  represent  or  conceive  either.^ 

By  condition  thus  in  thought,  Hamilton  means  that 

1  Compare  Metaphysics,  vol.  ii.,  App.  IL 


Meanings  of  Condition. 


227 


without  which  thought  cannot  be,  or  an  object  cannot 
be  thought.  In  thought  he  would  include  intuition,  or 
perception  of  the  individual,  and  conception  or  compre- 
hension of  the  general  and  universal, — in  fact,  conscious- 
ness in  the  sense  of  knowledge.  Every  object  which 
Ave  think  in  this  wide  sense  is  known  as  the  term  of  a 
relation;  it  is  object  to  the  conscious  subject  or  self. 
This  is  the  condition  of  being  known.  Every  object  is 
also  known  or  knowable  as  existing  in  certain  necessary 
relations ;  the  principal  of  these  being  that  of  sub- 
stance and  quality,  time  and  space,  or  succession  and 
coexistence.  These  are  the  conditions  of  the  object  as 
existent  and  knowable.  In  each  there  is  difference, 
plurality,  relation.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  condi- 
tion is  not  synonymous  with  caiise.  Condition  is  simply 
that  without  which,  on  the  one  hand,  an  object  is  not 
known,  and,  on  the  other,  without  which  it  is  not 
knowable  by  us.  Cause,  again,  is  at  the  least  that  by 
and  through  which  an  object  is,  or  is  given  in  our  expe- 
rience,— "  the  power  of  effectuating  a  change."  Hamil- 
ton would  certaiidy  not  have  regarded  the  moments  of 
time  taken  in  regress  as  causes  of  the  moment  from 
which  we  start;  or  the  coexisting  points  of  space  as 
causes,  much  less  mutually  causative.  These  are  simply 
conditions, — conditions  of  each  other.  Kant  himself 
has  not  avoided  this  confusion  of  causality  and  succes- 
sion in  his  solution  of  the  third  antinomy, — freedom 
and  necessary  causation;  and  the  fallacy  frequently 
recurs  in  contemporary  neo-Kantian  literature.  But  the 
jpod  hoc  and  the  ;propter  hoc  stiU  survive  as  incapable  of 
identification. 

Our  thought,  then,  is  of  the  conditioned,  and  the  con- 


228 


Harailton. 


ditioned  only.  Let  us  try  to  rise  above  tliis  in  regard 
to  time  or  space,  the  beginning  of  the  world  or  series 
of  phsenomena,  the  component  elements  of  the  world, 
the  infinitely  divisil)le  or  the  aljsolutely  indivisible, 
natural  causation  and  free  causation,  the  contingent 
or  changeable  in  things  and  the  necessary;  we  are 
equally  precluded  from  reaching  the  unconditioned  in 
any  form.  AVe  have  a  series  of  opposing,  even  contra- 
dictor)^ alternatives,  the  moment  we  seek  to  rise  above 
the  finite,  conditioned,  or  relative.  Yet,  in  Hamilton's 
view,  wo  are  able  to  say  that  our  intelligence  is  not 
deceitful, — is  not  driven  to  the  despair  of  scepticism. 
It  is  weak,  but  not  illusory.  The  problem  of  Hamilton 
is  to  show  how  this  is  so, — whence  these  contradictory 
alternatives  rise,  and  how  even  on  the  principles  of 
human  knowledge  we  are  able  and  obliged  to  accept  one 
of  the  alternatives. 

This,  then,  is  the  Conditioned  for  us.  But  Hamilton 
distinguishes  between  "  the  conditioned  "  and  "  the  con- 
ditionally conditioned,"  "  the  relatively  or  conditionally 
relative."  The  correlative  phrases  are  the  unconditioned, 
and  "  the  unconditionally  conditioned,"  "  the  relative 
absolutely,  or  infinitely."  What  precisely  is  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  conditioned  and  the  conditionally 
conditioned  %  The  former  is  of  course  the  mean  between 
either  term  of  the  unconditioned,  absolute  or  infinite, 
— the  opposite  or  contradictory  alike  of  the  uncondi- 
tionally limited,  or  absolute,  and  of  the  unconditionally 
ludimited,  or  the  infinite, — say  of  time  as  a  whole,  as 
completed,  and  of  time  as  never  ending.  The  condi- 
tionally conditioned  is  the  opposite  or  contradictory  of 
the  unconditioned  of  the  conditioned.     The  conditioned 


The  ConditioTmlly  Conditioned, 


229 


as  thought  always  implies  two  terms, — a  relative  and 
correlative — as  before  and  after,  here  and  there,  sub- 
ject and  object,  substance  and  pha?nomenon.  The  one 
of  these  is  conditioned  by  the  other;  subject  condi- 
tions object,  object  conditions  subject, — so  substance 
and  phienomenon.  Let  us  now  try  to  think  one  of  these 
per  86^  one  out  of  relation  to  the  other,  and  we  cannot, 
because  we  cannot  think  the  uitfconditioned  of  the  con- 
ditioned. "VYe  must,  therefore,  think  the  conditionally 
conditioned.  The  unconditionally  conditioned,  or  the 
unconditional  of  the  conditioned,  would  be  either  of 
these  terms  thought  per  se.  This  is  impossible,  un- 
thinkable. The  unconditioned  would  be  the  uncondi- 
tioned absolutely,  or  infinitely, — the  genus  of  the  abso- 
lute or  the  infinite.  The  conditioned  ^^er  se  would  l)e 
the  relative,  or  the  finite,  in  abstraction.  But  the 
conditioned  we  know  is  a  conditionally  conditioned,  that 
is,  it  is  a  term  relative  to  or  conditioned  by  another 
term,  as  object  by  subject,  quality  by  substance.  Each 
is  conditioned  by  the  other;  it  is  internally  or  condi- 
tionally conditioned. 

The  Unconditioned  is  thus  simply  the  highest  ex- 
pression for  the  common  element  in  what  is  properly 
absolute  and  infinite  in  thought,  or  as  these  can  be 
understood.  In  each  there  is  an  element  that  may  be 
named  unconditioned  —  viz.,  in  the  absolute,  uncon- 
ditional limitation;  in  the  infinite,  unconditional  non- 
limitation — i.e.  (absolute)  completeness;  (infinite)  end- 
lessness. The  genus  of  the  two,  that  which  holds 
their  common  element  is  thus  the  Unconditioned.  No 
l)roper  objection  can  be  made  to  this  expression,  as  none 
can  be  made  to  the  Incomprehensible,  the  Contradictory, 


230 


Hamilton. 


The  Uiuonditioned  Contradictory.  231 


or  the  Fnknowable.  All  these  mean  simply  a  common 
element ;  and  we  are  not  to  infer  that  this  is  either  a 
personification  or  an  abstraction,  supposed  to  he  realisahlo 
j>er  se.  It  is  an  accurate  way  of  stating  this  element. 
Its  realisation  is,  of  course,  subject  to  the  ordinary  con- 
ditions under  which  any  universal  notion  is  actually 
thought. 

At  this  point  there  emerges  the  crucial  distinction  be- 
tween the  Unconditioned  and  the  species,  or  Incondition- 
ates  which  it  contains— viz..  Absolute  and  Infinite.     The 
Unconditioned,  as  connoting  the  common  element  in  the 
absolute  and  infinite,  signifies  simply  limitation  regarded 
as  complete,  or  non-limitation  as  actual.    But  the  Uncon- 
ditioned has  been  taken  to  mean  one  notion,  in  which 
arc  actually  united  both  those  kinds  of  sub-sjiecies— 
the  complete  and  the  endless.      According  to  Hamil- 
ton, the  Unconditioned,    regarded   as   the   actually  re- 
alised genus  or  sum  of  the  two  inconditionates  —  the 
Absolute  and  the  Infinite  —  is  not  only  an  inconceiv- 
able  notion;   it   is   a   contradiction  —  a  notion   whicli 
annihilates  itself  through  a  simple  violation  of  the  law 
of  non-contradiction.     This  notion  or  alleged  notion  of 
the  Unconditioned  is,  according  to  Hamilton,  no  notion 
at  all,  but  a  pure  and  simple  contradiction— the  annihila- 
tion of  thought.     We  know  what  the  terms  mean,  but 
they  not  only  baffle  conception;   their  union  destroys 
a  subject  of  predication  at  all.     Each  of  the  terms,  or 
inconditionates,  supposed  to  be  united  under  it,  is  sim- 
ply, as  irrelative,  inconceivable.      As   such   the  object 
shadowed  out  is  not  necessarily  impossible  in  reality,  or 
non-existent     The  Absolute  by  itself  is  not  a  contra- 
diction or  self-contradiction ;  the  Infinite  by  itself  is  not 


a  contradiction  or  self-contradiction.  Tlie  inconceiv- 
ableness  of  each  does  not  preclude  tlie  possibility  in 
existence  of  each.  But  the  alleged  notion  of  the  Un- 
conditioned, or  the  attempt  to  combine  in  one  thought 
or  to  grasp  the  Unconditioned  as  one,  does  imply  an 
impossibility  alike  of  thought  and  being.  The  Uncon- 
ditioned regarded. as  one,  or  thought  as  one,  is  neces- 
sarily the  union  of  contradictories.  We  have  in  it,  for 
example,  the  assertion  of  an  absolute  beginning  and  its 
negation ;  we  have  the  assertion  of  an  absolutely  first 
and  of  an  infinite  series.  We  have  absolute  and  infinite 
affirmed, — absolute  limitation,  infinite  non -limitation. 
We  have  contingency  in  things,  and  a  necessary  ground 
of  things  as  alternatives.  These  we  cannot  conceive  as 
one  notion,  or  as  one.  Thus  joined  in  their  extension, 
they  are  pure  contradictories.  They  not  only  cannot  bo 
applied  to  one  object  of  thought ;  they  simply,  as  thus 
applied,  annihilate  the  matter  or  object  of  thought. 
The  Unconditioned  is  thus,  in  Hamilton's  view,  "the 
formally  illegitimate, — a  fasciculus  of  negations  of  the 
Conditioned  in  its  opposite  extremes."  We  are  able  to 
conceive  the  requisites  of  the  Unconditioned  as  a  notion ; 
we  know  the  meaning  of  the  terms  in  which  its  postu- 
lates are  couched.  But  that  is  all.  We  know  enough 
to  know  that  these  postulates  imply  contradictions ;  and 
the  attempt  to  fuse  them  results  simply  in  the  zero  of 
thought  and  knowledge.  This,  according  to  Hamilton, 
has  "no  objective  application" — no  reality,  because  it 
has  "no  subjective  affirmation."  It  is  a  nullity  in 
thought,  and  therefore  a  nullity  in  existence. 

"  It  affords  no  real  knowledge,  because  it  contains  nothing 
even  conceivable  ;  and  it  is  self-contradictory,  because  it  is 


I 


232 


Hamilton. 


not  a  notion,  either  simple  or  positive,  but  only  a  fasciculus 
of  negations,— negations  of  the  Conditioned  in  its  opposite 
l^\t^emes,  and  bound  together  merely  by  the  aid  of  language 
and  their  common  character  of  incomprehensibility."  ^ 

The  meaning  here  stands  out  perfectly  clearly — viz., 
that  the  Unconditioned  is  the  contradictory.  The  incon- 
ditionate,  whether  absolute  or  infinile,  is  not  self-con- 
tradictory, but  simply  irrelative  and  inconceivable.  'Jo 
l>oint  out  this,  which  should  not  have  needed  to  be 
pointed  out  to  any  one  assuming  the  position  of  a  critic 
of  the  system,  is  to  answer  the  objections  to  it,  founded 
on  misconception.  One  critic,  after  quoting  this  passage, 
actually  calls  upon  us  to  note  this  as 

"  tlie  first  and  most  fundamental  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  argu- 
ments,  tliat  our  ideas  of  the  Infinite  and  Absolute  are  '  only 
a  fasciculus  of  negations.' "  * 

The  fundamental  argument  is  nothing  of  the  sort.  There 
is  a  double  misrepresentation  of  Hamilton's  statement 
and  argument  iu  this :  (1)  He  is  not  speaking  at  all  of 
"  our  ideas  of  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute,"  but  of  our 
idea  (alleged)  of  the  Infinite  and  Absolute  as  one  notion, 
or  of  a  supposed  single  conception  of  Infinite  and  Ab- 
s<dute.  Ho  denies  the  unity  or  possible  unity  of  any 
such  notion.  And  (2)  he  denies  it  on  the  ground  that 
the  alleged  notion  is  not  only  a  fasciculus  of  negations 
but  of  contradictions,  and  that  accordingly  it  is  psycho- 
logically unreal,  a  mere  delusion. 

Cut  the  climax  of  misconception  is  still  to  be  realised. 

'  Ditcussions,  p.  17. 

«  Mill's  Examination,  p.  38  (1st  ed.)  In  the  4th  ed.,  p.  53,  the 
sentence  runs,  "are  purely  negative,  and  the  Unconditioned  which 
combines  the  two,  a  fasciculus  of  negations." 


MUVs  Criticism. 


233 


"  If  we  are  told,"  Mill  says,  "  that  there  is  some  one  Being 
who  is  or  which  is  The  Absolute, — not  something  absolute, 
but  the  absolute  itself, — the  proposition  can  be  understood 
in  no  other  sense  than  that  the  supposed  Being  possesses  in 
absolute  completeness  all  predicates :  is  absolutely  good  and 
absolutely  bad ;  absolutely  wise  and  absolutely  stupid ;  and 
so  forth.  The  conception  of  such  a  being — I  will  not  say  of 
such  a  God — is  worse  than  a  fasciculus  of  negations, — it  is 
a  fjisciculus  of  contradictions  ;  and  our  author  might  have 
spared  himself  the  trouble  of  proving  a  thing  to  be  unknow- 
able, which  cannot  be  spoken  of  but  in  words,  implying  the 
impossibility  of  its  existence."  * 

Clearly  here  "  The  Absolute  "  of  the  critic  is  meant  to 
stand  for  "  The  Unconditioned  "  of  Hamilton.  And  this 
latter  is  the  object  of  criticism.  But  would  not  any  one 
reading  this  suppose  that  Hamilton  had  only  alleged 
the  Unconditioned,  or  the  Absolute  thus  used  for  it,  to 
be  "a  fasciculus  of  negations;"  that  he  had  not  declared 
it  to  be  "  a  fasciculus  of  contradictions ;"  and  that  he  had 
on  other  grounds  than  that  it  is  a  fasciculus  of  contradic- 
tions sought  "  to  prove  "  it  unknowaljle  1  That  certainly 
is  the  impression  conveyed  by  the  critic,  and  apparently 
sought  to  be  conveyed;  but  it  is  false  in  every  partic- 
ular. Hamilton,  as  we  have  seen,  expressly  repudiated 
the  Unconditioned  or  the  Absolute,  on  the  ground  that 
when  properly  analysed  it  is  a  fasciculus  of  the  nega- 
tions of  the  conditioned  in  its  opposite  extremes, — that 
it  is  self-contradictory,  and  formally  illegitimate.  He 
gives  and  requires  no  further  proof  that  there  is  any 
being  corresponding  to  such  a  notion.  The  notion  itself 
is  psychologically  null. 

It  ought  further  to  be  observed  that  there  can  be  no 

1  Mill's  Examination,  p.  59. 


234 


Hamilton, 


greater  mistake  than  to  identify  Hamilton's  incondi- 
tionates  with  Kant's  nonmenon.  The  latter  is  supposed 
to  be  of  a  wholly  different  nature  from  the  ol)ject  of 
experience, — the  phcTnomenon.  It  is  incognisablft,  as 
existhig  in  and  by  itself,  without  any  relation  to  us, 
or  our  knowledge, — incapable,  in  fact,  of  predication 
on  our  part.  But  the  inconditionate, — say  an  infinite 
regress  of  time  or  phaenomena  in  time — an  absolute 
coinmencement  of  time  or  of  existence  in  time, — this  is 
not  an  object  of  a  wholly  different  kind  from  our  phaj- 
nomenal  eX'perience.  AVe  know  time  and  we  know 
phaenomena  in  time,  and  what  we  are  supposed  to  do 
in  the  infinite  regress  of  unconditioned  commencement 
of  these  is  to  carry  out  a  definite  concept  of  things  in 
experience  beyond  all  oar  actual  experience, — nay,  all 
our  possible  experience.  It  is,  in  fact,  to  seek  to  extend 
our  knowledge  of  the  actual  to  a  point  where  there  is  no 
experience,  but  still  to  connect  this  knowledge  with  our 
actual  experience,  so  as  to  make  up,  as  it  were,  the  whole 
of  it.  In  tnith,  the  inconditionates  of  Hamilton  come 
very  near  in  character  the  antinomies  of  Kant, — the 
pairs  of  so-called  contradictory  Ideas  in  regard  to  origin 
in  time,  limit  in  space,  freedom  and  causality,  contingent 
and  necessary  being;  while  the  treatment  of  them,  or 
solution  of  the  contradiction,  is  very  different  in  the  two 
cases. 

An  accurate  reading  of  Hamilton's  doctrine  might 
thus  have  saved  him  from  the  charge  of  "  creating  "  first 
of  all  "  a  fictitious  logical  entity," — an  absolute  reality, 
unconditioned,  unqualified,  existing  in  and  for  itself,  in- 
dependently of  any  mind  to  know  it,  and  then  with  say- 
ing that  consciousness  is  impotent,  or  has  an  inherent 


The  Irrelative  not  Meaningless. 


235 


inability  to  think  this  fiction.  This  is  neither  accurate 
nor  fair.  There  is  nothing  in  Hamilton's  statements  or 
reasonings  to  justify  this.  No  such  "  fictitious  logical 
entity "  was  created  by  Hamilton.  But  this  fiction  or 
fictitious  logical  entity  was  (as  it  is  now,  in  a  covert 
form)  the  basis  of  philosophical  theory,  and  of  very 
pretentious  philosophical  theory,  when  Hamilton  took  up 
the  question  of  the  Unconditioned ;  and  what  he  did  was 
not  to  create  a  fiction,  but  to  show  what  was  supposed 
to  be  a  reality,  and  the  ultimate  reality  of  things  to  be 
either  contradictory,  and  thus  a  fiction,  or  one  of  two 
inconceivable,  because  irrelative  alternatives.  Hamilton 
tore  off  the  cover  from  the  fiction  and  revealed  it  to  philo- 
sophical analysis.  To  state  the  matter  otherwise  is  simply 
to  reverse  the  work  of  his  philosophy.  It  is  odd  to  find 
a  man  represented  as  creating  what  he  abolished  as  an 
object  of  thought  at  all,  and  thus  an  impossible  object  of 
being. 

This  is  the  result  of  Hamilton's  analysis  of  "  the  Un- 
conditioned." But  while  this  is  so,  he  would  certainly 
have  objected  to  the  further  criticism  that  the  irrelative 
or  inconditionate  as  inconceivable  by  us  is  meaningless, 
and  can  therefore  have  nothing  corresponding  to  it  in 
existence.  The  irrelative  is  not  meaningless  thoudi 
inconceivable,  any  more  than  the  terms  of  the  contra- 
dictory are  meaningless.  We  know  what  a  wholly  self- 
limited  being  would  mean,  as  we  know  what  an  infin- 
itely non-limited  being  would  mean.  And  we  have  no 
right  whatever  to  deny  the  possibility  of  the  existence 
of  either  of  these  as  objects.  This  would  be  to  dogma- 
tise beyond  knowledge,  or  to  assume  the  convertibility 
of  actual  knowledge  and  existence.     It  is  only  of  the 


236 


Hamilton, 


contradictory  that  we  can  predicate  absolute  non-exist- 
ence, because  it  is  self-annihilating  in  thought.  The 
irrelative,  though  transcending  relative  knowledge,  is  at 
the  same  time  its  necessary  complement.  It  is  further 
forgotten  that  if  on  the  ground  of  the  meaninglessness 
of  the  irrelative,  no  predicate  is  possible  regarding  it, 
non-existence  itself  is  impossible.  The  proper  position 
is  non-determination,  or  saying  nothing  about  it. 

It  is  the  merit  of  Hamilton  that  he  analysed  the 
question  of  the  unconditioned,  and  showed  the  inherent 
absurdity  of  one  prevailing  sense  of  it,  while  he  pointed 
out  the  real  possibilities  in  the  case.  His  inconditionates 
are  simijly  the  forms  under  which  we  must  put  the 
(juestions  as  to  the  origin  of  the  world,  as  to  moral 
freedom,  and  GoiL  They  are  further  the  exclusively 
opposite  forms,  and  it  may  be  (piite  possible  to  deter- 
mine one  or  other  as  a  fact,  though  not  possible  to  do 
so  on  purely  speculative  grounds.  Hamilton  has  shown 
liimself  no  enemy  to  insight;  but  his  dialectic  is  the 
mortal  foe  of  non-sense. 

Mill,  as  we  have  seen,  misconceives  Hamilton's  funda- 
mental position  regarding  the  unconditioned.  His  at- 
tempt to  break  down  the  law  of  the  conditioned  itself  is  a 
signal  failure.  Mill  imagines  that  by  substituting  what 
lie  calls  "  a  concrete  reality,"  or  "  a  something "  for  the 
abstraction,  the  unconditioned,  Hamilton's  reasoning  for 
the  inconceivability  of  either  absolute  or  infinite  breaks 
down.i  He  has  at  length  got  to  admit  that  the  uncon- 
ditioned as  representing  one  being  is  self-contradictory, 
as  Hamilton  had  shown  it  to  be. 

The  gist  of  Mill's  argument  is,  that  "  we  know  the 

^  Ejcaminaticm,  p.  61. 


The  Infinite  and  Indefinite. 


237 


infinite  [in  the  concrete  or  something  infuiite]  as 
greater  than  anything  finite,  and  this  is  not  to  know  it 
as  finite."^  What  precisely  does  this  mean ?  Does  the 
phrase  mean  that  we  can  actually  conceive — at  once 
think  and  imagine  the  infinite  in  any  form — as  of  time, 
space,  degree — as  greater  than  anything  finite?  This  is 
simply  the  point  in  dispute.  What  Hamilton  alleges  is 
that  we  cannot  in  any  way  know  or  represent  to  our- 
selves such  an  object  of  thought.  A\^e  know  the  require- 
ments of  the  conception,  but  we  cannot  realise  it.  A 
space  greater  than  any  finite  space,  actually  conceived 
by  us,  is  what  is  denied  as  a  possilnlity ;  and  space  con- 
ceived as  greater  than  the  finite  space  of  a  given  act  or 
attempt  in  this  or  that  moment,  is  not  the  infinite  at  all, 
but  the  indefinite.  Is  it  meant  that  we  believe  space 
or  time,  the  infinite  in  any  form,  as  transcending  what 
we  actually  conceive,  or  transcending  the  finite  of  any 
given  knowledge?  This  is  admitted,  but  a  belief  that  in 
the  utmost  stretch  of  finite  thought  we  do  not  exhaust 
or  compass  the  infinity  of  the  object  thought,  is  an  ex- 
traordinary proof  that  we  do  know  this  infinity.  And 
what  is  the  phrase  really  but  a  statement  that  the  greater 
than  anything  finite  is  the  infinite  1  But  this  is  not  the 
infinite  at  all.  This  is  nothing  positively  realised  as 
utterly  or  actually  unlimited.  This  only  means  that 
wdien  we  have  got  the  length  of  any  the  utmost  finite, 
thoro  is  still  always  something  stretching  outwanls, 
al)ove,  and  beyond  it,  whatever  be  the  malter,  be  it  time, 
S])ace,  degree — in  which  we  seek  to  reahse  the  unlimited. 
Uliis,  of  course,  is  the  mere  indefinite.  Supposing  that 
we  had  compassed  the  utmost  finitude,  this  would  sim2% 

1  Examination,  p.  62. 


238 


Hamilton. 


be  tlie  absolutely  complete,  or  the  absolute  in  whatever 
form.  This,  again,  is  what  Hamilton  denies,  and  pro- 
perly denies,  in  regard  to  all  quantity,  time,  space,  or 
degree.  But  to  know  that  there  is  a  greater,  an  indefin- 
itely greater,  than  anything  we  reach,  is  simply  to  say 
that  any  quantum  we  can  compass  is  not  equal  to  all 
the  compassable.  The  infinite  is  simply  confused  with 
the  possibility  of  indefinite  progress,  and  this,  as  Ham- 
ilton points  out,  is  not  compassable  to  infinity,  unless 
on  the  condition  of  thought  working  always, — always 
tlirough  infinite  time 

Historically,  Hamilton's  theory  of  the  conditioned 
connected  itself  directly  with  that  portion  of  the  criti- 
cism of  Kant  in  which  he  dealt  with  the  Ideas  of  the 
lieason.  Through  this  Hamilton's  criticism  was  directed 
to  the  whole  subsequent  positions  of  Absolutism  in  Ger- 
many and  in  France.  If  liis  positions  be  well  founded, 
the  assumptions  and  the  methods  of  Fichtc,  Schelling, 
Hegel,  and  Cousin,  are  bad  intellectually,  as  they  are 
contradicted  morally  and  theologically,  on  grounds  as 
ultimate  as  anything  alleged  for  them  can  be. 

Kant  holds  that  "  the  Idea "  of  Eeason  is  more  than 
a  mere  negation  of  tlie  conditioned;  it  is  positively 
thought,  although  intuition  gives  us  no  object  corres- 
ponding to  it,  and  although  it  cannot  be  conceived  by  the 
understanding,  being  above  this, — in  fact,  merely  a  logical 
tendency  to  systematise  what  is  actually  conceivable. 
He  holds  further  that  "  the  Idea  "  gives  us  no  real  know- 
ledge,— that  it  is  a  necessary  and  inevitable  source  of 
illusion,  at  the  same  time  that  the  critical  method  is 
able  to  show  how  the  illusion  has  arisen ;  and  while  un- 
able to  destroy  the  fact  of  the  illusion,  can  yet  guard  us 


Kant's  Antinomies. 


239 


against  being  deceived  by  it.  In  the  case  of  the  Idea 
of  the  "  Ego  "  as  one,  simple,  indivisible,  existing  really 
anywhere,  or  in  our  consciousness,  as  there  more  than 
a  merely  logically  indivisible  synthetic  act,  he  professes 
to  show  that  while  Ileason  necessarily  leads  to  this  as 
a  positive  idea,  it  does  so  through  a  detectal^le  paralo- 
gism. We  mistake  in  fact  the  mere  universal  form  of 
all  consciousness  of  knowledge  for  us,  for  an  "Ego" 
subsisting  in  and  through  our  consciousness,  as  really 
one  and  indivisible,  while  we  truly  have  no  intuition 
of  this,  even  no  concept  of  it.  We  mistake  for  "a  real 
self,  as  it  exists  by  itself,  a  pluenomenon  only  given  to 
the  sensibility  of  this  to  us  unknown  being."  ^  The 
critical  method  shows  that  reason  naturally  and  neces- 
sarily mocks  us  with  "a  transcendental  illusion  of 
reality  where  there  is  no  reality." 

In  regard  to  the  cosmological  ideas,  these  are  truly 
and  absolutely  contradictory  antinomies.  Yet  they  are 
the  legitimate  product  of  Eeason.  We  have  the  posi- 
tive thought  (Idea)  of  a  commencement  of  the  world 
in  time,  a  first  absolutely  unconditioned,  and  we  have 
its  contradictory  in  infinite  non-commencement,  or  re- 
gress of  conditions.  We  have  the  contradictions  of  a 
limited  and  unlimited  world  in  space.  We  have  equal 
grounds  for  holding  that  the  world  is  composed  of 
simple  elements,  and  that  it  is  not ;  that  there  is  a  free 
or  unconditioned  cause,  a  first  cause,  and  that  all  is 
under  necessary  causation;  that  there  is  a  necessary 
Being  at  the  root  of  the  Universe,  and  that  there  is 
none,  nothing  but  the  order  of  things. 

Each  of  these,  thesis  and  antithesis,  can  be  supported 
1  Kritikf  Hart.,  p.  373;  MUUer,  vol.  ii.  p.  427. 


240 


Hamilton. 


by  equally  cogent  reasons,  from  the  very  nature  of 
Reason,  So  far,  then,  as  Reason  is  concerned,  it  is  the 
source  of  two  sets  of  propositions  regarding  the  highest 
objects  of  knowledge  which  are  mutually  subversive. 
A  first  cause,  and  no  first  cause ;  a  necessary  being  at 
the  root  of  the  universe,  and  none  such  :  these  pro- 
positions are  each  at  least  equally  possible,  equally 
supix)rted,  and  hence  Reason  is  self-contradictory  and 
discredited.  Xo  doubt  Kant  undertakes  to  show,  in  the 
case  of  the  two  firet  antinomies,  how  the  illusion  has 
arisen  :  that  we  mistake  phivnomena  for  things  in  them- 
selves ;  that  Ave  mistake  categorised  objects  of  perception, 
which  have  no  existence  outside  of  us,  for  things  tmly 
existing  outside  of  us;  that  we  thus  illegitimately  apply  to 
them  the  contradictory  predicates,  (definitely)  finite  and 
(definitely)  infinite,  whereas  these  have  no  true  applica- 
tion in  the  case.  1'he  things  to  which  we  apply  them 
l>eing  only  subjective  pluTnomena,  our  categorised  im- 
pressions or  ailections,  cannot  be  spoken  of  either  as 
finite  or  infinite.  They  have  a  quantity  only  in  our 
thought;  and  our  thouglit  never  rises  beyond  the  in- 
definite, that  is,  we  can  never  stay  in  the  regress  of 
time  at  a  pht^nomenon  that  does  not  imply  another 
phaenomenon  (condition)  beyond  it;  and  we  thus  can 
never  reach,  either  in  intuition  or  in  conception,  an 
al>solutely  first  in  the  series.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
can  never  actually  reach  the  infinite  series,  the  uncon- 
ditioned of  infinity,  and  we  mistake  this  necessity  of 
endless  regress  on  our  part  for  a  real  infinity.  But  all 
that  we  actually  reach  is  the  indefinite,  the  finite  and 
the  infinite  being  equally  inapplicable  to  the  regressive 
tendency  of  our  thought  dealing  with  mere  pha?nomena 


\ 


Kant  and  Hamilton. 


241 


of  our  own  consciousness,  constructed  by  ourselves,  and 
called  objects  of  external  intuition.  This  applies  also 
to  the  second  antinomy.  There  is,  in  a  word,  no 
real  infinite  regress  to  be  grasped:  all  that  exists  is 
what  we  constitute  in  thought  or  by  our  synthesis,  and 
this  is  merely  an  indefinite  approximation  to  an  ideal 
goal. 

The  third  antinomy  is  solved  by  the  supposition  of  an 
unconditioned  or  First  cause,  Free- Will,  as  noumenon, 
and  a  natural  necessary  causality  among  phsenomena  in 
the  world  of  experience.  As  the  phaenomenal  world  is 
really  nothing,  has  no  subsistence,  real  freedom  is  pos- 
sible. There  is  a  twofold  causation  at  work,  but  only 
one  is  real. 

The  fourth  antinomy  is  solved  much  in  the  same  way. 
In  time  all  is  conditioned  or  determined  by  what  went 
before,  but  above  time  there  may  possibly  exist  a  neces- 
sary Being.  There  is  necessary  determination  in  time, 
alongside  Absolute  or  Unconditioned  Being  above  it. 
Here,  too,  there  are  two  sorts  of  causes  at  work ;  but, 
as  phsenomena  exist  only  in  consciousness,  the  infinite 
regress  is  only  in  appearance,  a  law  of  thought,  not  of 
things.  The  phtenomena  may  have  a  first  imconditioned 
cause,  provided  it  be  in  the  intelligible  world,  and  exer- 
cise only  intelligible  causality,  which  does  not  touch 
time  or  space. 

The  Ideal  of  Reason,  God,  is  treated  as  simply  a  per- 
sonification ;  and  the  proofs  of  His  reality  as  an  object 
are,  as  is  well  known,  summarily  set  aside  by  the  critical 
method. 

Hamilton  holds  that  his  doctrine  diff'ers  from  Kant's, 
in  that 

P. — VI.  ft 


242 


Hamilton. 


"  our  faculties  are  sliown  to  Le  weak,  not  deceitful.  The 
luind  is  not  represented  as  conceiving  two  propositions,  sub- 
versive of  each  other,  as  et^ually  possible  ;  but  only  as  un- 
able to  understand  as  possible  either  of  the  two  extremes  ; 
t)ne  of  which,  however,  on  the  ground  of  their  mutual  repug- 
nance, it  is  compelled  to  recognise  as  true."  ^ 

What  Kant  regards  as  positive  Ideas,  clothing  his 
unaccomplished  hypotheses  in  Platonic  nomenclature, 
Hamilton  views  as  mere  negations  of  the  conceivable 
or  conditioned,  and,  therefore,  as  incapable  of  gi-ound- 
ing  contradictory  propositions  equally  possible,  or  being 
supported  by  two  contradictory  trains  of  reasoning 
equally  valid.  He  holds  that  we  are  only  unable  to 
understand  as  possible  either  of  the  extremes,  one  of 
which,  on  the  ground  of  their  mutual  rej^ugnance,  we 
are  compelled  to  "recognise  as  true."^  Qiu*  faculties 
are  weak,  not  deceitful.  He  thus  avoids  the  obligation 
of  solving  the  contradictions  involved  in  an  actual 
thought  of  the  Unconditioned,  or  Infinite,  or  Absolute. 
The  Unconditioned  is  not  a  positive  thought  at  all,  but 
the  negation  simply  of  positive  thought  as  Conditioned 
or  Relative.  In  it  you  transcend  the  positive  sphere  of 
thought,  and  your  "  Ideas  "  are  merely  negations  hypos- 
tatised. 

Hamilton  has  thus  no  need  to  have  recourse  to  "  trans- 
cendental idealism,"  or  the  assertion  of  the  entire  sub- 
jectivity of  the  perceived  world,  a  piece  of  dogmatism 
which  is  even  incompatible  with  the  critical  method 
itself.  He  has  no  need  further  to  admit  the  contradic- 
tories in  the  first  two  antinomies  as  valid,  if  the  perceived 
world  in  time  or  space,  or  any  world  in  time  or  space, 

1  Discussions,  p.  15.  s  jn^i^ 


The  Critical  Method. 


243 


be  allowed  to  be  self-subsisting.  For  Kant's  solution 
fails  the  moment  you  hold  even  an  unperceived  but 
inferred  substantial  reality  in  time  or  space,  different 
from  and  beyond  the  subjective  affection  clothed  in 
category.  It  fails,  in  fact,  to  save  Reason  from  absolute 
contradiction  on  every  recognised  view  of  the  external 
world  save  his  own,  that  is,  save  one  view  that  has 
neither  jjsychology  nor  anything  but  an  unanalysed 
tradition  in  favour  of  its  essential  assumption. 

The  critical  method  professes  to  be  different  from  the 
dogmatical.  How  so?  It  professes  to  criticise  the 
proof  of  the  Ideas,  viz.,  an  Ego,  a  real-Ego,  anywhere  in 
the  universe  or  in  human  consciousness, — a  beginning, 
an  infinite  regress,  or  a  creator.  It  says,  in  result,  we 
cannot  affirm  any  one  of  these  things.  Reason  is  para- 
lysed ;  there  is  a  paralogism,  or  an  annihilation  through 
contradictories,  tlie  cosmological  antinomies.  Is  this 
really  different  from  dogmatism?  In  no  way  whatever. 
The  critical  method  proceeds  on  principles,  and  on  an 
alleged  representation  of  the  ultimate  principles  of  human 
reason.  How  otherwise  can  it  correct  the  aberrations 
of  Reason  1  If  its  assumption  of  the  ground  principles 
is  coiTect,  it  is  not  merely  critical,  but  absolute  and  dog- 
matical If  not,  it  is  not  even  critical,  or  worthy  of 
being  spoken  of  as  validly  critical  or  anything  else. 
The  Reason,  after  the  utmost  that  can  be  said  for  it 
in  the  way  of  correcting,  or  opening,  our  eyes  to  the 
necessary  illusions  wath  which  it  mocks  us,  is  still  essen- 
tially a  faculty  of  illusion — in  fact,  of  deceit.  It  is  so 
in  regard  to  the  highest  possible  objects  of  human  intel- 
ligence and  interest, — Self,  Liberty,  and  God.  If  there 
"be   essential  contradiction   inherent  in   the   Reason  in 


241 


Hamilton, 


regard  to  any  one  of  the  forms  of  the  Unconditioned, 
c>ur  whole  intelligence  is  discredited,  and  the  Practical 
lieason  cannot  after  that  be  regarded  as  trustworthy. 
Hamilton's  position,  on  the  other  hand,  is  that  as  irrel- 
ative these  objects  cannot  be  positively  thought,  and 
regarded  as  positive  ideas  in  Reason ;  while  as  contra- 
dictorv  extremes  one  or  other  must  be  held  to  be  real. 
AVliich  of  them  is  so,  falls  to  be  determined  by  consid- 
erations drawn  from  our  actual  experience,  intellectual 
and  moral. 

T(j  this  it  may  be  added  that  the  doctrine  at  the  root 
of  the  whole  theory  of  the  Conditioned,  of  a  conscious 
self,  really  one,  simple,  identical,  in  and  through  the 
succession  of  the  facts  of  consciousness,  is  a  wholly 
different  view  from  anything  found  in  Kant.  What 
Kant  demands  as  the  ultimate  a  lyrlorl  condition  of 
knowledge  is  a  synthetic  act  of  self- consciousness  or 
apperception ;  and  he  clearly  holds  that  we  have  no 
grounds  in  this  to  assert  an  Ego,  one,  simple,  indivisi- 
ble anywhere  in  the  universe,  or  even  "  in  the  think- 

The  "  I "  of  Kant  is  but  the  factor 


mg  consciousness. 


in  a  statiB  of  consciousness,  logically  one  and  indivis- 
ible, but  not  capable  of  being  regarded  as  really  one 
ami  the  same.  In  every  representation  there  is  an  "  I," 
but  it  is  not  necessarily  the  same  subsisting  "I."  All 
that  is  demanded  is  an  "  I "  logically  or  generically  the 
same  in  every  succeeding  act.  This  is  the  universal  con- 
dition of  the  possibility  of  knowledge.  This  synthetic 
act  can  readily  be  shown  to  be  a  mere  contradictory  as- 
sumption,— the  assumption  of  an  act  without  an  agent, 
— the  assumption  of  unity  in  modification  without  a  one 
being  modified, — a  secondary  and  derivative  abstraction 


KanCs  Bodriiu  of  the  Ego, 


245 


from  a  fact  of  experience  for  which  it  is  substituted, 
and  which  it  is  adduced  to  discredit.  Of  course  no  one 
need  contend  for  a  contentless  Ego  up  in  cloudland, 
transcending  all  thought  and  consciousness, — a  by  itself 
existing  Ego, — and  postulated  as  one  and  indivisible. 
This  is  a  mere  chimera  of  a  perverse  and  preposterous 
abstraction.  The  Ego  one  and  indivisible,  for  which  we 
need  to  contend,  is  the  one  Ego  of  our  actual  conscious- 
ness, one  amid  its  successive  modifications  or  diff'erences. 
This,  I  maintain,  Kant  does  not  give  us,  and  cannot 
consistently  give  us.  He  cannot  get  beyond  mere  ground- 
less logical  relation.  He  denies  this  Ego  as  an  object 
alike  of  intuition  and  conception;  and  in  so  doing  he 
saps  the  ground  of  every  philosophy,  his  own  structure 
among  the  rest. 

In  this  synthetic  act,  divorced  from  a  personal  Ego, — 
from  the  Ego  of  consciousness, — reduced  to  a  mere  co- 
factor  in  passing  conscious  modifications,  and  in  the  only 
Ego,  postulated  as  an  Idea,  being  a  transcendent  object, 
which  is  not  known  even  to  be  "a  thinking  being," — 
we  see  the  germ  of  8ul)sequent  absolutist  developments. 
There  is  the  suggestion  of  the  "  pure  Ego  "  of  Eichte,  and 
the  "infinite  Ego"  of  others,  both  empty  abstractions 
baptised  as  the  true  and  only  real,  and  credited  with  the 
power  of  working  out  the  universe.  Matter,  Mind,  and 
God,  in  defiance  of  all  laws  of  intelligibility  and  fact. 
Subsequent  absolutism  is  a  mere  wheeling  round  of 
Kantianism.^  Kant  ends  in  vacuOy  where  consciousness 
and  knowledge  perish;  the  system-mongers  who  have 
followed  him  have  conceived  the  sublime  idea  of  com- 
mencing where  he  ended.     Kant  thought  he  descried 

^  Kritik,  Hart. :  Midler ^  vol.  ii.  p.  329. 


DIG 


Hamilton. 


247 


from  afar  tlio  land  of  tho  unconditioned,  as  something 
on  the  limits  of  real  knowledge,— the  little  world  of 
sensation  and  its  coherent  requisites.      In  tins  he  was 
comparatively  cautious  and  harmless,  though  not  illu- 
minative.    Others  since  his  time  have  made  tliis  uncon- 
ditioned the  starting-point,  even  the  all  in  all,  of  know- 
ledge and  reality,— with  this  among  other  resiUts,  that 
the  passing  generations  of  individuals  are  as  "children 
of  the  mist,"  baptised  "the  universal,"  out  of  which  in 
spectral  forms  they  appear  in  time,  and  into  which  again 
they  disai)pear  and  are  dissolved.    But  it  is  these  systems 
which  will  have  their  little  day.      Human  experience 
and  human  history  have  always  proved  too  strong  in  the 
end  for  contradictory  paradox  and  abstraction. 


CHAPTEE    XT. 

THE   COXDITIOXED    AXD    THE    UXCOXDITIOXEn — HAMILTON 
AXD    COUSIX — FICHTE,    SCHELLING,    HEGEL. 

There  are  other  doctrines  of  the  absolute  more  positive 
than  that  of  Kant,  and  we  can  now  see  how  Hamilton 
deals  with  theories  alleging  either  a  conception  or  a 
knowledge  of  being  called  absolute  or  infinite,  or  the 
absoluto-infinite.  It  is  his  pre-eminent  merit  to  have 
analysed  those  words  ahsolute^  iv finite,  unconditioned, 
and  to  have  shown  precisely  what  they  mean,  and  must 
mean,  either  as  representing  one  being,  or  as  predicates 
of  being  in  any  form.  A  knowledge  of  being,  a  concept 
of  being,  called  absolute  or  infinite,  is  alleged.  Hamilton's 
question  at  once  emerges, — What  precisely  do  you  mean 
by  this  so-called  object  of  thoughts  Is  it  a  one,  a 
unit  embodying  both  the  inconditionates,  the  uncon- 
ditional negation  of  limitation,  the  infinite,  or  the  un- 
conditional affirmation  of  limitation,  the  absolute — i.e., 
the  finished,  perfected,  completed — what  is  out  of  rela- 
tion,— the  simple  contradictory  of  the  infinite  1  This 
would  be  named  the  absoluto-infinite.  If  there  be  a 
concept  of  this,  if  there  be  a  positive  and  real  knowledge 
of  existence  in  its  all-comprehensive  unity,  and  if  the 


248 


Hamilton, 


Cousin^s  Position. 


249 


terms  Absolute,  Infinite,  Unconditioned,  be  employed 
to  denote  this  unit  of  existence,  this  Deity,  if  you 
choose,  then  the  upholder  is  bound  to  prove  that  his 

"one  corresponds,  either  with  that  Unconditioned  which 
we  have  distinguished  as  the  absolute,  or  with  that  Uncon- 
ditioned which  we  have  distinguished  as  the  Infinite,  or 
that  it  includes  both,  or  that  it  excludes  both." 

Hamilton's  charge  against  the  upholders  of  this  know- 
ledge is  that  they  have  not  done  this,  and  have  never 
attempted  to  do  it.  And  what  he  further  urges  is  that 
neither  under  the  so-called  concept  of  the  uncondi- 
tioned as  the  sum  of  absolute  and  infinite,  as  the  fusion 
of  tlie  two  in  their  distinctive  comprehension,  nor 
under  either  extreme,  absolute  or  infinite,  can  they  get 
a  positive  concept  or  knowledge  of  existence  as  one. 
The  one  alleged  to  be  conceived  or  known  cannot  be 
the  identity  of  the  two  contradictory  notions,  absolute 
and  infinite,  and  it  can  as  little  be  the  exclusion 
of  both.  These  are  the  alternatives,  the  dilemmatic 
disjunctions,  which  Hamilton  presents  to  absolutism 
in  any  form;  and  these  are  the  positions  ^vhich  must 
be  assailed  and  abolished  ere  we  can  affirm  that  we  have 
a  knowledge  of  being  as  one,  of  being  in  its  all-com- 
prehending unity,  as  the  abolition  and  yet  the  absorj)- 
tion  of  the  duality  or  difierence  actually  found  in  our 
experience. 

2n^ow  there  are  two  ways  of  assailing  those  positions, 
and  but  two  ways.  The  one  of  these  is  represented  by 
Cousin,  and  by  writers  since  his  time,  who  unconsciously 
adopt  his  line  and  method.  The  other  mode  is  repre- 
sented by  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel. 

AVhat,  then,  is  Cousin's  position?  and  how  does  he 


vindicate  it  ?  We  shall  take  this  first,  not  because  it 
was  so  historically,  but  because  it  is  necessary  to  clear 
the  ground  for  the  purely  absolutist  theories.  Cou- 
sin's position  is  simply  this,  that  in  our  consciousness, 
or  ordinary  conscious  experience,  under  the  laws  of  our 
actual  Understanding  or  Thought,  we  can  not  only  con- 
ceive, but  know,  and  know  immediately  as  an  exist- 
ing object,  what  is  called,  without  precision,  the  infinite, 
or  absolute,  or  unconditioned  being. 

The  first  vice  of  this  doctrine  is  the  non-discrimina- 
tion of  the  object,  called  absolute  or  infinite.  It  is  not 
identified  either  with  the  unconditioned  proper,  or  with 
either  of  its  species,  the  inconditionates,  absolute  or 
infinite.  The  former  alternative  would  be  a  violation  of 
intelligibility  itself,  for  the  supposed  object  as  a  unity 
of  thought  would  be  self-contradictory. 

Secondly,  the  identification  of  this  object  either  with 
the  absolute  or  the  infinite  is  impossible  under  the  laws 
of  consciousness,  or  intelligence  in  general.  Cousin 
liimself  allows  that  "the  condition  of  intelligence  is 
clifference ;  and  an  act  of  knowledge  is  only  possible 
where  there  exists  a  plurality  of  terms."  This  Hamilton 
holds  to  be  true ;  and  hence  he  argues  that  it  is  both 
incorrect  and  inconsistent  for  Cousin  to  hold  the  alleged 
knowledge.  Under  such  conditions  there  is  neither  a 
knowledge  nor  a  notion  even  of  absolute  being  in  any 
form.  This  implies  the  negation  of  diff'erence  and 
plurality ;  and  we  can  know  only  as  we  distinguish  our- 
selves from  the  object  in  the  act  of  knowledge,  know, 
therefore,  only  what  is  relative.  The  only  immediate 
result  is  a  contradiction.  For  the  absolute  as  known, 
and  the  absolute  as  existing,  are  admitted  to  be  one, 


250 


Hamilton. 


identical.  But  the  absolute,  as  known  by  an  intelligenco 
which  always  necessarily  distinguishes  itself  from  its 
object,  is  different  from  the  absolute  whose  essence  is 
unity.  We  have,  then,  the  contradiction  on  such  a 
scheme  of  two  objects,  each  called  absolute. 

Further,  supposing  that  there  is  a  distinction  between 
knowledge  and  existence,  the  absolute  as  known  must 
still  bo  known  as  absolute  imitv.  This  is  the  condition 
or  hypothesis  of  its  existence  at  alL  As  such,  the  so- 
called  absolute  known  must  be  identified  either  with  the 
subject  knowing,  the  object  known,  or  with  the  indiffer- 
ence of  both.  As  identified  either  with  subject  or  with 
object,  it  is  contradistinguished  from  the  object,  or 
from  the  subject ;  it  is  no  longer  a  unity,  a  one  being, 
but  a  simple  relative.  The  third  supposition,  that  the 
absolute  is  identical  with  the  neutrum  or  indiff'erence 
of  the  subject  and  object  of  knowledge,  abolishes  the 
admitted  condition  of  intelligence  which  says  that  only 
in  this  distinction  of  subject  or  object  is  knowledge 
possible.  Holding,  in  a  word,  the  distinction  of  self 
and  not-self  in  knowledge,  we  cannot  know,  cannot 
conceive,  that  all-comprehending  unity  named  Absolute 
Being. 

Hamilton,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  observe,  meant  by 
the  absolute  being  known  under  the  condition  of  the 
plurality  of  intelligence,  that  it  could  not  be  known  as 
the  only  thing,  as  the  only  being,  all-comprehensive 
of  reality.  For  this  condition  of  intelligence  always 
supposes  the  knower  known  along  with  it,  and  distin- 
guished from  it.  There  is  always,  therefore,  something 
out  of  the  absolute  or  object  known,  and  this  is  thus 
never  wholly  or  absolutely  one — complete,  perfect,  fin- 


Thc  Absolute  as  One. 


251 


ished  in  itself, — an  all-embracing  unity.  He  had  no 
need  whatever  to  contend  for  the  utterly  inept  position, 
as  Mill  supposes,^  that  the  absolute  qua  absolute  is  in 
itself  plural.  Moreover,  plurality  in  the  absolute  itself 
is  in  no  way  inconsistent  with  its  imity  or  oneness,  as 
comprehending  all  existence.  The  absolute,  as  soul, 
might  contain  a  plurality  which  did  not  imply  outward 
difference  or  distinction,  or  an  Ego  along  with  it  and 
contradistinguished  from  it.  But  Hamilton's  argument 
did  not  in  the  least  require  him  to  refer  to  this,  nor  does 
he.  He  speaks  only  and  correctly  of  the  incompatibility 
of  absolute  unity  in  knowledge,  if  subject  and  object 
be  always  conceived  as  different  existences,  as  two  or 
plural.  If  the  knower  and  the  known  be  necessarily 
thought  as  different,  the  thought  of  wliat  is  absolutely 
one,  or  a  being  absolutely  one  and  all-comprehensive, 
is  impossible,  inconceivable  and  unknowable.  That  is 
the  sum  and  point  of  his  argument;  and  of  this  his 
critic  has  not  got  a  glimpse. 

But  there  is  another  essential  point  in  the  doctrine  of 
Cousin.  This  is  the  link  by  which  he  seeks  to  connect 
the  absolute  with  the  relative  or  conditioned.  The 
deduction  of  the  relative  from  the  absolute  is  an  in- 
soluble problem  on  any  scheme  of  absolutism,  be  it 
that  of  Fichte,  Schelling,  or  HegeL  But  Cousin  seeks 
to  bridge  the  gulf  by  identifying  the  absolute  with  a 
certain  relation,  by,  in  fact,  conditioning  it,  making 
it  a  relative.  He  defines  the  absolute  as  an  "  absolute 
cause — a  cause  which  cannot  but  pass  into  act."  This, 
according  to  Hamilton,  is  suicidal.  (1.)  It  defines  by 
relation  and  conditions  that  which  can  be  only  as  exclu- 

A  Examination,  p.  64. 


252 


Hamilton, 


give  of  both.  This  is  simply  playing  fast  and  loose  with 
words.  What  exists  absolutely— that  is,  not  under  rela- 
tion; total,  self-complete,  and  what  exists  absolutely 
as  a  cause — such  as  cannot  but  pass  into  act, — are  con- 
tradictory notions.  This  is  to  deny  all  relation  j  and  to 
affirm  one  in  the  same  thing  or  object 

(2.)  What  exists  merely  as  a  cause,  exists  merely  for 
the  sake  of  something  else.  In  this  it  reaches  its  per- 
fection, its  completeness. 

(3.)  What  exists  necessarily  as  a  cause,  is  to  that  ex- 
tent not  all-sufficient  to  itself;  and  what  exists  abso- 
lutely as  a  cause,  exists  in  absolute  dependence  on  the 
effect  for  its  reality.  Such  a  cause  exists  only  in  its 
effects.  This  is  really  a  thing  becommg,  or  seeking  to 
be,  developing  into  reality. 

But,  (4.)  this  is  to  subject  the  Deity,  identified  with 
the  Absolute,  to  a  necessity — a  necessity  of  self-manifes- 
tation identical  with  the  creation  of  the  universe,  and  to 
subvert  the  fundamental  postulate  of  a  divine  nature. 
A  Being  existing  only  as  it  acts  to  produce  what  is  ex- 
ternal to  itself,  and  necessarily  so  acts,  is  no  God.  This 
is  a  limited,  restricted  being,  in  itself  imperfect,  not 
even  real,  unless  in  its  effect. 

One  of  the  worst  of  Mill's  misconceptions  of  Hamilton 
comes  out  here.     He  actually  puts  this  question — 

"  Why  is  M.  Cousin  under  an  obligation  to  think  that  if 
the  absolute,  or,  to  speak  plainly,  God,  is  only  known  to  us 
in  the  character  of  a  cause,  He  must  exist  only  as  a  cause  \ " 

This  question  would  have  had  some  relevancy  if  Cousin 
had  admitted  his  absolute  or  Deity  to  be  or  be  known 
as  anything  else  than  a  cause,  and  a  necessary  one.    This 


Criticism  of  Cousin. 


253 


is  the  assumption  which  Hamilton  challenged.  As  put 
by  Mill,  it  is  an  irrelevant  question.  The  absolute 
of  Cousin — that  which  is  all -being  and  one  being — 
is  defined  by  him  as  that  "  which  cannot  but  pass  into 
act,"  cannot  but  pass  into  the  creation  which  is,  and  is 
his  manifestation.  This  is  his  essential  nature,  his  being. 
And  thus,  if  the  absolute,  whatever  it  be  called,  be,  as 
Cousin  says  it  is,  only  as  it  is  cause,  and  cause  of  a 
definite  effect,  this  object  exists  only  as  cause  and  this 
cause,  and  nothing  more.  The  necessity  of  causation 
under  which  Cousin  places  the  object,  identifies  and 
restricts  it  to  the  single  manifestation  or  relationship. 
It  has  no  choice,  no  freedom,  no  reserve  of  power. 
There  is  no  personality  with  a  free  alternative.  It  must 
act  and  be,  exactly  as  it  is,  and  only  as  it  is.  Creation 
is  a  necessity,  and  God  is  the  necessity  of  creation.  He 
is  as  He  creates,  and  as  He  does  create,  nothing  else  or 
other.  An  absolute  and  necessary  cause  is  only  as  it 
causes,  and  causes  in  one  way.  That  is  why  Hamilton 
says,  this  being,  if  God,  must  exist  merely  as  a  cause,  and 
thus  as  an  imperfect,  inchaotic,  thing, — a  becoming  wait- 
ing for  its  development  and  reality, — a  thing  that  must 
not  only  be  what  is,  but  must  be  everything  that  is. 

Cousin's  position,  that  of  naming  a  particular  relation 
— ^viz.,  causality,  the  absolute,  and  regarding  the  cause 
us  necessarily  determined  to  act,  has  been  taken  up  again 
in  these  times,  with  little  or  no  apprehension  of  its 
inconsequences,  and  its  utter  insufficiency  to  express  the 
nature  of  a  Deity.  Such  a  conception  is  in  no  proper 
sense  absolute  and  infinite,  nor  is  it  the  absolute  or  the 
infinite.  It  is  simply  a  narrow  and  rigid  limitation  of 
Power  to  a   given   definite  issue,  that  which  actually 


254 


Hamilton, 


Schcllitu/, 


255 


comes  out  of  it,  presumably  our  experience.  Specula- 
tively, this  conception  is  imworthy  of  God ;  morally,  it 
is  destructive  of  a  God  altogether.  For  where  there  is 
necessary  determination  to  a  given  issue,  there  is  nothing 
infinite ;  where  there  is  no  choice,  not  necessitating  even 
intelligence,  there  is  nothing  moral.  This  is  simply 
Fate ;  and  even  if  it  be  supposed  conscious  in  the  pro- 
cess, this  would  not  elevate  it,  but  reveal  to  itself  its 
own  limitation  and  degradation. 

And  what  is  more  and  worse,  this  absolute  cause 
imder  an  absolute  necessity  of  manifestation,  a  neces- 
sity M'hich  extends  over  its  whole  nature,  must  issue  in 
another  absolute,  as  full  and  complete  a  form  of  being 
as  itself;  and  then  you  have  the  contradiction  of  two 
absolutes,  the  one  the  cause  or  author  of  the  other,  in 
succession.  Or  if  the  former  has  not  perished  in  the  act 
of  creation,  the  two  absolutes,  forsooth,  exist  in  correla- 
tion. Fui'ther,  if  the  resulting  universe  be  regarded  as 
finite,  the  act  of  creation  is  also  finite ;  and  God  is  not 
thought  as  infinite.  Or  if  the  universe  be  held  infinite, 
it  is  the  effect  of  a  finite  Creator, — an  obvious  contra- 
diction. "What  more  is  needed  to  show  that  we  have 
got  beyond  sense  and  intelligibility,  and  that  all  this 
so-called  rationalistic  dogmatism  is  pure  verbalism? 

The  lowest  form  of  this  theory  is  reached  when  we 
have  the  infinite  and  finite  set  up,  not  simply  as  limit- 
ing correlatives,  but  as  existing,  or  real,  each  through 
the  other.  Here  each  is  only  as,  and  if  the  other, 
is;  each  depends  for  its  reality  on  that  of  the  other; 
and  the  two  vacuous  entities  in  synthesis  make  the 
real  This  hollow  relationship,  or  relativity  2>^  «e,  is 
the  infinite,  or  all  we  can  get  for  it.     This  is  the  see-saw 


theory  of  Being.  The  name  is  preserved,  the  reality 
is  gone;  neither  the  one  term  baptised  God,  nor  the 
other  baptised  man,  truly  is.  Tliis  is  worse  than  Cousin's 
Absolute  Cause ;  for  it  sought  to  hold  by  a  real  cause 
working  to  a  real  effect ;  but  this  in  mere  illusory  rela- 
tionship sniks  God  in  man,  and  man  in  God ;  each  may 
be  interpreted  in  terms  of  the  other ;  they  have  no  dis- 
tinctive reality  whatever ;  cannot  be  discriminated,  and 
cannot  thus  be  known  in  any  form  of  individuality 
or  personality.  This  is  the  absolute  of  relativity,  the 
mere  mirage  of  realit}^,  whether  finite  or  infinite. 

But  this  mode  of  reaching  absolute  existence  repre- 
sented by  Cousin  has  been  repudiated  by  the  philosophers 
of  the  purely  absolutist  type.  They  would  admit  the 
force  of  the  criticism,  which  excludes  the  knowledge  of 
it  from  reflective  consciousness,  and  yet  maintaui  that 
it  is  cognisable,  if  not  conceivable.  This,  in  Hamilton's 
view,  is  Schelling's  position,  and  it  is  vu'tually  the  posi- 
tion of  Fichte  and  HegeL  Schelling's  doctrine  is  the 
one  specially  selected  by  Hamilton  for  criticism. 

"Schelling  holds  that  there  is  a  capacity  of  knowledge 
above  consciousness,  and  higher  than  the  understanding,  and 
this  knowledge  is  competent  to  human  reason  as  identical 
with  the  Absolute  itself.  In  this  act  of  knowledge— which, 
after  Fichte,  he  calls  the  Intellectual  Intuition — there  exists 
no  distinction  of  subject  and  object, — no  contrast  of  know- 
ledge and  existence  ;  all  difference  is  lost  in  mere  difference, 
all  plurality  in  simple  unity.  The  intuition  itself— Reason 
and  the  Absolute— are  identified.  The  Absolute  exists  only  as 
known  by  Reason ;  and  Reason  knows  oiJy  as  being  itself 
the  Absolute."  i 

To   this   Hamilton  objects — first,  that   the   so-called 

1  Discussions,  p.  20. 


256 


Hamilton. 


absolute  is  an  abstraction  or  point  of  indiiference  reached 
by  annihilating  the  subject  and  object  of  consciousness 
alike.  It  is  not  absolute  existence,  but  absolute  priva- 
tion. Secondly,  that  by  no  process  possible  to  intelligence 
can  relative  or  conditioned  being  be  shown  to  be  evolved 
from  this  absolute  being  or  stage  of  indifference.  It  is 
impossible  to  connect  the  state  of  intuition  or  clairvoy- 
ance above  consciousness  with  the  state  of  consciousness 
itself,  by  memory.  And  the  philosopher,  while  personal 
and  conscious,  writing  or  speaking  of  this  absolute  above 
personal  individuality  and  consciousness,  deals  only  with 
empty  words. ^ 

Here  it  should  be  observed  that  Hamilton's  criticism 
of  Schelling  does  not  necessarily  suppose  the  truth  of 
his  own  pecidiar  doctrine  of  the  Conditioned,  or  theory 
of  the  derivation  of  the  laws  of  Relative  Knowledge. 
All  that  he  proceeds  upon  is  the  universal  principle  of  a 
Self  and  not-Self,  or  subject  and  object,  in  knowledge. 
It  is  indifferent  to  his  criticism  of  Absolutism,  whether 
the  principle  be  a  positive  law  of  thought,  or  one  derived 
from  the  impossibility  of  thinking  either  subject  per  so 
or  object  ^jcr  se.  If  the  law  be  admitted,  whatever  its 
grounds,  the  criticism  of  Schelling's  position  is  vahd. 

This  duaUsm  of  Hamilton  excludes  the  possibility  of 
any  absolute  doctrine  whatever  as  matter  of  thought. 
With  Fichte  he  has  not  dealt  expressly  or  at  length. 
But  the  application  is  obvious.  Fichte^s  absolute  Ego, 
which  is  above  our  consciousness,  and  therefore  tran- 
scends the  distinction  of  an  Ego  and  non-Ego,  is  for 
Hamilton  unthinkable.  No  mere  or  pure  Ego,  that  is, 
something  which  is  neither  Ego  nor  non-Ego,  yet  capable 

1  Discussions,  pp.  22,  23, 


Hegel. 


257 


of  developing  into  both,  can  be  regarded  as  matter  of 
thought  in  any  form.  Abstraction  being  made  of  the 
Ego  and  non-Ego  of  consciousness,  the  residuum  called 
the  Absolute  is  simply  zero,  a  void  term,  and  can  form 
the  ground  of  no  reasonable  philosopliical  theory  within 
the  sphere  of  consciousness. 

The  same  line  of  criticism  applies  to  Hegel.  It  is 
obvious  that  if  conscious  thought  be  possible  only  under 
the  conditions  of  plurality  and  difference,  and  a  Self  and 
a  not-Self,  as  contrasted  yet  independent  relatives  in  the 
very  moment  of  the  contrast,  any  conception  such  as 
that  called  Pure  Being  or  Pure  Thought  or  Idea  in  its 
potential  form  is  utterly  incognisable.  Belation  and  dif- 
ference, in  object  and  act  of  knowledge  alike,  have  dis- 
appeared ;  and  the  residuum  as  incognisable,  is  incapable 
of  forming  the  basis  of  any  dialectical  movement,  imma- 
nent or  other.  This  pure  or  unconditioned  being  is  as 
such  the  undifferenced.  There  is  therefore  no  discrimina- 
tion of  self  and  object ;  they  are  as  yet  one,  or  rather  there 
is  neither  the  one  nor  the  other ;  yet  this  is  thought  or 
knowledge.  Xow  no  such  thought  or  knowledge  is  pos- 
sible to  our  consciousness.  There  cannot  be  a  state  of 
conscious  thought  or  knowledge  in  which  I  am  as  against 
an  object,  and  in  which  also  I  am  not  as  against  an 
object.  No  thought  of  mine  can  unite  in  one  the  per- 
sonal and  the  impersonal, — can  hold  me  in  being,  and 
being  that  is  not  yet  discriminated  as  me  and  not  me. 
There  is  here  not  a  transcending  of  consciousness  merely; 
there  is,  in  the  very  statement  of  the  cognisability  of  the 
object,  a  felo  de  se, — a  suhversio  principii, — as  much  as 
in  a  doubt  of  the  act  of  consciousness  itself.  Conscious- 
ness, thought,  knowledge,  have  ceased  to  have  meaning 

P.— VI.  R 


258 


Hamilton. 


for  us  the  moment  the  relation  of  contrast  between  Self 
ami  not-Self,  subject  and  object,  has  been  obliterated  or 
abstracted  from.  Ko  method  of  dialectical  verbalism  can 
ever  on  such  a  })asis  restore  consciousness  to  itself. 

The  deduction  of  certain  of  the  necessary  laws  of 
thought, — esj^ecially  Causality  and  Substance, — from  the 
doctrine  of  tlie  Conditioned  is  an  important  point  in  the 
philosophy  of  Hamilton.  He  holds  that  the  necessity 
we  are  under  of  thinking  every  jihsenomenon  we  appre- 
hend as  tlie  quality  of  something  out  of  relation,  and 
as  such  absolute  and  imknowable,  —  the  known  pha3- 
nomenon  of  an  unknown  substance, — arises  on  the  one 
hand  from  an  impotency  on  our  part  to  think  mere  sub- 
stance, substance  j>er  se^ — that  is,  irrelative  being;  and 
on  the  other,  from  an  impotency  to  think  a  pha^nomenon 
as  such  and  nothing  more — that  is,  the  relative  as  abso- 
lutely relative, — tlie  relative  per  se.  Try  to  think  sub- 
stance per  se,  and  you  cannot ;  you  at  once  and  neces- 
sarily clothe  it  in  quality.  Try  to  think  phaenomenon 
or  quality  per  se,  and  you  at  once  refer  it  to  a  substance 
beyond  and  incognisal)le.  Hence  the  law  of  Substance 
and  Accident  or  Phcienomenon.^ 

The  necessity  of  the  Causal  Judgment  arises  from  a 
similar  impotency.  We  think  what  we  think  as  exist- 
ing, as  existing  in  time, — therefore  as  relative  in  time. 
The  object  or  event  appears  to  begin  to  be,  but  we  can- 
not think  it  absolutely  beginning  in  time.  In  other 
words,  the  quantum  of  existence  which  it  has  or  mani- 
fests is  not  an  addition  to  the  quantum  of  existence 
already  in  the  universe.  This  we  cannot  represent  to 
ourselves,  either  as  increased  without  abstraction  from 

1  See  especially  ReicTs  Works,  pp.  934,  935. 


aaai 


Theory  of  Cause. 


259 


other  entities,  or  as  diminished  without  annexation  to 
them.  "VYe  are  compelled  to  believe  that  the  object — • 
that  is,  the  certain  quale  and  quantum  of  being,  whose 
phaenomenal  rise  into  existence  we  have  witnessed — did 
really  exist,  prior  to  this  rise,  under  other  forms.  By 
form  must  be  understood  any  mode  of  existence  conceiv- 
able by  us  or  not.  But  to  say  that  a  thing  previously 
existed  under  different  forms,  is  to  say  that  a  thing  had 
causes.^  The  universal  necessity,  accordingly,  of  which 
we  are  conscious,  to  think  causes  for  every  event  arises 
from  our  inability  to  realise  in  thought  an  al^solute  com- 
mencement of  being. 

This  theory  of  the  origin  of  substance  and  cause  opens 
up  a  wide  field  of  discussion,  upon  which  I  cannot  now 
enter.  It  seems  to  me  to  be  the  least  satisfactory  por- 
tion of  the  philosophy  of  Hamilton.  The  tendency  of 
the  theory  is  to  weaken  the  force  of  those  laws,  and  thus 
of  the  bonds  which  knit  together  our  finite  experience. 
It  may  be  (questioned  whether  the  impotency  on  our  part 
to  conceive  an  absolute  commencement  of  being  guar- 
antees the  necessity  of  the  law  of  causality  as  an  objec- 
tive principle,  or  as  more  than  a  mere  subjective  neces- 
sity on  our  part.  Causality  would  thus  cease  to  be  a 
necessary  law  of  things.  There  would  always  be  the 
possibility  of  an  absolute  or  uncaused  commencement 
as  a  fact. 

Further,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  the  converti- 
bility of  the  quantum  of  existence  in  a  given  or  phe- 
nomenal form  with  that  quantum  previously  existing, 
whether  known  or  not,  is  identical  with  the  concept 
of  causality.  "  To  say  that  a  thing  previously  existed 
1  See  Discussions,  pp.  620,  621. 


iJ60 


Hamilton. 


under  different  forms,  is  to  say  that  a  thing  had  causea" 
may  be  true ;  but  it  does  not  quite  say  that  the  thing 
WC18  cattsed.  Tliere  is  here  the  condition  of  the  new 
event  or  pliasnomenon, — hardly  its  cause.  We  still  re- 
quire the  ground  or  determining  element  in  each  actual 
change.  We  still  require  to  ask  why  was  there  a  change 
at  all  from  the  one  form  or  quantum  to  the  other ;  even 
why  it  was  this  change  and  not  another.  Even  suppos- 
ing that  we  could  not  conceive  the  existent  arisuig  from 
the  non-existent,  while  we  perceive  the  existent  arising ; 
tliis  would  not  give  the  explanation  of  the  movement  or 
transmutation  in  the  previously  existent — that  is,  the 
dynamic  force  implied  in  change. 

We  ought,  however,  hero  to  keep  in  mind  that  this  is 
a  theory  of  the  origin  of  those  i>rinciples  merely,  prob- 
ably an  unsatisfactory  one.  It  would  l)e  a  mistake  to 
suppose  that  if  this  theory  were  shown  to  be  untenable, 
the  doctrine  of  the  nature  of  our  knowledge  as  more 
than  relative  would  fall  with  it.  On  the  contrary,  all  of 
importance  in  the  philosophy  of  Hamilton  would  still  be 
conserved. 


261 


CHAPTEE    Xll. 


INFERENTIAL   PSYCHOLOGY   OR    ONTOLOGY. 


What,  it  may  be  asked,  was  the  aim  of  Hamilton  in 
his  theory  of  the  Conditioned,  as  bearing  on  a  philo- 
sophical and  rational  theology  ] 

The  aim,  main  and  direct,  of  his  criticism  of  the  ab- 
solute theories  is  to  show,  in  the  first  place,  that  our 
intelligence,  call  it  Intuition  or  Eeason,  cannot  of  itself, 
or  apart  from  experience,  give  us  a  knowledge  either  of 
tlie  existence  or  of  the  attributes  of  Deity.  If  it  can, 
he  virtually  reasons,  the  Deity  must  appear  either  in  the 
form  of  the  unity  of  the  absolute  and  infinite,  or  he 
must  appear  in  the  form  of  the  absolute  (the  wholly 
limited,  or  wholly  self-limited),  or  in  that  of  the  infinite, 
the  endlessly  unlimited.  But  the  former  so-called  con- 
cept, the  unconditioned  proper,  is  a  purely  contradictory 
concept,  and  can  typify  nothing  real.  And  while  each 
of  the  latter  concepts  as  simply  irrelative  is  not  in  itself 
contradictory,  and  its  object,  therefore,  not  necessarily 
non-existent,  it  is  yet  impossible  for  mere  reason  or  pure 
thought,  to  say  that  Deity  is  the  absolute,  or  the  infinite, 
— is  to  be  referred  to  either  category.  All  that  it  can  say 
is  that,  hypothetically,  if  he  is,  he  must  be  either  the  one 


262 


Hamilton. 


or  the  other,  but  cannot  be  both.  Hamilton  strongly 
insists  that  the  correlation  of  absolute  with  relative, 
of  infinite  with  finite,  proves  nothing  as  to  the  reality 
of  the  absolute  or  infinite.  As  a  correlative,  neither  is 
necessarily  more  than  a  mere  negation  of  relative  or 
finite.  This  con-elation,  then,  while  essential  in  Eeason, 
is  no  proof  of  the  reality  or  existence  of  the  object, 
whether  absolute  or  infinite.  The  correlation  is  satisfied 
by  pure  or  ideal  negation.  And  this  is  all  the  length 
reason  can  by  itself  go.  Consequently,  if  we  are  to 
identify  Deity  either  with  the  absolute  or  the  infinite, 
this  must  be  done  on  grounds  other  than  those  of  pure 
reason  or  pure  thought.  And  what  are  these  possible 
grounds'?  Hamilton  would  allege  one,  if  not  two,  but 
one  first  and  principally.  And  this  is  Experience ;  the 
experience,  first,  which  we  liave  of  the  insufficiency  of 
tlie  conditioned,  or  of  conditioned  being  as  the  whole  of 
the  possible  in  reality.  In  thinking  the  relative,  we 
cannot  think  it  by  itself,  we  are  driven  from  it  and 
beyond  it.  In  thhiking  the  finite,  we  have  a  similar 
experience.  We  are  thus  naturally  insi)ired  with  a  kind 
of  suggestion  and  belief  in  being,  transcending  what  Ave 
actually  experience. 

He  would  add  to  this  that  there  are  various  modes  of 
thought  in  our  actual  experience  which  lead  us  outwards 
and  upwards  to  this  transcendent  reality,  to  a  natural 
faith  in  what  we  cannot  by  reason  grasp.  These  in  par- 
ticidar  are  the  concepts  of  Substance,  Cause,  Moral 
Law. 

There  is,  further,  as  Hamilton  would  admit,  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  fact  of  a  supernatural  revelation  or  know- 
ledge of  Deity.  This  may  be  supposed  to  be  indepen- 
dent alike  of  Eeason  and  ordinary  Experience.     Hamil- 


JTamilton^s  Beal  Aim, 


263 


ton  very  distinctly  allows  that  this  revelation  supple- 
ments our   ordinary  knowledge  of   Deity;   though   he 
certainly  would  not  admit  anything  to  be  properly  a 
revelation  which  could  be  shown  to  contradict  any  fun- 
damental law  of  our  consciousness,  whether  specidative 
or  moral.    To  represent  him,  however,  as  has  been  done, 
as  having  for  "  his  avowed  aim,  by  demonstrating  the 
actual  and  essential  weakness  of  human  intelligence,  to 
lend  new  and  exclusive  authority  to  a  supernatural  reve- 
lation, and  to  supersede  reason  by  faitli,  as  the  sole 
organ    of    religious    knowledge," — is    utterly    Avithout 
ground.     There  is  nothing  in  the  scope  of  his  reasoning, 
nothing  in  his  positive  statement,  to  countenance  such  a 
representation  of  his  philosophy.      Hamilton's  primary 
aim  was  that  of  vindicating  the  rights  of  our  normal 
intelligence   against   illegitimate   pretensions   to  know- 
ledge, which  could  end  only  in  scepticism.     To  conceive 
the  "  faith  "   of  which  Hamilton  constantly  speaks  as 
faitli  in  supernatural  revelation  is  a  mistake.     He  means 
what  indeed  he  says  he  means,  philosophic  faith — faith 
in  reality,  Avhich  transcends  positive  or  relative  know- 
ledge,  and  Avhich  is  necessitated   in  his  view  by  the 
very  limitation  of  positive  knowledge  itself.      He  cer- 
tainly discountenances  Reason  or  Pure  Thought  as  an 
organon  of   theology.     He   properly  regards  it   as  the 
organon  of  a  self-contradictory  verbalism,  and  of  empty 
concepts.       He    held    experience,    especially   of    mind, 
to  be  a  ground  for  deciding  alternatives  in  theology, 
for  setting  the  balance  one  way  or  other  in  favour  of 
opposite  positions  not  otherwise  determinable.     But  he 
neither  sought  for  any  purpose  to  weaken  our  intelli- 
gence, nor  to  exalt  exclusively  a  supernatural  revelation. 
And  Avith  regard  to  the  applications  to  theology  of  his 


264 


Hamilton. 


principles  sulxsequently  made,  Hamilton  is  not  to  he  held 
responsil)le  further  than  for  their  logical  consequences. 

To  enter  upon  the  grounds  on  which  Hamilton  con- 
ceived that  we  could  f(jund  inferences  in  regard  to  tran- 
scendent being,  or  being  beyond  intuition  and  concept 
proper,  Avould  be  to  discuss  the  last  and  highest  depart- 
ment of  his  philosoi)hy— viz.,  Inferential  Psychology  or 
Ontology.     This,   however,   my  limits  forbid.     In  the 
foregoing  pages  I  have  necessarily,  to  some  extent,  anti- 
cipated certain  points  in  this  department,  especially  the 
principles  of  the  inferences.     On  this,  which  might  be 
called  the  constructive  side  of  the  philosophy  of  Hamil- 
ton, he  cannot  be  said  fully  to  have  explained  his  views. 
lUit  the  main  principle  of  it  may  be  stated  as  that  of 
-Analogy,  or  Inference  through  Analogy.     On  the  ground 
of  what  we  find  in  experience  and  actual  consciousness 
only,  can  we  rise  to  convictions  regarding  the  nature  of 
mind,  of  the  world,  and  of  God. 

In  regard  to  the  two  first  objects— mind  and   the 
world— while  he  liolds  the  substance  of  each  incognis- 
able  per  sr,  he  virtually  holds  it  to  be  relatively  kno%\^able 
through  the  specific  qualities  or  manifestations.    On  this 
point,  however,  he  ought  to  have  been  more  explicit,  and 
to  have  said  that  we  know  the  two  finite  substances  mind 
and  matter  to  be,  and  to  be  of  different  natures  appropriate 
to  their  manifestations.    These  are  to  be  accepted  as  true 
revelations  of  the  subsisting  nature  of  each,— whatever 
mystery  or  incognisability  may  attach  to  an  attempt  to 
penetrate  further.     Hamilton  has  numerous  statements 
which  bear  out  this  view.     Indeed,  in  regard  to  mind, 
there  is  a  step  further  to  be  taken;   for  it  is  knoAvn 
primarily  as  Ego  or  Self  in  its  unity  amid  successive 
states. 


Mato^l  Substance. 


2G5 


In  regard  to  what  may  l)e  called  material  substance — 
that  of  the  Kot-self  in  sensible  exjjerience — his  philo- 
sophy affords  a  true  light,  if  only  it  be  carried  a  step 
further  than  he  left  it.  AVhile  w^e  need  not  hold  the 
sensible  quality  to  be  as  we  perceive  it,  out  of  and  above 
perception,  we  may,  nay,  must  still  hold  the  quantum 
of  being  as  a  Xon-ego,  which  it  represents  to  continue 
in  being.  We  cannot  conceive  this  either  increased  or 
diminished;  we  can  conceive  only  change,  transmuta- 
tion. Therein  thus  we  have  the  permanent,  the  sub- 
stantial of  the  Kon-ego.  It  is  the  permanence  of  the 
quantum  of  existence  in  the  sensible  universe.  This  is 
what  perishes  not,  only  changes.  This  is  all  that  Real- 
ism need  ask.  It  does  not  require  permanency,  above 
perception,  in  the  definite  olgect  of  perception ;  the  per- 
manent quantum  in  the  matter  is  alone  sufficient,  sub- 
sisting in  potency,  and  capable  of  coming  into  correlation 
with  our  organism  and  the  fixed  laws  of  our  mental 
powers.  This  is  precisely  what  Hamilton  has  expressed 
in  his  doctrine  of  the  ultimate  incompressibility  of  mat- 
ter in  space. 

In  respect  to  the  existence  and  character  of  God,  the 
same  principle  holds  good.  These  points  are  to  be 
reached  by  Analogy  from  our  experience.  A  noumenal 
entity  called  God  in  absolute  abstraction  from  all  rela- 
tions is  not  the  God  we  seek  to  infer  or  reach.  It  is,  so 
to  speak,  not  a  being  unconditioned,  but  a  being  incon- 
ditionate  for  which  we  inquire.  He  is  the  absolute 
])eing  in  free  relation  to  the  world  and  to  mind.  He 
is  related  on  the  side  of  time  and  space  to  the  things 
therein,  yet  not  as  a  link  in  the  series,  but  as  the  ground 
of  the  whole ;  on  the  side  of  mind  He  is  related  to  the 
Ego  and  the  contents  of  consciousness, — to  intelligence, 


266 


Ham  ilton. 


personality,  freedom,  morality,  as  their  ultimate  ground 
and  possibility.  These  reveal  his  truest  nature  for  us 
as  the  unconditioned  cause.  Even  of  this  God,  thus 
defined,  we  have  no  intuition  and  no  proper  comprehen- 
sion; but  we  have  grounds  fur  believing  Him  to  be, 
and  we  know  certain  relations  to  the  world  and  to  con- 
sciousness through  which  He  reveals  Himself.  These 
relations  do  not  disclose  Him  in  the  fulness  of  His  bemg  : 
as  relations  they  are  restrictive,  and  they  are  not  possibly 
even  all  the  relations  in  which  He  might  be  manifested. 
They  give  us  an  imperfect,  partial,  representative  know- 
ledge of  God,  but  one  which  is  true  and  sure,  and  while 
capable  of  increase  and  sublimation,  is  incapable  of  being 
contradicted  in  the  course  of  time  and  development. 

The  main  point  of  the  question  is — Does  a  state  of 
things  exist  in  our  experience  such  as  is  oidy  possible 
through  the  agency  of  a  Divine  cause  or  Deity  1  Lut 
what  is  the  notion  of  a  Deity  ] 

It  is  not  merely  that  of  a  first  cause,  or  even  an 
omnipotent  first  cause,  but  intelligence  and  virtue  in  a 
primary  and  omnipotent  cause.  To  establish  the  i*eality 
of  such  a  Deity,  we  must  show  that  intelligence  stands 
first  in  the  absolute  order  of  existence,  and  that  the  uni- 
verse is  governed  by  moral  laws.  But  the  analysis  of 
our  experience  gives  us  mind ;  intelligence  as  a  free 
power,  independent  of  matter  and  necessity,  and  thus  a 
spiritual  and  immaterial  subject.  In  this  we  have  the 
condition  of  the  proof  of  God.  For  Analogy  entitles 
us  to  infer  that  intelligence  holds  the  same  relative 
supremacy  in  the  universe  which  it  liolds  in  us.  There 
is  the  priority  of  free  creative  intelligence.  The  law  of 
the  ]Microcosm  applies  to  the  ^Macrocosm. 

Again,  as  moral  agents  and  the  free  subjects  of  a 


Doctrine  of  Analogy. 


267 


moral  order,  we  are  connected  with  a  supreme  intelli- 
gence by  whom  that  order  is  established,  sustained,  and 
regulated.  It  is  thus  supposed  that  the  moral  order  of 
our  experience  is  necessarily  connected  with  a  tran- 
scendental power  and  order. 

The  position  as  put  by  Hamilton  needs  considerable 
supplement,  especially  in  the  Imks  of  inference.  AVe 
may  indeed  conceive  an  ideal  intelligence  first  in  thmgs, 
and  causative,  as  our  own  is,  in  strict  analogy  with  our 
experience.  We  may  also  conceive  an  ideal  sphere  of  an 
Intelligence  free  and  moral,  in  accordance  with  the  re- 
quisites of  our  own.  But  do  tliese  actually  exist  1  Are 
they  more  than  ideal  conceptions]  The  knowledge  of 
them  is  only  possible  through  analogy.  If  there  be 
nothing  but  brute  matter  in  our  experience,  and  no  free- 
dom, only  mechanical  necessity,  clearly  we  cannot  even 
think,  far  less  infer,  intelligence  and  morality  in  a  tran- 
scendent sphere.  But  while  there  is  thus  a  knowledge, 
even  a  presumption  through  analog}^,  the  mode  of  infer- 
ence requires  to  be  more  ex})licitly  shown  and  stated, — 
either  in  the  way  of  a  proof  through  causality,  or  as  a 
supplement  to  the  imperfection  of  our  experience,  or  as 
the  necessity  of  continuous  realisation  and  development 
of  our  moral  nature.  This,  however,  is  clear,  that  Ham- 
ilton is  an  agnostic  only  in  the  sense  of  denying  and 
exploding  a  ridiculous  absolutism :  and  though,  in  the 
process  of  inference,  Hamilton  leaves  several  links  un- 
supplied,  there  is  yet  no  other  opening  into  the  super- 
sensible, unless  through  Analogy.  If  we  find  not  the 
image  of  God  in  our  own  consciousness,  we  shall  rise 
neither  to  the  belief  nor  to  the  knowledge  that  there 
is  a  God,  and  a  God  for  us. 

I  have  not  attempted  to  discuss  the  Logic  of  Hamil- 


268 


Hamilton. 


ton  in  this  volume.  There  was  not  space  to  do  it 
justice.  I  can  hut  indicate  the  fact  tliat  until  the  time 
of  Hamilton  logical  study  and  learning  was  at  a  very- 
low  ebh  in  the  Universities  both  of  Scotland  and  En^^- 
land.  Whately's  Elements  (1826)  was  an  improvement 
on  Aldrich,  hut  it  was  Hamilton  who  fresliened  the  faded 
dialectic  of  Oxford.  AVe  liave  to  look  to  the  writings 
on  Logic  of  Archbishop  Thomson,  Dean  ISfansel,  and  the 
late  Professor  Spalding  of  St  Andrews,  to  appreciate  the 
new  line  of  precision  and  scientific  treatment  of  the  sub- 
ject which  was  due  to  Hamilton's  discussion  of  Whately's 
treatise  in  the  Edinhurffh  Review  in  1833,  and  to  his 
subsequent  logical  expositions,  fragmentary  as  these  were. 
Hamilton,  in  fact,  has  revolutionised  the  treatment  of 
the  science  of  Logic  in  Britain. 

The  points  requiring  notice  under  the  Logic  are  his 
view  of  the  science  as  one  of  formal  relations, — his  view 
of  the  Laws  of  Thought, — of  Concepts,  embracing  the 
doctrine  of  Comprcliension  and  Extension,  carried  out  to 
Judgments  an<l  lleasonings,— his  theory  of  Logical  Judg- 
ment, including  tlie  Quantification  of  the  Predicate,  with 
its  application  to  Syllogism,— his  Unfigured  Syllogism, 
and  his  new  canons.  This  wide  subject  must  meanwhile 
be  left  untouched. 


BXD   OF  HAMILTON. 


PUNTED  BT  WILUAM  BLACKWOOD  AND  SONS. 


MESSRS  WM.   BLACKWOOD  &   SONS' 


NEW    PUBLICATIONS. 


This  Day  is  Published. 

A  TOUR  IN  GREECE,  1880.  By  Richard  Ridley 
FARRER.  Witli  Tweuty-seven  Full-page  Illustratious,  by 
LORD  WINDSOR.     Royal  8vo,  with  a  Map,  21s. 


HARRY    ERSKINE. 

THE  HONOURABLE  HENRY  ERSKINE.  Lord  Ad- 
vocate FOR  Scotland.  With  notices  op  certain  of  his 
Kinsfolk  and  of  his  Time.  Compiled  from  Family  Papers, 
and  other  sources  of  Information.  By  Lieut. -Colonel  ALEX. 
FERGUSSON,  Late  of  the  Staff  of  Her  Majesty's  Indian  Army. 
Large  8vo.     With  Portraits  and  other  Illustrations.     31s.  6d. 

"  A  very  charming  medley  of  grave,  gay,  and  gossiping  literature  which 
gives  most  lively  pictures  of  the  manners  of  the  time,  and  graphic  sketches 
of  contemporary  Scotch  history.  It  is  written  in  a  light  and  agreeable 
style ;  the  incidents  and  episodes  are  grouped  artistically." — The  Times. 

•'  Choke  full  of  those  little  glimpses  into  the  life  and  conversations  of  past 
ages,  which  constitute  the  charm  of  all  good  books  of  this  kind." — Pall  Mall 
Gazette. 


MEMOIR  OF  THE  HONOURABLE 

GEORGE  KEITH  ELPHINSTONE,  K.B.,  Viscount 
KEITH.  Admiral  of  the  Red.  By  ALEXANDER  ALLAR- 
DYCE.  Author  of  '  The  City  of  Sunshine,'  &c.  8vo,  with  Por- 
trait, Illustrations,  and  Maps,  21s. 

••  As  a  careful  study  of  a  life  history  which  interweaved  itself  with  many 
of  the  gravest  historical  events,  the  present  volume  may  be  warmly  com- 
mended " — Observer. 

"  The  whole  of  the  book  is  interesting  as  a  record  of  the  stirring  life  of  a 
typical  British  sailor." — Allan's  Indian  Mail. 

"  A  valuable  contribution  to  our  stock  of  naval  biography."-  Academy. 


/ 


v^ 


2  ' 


William  Blackwood  cj-  Sons* 


TUNIS,  PAST  AND  PRESENT.  ^Vith  a  Narrative 
OF  THE  Frexch  CONQUEST  OF  TUB  Regexcy.  By  A.  M.  BROAD- 
Jir^  ,'  ^o'^respondent  of  the  '  Times '  during  the  War  in  Tunis. 
With  numerous  Illustrations  and  Maps.     2  vols,  post  8vo,  25s. 

"The  volumes  afford  a  complete  key  to  the  political  history  of  Tunis 
d??ll'^^^  *^'^P^-,-  •  •  u:*''"  B''«''^'i»«y'3  instructive  volumes,  which,  entertainl 
Ifn^i^Jil  v^^'!''?)  P^^^l^JLv^'-e  indispensable  to  the  students  of  England's 
policy  m  North  Africa.  The  author  writes  tersely  and  to  the  point  His 
facts  are  placed  pleasantly  before  the  reader;  and  valuable  as  the  book  is 
to  politicians  as  a  work  of  reference  in  the  library,  it  will  be  equally  appreci- 
ated  by  millions  of  our  fellow-countrymen."— /)«%  Telegraph. 

"It  is  as  full  of  entertainment  as  information;  and  especially  remarkable 
lor  Its  histoncal  research  in  comparatively  unfamiliar  directions."— r//n«. 

a1!3}^  account  of  the  gradual  steps  by  which  France  acquired  a  prepon- 

»nSnt  f.ii'^"'r'.  *S^""'1',  J''''^^^^'^^  ^  '''^^^  «»^  compelled  the  Bey  to 
accept  her  protectorate,  will  be  read  with  something  of  the  interest  which 
surounds  a  sensational  romance."-iVo<<?«  and  Queries.  ^'^^^i*'"  ^nicn 

A  CRITICAL  INQUIRY  INTO  THE  SCOTTISH  LAN- 
GUAGE. With  the  view  of  Illustrati.vg  the  Risk  and 
i?T??i?^f  OF  Civilisation  in  Scotland.  By  FRANCISQUE- 
Mlt^HtiL,  Kb. A.  Lond.  and  Scot.,  Correspondant  de  I'lnstitut 
de  France,  &c.  In  One  handsome  Quarto  Volume,  printed  on 
liand-made  paper,  and  appropriately  bound  in  Roxhur^he  style. 
FricebSs.  1  he  Edition  is  stnctly  limited  to  500  copies,  which 
will  be  numbered  and  allotted  in  the  order  of  application,  i 

i,J,'^!T^**l''t.°°'^'-*'"'*l*.®."^^'^'^*«*'^  philologist  and  archi«ologist  would 
ha\e  taken  the  pains  which  have  borne  their  fruits  in  this  very  unique 
work..  .  ..We  have  seldom  oi)ened  a  book  of  the  kind  in  which  we  found 
such  interesting  or  even  seductive  reading  The  stvle  is  light  and  lively, 
the  facts  are  fresh,  original,  and  piquant ;  and,  in  short,  in  striking  into  by- 
paths  of  archaB.>logical  history,  while  collecting  curiosities  and  eccelitricities 
of  philology,  M.  Michel  has  imparted  to  his  chapters  much  of  the  animation 
of  medieval  romance."— r^e  rimes. 


This  Day  is  Published.     The  Fourth  Edition. 

THE   REVOLT  OF  MAN.    By  Walter  Besant.    New 
and  Cheaper  Edition.    Crown  8vo,  3s.  6d. 

"'The  Revolt  of  Man'  is  decidedly  clever. It  is  a  happy  idea  well 

Sd  "-SJLn^m*''  amongst  the  best  literary  confections  of  its 

"  '^'J®  fom^nce  contains  a  love  story,  carried  on  under  conditions  of  fresh- 
ness that  will  inspire  envy  in  the  heart  of  many  a  novelist.  "—(?/o6e. 

"The  author  of  the  satirical  romance  before  us  has  achieved  a  verv  re- 
-  w^I  i±^^''''''^r  *  • I^e  book,  as  a  whole,  ought  to  be  read  by  everybody 

'*  A  vivacious  satire,  sustained  and  wrought  out  with  exceptional  ingenu- 
ity and  point.  —^coto?nan.  * 


Keio  Publications. 


ROUGH  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  MILITARY  SERVICE 
AND  SOCIETY.  By  Lieut.-Colonel  BALCARRES  D. 
WARDLAW  RAMSAY.     Two  Volumes,  post  8vo,  21s. 

"The  volumes  are  charged  with  anecdotes,  some  of  them  truly  delicious. 
.These  amusing  volumes  are,  as  we  have  said,  replete  with  authentic 


and  excellent  anecdotes  of  persons  great  and  small."— 5a/«r(foi/  Jievietc. 

"The  br.ice  of  laughable  stories  which  we  8hall  now  quote  will  recall 
Charles  Lever's  merriest  vein We  can  quote  no  more  samples  of  Col- 
onel Ramsay's  strictly  personal  recollections,  but  must  remark  that  they  are 
all  so  uniformly  good,  that  our  selections  can  lay  no  claim  to  be  in  any 
sense  the  pick  of  his  well-stocked  basket." — Spectator. 

TRASEADEN  HALL.  "When  George  the  Third 
WAS  Kino."  By  Major-General  W.  G.  HAMLEY,  Author 
of  'Guilty  or  Not  Guilty?'  *The  House  of  Lys."  Second  Edi- 
tion.    In  One  Volume,  crown  8vo,  6s. 

"  An  admirable  novel.    There  is  spirit  in  the  style,  and  culture  in  the 

matter  ;  the  themes  are  as  fre*h  as  the  thoughts  are  brifiht We  may 

repeat  that  we  have  rarely  met  with  a  book  by  a  veteran  writer  so  full  of 
freshness  and  unflagging  animation." — Satiirday  Review. 

"  'Traseaden  Hall'  is  in  all  respects  an  admirable  novel— it  is  animated 
and  humorous,  soldierly  and  scholarly." — The  Times. 


BY  FELL  AND  FJORD  :  Or, 
Iceland.     By  E.  J.  OSWALD. 

78.  6d. 


Scenes  and  Studies  in 
Post  8vo,  with  Illustrations, 


"  She  gives  many  pictures  and  stories  of  social  life  in  Iceland,  and  her 
chapters  are  a  series  of  sketches  arranged  with  much  skill  and  unusual 
knowledge;  her  style  is  remarkably  quiet  and  easy,  and  bright  with  an  un- 
dercurrent of  humour.  Her  book  ought  to  prove  welcome  to  the  more 
thoughtful  class  of  tourists." — The  Times. 

"  She  studied  the  sagas  of  Iceland  in  their  own  home,  as  it  were ;  and  that 
is  the  special  characteristic  of  her  most  agreeable  and  entertaining  book." — 
St  James's  Gazette. 


OF    BAR  NOW. 
Translated  by   M. 


Stories  hv  Karl  Emil 
W.    MACDOWALL.     Crowu 


THE  JEWS 
FRANZOS. 
8vo,  6s. 

"These  stories  deserve  great  praise.  They  are  told  in  a  simple  straight- 
forward style,  which  rises  at  times,  when  the  situation  requires  it,  to  a  very 

high  level They  possess,  moreover,  the  great  charm  of  novelty It 

is  well  worthy  of  notice  that  the  book  has  been  exceptionally  well  trans- 
lated."—Sattirday  Review. 

"  We  need  hardly  add,  then,  that  its  widely-spread  popularity  is  desen-ed. 
Karl  Emil  Franzos  has  the  dramatic  instincts  which  can  imagine  striking 
scenes,  placing  them  in  the  most  artistic  lights,  and  which  seize  on  the 
salient  points  of  remarkable  or  eccentric  characters,  without  neglecting  the 
homely  realism  which  forms  the  background  of  these  spirited  sketches."— 
The  Times. 


4 


William  Blackwood  ^  Sons* 


This  Day  is  Pubushed. 

LAMBETH  PALACE  AND  ITS  ASSOCIATIONS.  Bv 
J.  CAVE-BROWNE,  M.A  ,  Vicar  of  Detling,  Kent;  and  for 
many  years  Curate  of  Lamheth  Parish  Churcli.  With  an  In- 
troduction by  the  ^rrfjbisljap  of  Cantrrburp.  8vo,  with 
Illuminated  Frontispiece  and  other  Illustrations.  "  Price  21s. 
Also  50  Copies  in  4to,  printed  on  hand-made  paper.    Price  31s.  6d. 

TRAITS  AND  TRAVESTIES  ;  Social  and  Political. 
By  LAURENCE  OLIPHANT,  Author  of  'Piccadilly,'  'The 
Land  of  Khenii,'  '  The  Land  of  Gilead,'  &c.     Post  8vo,  lOs.  6d. 

"Mr  Oliphant  writes  as  a  man  of  the  world  and  a  wit,  and  he  adds  to  those 
qnahtjes  a  certain  gentle  spirit,  which  takes  from  satire  its  stin-'  and  from 
ridicule  its  cruelty.  There  is  a  subtle  and  delicate  ironv  permeatiuK  this 
vo  ume  which  i%  as  amusing  as  it  is  refreshing.  A  more  thoroughly  eniov- 
able  book  has  not  appeared  in  many  a  long  Adiy."— Morning  Post, 

"A  most  charming  book,  exquisitely  written,  and  full  of  fancy  and  philo- 
sophy. —  Vanity  Fair.  * 

"  He  has  the  gift,  not  common  in  this  country,  of  the  esprit  GnuMs ;  he 
aims  his  strokes  at  follies  and  abuses  without  any  semblance  of  effort  His 
wit  IS  at  once  keen  and  light-hearted Not  only,  however,  are  Mr  Oli- 
phant 8  stones  new  and  delightful,  but  the  turn  of  thought  which  they 
suggest,  and  which  he  follows  up  without  in  the  least  riding  it  to  death,  is 
stwcially  unexpected  and  humorous."— Safttrrfai/  Review. 

In  crown  Svo,  price  5s. 

THE  FAITHS  OF  THE  WORLD.    A  Concise  History 
OP  THE  Great  Religious  Ststkms  of  the  World,    By  Prin- 
?^t^  S^^^H\  P««^E8S0Rs  FLINT,  MILLIGAN,  and  TAY- 
LOR;   Drs   JAMES   MACGREGOR,    J.    CAMERON   LEES 
and  Others.  ' 

'.l^'^fu^"?"^*'"."'!®  "^^  ^""'^  ^f  "<*  "i<""e  Instructive  work  than  the  one 
under  the  above  title  to  which  we  have  the  pleasure  of  calling  the  attention 
of  our  rea<lers-a  pleasure  which  is  increased  by  the  assurance  that  the 
book  will  not  have  the  effect  of  unsettling  the  minds  of  those  who  have  an 
jntelligent  trust  in  Christianity  but  may  contribute  to  the  restoration  of 

faith  m  the  minds  of  many  who  have  begun  to  doubt We  are  enabled 

to  follow  with  intense  interest  the  gropings  of  the  greater  and  better  minds 
of  heathen  antiquity  in  the  darkness  which  enveloped  them  with  more  or 
less  of  success  towards  the  light."-i;f,^j^/3/«gaci„i      "'*^™  *'^"  ^ore  or 

This  day  is  Published. 
SYNOPSIS    OF    THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE 

inl^t\^^^^^^l^'  T^^^  ^P^Y  ALLEYNE  NICHOL- 
SON. M.D.,  DSc  Ph.D..  &c.  &c.,  Regius  Professor  of  Natu- 
ral History  in  the  University  of  Aberdeen  :  Author  of  '  A  Manual 
of  Zoology.  'A  Manual  of  Pal«ontology,'  &c.  With  106  Illus- 
trations, Svo,  68. 


New  Publicatioiid. 


New  and  Cheaper  Edition. 

A  LADY'S  CRUISE  IN  A  FRENCH  MAN-OF-WAR. 
By  C  F  GORDON  GUMMING,  Author  of  '  At  Home  in  Fiji,' 
«c.     I'ost  Svo,  with  Map  and  numerous  Illustrations,  12s.  6d, 

tionJof'loriLTe'*  *°*^  liveliness,  interspersed  with  fascinating  descrip- 
tions of  gorgeous  scenery."— .S2iccr<(  tor. 

"  Another  delightful  hook."— Athemcum. 

Fourth  Edition. 

AT  HOME   IN  FIJL    By  the  Same.    Complete  in  One 
Volume,  post  Svo,  with  Illustrations  and  a  Map,  7s.  6d. 
"Beautiful  and  enchanting."— Dai7y  Telegraph. 

♦  n^J^'^^^^J'  ^*!  ^*^"  ^^^^'^  praised,  tut  never  enough The  volume 

lempts  one  to  return  to  it  again  and  again."— I«n(7i/  Fair 

Joreicftt  Classics  for  lEnglisli  Eealiers, 

Edited  by  Mrs  OLIPHANT. 
In  ciown  Svo  Volumes,  cloth,  2s.  6d.  each. 


Now  Published. 
Dante.    By  the  Editor. 

Voltaire.    By  Major-General  Sir  E.  B.  Hamley,  K.C.M.G. 
Pascal.    By  Principal  Tulloch. 
Petrarch.    By  Henry  Reeve,  C.B. 
Goethe.    By  A.  Hay  ward,  Q.C. 
MoLlfeRE.     By  the  Editor  and  F.  Tarver,  M.A. 
Montaigne.    By  Rev.  W.  L.  Collins.  M.A. 
Rabelais.    By  Walter  Besant,  M.A. 
Calderon.     By  E.  J.  Hasell. 
8aint  Simon.     By  Clifton  W.  Collins,  M.A. 
Cervantes.    By  the  Editor. 
Corneille  and  Racine.    By  Henry  M.  Trollope. 
Madame  de  Si5vign£\    By  Miss  Thackeray. 
La  Fontaine,  and  other  French  Fabulists.    By  Rev. 

W.  Lucas  Collins,  M.A. 
Schiller.    By  James  Simc,  M.A.,  Author  of  '  Lessing : 

his  Life  and  Writings.' 
Tasso,     By  E.  J.  Hasell. 


6      William  Blackwood  tj*  Sons^  Neio  Pahlications. 


WORKS   ON    MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


LECTURES  ON  METAPHYSICS.  By  Sir  William 
HAMILTON,  Bail;.,  Professor  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  in  the 
University  of  Edinburgh.  Edited  by  tlie  Very  Rev.  H.  L.  Man- 
sell,  LL.D.,  Dean  of  St  Paul's,  and  John  Veitch,  M.A.,  Pro- 
fessor of  Logic  and  Rlietoric,  Glasgow.  Sixth  E<lition.  2  vols. 
8vo.    24s. 

LECTURES  ON  LOGIC.  Ly  Sir  William  Hamilton, 
Bart.     Edited  by  the  Same.    Tliirtl  Edition.    2  vols.  8vo.    24s. 

DISCUSSIONS  ON  PHILOSOPHY  AND  LITERATURE, 
EDUCATION  AND  UNIVERSITY  REFORM.  By  Sir  WIL- 
LIAM HAMILTON,  Bart.    Third  Edition.    8vo.    21s. 

PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS  OF  THE  LATE  JAMES 
FREDERICK  FERRIER,  B.A.  Oxon.,  LL  D.,  Professor  of 
Moral  Philosophy  and  Political  Economy  in  the  University  of 
St  Andrews.    New  Edition.    3  vols,  crown  Svo.    34s.  6d. 

The  foUowiog  are  sold  separately  :— 

INSTITUTES  OF  METAPHYSIC.    Third  Edition.    10s.  6d. 

LECTURES  ON  THE  EARLY  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY.  Second  Edi- 
tion.    lOs.  6d. 

PHILOSOPHICAL  REMAINS,  including  the  Lectures  on  Eahlv 
Greek  Phiu)80phv.  Edited  by  Sir  Alex.  Grant,  Bart.,  D.C.L., 
and  Professor  Lusbinoton.    2  vols.    248. 

PORT  ROYAL  LOGIC.  Translated  from  the  French  : 
with  Intro4luction,  Notes,  and  Appendix.  By  THOMAS  SPEN- 
CER BAYNES,  LL.D.,  Profe.ssor  of  Logic  and  English  Literatnre 
in  the  University  of  St  Andrews.    Eighth  Edition.     12nio.    4s. 

METHOD.  MEDITATIONS,  AND  PRINCIPLES  OF 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  DESCARTES.  Translated  from  the  origi- 
nal French  and  Latin.  With  a  New  Introductory  Essay,  His- 
torical and  Critical,  on  the  Cartesian  Philosophy.  By  JOHN 
VEITCH,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Logic  and  Rhetoric  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Glasgow.     Eighth  Edition.     12mo.    68.  6d. 

THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    HISTORY    IN    EUROPE. 

VoL  I.,  containing  the  History  of  that  Philo.sophy  in  Franck 
and  Germany.  By  ROBERT  FLINT,  D.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor 
of  Divinity  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh.    8vo.     15s. 


WILLIAM  BLACKWOOD  &  SONS,  Edinburgh  asd  London. 


ill 


/ 


\ 


This  book  is  due  two  weeks  from  the  last  date  stamped 
below,  and  if  not  returned  at  or  before  that  time  a  fine  of 
five  cents  a  day  will  be  incurred. 


& 


4 


\ 


I  "iiJp 


1    I 


M 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 


1010663304 


\3?.\-\\% 


to,  m-,:.:  r    * 


CD 

i-i  ^ 

X  O 

• 

CM  ^ 

cr  > 

«-l  CD 


< 

X 


~S>\\ 


>i|' 


V'   • 


MAi<  2 s  lu... 


^j  %« ^,' 


^ 


.^ 


.s:« 


-if. 


i-fii 


'r.:^.Af.i  :rir:i.i. 


>f^v:; 


